Fundamentalism in the United States and Egypt: A Comparative Analysis

1870-1980

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ABSTRACT

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Brandeis University
Waltham, Massachusetts

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Religious fundamentalism is a phenomenon that has affected many parts of the world. Its very presence baffles the minds of scholars of secularization. In the United States and Egypt, fundamentalism has infiltrated Protestant Christianity and Sunni Islam respectively. Using the work of numerous sociological and religious scholars, secondary historical texts as well as data, this thesis examines the origins of Christian and Islamic fundamentalism in the United States and Egypt, as well as their politicization. It will first look at the meanings of several concepts provided by several scholars, including fundamentalism, modernization and secularization. It will examine the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Egypt and the Christian fundamentalist movement in the United States during the early and late 20th century, and the social and political contexts under which they developed. The paper makes the argument that both fundamentalist movements, despite their differences, they have many similarities; most notably the variables of modernization, secularization, changing social, political and economic conditions, migration and urbanization.

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> *“The idea that religion and politics don't mix was invented by the Devil to keep Christians from running their own country. If [there is] any place in the world we need Christianity, it's in Washington. And that's why preachers long since need to get over that intimidation forced upon us by liberals, that if we mention anything about politics, we are degrading our ministry.”*

-The Rev. Jerry Falwell, Lynchburg, Virginia, 1976

> *“When, in a society, the sovereignty belongs to God alone, expressed in its obedience to the divine Law, only then is every person in that society free from servitude to others, and only then does he taste true freedom. This alone is 'human civilization', as the basis of a human civilization is the complete and true freedom of every person and the full dignity of every individual of the society. On the other hand, in a society in which some people are lords who legislate and some others are slaves who obey them, then there is no freedom in the real sense, nor dignity for each and every individual.”*

-Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones,* Page 65, 1964

Many people feel it would be an outrage to say that the two men quoted above had any similarities to one another. The Reverend Jerry Falwell was an American Christian preacher of an independent Baptist church who was born in Lynchburg, Virginia and graduated from a bible college in Missouri. He later became the founder of the Moral Majority, Inc., the movement that would try to give the government a more traditional Christian influence. In every sense, he embodied conservative Christianity and politics and was a defender of ‘American Christian values.’ In contrast, Sayyid Qutb, was born in the Egyptian village of Musha to a landowner and administrator of the family’s estate. He received a Western education in Cairo and the United States. Qutb would later become an outspoken opponent of the West and secularization and a proponent of

Islamism, the idea that the government and laws should be based on Islamic norms and Sharia law. He would become a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, the most important Islamist organization in Egypt and the Middle East.

When one looks a little closer at the work of these two individuals, one can see striking and important similarities. Both men grew up in a time when their society's traditions were thought to be under attack by secular governments and social movements. Both men endorsed the influence of religion on politics. While Falwell wanted to impact the government to a lesser extent than Qutb, who desired to overthrow the government and change the laws of Egypt to Islamic Sharia law, both men saw religion as dictating the norms and rules of society and both greatly wanted to apply the doctrines of their faiths to the law of the land. Both men were accused by some of being crazy radicals. On the other hand, they were also praised by many as being saviors who fought against forces that were 'damning' and 'corrupting' society. Both men were educated in institutions of higher learning and came from families of middle class standing. Perhaps most importantly, however, Qutb and Falwell were both products of movements that had started years before either of them was born. In the case of Qutb, this was Islamic fundamentalism, a movement energized by the work of Egyptian Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the early 20th century. In the case of Falwell, this was early Christian fundamentalism, which emerged in the first quarter of the 20th century in response to widespread social changes in the United States. Both men would become famous for politicizing these movements.

It is the origins of Christian and Islamic fundamentalism in the United States and Egypt, as well as their politicization that this paper addresses. In doing this, this paper aims to show the similarities and differences between these two movements. Like Falwell and Qutb, these movements appear to have many differences that can never be reconciled. Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt was, in part, a reaction to what was seen as the Westernization of the Egyptian government and the corrupting influences of modernization and British imperialism. It would evolve into a movement focused on changing 'secular' laws to Islamic Sharia-based laws. Christian fundamentalism in the United States emerged in reaction to the industrialization of the northern states and the pluralism that accompanied it. It was also a reaction against liberal Protestant theological challenges of the time that questioned the inerrancy of Biblical texts. Later, it fought against what was seen as societal decay. Unlike the Islamic fundamentalist movement, however, the Christian fundamentalists were more interested in influencing laws pertaining to social issues such as education and gay rights than in changing the entire legal and legislative system of their country.

At the same time, the movements share many important commonalities. First, the very definition of religious fundamentalism developed by multiple scholars can be applied to both movements. Second, while Christian fundamentalism was not a reaction against Westernization, the two movements share similarities in the sense that they gained popularity within the context of industrialization, modernization, secularization and the conditions that accompany those occurrences. Third, while the way in which they responded to these forces differed, the two fundamentalist movements challenged changing societal conditions in their respective countries and eventually evolved into

political movements that sought to change the way their governments and societies functioned. Fourth, both movements would rise and decline multiple times throughout the 20th century. Fifth, both efforts have been seen as backwards by many, but are in fact modern movements that employ modern methods, such as the use of technology and the mass media, to spread their messages. Finally, they continue to have lasting impacts on the social, political and economic spheres of the United States and Egypt. While this is more obvious in Egypt, especially since the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the Egyptian government in 2011, Christian fundamentalists have profoundly changed the nature of American political life. The very fact that abortion, gay marriage and other social issues have risen to the forefront of American politics suggests that Christian fundamentalism is still a force to be reckoned with.

This paper will be broken into four sections. The first section of this paper will discuss how religious fundamentalism has been defined and what lies at the heart of this concept. Before applying this term to Islam or Christianity in Egypt and the United States, there must be an understanding of what it is at its most basic elements. Over the years, the definition of religious fundamentalism has been debated by a number of scholars, who have focused on its origins, what it reacts against, and what makes this phenomenon unique. This section will examine some of the varying definitions of fundamentalism and will outline variables that are common to all religious fundamentalist movements, such as modernization and secularization. Furthermore, the section will argue that, while fundamentalism is often considered backwards by many, it is in fact a modern movement utilizing modern methods of engagement. This use of

modernity for their own benefit has been exemplified by the Christian and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Egypt and the United States.

In addition to examining the definitions and meanings of fundamentalism, the ideas of modernization and secularization will be discussed. A main theme of this paper is how modernization and secularization have galvanized and energized fundamentalist movements in the United States and Egypt. In both countries, secularization and fundamentalism are in a constant battle with one another. Just as there is a need for a clear definition of fundamentalism before applying it to these case studies, both modernization and secularization are ideas that have been discussed at great length by scholars and will be clarified for use by this research project.

The second section of this paper will address the rise of Christian fundamentalism in the United States, arguing that it emerged and gained strength multiple times as the result of the conditions of increased modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration, as well as changing social, political and economic conditions, More specifically, the section will examine the background in which fundamentalism in the United States emerged. As the United States rapidly industrialized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, people migrated both from within the country and from outside. Society became increasingly pluralistic as newcomers arrived from various countries with different religious practices, most notably Judaism, Russian Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism. At the same time, newly developing theological ideas, as well as Darwin's theory of evolution, began to challenge traditional Protestant understandings of the Bible. The early Christian fundamentalists saw many of these factors as threats to American and

Protestant traditions. With their emphasis on maintaining long-standing religious and American cultural traditions, the early Christian fundamentalists, who were a part of the Evangelical Christian sects, attracted many lower-class individuals who had migrated from the South and Midwest to northern cities such as New York and Chicago and felt lost within a diverse and pluralistic society and suffered under the conditions accompanying modernization. They also attracted rural Americans threatened by the secular and 'lax' nature of the growing cities. Gradually, fundamentalists became more politically active over their concern that American political life was moving away from 'Godly' traditions and careening towards 'damnation.' However, a watershed occurred in 1925, when the debate over the teaching of evolution in schools would divide this group of 'traditional' Americans into factions, greatly weakening the influence of the fundamentalist movement. Additionally, the fragmented nature of the movement's organizational structures further contributed to its decline.

After examining the early origins of Christian fundamentalism and its rise and fall in politics, the paper will look at its reemergence as a political and religious force in the 1970's. During these years, liberal social movements flourished and government intervention in issues such as equal rights and abortion increased. At the same time, the region that would become the 'Sunbelt', comprised of the southern half of the United States, emerged as a powerful and fiscally conservative industrial center. It attracted hundreds of thousands of affluent middle and upper class migrants from all over the country seeking success and limited government intervention in business policies. Many of these newcomers helped fundamentalist churches already existing in the region grow into wealthy mega-churches that employed modern methods such as televising church

services. Gradually, both the Sunbelt residents and Christian fundamentalist leaders such as Jerry Falwell became disturbed by the popularity of liberal social ideas and bristled at the intervention of the government in 'American traditions' they held dear. By the late 1970's, Christian fundamentalists began to politicize the conservative and fragmented religious right through the creation of organizations such as the Moral Majority, Inc., which rallied against issues such as gay rights and abortion, and attracted a large following in the Sunbelt. Their efforts would be instrumental in the election of social and fiscal conservative politicians, such as President Ronald Reagan, and would have a lasting impact into the 21st century.

The third section of this paper will look at Islamic fundamentalism, and more specifically, Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. As was the case with Christian fundamentalism, this section argues that the conditions of modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration, as well as other changing social, political and economic conditions, resulted in the emergence and strength of Islamic fundamentalism multiple times in the 20th century. Beginning with an overview of the history of Egypt in the 19th and early 20th centuries, this paper shows that Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt emerged and gained strength in response to the forces of modernization and secularization associated with Western imperialism. In the 19th century, modernizing efforts by various Egyptian rulers led to the colonization of the country by the British Empire. As a result of Westernized modernization and secularization, new groups of Egyptians were created, most notably a Western educated elite and a large lower class. At the same time, in reaction to the secular culture that Egyptian elites and British colonizers had created in the country, various Muslim scholars

began to push for reforming Islam and replacing the secular Egyptian government with one based on Islamic Sharia laws. In the 1920's, as more lower class and Western educated Egyptians became disenchanted with the British dominated government, Islamic fundamentalism grew more attractive. The Muslim Brotherhood, the first Islamic fundamentalist organization in the world, would emerge both as a champion of an Islamic government and society, as well as a provider of welfare and education to those Egyptians most disenfranchised by modernization. Ultimately, its popularity among the people and actions against the Egyptian government would lead to its repression in the 1950's and 1960's.

This section will also look at the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970's in Egypt and the historical context in which this happened. During the 1950's and the 1960's, the socialist policies of President Gamal Abd Nasser created a large college educated middle class to fill the many job vacancies in the public sector. The secular and capitalist policies of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, greatly reduced the public sector and left a large number of middle class Egyptians unemployed. They also limited job opportunities for college graduates. At the same time, however, in an effort to undermine his enemies, Sadat granted amnesty to Muslim Brotherhood members and allowed it to continue its philanthropic activities and become more politically involved. Additionally, he allowed for the creation of Islamic student organizations on university campuses. Sadat's actions would lead to the increased influence of Islamic fundamentalism all over Egypt, an influence that has continued to be strong to this day.

Finally, the fourth section of this paper will provide an analysis of the two case studies. It will essentially compare and contrast the nature of the fundamentalist movements in the United States and Egypt and the conditions under which they arose. Additionally, it will explain why the cases of the United States and Egypt are being written about in relation to one another.

Methodology and Sources

The paper is a comparative project addressing two case studies of religious fundamentalism and the forces that gave rise to them. As shown earlier, it begins with an examination of definitions and meanings of fundamentalism, modernization and secularization, and discusses how these ideas can be applied to two specific case studies of religious fundamentalism –the first in the United States, and the second in Egypt. When observing Christian fundamentalism in the United States, the period being covered is from 1880-1989. In the case of Egypt, the period being examined lasts from 1850 to the early 1980's. During these timeframes, industrialization and modernization spread, internal and external migration increased and societies and governments became increasingly secular. In order to understand religious fundamentalisms, these variables must be examined in order to clarify their influence on the rise of fundamentalism in the United States and Egypt.

It must be noted that while many Christian fundamentalist organizations politicized in the late 1970's and early 1980's, only one organization is focused on when looking at its politicization in the 1970's and early 1980's. This organization is Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, Inc. This is done in the interest of space but also because the

story of the Moral Majority truly embodies the resurgence and politicization of Christian fundamentalism in the 1970's. It does this more so than any other organization like it.

The sources used in this paper are notably secondary accounts of the 19th and 20th century history of fundamentalist movements in the United States and Egypt, but also include statistical data concerning social trends, membership in religious organizations, and internal and external migration movements over one hundred years. Works by various scholars on the meaning of fundamentalism are additionally accessed for this paper. In seeking to provide a broad understanding of fundamentalism to apply to various case studies, this paper mostly draws on the work of Martin Marty, Scott Appleby and Richard Antoun. Martin Marty and Scott Appleby were in charge of the *Fundamentalist Project,* a large collection of essays on different theories of religious fundamentalism and case studies of this phenomena found within the United States, the Middle East, and India. Their understandings of religious fundamentalism are some of the most respected in academia and are the most valuable for this paper. When defining modernization and secularization, the works of sociologists Jose Casanova, Mark Emerson and David Hartman are used. The works of Emerson and Hartman are very much based off of the theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim.

The two case studies examined in this paper draw upon a much larger pool of sources than the discussions of fundamentalism, modernization and secularization. The sources include not only books, but also articles in academic journals and statistical data. When looking at the early history of Christian fundamentalism in the United States, U.S. Census data information is observed as well as the writings of Dr. Nancy Ammerman, a

sociologist and religious scholar at Boston University. Additionally, the writings of George Marsden, a historian on Christian Evangelicalism and former professor at the University of Notre Dame, are looked at. The discussion of Christian fundamentalism in the second half of the 20th century uses the works and data of several religious scholars, sociologists, and political scientists. Some of these writings include *Sunbelt Rising* by Darren Dochuk and Michelle Nickerson, *The Rise and the Fall of the New Christian Right* by Steve Bruce and *Repositioning North American Migration History* by Marc Rodriguez.

The examination of the emergence and growing strength of Islamic fundamentalism in 20th century Egypt also draws upon a large variety of sources. Some of the writings used when looking at the first wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt include an account of the early years of the Muslim Brotherhood by historian Brynjar Lia and a historical overview of British colonial rule over Egypt by Robert Tignor. The later discussion of the second wave of Islamic fundamentalism Egypt includes general historical accounts of the second half of the 20th century in Egypt, such as *Cairo* by Andre Raymond, as well writings focused solely on actors in the Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and various Islamic student organizations.

Section One: Defining Religious Fundamentalism

Before discussing the cases of Christian fundamentalism in the United States and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt, the actual meaning of religious fundamentalism must be understood. In the past, various scholars have made an effort to define this term. It is a complicated concept and some authors have simply avoided defining it in a broader, more inclusive way, focusing instead on providing descriptions of individual fundamentalist movements. Despite the difficulties in defining the concept more inclusively, numerous scholars have been able to identify the basic elements found in most fundamentalist movements. Furthermore, in delineating what fundamentalism is, scholars take both functional and substantive approaches to the concept. While some works describe what fundamentalists basically do and why they do it, others focus on the ideological substance of fundamentalist movements, or what they believe.

The work of R. Scott Appleby and Martin Marty, who directed the acclaimed *Fundamentalism Project,* is central to this paper.[1] The project culminated in a series of essays discussing the meanings of fundamentalism, the social and political contexts in which movements have emerged and various theories surrounding specific cases and definitions. In the first volume in this series entitled *Fundamentalisms Observed,* Marty and Applebee offer a description of what they understand religious fundamentalism to be. In attempting to define the term, which they acknowledge is a matter of controversy and

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[1] Martin Marty is a professor of history at the University of Chicago and Scott Appleby is the director of the Cushwa Center for the Study of American Catholicism at the University of Notre Dame.

disagreement among scholars, they state what fundamentalists *do*. In effect, they describe fundamentalists as those who rally against the influences of secularity, which threaten to marginalize religion from the public sphere. Quoting another author within their volume, they state that "Members of the movement they observe 'no longer perceive themselves as reeling under the corrosive effects of secular life. On the contrary, they perceive themselves as fighting back, and doing so rather successfully.'"[1]

Marty and Appleby essentially argue that fundamentalists perceive themselves to be agents of God and tradition who are fighting *against*, *for*, *with,* and *under* something they hold to be sacred and non-negotiable. Fundamentalists fight against others whom they believe to be assaulting their beliefs and identities.[2] They fight against an immoral society that threatens to vanquish their beliefs in various ways. If these are lost, then everything is lost.[3] In addition, the authors state that fundamentalists fight for a worldview that they inherit or adopt. "If there are assaults on the most intimate zones of life, such as family, they will respond with counteraction in support of such an institution." They fight for ideas of the family and social ideas that they have inherited or adopted.[4] Fundamentalists also fight with a "particularly chosen repository of resources" that they believe are fundamental to their beliefs.[5] Finally, fundamentalists fight under God. They believe that they are fighting against those challenges to God and their faith.

In their book *Strong Religion,* authors Gabriel Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby add to the discussion by offering up their idea of the structure, genus and elements of religious fundamentalism. They argue that religious fundamentalism refers to "religious phenomena" that have formed in the past century as a result of the successes of

modernization and secularization and "secular-rational transformation of traditional institutions."[6] Basically, they believe that fundamentalist movements would not have formed had society not modernized and had government institutions remained strongly influenced by religion.

With this understanding of religious fundamentalist movements and phenomena, the authors describe what they believe to be the ideological characteristics of fundamentalism. The first is "reactivity to the marginalization of religion."[7] Fundamentalists are concerned with the decline of the role of their religion in a society. Following up on this point, they argue that movements seek to reestablish a strong religious influence in politics and government.[8] Second, fundamentalism is selective in three ways. 1) It is not just defensive of tradition, but it reshapes and selects particular aspects of tradition to emphasize; 2) fundamentalists embrace some parts of modernization. This can include mass media, modern science and communication; and 3) fundamentalists will single out certain effects of the process of modernization and secularization and challenge them.[9] These can include issues such as abortion, gay marriage, or women not wearing a hijab, among many others.[10]

Another characteristic of fundamentalism that the authors cite is inerrancy. This means that fundamentalists believe that each text in all of the great religious books, such as the Torah, the Bible and the Quran, is absolutely authoritative.[11] Any questioning of what the texts say is considered to be blasphemous. Finally, a fourth characteristic of fundamentalism is called "millennialism and messianism." The good forces will defeat the evil ones and the "Savior" will come and rescue those who are without sin.

Fundamentalists thus believe that the world must be saved and that they must help spread the message of the "Savior" to do this.[12]

Sociologists have also attempted to define what fundamentalism means. In their 2006 article "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism," authors Michael Emerson and David Hartman not only discuss various religious fundamentalist movements that have occurred around the world since the 1960's, but also the meaning of the concept itself. At first, Emerson and Hartman comment on the fact that the term fundamentalism is frequently and loosely used. "Sometimes the term fundamentalist is used to describe any group that takes religion seriously or that views religion's role in public life to be greater than the labeler would wish it to be."[13] The authors follow this comment by stating that the definition of fundamentalism changes depending on the perspective.

> How fundamentalism is defined and interpreted depends in good part on one's perspective. From a modern, secular viewpoint, fundamentalists are reactionaries, radicals attempting to grab power and throw societies back into the dark ages of oppression, patriarchy, and intolerance. . . Conversely, for fundamentalists and their sympathizers, Western versions of modernization rush over them in a tidal wave of change, ripping apart communities, values, social ties, and meaning. To these changes, some groups say, 'No.' When they do so out of their religious conviction, they are called, by modernists, religious fundamentalists. Fundamentalists and their sympathizers see their stand against the tidal wave of change as honorable, right, life preserving, and a life calling.[14]

By examining the definitions provided by these scholars, one can gain an understanding of what a fundamentalist is and does. In one sentence, fundamentalists can be described as ***those who use modern innovations to fight against the conditions of modernization and secularization in order to promote a traditional lifestyle based on values found in sacred religious texts that are deemed to be authoritative.*** Two of the concepts

mentioned in that sentence—modernization and secularization--- provide the reason for fundamentalism's existence. It is thus necessary that they be discussed in greater detail.

Modernization and Secularization

All of the scholars previously discussed reference modernization and secularization when talking about fundamentalism. Unfortunately, many of them don't elaborate on what, exactly, these concepts mean. Because these two concepts are so crucial to understanding fundamentalism, this paper will examine them briefly. In its simplest understanding, modernization is the gradual move away from a traditional society emphasizing the importance of communal and family units. Authors Emerson and Hartman note that under conditions of modernization, social life becomes divided into various spheres and institutions become rationalized.[2] Furthermore, modernization results in the rationalization of society in which "much of life comes to be regulated using policies and procedures, science, administrative rules and the like."[15] At the same time, religion plays less of a role in the public sphere.[16] According to several theorists, with industrialization and urbanization, comes increased modernization.[3] Scholars generally agreed that with increased industrialization comes increased cultural and religious pluralism. A modern society can be understood as one that has rational institutions lacking any religious influence and with a society divided into different spheres of influence.

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[2] The writings of Emerson and Hartman on modernization are based largely off of the theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. For a more comprehensive understanding of the writings of these two men, please see *The Division in Labour and Society* by Durkheim and *Economy and Society* by Weber.
[3] These scholars include Max Weber, Ernest Gellner and Emile Durkheim

A corollary concept to that of modernization is the idea of secularization. The famous theorist Max Weber was one of the first people to have a major discussion of secularization. Weber focused on the idea of the process of the rationalization of action. "His studied convinced him that from the sixteenth century forward a process had been occurring in Western civilization as a result of which one after another sphere of life had become subject to the belief that explanations for events could be found within this worldly experience and the application of human reason."[17]As society became more rational, they became less convinced of the power of religion. They may have continued to have faith, but they were, as Weber suggested, "disenchanted."

Over one hundred years later, scholars have come up with more clear and concise ways of defining secularization. One of the best definitions comes from Jose Casanova, a sociologist based in New York City. Casanova argues that when speaking of secularization, there are three connotations of the term that need to be clarified. The first is that secularization means the decline of religion's influence and practice in society. The second is that secularization means that religion is relegated to the private sphere, or religion becomes something that is solely practiced by individuals and nothing else. The third and final connotation is secularization as "the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as 'emancipation' from religious institutions and norms."[18] In their book *Rethinking Secularization,* Gerard Dekker, Donald Luidens and Rodger Rice presented similar ideas to those of Casanova. They argue that in relation to religion, secularization has two main processes. First, the influence that religion has on individuals and larger entities gradually diminishes over time. Second, religion "moves with the times" and learns to become compatible with the

secular changes occurring in a society.[19] It accommodates itself to secularization by not only moving from public to private life, but also allowing the infiltration of rational thought into theology. This will be seen later when liberal Christian theology is discussed.

Fundamentalisms: Modern Challenges

Having illuminated the meanings of modernization and secularization, it is necessary to reexamine their relationship to fundamentalist movements. First, religious fundamentalism undermines secularization theory by illustrating that modern movements can challenge rather than accommodate the processes of secularization. What exactly does this mean? The main concern of secularization theory is the decline of religion in the modern world. It argues that as the world becomes more modernized, religion will gradually play less of a role in government and politics and be confined to the private sphere. The theory of secularization is simply a description of the processes of secularization that society has witnessed over time. An example is Western Europe after the Renaissance. Prior to the 16th century, the Catholic Church had a huge influence on the governments of numerous kingdoms. Gradually, its power was reduced to the private sphere. Fundamentalist movements challenge the processes of secularization that threaten to push religion to the margins of society. Whether it is through use of the Bible to challenge gay marriage and pro-abortion legislation or by replacing the Iranian monarchy with a theocracy, there is a demand to increase the role of religion in government and society and to reduce the influence of rationality on laws and politics. The very existence and popularity of fundamentalist movements brings into question a broad use of

secularization theory. By successfully challenging secular processes and pushing for an increased role in religion, fundamentalist movements illustrate that the role of religion is not simply on the decline in societies, but may have times of resurgence and influence.

Second, while challenging the processes of secularization, fundamentalists attract those who are marginalized by the conditions accompanying modernization. Modernization in societies has often accompanied rapid industrialization and development. In industrialized societies, people are displaced from rural areas and relocate in cities where the culture is completely different from their traditional upbringing. They are surrounded by secular ideas about everyday life, administration, and governance. There is a complete move away from familiar traditions to a more institutionalized, pluralistic and rational form of society. While the standard of living may be higher in societies that have been industrialized and modernized, many people, especially unskilled laborers, continue to feel the effects of the socio-economic disparities and the multiple worldviews they encounter. They may suffer under squalid living and working conditions while simultaneously being restricted in mobility. Religion can serve as a buffer, providing familiar traditions, resources, and a sense of certainty in a pluralistic and hostile world. With its anti-secular message, a fundamentalist movement can attract those most disadvantaged by a new, modern and secular environment. Fundamentalists promote an alternative way of life that is familiar to many, that provides a sense of community and welfare, and that offers theological certainty in a chaotic world.

Interestingly, while fundamentalist movements are seen as reacting against modernization and secularization, they are, in essence, modern. Most of the scholars discussed earlier have highlighted this inherent contradiction and have included these discussions within a larger one on fundamentalism. Others have made this the sole topic of their essays. In *Strong Religion,* Appleby, Almond and Sivan discussed two of the important properties of fundamentalism--modernity and anti-modernity. The authors claim that they do not see fundamentalism as an orthodox, traditional, conservative or new religious movement, but as "a hybrid of both kinds of religious modes, and it belongs in a category by itself."[20] Fundamentalists can be seen as upholding and protecting traditions, but they do so by "crafting new methods, formulating new ideologies, and adopting the latest processes of organizational structures."[21] Thus, fundamentalism is, in fact, modern and not traditional, even though it is attempting to uphold longstanding traditions.

In his essay, "Fundamentalism, Phenomenology, and Comparative Dimensions," S.N. Eisenstadt also discusses the relationship between fundamentalism and modernity. In it he states that, despite the fact that fundamentalism is often seen as anti-modern, fundamentalist movements have attempted to incorporate themselves into modern and secular political systems and influence them. They take full advantage of political institutions and gain strength through them while promoting their agenda of a more traditional and religious society. In the process, they take advantage of modern advancements such as communications and media.[22] As will be shown in the following sections, multiple movements have actually done this.

With the broad understandings of fundamentalism, modernization and secularization provided above, the paper will now introduce two case studies of religious fundamentalism found within the United States and Egypt. In almost every way, these cases match the profile of fundamentalist movements given to them by scholars. In both countries, several similar conditions gave rise to the emergence of fundamentalist movements. These variables are modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration, and other changing social, political and economic conditions. Furthermore, they have similar functional and substantive elements in common that allow them to be both modern and anti-modern simultaneously.

Section Two: Christian Fundamentalism: The Case of the United States of America

The first case study to be examined is Christian fundamentalism in the United States. It must be noted that this paper is concerned with Protestant Christian fundamentalism, as it is this movement that became the most popular and influential in the United States. It is also one of the most confusing cases for scholars of secularization. In a democratic country founded on the secular principle of the separation of church and state, the strong popularity of religious movements that are politicized has baffled many proponents of secularization theory. Yet, the Christian fundamentalist movement has been identified as one of the strongest political forces to emerge in the 20th century.

The Christian fundamentalist movement as a popular movement in the United States occurred in two waves: from 1910-1925 and from the late 1970's until the present day. It is the origins of these waves that this section of the paper is most concerned with. In both eras, the movements can be characterized as growing in relation to the same conditions discussed earlier: modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration, as well as changing social, political and economic conditions. In some way or another, each of these variables is related to one another. During the late 19th century, the Northeastern and northern Midwestern United States rapidly

industrialized and modernized, leading to widespread social, economic and political changes for the country. Emerging as a challenger against some of the liberal and secular laws and ideas circulating at that time, especially that of liberal Christian theology, Christian fundamentalists attracted many who believed that the conditions accompanying urbanization and pluralism spelled the end of traditional Protestant 'American' values. Years later, in the 1960's and 1970's, an increasingly industrialized and fiscally conservative South and Southwest, later known as the 'Sunbelt', attracted job seekers from all over the country wishing to find success in the anti-union anti-regulatory environment. This large and powerful new economic and politically conservative population felt threatened by an increasingly secular minded government's interference in social issues and by the liberal ideas of the era. As the South and Southwest grew more influential, Christian fundamentalists reemerged as a powerful political movement that challenged the influence of liberalism and secularity on social life.

There are several contextual variables to be discussed when looking at Christian fundamentalism in the United States and its resurgence. First, with rapid industrialization in the late 19th century came modernization and other associated conditions, such as secularization, migration, sharp economic divisions, and pluralism. Essentially, the United States was experiencing an economic modernization and secularization that challenged the way people had lived for over two centuries. Second, in the 19th century, Protestant Christian theology was increasingly influenced by liberal, rational methods that questioned the absolute authority of the Bible. Third, Christian fundamentalism emerged within the Evangelical movement as a reaction to liberal Christian theology and the changing social, political and economic conditions witnessed in the United States.

Fourth, while fundamentalism had a strong base of support in the Southern churches, it was in the northern cities where most of their mobilizing efforts were concentrated. Finally, Christian fundamentalists became involved in politics and were able to mobilize many rural Southerners and some Northerners. This would also lead to the weakening of their influence prior to the 1970's. The debate surrounding the teaching of evolution in schools and the 1925 "Scopes Monkey Trial" caused fundamentalists to fight against what they saw as secular politics. Additionally, it revealed the rift between secular-minded and traditionalist Americans. Following the trial, fundamentalists became marginalized within many of the mainstream Protestant denominations as leaders of these denominations began to reevaluate their theological and political stances. Ultimately, fundamentalists between 1930 and the late 1970's labeled themselves as a non-political separatist movement unwilling to compromise with liberal Protestant denominations and Evangelicals willing to work with such entities.

After looking at Christian fundamentalism through the early 1950's, this paper will examine the origins of the second wave, which began in the 1970's and has continued to the present day in some form or another. All of the variables relating to the emergence and early strength of Christian fundamentalism contributed to its resurgence. There are also several contextual variables to look at when looking at Christian fundamentalism in the last quarter of the 20th century. First, during the 1960's and 1970's, many changes were occurring. As many progressive movements were taking place, the government and Supreme Court increasingly intervened in social issues through secular and liberal policies. At the same time, the South and the Southwest were rapidly becoming industrialized and affluent due to the increased economic investments

and business friendly policies that followed the Second World War. Second, the residents of the South and South West at this time were generally middle class and conservative. Migrants who had moved there were attracted to the region's low-regulatory policies. Incidentally, many of them were upset by what they saw as a secular and liberal government's interference in their social values and traditions. They were also disturbed by the liberal progressive movements occurring in the country at the time. Third, Christian fundamentalist churches grew stronger as the region grew wealthier and urbanized. With more money, they could build bigger churches and attract more members through mass media. Finally, fundamentalists were able to become a formidable political movement because they challenged what many saw as secular government interferences in "traditional" values and the decay of society via secular and modern conditions. Fundamentalists advanced their own concerns while attracting many conservatives who feared a government undermining 'American values.'

The United States: The late 19th and early 20th centuries

In the 1880's, the United States began its rapid ascent as a world power. Britain had already achieved this role, and along with France and Germany, was scrambling for colonial territories. The United States had come out of a long and bloody civil war nearly two decades earlier, and the northern states were the victor in more ways than one. The victory of the North over the Southern states not only led to the abolishment of slavery

and inclusion of African Americans into the citizenry of the country, but also destroyed any challenges to its industrial and economic might. [4]

One of the most important characteristics of an industrializing and modernizing nation is an increase in the presence of demographic and religious pluralism. As it rapidly industrialized during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States experienced broad demographic changes due to immigration. During this time, newcomers from Italy, Russia, Poland and many Eastern European countries poured into American cities. According to U.S. Census data, from 1850 to 1930, the foreign born population increased sevenfold, from 2.2 million to 14.2 million. In the Northeast and the Great Lakes region, the foreign born population was 1.9 million in 1850. In 1890, it had grown to 7.9 million. By 1920, this number had reached 11.4 million.[23] Meanwhile, in 1850, only about 10,000 people came from Southern Europe and 1,500 came from Eastern Europe, while seventy years later, these numbers had increased to 5.6 and 3.7 million respectively.[24] The Southeastern and Southern Midwest states, on the other hand, saw less external migrant activity. According to more U.S. Census data, in 1850, the foreign born population in the South was 241,665. By 1920, it had risen to 868,354.[25] The external migrants entering American cities came from very diverse backgrounds. In fact, they were completely different from earlier immigrants, who, up until 1850, had been mainly Protestant Christians who spoke English. Those who migrated after 1880 were Roman Catholic, Russian and Greek Orthodox and Jewish.

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[4] While the 14th Amendment granted African American males voting rights, this group didn't achieve full rights until the 1960's.

A less talked about but perhaps equally important characteristic of the late 19th century was internal migration in the United States. Between 1880 and 1910, the Northeast also saw population growth rates caused by internal migration, which noticeably increased from previous decades. For example, in the years between 1890 and 1900, the population of the Northeast grew by 20%, in comparison to a 6% growth rate between 1870 and 1880. This would stay consistent throughout the following decade.[26] While the Northeast, northern Midwest and Pacific regions saw growth with regards to internal migration, the South seems to have had negative rates of growth during this time. Combined, the population in the Southeastern and southern Midwestern states declined by 7% between 1890 and 1900. In the following decade, that number had dropped by another 2%. What these numbers indicate is that people from all over the country, most of which was rural throughout the 19th century, were migrating to the cities of the Northeast and northern Midwest. Migrants were leaving their homes and traditional lifestyles behind and entering much more pluralistic and modern environments. Regions such as the South and southern Midwest were not exceptions to this phenomenon.

The late 19th century can also be characterized as an era where new ideas clashed with traditional Christian theology. These ideas were not limited to the United States but had a profound impact on its population into the 20th century. The two most important concepts, evolution and the Enlightenment, greatly impacted the disciplines of biology and theology. In 1859, Charles Darwin's book, *The Origin of Species,* was first published. The book argued that life evolves over the course of many generations through natural selection. The ideas presented by Darwin would influence the way politicians, social scientists, natural scientists and theologians would think about the relation of social

and ethnic classes to one another through the rest of the century. The *Origin of Species* would also challenge the traditional understanding held by Christians that God created all life in its present form, including humans.

In addition to evolution, the rational ideas of the Enlightenment had reached the discipline of theology in the form of "liberal Christianity" by the mid 1800's. This would have the most profound impact on traditional forms of Protestant Christianity. In an essay on fundamentalism in the United States, Nancy Ammerman states, "Around midcentury, German scholars had begun to study the Bible with the same rational critical tools being used to uncover the origins and meanings of other ancient texts. They analyzed its literary forms and its historical contexts and speculated about who really wrote which book when."[27]

Perhaps as a way of accommodating to their increasingly secular environments, liberal theologians began to doubt the factual efficacy of the Bible and instead thought of it more as a guide to life. Ammerman goes on to say that "Visions and miracles were recounted in modern terms. Biblical books were re-dated and stories compared to other ancient literature . . . their [biblical scholars] method of interpreting became so accepted by the end of the century that 'exegesis' and 'criticism' became synonymous."[28] The father of this way of thinking is considered to be Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a German theologian and philosopher who attempted to reconcile Enlightenment ideals with those of Protestant Christianity.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was nowhere in the United States quite like the Northeast and northern Midwest. Rapid industrialization expedited the

process of modernization in these areas, attracting huge groups of southern and eastern European immigrants and rural Americans both looking for a chance to achieve monetary success. Regions like the South, on the other hand, saw declines in growth as either no one migrated there or Southerners left for the North. At the same time, the United States became increasingly influenced by more secular and rational ideas such as liberal Christian theology and evolution. All of this set the stage for a process that has continued to baffle secularization theory scholars to this day.

The Roots of Fundamentalism in the United States.

Christian fundamentalism was born out of the burgeoning intellectual and social environment of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. However, in the beginning, it was not a movement that emerged by itself. It was, instead, rooted in Evangelicalism. The early history of Christian fundamentalism is the history of Evangelicalism in the early 20th century. Thus, it is important to examine Evangelicalism at the turn of the century.

According to David Zeidan, author of *The Resurgence of Religion*:

> Evangelicalism is based on the Reformation doctrine of the Bible as the inerrant, revealed Word of God and the ultimate sole authority in all matters of faith and practice. Other essential doctrines characteristic of Evangelicalism include the deity of Christ, his saving and atoning substitutionary death, the necessity of individual conversion and sanctification and the importance of active involvement in evangelism.[29]

George Marsden defined Evangelicals as those believing that the Bible has the greatest authority on the Word of God, that eternal salvation can be attained through “the

atoning work of Jesus Christ for our sins," and that spreading the message of Jesus and the Bible to others is an imperative for Christian believers.[30]

Evangelical Christians dominated many Protestant Christian denominations in the late 19th century, including the Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist churches.[31] However, by this time, Evangelicals felt threatened by liberal Christianity, as their ideas questioning the authority of the Bible and the identities of its authors had entered the United States and began to infiltrate more conservative churches. As liberal Christian theology gained momentum, Evangelical Christians reacted by promoting two ideas: biblical inerrancy and dispensational pre-millennialism. The first concept, *biblical inerrancy,* holds that the words in the Bible are direct revelations from God and, therefore have ultimate authority and should not be questioned by man. The concept of inerrancy was developed as an intellectual doctrine in the Princeton Theological Seminary during the 1870's. The second idea is *dispensational pre-millennialism*. Dispensationalism argues that history is divided into seven eras, or dispensations. In each era, God tested humans. They in turn failed each test and God intervened and provided judgment. However, Evangelicals argue that the current historical era, or dispensation, will end in destruction. God will only save those who believe in him and are free of sin. "Believers . . . will be exempted from this destruction by the secret rapture, when they will mysteriously be taken up to heaven while the rest of the earth goes through seven years of warfare and tribulation."[32]

While challenging liberal brands of Christianity, Evangelicals promoted Protestant Christian 'values.' They saw the country as a Christian country "based on shared religious, cultural and moral principles that integrated society." [33] Evangelicals

reacted to the growing modern and secular conditions of the North, such as industrialization and pluralism because they perceived these forces to undermine traditional 'American' Protestant values and orthodoxy. It was in the North that they felt society was becoming the most corrupted. It was in this area that Americans were most exposed to the conditions of modernization. Thus, many Evangelical groups focused their missionary efforts on northern cities, which were considered ripe for harvest. As Nancy Ammerman so clearly explains:

> Cities not only meant pluralism of belief and lifestyle; they also meant a complex division of labor . . . As the nation moved from village to city, the church moved from village green to side street. It also took a city to provide the moral grist for the evangelist's mill. It was in cities that the ills of the day were most visible and that individuals seemed most in need of salvation. Furthermore, 'throughout the period, these preachers were touring the cities of America, offering a message of salvation from despair and hell. Revival preachers spoke to the worries of the day—unbridled business, the abuse of alcohol, unassimilated immigrants—and offered a ritual of purification that was both individual and communal. . . the community was reassured that their Protestant God was still in charge.[34]

In cities, Evangelicals held revivals and conferences, established bible institutes and disseminated pamphlets and books. Through these efforts, they were able to build a large constituency of those opposed to liberal Christian ideas.[35] Bible and prophecy conferences allowed preachers and laity to gather and build coalitions opposed to the increasing liberalization of their denominations. The establishment of bible institutes such as the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago trained a whole new generation of preachers and laity in conservative Christian theology. Some of these institutes would inspire the establishment of future fundamentalist dominated bible institutes, such as the Dallas Theological Seminary. At the same time, Evangelicals were proponents of social

reform and welfare. Through their speeches and charitable institutions, they promoted education for the poor, child labor reform and temperance. They sought to allay those most disadvantaged by modern economic policies while also seeking to re-Christianize America's urban society.

Until the 1940's, Christian fundamentalism did not have a separate identity from Evangelicalism. Much of its doctrine came from that movement. The very writings that are considered to be the most influential fundamentalist documents essentially restated the goals of conservative Evangelicals. In 1910, Milton and Lyman Stewart, owners of the Union Oil Company, financed a publication of ninety essays called *The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth.* These essays asserted biblical inerrancy, argued against liberal Christianity, and restated what were seen as the 'fundamentals' of Christianity. They also rejected socialism and emphasized dispensational pre-millennialism. Furthermore, fundamentalists were often considered to be opponents of conditions that accompanied modernization and secularization. Through Evangelical churches, they combated such conditions because they themselves were Evangelicals.

In the early 20th century, what made early Christian fundamentalists different from the Evangelical urban reformers and challengers of liberal theology was their aggressive, or 'militant' efforts to change society through its laws and politics. In his 1980 book *Fundamentalism and American Culture,* George Marsden describes Christian fundamentalists as "militant anti-modernist Protestant" Evangelicals who are opposed to "both modernism in theology and the cultural changes that modernism endorsed."[36] Fundamentalists were Evangelicals who were ready to aggressively fight against what

they saw as threats and determined to actively influence legislation. The greatest example of this came in the 1920's, when fundamentalist Evangelicals had repeatedly worked to influence legislatures all over the country on the issue of teaching evolution in schools. In 1925, the height of their early popularity and downfall came with the "Scopes Monkey Trial," officially known as the *State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes*. This event, in which Tennessee teacher John Scopes was tried for teaching evolution, an act that was illegal in Tennessee at the time, revealed a growing split between traditional Evangelical and secular thought. The issue of teaching evolution had infuriated fundamentalists, who saw it as the 'last straw' in America's push towards liberalism and 'decay.' Using the influence fundamentalists gained in cities and the South, they fought the teaching of evolution and pushed legislators, both on the local and national level, to outlaw it.

While Scopes was convicted for teaching evolution, the fundamentalists lost their popularity in the North and not only stepped back from politics, but were also marginalized theologically in the region. For perhaps the second time in half a century, the cultural divide between North and South was revealed. The South and the Evangelical denominations specific to that region, such as the Southern Baptists, remained conservative and full of fundamentalists. In fact, many authors have argued that the movement's purpose was irrelevant in the South, because Southern Christians already adhered to many of these views. However, this was not the case in the North, where the perceived urban 'squalor' and decay of American traditions had originally given Evangelicals a reason to conceive of fundamentalism. In the wake of the events of 1925, within the Northern Baptist and northern Presbyterian denominations, liberalism was beginning to have a strong influence. In a sense, the Scopes Monkey Trial revealed to

many fundamentalists that it might have been in their best interests to accommodate to their secular environment. Conservative coalitions within the denominations, mainly fundamentalists, were upset and did not wish to compromise.[37]

In reaction, one group of fundamentalists wanted to continue championing its doctrine within the major denominations while another group believed that fundamentalists should form their own institutions and denominations.[38] Nancy Ammerman states that the new denominations formed by fundamentalists were mainly Baptist and Presbyterian. These groups included the Conservative Baptist Association, founded in 1947, and the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.[39] Some of the non-congregational institutions that would be established included the American Council of Christian Churches, founded in 1941, which was a response to the American Federal Council of Churches, an umbrella organization of what were seen as churches influenced by liberal Christian theology.[40] Additionally, fundamentalists continued to be strongly influential in the Southern Baptist denomination and this has been true to this day.

Ammerman points out that there were many small and large fundamentalist churches. They thrived in the South and southern Midwest, which, from the 1870's to the 1940's, were areas considered to be at the outer fringes of modern society. However, they also helped to form communities that wanted to hide from the change occurring in the United States. "They offered to their members an ideological home. When the rest of the world seemed to be living by the wrong rules, believing the wrong things, church was the place where everything made sense. . . It also offered friendships and potential marriage partners . . . there might be activities on nearly every night of the week . . . To become a

fundamentalist was to join a group—a local, visible, supportive community."[41] Fundamentalism offered something that many churches did: community and support.

By the 1950's, a crucial split would occur. This time it was between the Evangelicals that had separated from northern denominations in the 1930's due to theological and political disagreements and the fundamentalists that accompanied them. Essentially, this was a split between conservative and moderate to liberal Evangelicals. By this time, mainstream Evangelical Christians, represented by the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), had become more willing to compromise with other denominations, some liberal and some conservative. They also were more concerned with cultural relevancy and moving with the times instead of opposing modern conditions and secularization by being separatists. The biggest event that divided fundamentalists from mainstream Evangelicals came in 1956, when popular evangelist Billy Graham displayed his willingness to work with conservative and liberal sects."[42] The split was further clarified in the 1970's. From July 16-25 of 1974, the First International Congress on World Evangelization was held in Lausanne, Switzerland. This conference produced the *Lausanne Covenant*, which defines Evangelicalism and outlines their responsibility in the world. One author, Justin Holcomb, provides the best paraphrasing of the Covenant. He asserts that, while continuing to promote the ideas of inerrancy and dispensational pre-millennialism:

> The document [Covenant] affirms the knowledge of Jesus Christ as the only way to salvation. Yet, it also affirms the global diversity of expressions of faith in Jesus. Social responsibility---even to those outside of the faith--is emphasized. . . As the church sets out to faithfully proclaim the gospel, it must also not ignore the physical needs of those in the world. [43]

Furthermore, the Covenant promotes coordination with other churches and organizations to execute its missions. Thus, according to the Lausanne Covenant, the role of Evangelicals is to not only spread the word of Jesus and the Bible, but also to help those who suffer around the world, whether it is by working alone or working with others.

As Billy Graham and others showed their willingness to compromise with more liberal denominations in order to extend the Evangelical mission, the ACCC and others continued to demand that all members be separatists.[44] This demand for separatism and absence from politics would continue until the late 1970's. Until this time, fundamentalist churches and their communities accepted defeat and continued living on the fringes of society while watching the country change. As will be made evident later, however, Christian fundamentalism would continue to have a following even before its resurgence as a popular movement.

Modern Christian Fundamentalism in the United States: 1960-1990

Early American Christian fundamentalism emerged in the northern cities of the United States. It was the urban population that concerned fundamentalists and Evangelicals, particularly those groups they perceived to have fallen under the greatest influence of liberal Christianity, modernization, and the "social decay" that accompanied these forces. Furthermore, it was in large cities that their organizations and institutions became more developed. The fundamentalism that emerged in the 1970's had similarities with the earlier movement in that it posed a challenge to modernization and secularization and gained much of its power in urban areas. However, unlike the earlier

movement, it remained in the South and Southwest and would become a formidable political power.

Just as it was important to look at the historical and social context in which Christian fundamentalism first emerged, it is important to look at the same contexts when discussing its resurgence forty years later. The 1960's and 1970's is a period in American history that is best remembered for its iconoclastic social movements. These movements were considered to be liberal and challenged the status quo of society and law. The Civil Rights movement challenged the Jim Crow policies of the South and North, with their violent and discriminatory treatment of African Americans. The Sexual Revolution that had begun in the late 1950's was completely changing the way young adults saw relationships and sex. The United States had gotten involved in what was originally a colonial dispute between Vietnam and France. This eventually turned into a long and ugly war. Students at universities and other young people questioned the government's involvement and protested the draft, which forced them to fight in a war they believed to be unjust. The anti-war culture is best identified with the "hippies," who promoted ideas such as "free love," psychedelic rock, and the use of drugs such as marijuana and LSD. At the same time, women were fighting for gender equality and questioning the traditional male-female relationship. In 1963, Betty Friedan published her now classic book *The Feminine Mystique,* which criticized the inequalities of women in the workplace and the expected role held by many that women should be housewives. The Sexual Revolution and the women's rights movement seem to have come together to result in the landmark 1973 Supreme Court Case, *Roe v. Wade,* in which abortion was legalized. The attitudes of the 1950's, so shaped by conformity, unquestioning loyalty,

and tradition, had given way to a cultural revolution in which the status quo was questioned. What was seen by many as an age of innocence had now reached adolescence.

The 1960's and 1970's are less remembered for the rapid urbanization and increasing political importance of the South and the area known as the 'Sunbelt,' which roughly includes the Southern half of the United States, including Southern California. The Second World War and the New Deal policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt resulted in the greatest economic expansion in United States history and created a path that would lead the South and Southwest to become leaders in technology and other industries. With industrialization came increases in population and diversity.

The Sunbelt was not a term that was used until the late 1960's. Darren Dochuk and Michelle Nickerson, authors of the 2011 book *Sunbelt Rising,* quote Kirkpatrick Sale as saying in 1975 that the Sunbelt is "a broad band of America that stretches from Southern California through the Southwest and Texas, into the Deep South."[45] Other authors have asserted that the area is the urbanized areas of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, California, Arizona and Virginia. These areas include Atlanta, Charlotte, Dallas and Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix and northern Virginia.[46] Another source defines the area as the area south of the 36th parallel, or the southern tier of the United States.[47] In essence, the Sunbelt is considered to be the urban South and Southwest. In 1975, Sale argued that this area would become the ultimate rival to the Northeast. To Sale, the Sunbelt can be described in the following way:

> [The Sunbelt is a] power base . . . built upon the unsurpassed population migration that began to draw millions and millions of people from the older and colder sections of the Northeast to the younger and sunnier sections of the South and Southwest . . . [and] upon an authentic economic revolution that created the giant new postwar industries of defense, aerospace, technology, electronics, agribusiness, and oil and gas extraction.[48]

The modernization of the South, or the creation of the Sunbelt, began in the 1940's, after years of decline following the loss of the Civil War. Between 1880 and the Second World War, the South was the poorest and least developed region in the United States. Bruce Schulman, the author of the 1991 book, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt,* describes the situation of the Southern states in much depth. In the late 1930's, the biggest industries in the South were agricultural and textile. It had been greatly affected by the restructuring of its economic system following the Civil War. One of the shifts that had occurred related to agriculture. After the war, the South moved from a system of plantations to family operated sharecropping, considered by many to be less efficient and backwards. "Share plantations simply operated less efficiently than wage-labor farms; tenants, after all, lacked incentives to improve the land they tilled."[49] These farmlands were also run inefficiently because most southern farmers lacked the adequate technology, such as tractors and other tools for farming. As a result of inefficient farming methods, many Southern farmers lived in poverty. The region also lacked in other areas of the economy and development. For example, the South had manufacturing but these industries-- textiles, lumber and hosiery-- were like relics from the previous era. Furthermore, many corners of the rural South lacked electricity.[50]

In the 1930's, the South was one of the areas receiving the greatest attention from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) and his New Deal program. Two of the most important development projects that reached the South included providing electricity for the entire area and modernizing agricultural methods. Despite millions of federal dollars flooding into the area, the major event that led to the industrialization and modernization of the South was the Second World War. America's war and technology industries boomed and the South and Southwest were the areas most dramatically affected, particularly the states of California and Arizona. In his 2004 book, *Repositioning North American Migration History,* Marc Rodriguez describes the transformation of the South and West following the WWII era:

> World War II had marked a watershed in regional economic organization. As the federal government raced to build shipyards, aircraft plants, steel and aluminum facilities, and hundreds of military installations in the previously low-industrial regions, the future of both the West and the South started to become clear: The West was going to become a population magnet, attracting auto mobilized job seekers by the millions, tripling its population in the three decades after 1940. The South was going to urbanize. And do so at a stunning pace. The region's massive farm population, still almost as large as at its 1910 peak, would leave the land, pouring into the cities and taking the jobs that the rapidly industrializing south could offer . . . As late as 1940 more than 14 million Southerners lived on farms. By 1970 there were only 3 million, and ten years later, less than 1.5 million."[51]

The war brought the South out of poverty. At the same time, it led to the evolution of the Southwest from frontier territory to a technological and military center. Thus, with the outbreak of World War II came the birth of the Sunbelt.

While oil and defense industries were thriving in the Sunbelt, private enterprises in the region proliferated and coupled with local conservative politicians. They championed conservative economics such as deregulation and anti-union policies. This was meant to lure business out of the Northeast and northern Midwest. Ultimately, the tactic would prove successful. Some of the things that southern and southwestern towns did to attract new business were to lower corporate taxes, freeze taxes, and provide exemptions on property and sales for new businesses. In addition, many legislatures in the regions passed "Right to Work" legislation. Meanwhile, local and state governments raised taxes on homeowners and properties.[52] To gain more in tax revenue, governments encouraged the creation of new suburbs. As Darren Dochuk and Michelle Nickerson explain, "Many local governments looked to take possession of ballooning [and] parasitic suburbs beyond city limits to secure more revenue but also to control sprawl and increase the number of affluent, white voters, who were the electoral base for their chamber political machines."[53] Thus, pro-business, conservative governments annexed surrounding farmland and desert to create a large political base and keep corporate tax rates low.

Through business friendly policies, the proliferation of defense-related businesses, aerospace and oil industries, as well as private enterprises led to the increased urbanization of the South and the Southwest. This burgeoning economy encouraged migration to the region from all over the country. Much of the early success of the Sunbelt appears to have occurred in areas such as Southern California and Arizona. In the 1950's and 1960's these areas attracted a large numbers of migrants, including Southerners.[54] By the early 1970's, however, the success of the Sunbelt's economy

appears to have begun to attract large numbers of migrants to its eastern side. According to Rodriguez, "the South had been attracting people in growing numbers since World War II . . . and something of an exchange had been going on between North and South. Mostly blue collar Southerners had been going north and mostly white-collar Northerners had been coming south."[55] Industries such as defense and technology had attracted engineers, technicians and other professionals. The region was increasingly attracting capital.[56] People were drawn to the area because of the increasing job opportunities and ability of local politicians to maintain low corporate tax rates and promote anti-union policies. Additionally, in an era where millions of White people were fleeing the cities and interstates were redrawing the map of the United States, the suburban character of Sunbelt metropolises was very attractive.[57]

With regard to urbanization, the population settlement patterns for the South in the 1970's showed a marked difference from earlier decades. In 1920, only 28.1% of the South's population lived in urban areas. In 1950, as more families moved from smaller towns to cities, that number had risen to nearly 50%. By 1980, the number of Southerners living in urban settings was up to 67%.[58] This can be attributed, in part, to the migration of farmers to cities. For instance, in 1940, over 34 % of the 11 million people surveyed, Southerners claimed that their occupation was in agriculture. However, by 1968, only 10.4% of Southerners were still employed in this industry, out of a sample of 18 million.[59] This number has continued to decrease over time. Because much of the South had become suburbanized by the 1980's, the metropolitan statistics of southern states must also be observed. In a dictionary, a metropolis is usually defined as a city. However, a metropolitan area usually refers to not only the central city, but also towns that are very

close to it, or suburbs. For example, Charlotte is a major city in North Carolina. Charlotte's metropolitan area, however, includes not only Charlotte, but also the communities of Matthews and Harrisburg. That being said, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, in 1910, only 10% of the South's population was metropolitan. By 1980, that number had reached well over 60%.[60]

In his study of internal migration within the United States, Larry Long states that in the 1970's, the South saw some of the greatest population gains. Between 1970 and 1980, there was a net migration of about 600,000 people to the South. This is in comparison to less than 200,000 new residents at the beginning of the decade.[61] Rodriguez states, "the South [traditional South] surpassed the West as a leading migration destination. People moving into the region outnumbered those leaving by 3.5 million during the 1970's . . . Mostly they were coming from the Northern states."[62] Additionally, the wave of migrants included Southerners returning to their homes. It has been said that 20-25% of migrants were returnees after 1970.[63] Furthermore, the increased urbanization of the South attracted foreign migrants. In 1940, 5.5% of the South's population had been born in another country. By 1980, that number had increased to over 20%.[64] According to Richard Lloyd, author of the 2012 article "Urbanization and the Southern United States," "By the late 1980s, Latin American and Asian immigrants had established a toehold in major southern cities, and population growth among these groups in the past two decades has been spectacular."[65] In less than 40 years, the South had become one of the most urbanized areas in the country. It had also become one of the most diverse.

As will be explained in the next section, these migration movements contributed to the South's rise as a strong and economically influential political base. Furthermore, they contributed to the resurgence of Christian fundamentalism in the country.

The Conservative Sunbelt

The creation of the Sunbelt via the modernization of the South and Southwest created a whole new class of people. As noted earlier, the Sunbelt grew in part because the area attracted businesses through its emphasis on deregulation, anti-union policies and lower corporate taxes. Regional politicians and businesses, alike, took a stand against Roosevelt's government-heavy New Deal policies and President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs. The millions of people who migrated to this region seeking work recognized that this conservatism contributed to the successes they were finding in their new communities. Furthermore, Southerners who migrated to the region had already championed this attitude as they rarely favored government interference. After all, by the 1970's, numerous instances of government intrusion, such as recent legislation outlawing voting discrimination against African Americans, left a bitter memory in the minds of many. These were people who detested government intervention and wished to be left alone. They would also come to dominate the suburbs that characterized the sprawling Sunbelt metropolises. In their book *Sunbelt Rising,* Darren Dochuk and Michelle Nickerson describe the political and social situation faced by the residents of the Sunbelt:

> Postindustrial in its dependence on service industries, high-tech manufacturing, and information and defense sectors this region [the Sunbelt] was also post-urban in its layouts, with communities stretching out from city edges rather than concentrating in the core. A distinctive climate of political thought settled over this sprawling terrain. Residents of

> this corporate dreamland internalized the pro-growth, antiregulatory assurances of free market capitalism and sought to limit the reach of the federal state in sectors that did not serve these interests. The myth and ethic of self-help and independence matched the surroundings, as did the culture of localism and community protectionism that grew up alongside it.[66]

As the years went on, Sunbelt conservatives voiced their political opinions by voting for conservative Democrats and Republicans in elections. Two studies exemplify the political attitudes and party affiliations of residents in the Sunbelt. In his essay, "Big Government and Family Values: Political Culture in the Metropolitan Sunbelt," Matthew Lassiter uses the example of Cobb County, Georgia, a giant suburb of Atlanta, to provide a micro example of the kind of political and social attitudes that were prevalent in the Sunbelt in the 1960's and 1970's. Like many other areas of the Sunbelt, Cobb County saw a massive increase in population in the 1970's. In 1970, its population was 196,793. By 1980, it had grown to 297,718.[67] Cobb County would become a hub for white-collar workers in the rising Sunbelt, attracting people from across the United States. Since the 1970's, this county and others like it have consistently supported low taxes and rejected social welfare programs for cities.[68] Their conservatism has been reflected in elections since the 1960s. For instance, in 1960, 61% of Cobb County residents voted for John F. Kennedy, a Democrat. In 1968, 41% of residents voted for Republican candidate Richard Nixon, while only 19% voted for his competitor, Hubert Humphrey. However, by 1980, 54% of Cobb Country residents voted for Republican candidate, Ronald Regan and 40% for Jimmy Carter. It must be noted that Jimmy Carter, who won the county in 1976, was seen as a representative of southern Evangelicalism. He was also from Georgia. Since 1976, however, this county has solidly voted Republican.[69]

In his 1989 study of the changing party affiliation of migrants to Denton County, Texas (part of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolis), author John Frendreis suggested that many migrants to the Sunbelt have gradually become more conservative in their political views.

> The changes sweeping Denton County, Texas, are characteristic of those which have converted the South into the Sunbelt . . . the area has shared in rapid growth of the metropolitan area over the last 25 years. At the same time, the political climate of Denton County has fundamentally changed, from a solid area of conservative Democratic strength to an emerging Republican stronghold."[70]

In 1964, 74% of Denton County residents had voted for Democratic members to the U.S. House of Representatives and 67% voted for Democratic Presidential nominee Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1976, 48% of residents voted for Democrat Jimmy Carter and 54% voted for Democrats in the House of Representatives. By 1984, 24% voted for Democratic presidential candidates and 44.3% voted Democrat in the House race.[71]

From Silent Majority to Moral Majority

Christian fundamentalism grew as the population of the Sunbelt grew. Considering that many of the people who had migrated to the Southwest were from the South, and considering that half of the Sunbelt consists of the South, this is understandable. As the Sunbelt became wealthier, fundamentalist churches and organizations grew stronger in constituents and resources. Generally, churches that had strong fundamentalist influences were Baptist churches in the South. This included Southern Baptists and non-denominational independent Baptist groups such as the Independent Baptists and the Southwide Baptist Fellowship. It also included the

Apostolic Christian Church of America. Steve Bruce, the author of *The Rise and the Fall of the New Christian Right,* asserts that, starting in the late 1960's, as the mainstream Protestant denominations began to decline, fundamentalist institutions rose. He states, "the most successful sections of Protestantism have been the Southern Baptist Convention [which often has fundamentalist churches] and the independent fundamentalist Baptist groups."[72] By the early 1990's, 9% of the adult U.S. population identified themselves as fundamentalists.[73]

A specific case that exemplifies the growth of Christian fundamentalism is the Southern Baptist Convention. As noted earlier, this denomination had always been very influenced by such forces. In their study on regions and religious affiliation in the United States between 1952 and 1980, William Newman and Peter Halvorson noted the increasing numbers in conservative Protestant and fundamentalist churches in the Sunbelt. In 1952, membership in the Southern Baptist Convention churches was 8,121,000. By 1980, membership had more than doubled.[74]

One important thing to note is that in many studies, authors and data collectors do not distinguish between fundamentalists from Evangelicals. Often times, they consider fundamentalism to be a part of Evangelical Christianity. Given that many Baptist churches are often considered Evangelical, this is understandable. This fact is evident in the 2007 Pew Research Institute's Forum on Religion and Public Life, in which fundamentalist churches, along with other Baptists, fall under the category of 'Evangelical Protestant Churches' It is then important to consider the growing numbers of Evangelical Christians, as these numbers may include fundamentalists. In 1952,

membership of the Evangelical Congregational Church was 28,000. By 1980, it had grown to 93,000 members.[75] Muhammad Arif Zakaullah wrote that in 1979, between 40 and 50 million Americans in general were classified as Evangelicals.[76]

So why did fundamentalism gain so much traction in this region at this particular time? The best explanation that can be provided is that with the increasing wealth of the South and the Sunbelt, fundamentalist churches gained more resources to influence people in a changing social and political environment. Fundamentalist churches always existed in the South. Southerners who migrated to the West in the 1950's brought with them fundamentalist ideas and those who stayed in the traditional South maintained their views. In the 1970's, however, people began to make more money in this area and were able to financially contribute to churches more. Fundamentalist churches became mega churches that could sponsor events and expand their outreach efforts. They could also employ modern communication methods to expand their message and utilize media more effectively. Fundamentalist Christianity in the late 1970's and early 1980's was characterized by its use of television programming. It has been stated by Zakaullah that in the early 1960's, only 12 % of Protestants tuned into religious broadcasts. A Gallup poll showed that by 1984, the audience for broadcasts had reached 13.3 million.[77] According to one author, "Conservative Protestants draw considerable comfort from the symbols of material success which their pastors acquired . . . to fundamentalists it is a source of pride that they have moved from clapboard shacks with a radio antenna to cathedrals purpose built for television."[78] While generally opposing modern and secular conditions, fundamentalists employed a modern method when conducting outreach.

Through the mass media and outreach events, these increasingly wealthy churches were able to attract not just traditional Southerners, but also many of the newly migrated individuals from all over the country. While they were not political in the 1960's and 1970's, they offered a message of traditional American and Christian values and provided a community that was in line with the America many conservatives imagined, not the liberal and completely secular America that was constantly interacting with them. These people were conservatives who had no idea what was happening to the United States they grew up in. As stated earlier, they generally supported policies that were anti-regulatory, anti-union and pro-growth and strongly opposed government intervention. Conservative and older Americans not only faced challenges to social traditions in the form of the counterculture, but they also were being affected by what they saw as an increasingly interventionist federal government. In their opinion, the government was interfering in their social traditions and lives not only through economic programs, but also with legislation and court rulings that supported issues such as gender equality, gay rights and most important of all, abortion and birth control. As Steve Bruce states:

> By the 1950's and 1960's, it was not the Army but the Supreme Court and the Congress that were imposing cosmopolitan values on the South. Without multiplying examples one can characterize the last hundred years as a period in which regional autonomy has gradually been eroded by central government intervention.[79]

What were some of these "government sanctioned" social challenges to traditions that concerned conservatives? One of the earlier ones was the 1962 Supreme Court decision to end mandatory prayer in school on the grounds that it violated the separation of church and state.[80] In the early 1970's, the equal rights legislation was passed for women in the workplace in various states. In 1969, the Stonewall gay bar in New York

was raided by police and helped spark the gay rights movement. Eight years later, Harvey Milk would be the first openly gay official elected to a public office. The biggest threat, however, was the 1973 landmark Supreme Court decision to legalize abortion in *Roe v. Wade.* It was this decision that prompted the politicization of Christian fundamentalism.

The Politicization of Christian Fundamentalism and the Moral Majority

While gay rights and gender equality irked many fundamentalists, *Roe v. Wade* brought them into the boxing ring. It was this decision that caused fundamentalist to come out from hiding as a separatist movement and fight against what they saw as the secular 'decay' of society. After this moment, fundamentalists would tap into the fears that many conservative Sunbelt residents had over government interference in their 'traditions' and liberal movements and fight to de-secularize the laws and politics of the United States. While preaching against the secularization of society to their members from church pulpits, they would use their television presence to broadcast their message to hundreds of thousands of Americans and beg them to join them in combating the moral decay of society. It is the emergence of this political activist presence that this paper will examine next.

As was previously discussed, the social upheavals of the 1960's and 1970's, the Supreme Court rulings and what was seen as Congress' interference in the lives of Americans led to the politicization of Christian fundamentalism, a force that continues to influence politics to the present day. Additionally, the strength this movement gained from the wealth of the Sunbelt put it in a position where it could have political influence. While numerous organizations resulted from the desire of fundamentalist Christians to

influence politics, this paper will look at one in particular: Moral Majority, Inc. The story of its founder, the Rev. Jerry Falwell, and the organization's origins and rapid climb to power embody the nature of the growth and politicization of Christian fundamentalism in the 1970's.

Jerry Falwell was an independent Baptist minister in Lynchburg, Virginia. He was educated at a bible college and came from a middle class family. Like many fundamentalists after 1925, he was originally a staunch advocate of isolation from politics. In fact, he was once quoted as saying, "Believing the Bible as I do, I would find it impossible to stop preaching the pure saving gospel of Jesus Christ, and begin doing anything else—including fighting communism, or participating in civil rights reforms . . . Preachers are not called to be politicians but to be soul winners." [81] As a preacher of what would become a mega church, Falwell was an extremely influential figure by the mid 1970's. The growth of his church corresponded with the increasing urbanization and wealth of Virginia in the 1970's. Not only had Richmond been expanding, but also what are now considered the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. The location of Falwell's church, Lynchburg, saw a 23.4% population increase between 1970 and 1980, the highest since 1930.[82] In 1956, Falwell established the Thomas Road Baptist Church in a former soda bottling plant. In 1964, an auditorium was added. By 1967, membership had increased and a new church with three times the capacity of the bottling plant was built. In the early 1990's, membership had reached over 18,000.[83] By the 1980's, the church had a nursing and adoption home (an alternative to abortion), a center for alcoholics and a youth summer camp on an island in the middle of the James River.

Once his church had become big enough, Jerry Falwell employed the modern methods used by many fundamentalists. He broadcast his church services to a large audience via radio and television on a program called the "Old Time Gospel Hour." According to Steve Bruce, in 1981, "the services in Thomas Road Baptist Church [were] recorded and broadcast on . . . 392 television and 600 radio stations."[84] Through his broadcasts, Falwell was able to reach a broad audience. Not only was his church membership 18,000, but non-members were tuning into the broadcasts. Through television broadcasts and increasing membership, fundamentalist preachers like Falwell were able to see their influence grow.

Authors Robert Wuthnow and Matthew P. Lawson have argued that by the late 1970's, the South was in a position to have a real and serious influence on American politics, and that conservative churches naturally followed. "As the South acquired a new economic base during these years, many of its churches and meetinghouses gained new resources as well as a sense of entitlement in national political affairs."[85] With his mega-church and popularity on television, Falwell certainly had a feeling of entitlement by the late 1970's. He was also just as angry over the government's intervention in social affairs as many other conservative residents of the Sunbelt states. Fully aware of his influence and prestige, in 1979, Falwell founded the Moral Majority, Inc. with various other pastors, including Timothy LaHaye, author of the famed *Left Behind* series.

In 1981, Falwell stated that the common concern of the Moral Majority was "to formulate a nonpartisan political organization to promote morality in public life and to combat legislation that favored the legalization of immorality."[86] A good definition of

what the Moral Majority, Inc. actually did is provided by Sharon Georgianna. In her 1989 book on the Moral Majority, she defined it as a social movement organization consisting of four branches. The first branch, Moral Majority, Inc., was handled lobbying and influencing legislators on all levels. The second branch, the Moral Majority Foundation, was focused on educating ministers and laity with knowledge on voter registration drives. The third branch, the Moral Majority Legal Defense Fund, combated the American Civil Liberties Union. Finally, the fourth branch was called the Moral Majority Political Action Committee, and it supported the campaigns of conservative Christian candidates.[87]

The Moral Majority became the most influential political Christian fundamentalist organization in the world. By 1983, it had offices in eighteen states, including Washington, D.C. Jerry Falwell's television program, the *Old Time Gospel Hour*, promoted the objectives of the Moral Majority. In 1989, it was said that 62 telephone operators took pledges following each broadcast. This program also had a mailing list asking for pledges. Through his television and radio broadcasts, which by 1989 had been broadcast from 392 stations, Falwell was able to demand millions of dollars from over six and a half million conservative members and viewers and use this money towards media campaigns and funding conservative candidates. [88] Others have suggested that membership reached four million, with two million donors.[89]As shown earlier, the television programs of fundamentalists had already been gaining popularity among Americans. With the popularity of his program, Falwell and his associates were able to ask for money to fight what they saw as issues threatening to "traditional" American values and the over-secularization of government. They effectively lobbied against gay rights, abortion, pornography, and equal rights for women. As shown earlier, each of

these issues had emerged in the 1960's and 1970's and disturbed many conservative Americans. Naturally, they were happy to support Falwell in his crusade.

The efforts of Falwell also largely contributed to the elections of conservative candidates who shared their religious and social views. They did this through their media efforts and political action committee. The best example of this occurred in 1980. In that year, Falwell and his Moral Majority were instrumental in electing President Ronald Reagan, who had been a conservative governor of California during the 1960's and hailed from the Southwestern region of the Sunbelt. Their efforts to elect religiously conservative Congressional candidates were equally as strong.

Less than twenty years after its foundation, the Moral Majority was dissolved. Its influence, however, as well as the influence of other conservative Christians, has continued to this day. Dozens of such organizations continue to demand that the government legislate on issues of morality that reflect conservative Christian values. Abortion and gay marriage continue to be contentious issues and their opponents often cite the biblical passages to legitimize their opposition. Recently, Governor Rick Perry of Texas happily signed into law a bill that he had previously championed restricting abortions. Other likeminded politicians have pushed for similar measures. Naturally, organizations continue to represent their anger. Furthermore, fundamentalists such as Jimmy Swaggert continue to broadcast their views to millions of Americans on television. Mega-churches continue to thrive in the South and bible institutes still exist. It can be fair to say that Christian fundamentalism still exists in the United States and will continue to for a long time.

Summary of Findings on Christian Fundamentalism

As has been shown, in the century between 1880 and 1980, the United States dramatically changed in many ways. At the dawn of the 20th century, the Northeast and northern Midwest had industrialized and modernized, leading to mass urbanization and pluralism. The conditions of these regions facilitated the spread of secular and rational ideas. At the same time, however, the lower classes of the population suffered under the conditions accompanying modernization. Following World War II, the South and Southwest caught up with the North. Defense and oil industries as well as fiscally conservative policies allowed for further industrialization and urbanization of the regions. For the first time in a century, the southern population was a formidable presence in the country. They were also not ready to accept many of the socially liberal and secular ideas permeating the United States government in the 1960's and 1970's.

Christian fundamentalism in the United States emerged because of the changes described above. In the early and late 20th century, modernization/industrialization, secularization/rationalization, changing social, political and economic conditions, urbanization and migration that occurred in the North and the South gave fundamentalists a reason to exist. Christian fundamentalists would assume the role of the defender of traditions and 'American values' in a social, political and intellectual environment that was constantly changing. The fundamentalists could attract people of all economic statuses yearning for stability and independence while preaching on inerrancy and pushing for the reversal of secular-minded decisions. At the same time, the leaders of the

fundamentalist movement and their followers employed modern methods to gain more influence in government and politics.

Section Three: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Case of Egypt

In February 2011, revolutionaries in Egypt toppled the thirty-year autocratic and repressive regime of President Hussayn Mubarak. In the year that would follow, the military would control the country until finally allowing Egyptians to elect their president and parliamentary members, most of which belonged to the Islamic fundamentalist organization known as the Society of Muslim Brothers, or the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a turning point in Egyptian history. For over nearly a century, Islamic fundamentalists in the country had been influencing the Egyptian population and challenging the secular nature of the governments. By 2011, they had gained so much influence in the country that through the military, they could force Mubarak, the successor of a whole line of corrupt but secular minded rulers, to release the reins of government. For over a year, they dominated the government and attempted to change Egypt from a secular to an Islamic and Sharia minded state.

However, despite the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood among Islamist Egyptians, many in the country promoting secular values, as well as others, saw the regime as autocratic and ineffective. As the economy worsened, anger towards the government became stronger. By July of 2013, the military once again secured power following widespread public protests against Morsi’s autocratic regime. Today, violent

clashes between pro and anti-Islamist protestors occur on a regular basis on the streets of Alexandria and Cairo.

The events of the last two years have indicated that while Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism have not won the hearts of every Egyptian, especially those advocating secularity, they have still generated a large following in the country. In trying to make sense of Egypt's changing political situation and the growing popularity of conservative religious parties, people all over the world ask the same questions: who are Islamic fundamentalists and what is the Muslim Brotherhood? Are they radical 'terrorists' or are they really the true representatives of the Egyptian population? Finally, why did they gain such a strong following among the Egyptian population? The second half of this paper seeks to answer these questions through an examination of the origins of Islamic fundamentalism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Egypt's 2011 revolution was the result of an intellectual current that began in the 1870's and would manifest itself as a popular movement multiple times throughout the 20th century. As was the case with the discussion on Christian fundamentalism, the aim of this section of the paper is to observe the origins of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Egypt in the first half of the 20th century and its resurgence in the 1970's.

In the periods of its emergence in the late 19th century and resurgence in the 1970's, Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt can be attributed to many of the same conditions found in the case of the Christian fundamentalism in the United States. The forces of modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration and changing social, social, political and economic conditions similarly contributed to the rise

of Islamic fundamentalism. As can be expected, however, these conditions took on a different flavor in Northern Africa. In the late 19th century, it was the industrialization and modernization of Egypt by way of Europeanized rulers and British colonization that opened the door to the new forces of change. Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt began in the 1870's as an intellectual trend among those opposed to the westernizing influences of modernization and secularization. From the 1930's to early 1950's, it would gain strength as a popular movement among those most disenfranchised by the conditions of modernization, mainly the thousands of laborers who migrated to the country's fast-growing urban centers. By the 1970's, following twenty years of socialist policies expanding the middle class, the Egyptian state supported a "counterrevolution" involving westernized capitalist policies such as increased privatization and free trade agreements. These were policies similar to those espoused by the British, and they resulted in the creation of a large urban middle class. However, this newly created socio-economic group was subject to high unemployment rates and underemployment. Many of these middle-class citizens had migrated from the rural regions of the country, drawn by new employment opportunities in the public sector. Yet, the country's more capitalistic policies of the 1970's left this group underemployed and dissatisfied. Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970's became a powerful defender of this marginalized group, which faced a pro-western government oblivious to the needs of its citizens. Unlike its preceding movement in the first half of the 20th century, however, Islamic fundamentalism would attract many more followers and would gain more influence not only among the lower classes of society, but also the college educated middle class.

More specifically, when looking at the origins of early Egyptian Islamic fundamentalism, several points will be discussed in this paper. First, in the 19th century, Egypt went from being a province of the Islamic Ottoman Empire to a secular and westernized colony of the British Empire. As a result of rapid industrialization due to British and French domination, the country would see the emergence of economic modernization as well as an increasingly educated Westernized group of Egyptian elites. The economic modernization and educational policies of the British not only created an economic rift between rich and poor, but also provoked the rise of a disaffected educated class with restricted mobility. Second, the changes in Egyptian society and government led to the emergence of Islamic scholars promoting an Islamic worldview and way of life. Third, this intellectual movement, combined with disenchantment over the conditions that accompanied modernization, led to the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first political and social Islamic fundamentalist organization in the world. Fourth, the Muslim Brotherhood would act both as a social welfare organization to those marginalized by social and economic policies, and also as a revolutionary religious force challenging the secular and imperialist actions of the British colonizers. Finally, as a result of their promotion of anti-imperialism and anti-secularism, Islamic fundamentalists like the Muslim Brotherhood would be strongly oppressed by government forces from the 1940's onward.

Additionally, several specific points must be addressed when looking at the Islamic fundamentalist resurgence of the 1970s in Egypt. First, Gamal Abdel Nasser's (1918-1970) socialist policies in the 1950's and 1960's created a new demographic: an educated middle class seeking employment in the expanded public sector. Second, the

Muslim Brotherhood and other groups were brutally suppressed throughout the 1950's and 1960's by Nasser's government. This was mainly because many members were influenced by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who advocated for toppling the government through violent means. They in turn attacked numerous British and Egyptian officials with the intention of toppling the government and ending British influence. Third, when Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) became president in 1970, Egypt experienced a "counterrevolution" against the socialized policies of the earlier regime. In essence, Sadat emphasized more westernized capitalist economics and invested less in the public sector. This not only helped to create a great income disparity between the middle class formed by Nasser and wealthy elites, but also produced a large group of unemployed and underemployed educated young Egyptians. Fourth, in order to undermine his leftist and Nasserite opponents, Sadat allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to continue its philanthropic and political activities and encouraged Islamic fundamentalist student organizations to thrive. Finally, with their philanthropic activities and offer of an alternative life to secular Egypt, these Islamic fundamentalist organizations gained more influence than ever before, strongly impacting the political and public spheres from the late 1970's onward. They attracted many Egyptians who felt the government had failed them.

Egypt: 1805-1952

The story of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt parallels that of European imperialism in the 19th century. It also correlates with the modernization of Egypt, which began with the ascendancy of Muhammad Ali (1769-1849), an Albanian commander in the Ottoman Empire's army, who ruled Egypt between 1805 and 1848. Prior to 1805,

Egypt had been a part of the Ottoman Empire, but had been captured by the French in 1798. French domination lasted for only three years. Throughout much of the 18th and 19th centuries, France was the main imperialist rival to Britain. At the dawn of the 19th century, the two countries were also at war with each other. The annexation of Egypt by France troubled the British, seeking to dominate the Mediterranean and Asia, and it troubled the Ottoman Sultanate. At the Battle of Alexandria in 1801, the British allied with the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluks, a powerful group of feudal nobles who descended from the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt (1250-1517) and continued to indirectly dominate Egypt. Additionally, mercenaries from Albania, then a province of the Ottoman Empire, were invited in to combat the French. In the wake of the expulsion of the French in 1801 and evacuation of the British two years later, there was a power vacuum in Egypt and a power struggle between Ottoman Turks, the ruling Mamluk class and Albanian mercenaries soon followed. Through his intelligence and military might, Muhammad Ali would come out of this as a victor and force the Ottoman Sultan to name him the governor of Egypt. He would also gain a strong following among the Egyptian population and officials. Ali later declared himself as *khedive,* or viceroy, although this title wasn't officially recognized by the Sultan until 1867, when Egypt began to exert much more economic influence. Perhaps because of his popularity and military influence in Egypt, as well as the fact that the Ottoman Empire was weakening by the early 19th century, Ali was given a great deal of independence to deal with Egypt's internal political, social, and military issues.

Muhammad Ali is now considered to be the father of modern Egypt. He was greatly influenced by the European models of government and wanted to see Egypt

follow a similar path. He divided the country into governorates and districts that were taxed and where manpower for the army was drawn, as conscription had also been introduced by Ali. [90] Local officials of these districts were responsible for overseeing taxation, conscription, industry, security and numerous other things. Apart from creating districts with local officials, Ali greatly expanded the role of the central government when he created departments for education, foreign affairs, the army, the navy and treasury. Additionally, instead of maintaining the traditional warrior class of Egyptians, Ali created a new military base through his implementation of conscription, which drafted peasants into the army and required the services of European military advisors.[91]

It has been said that the military interests of Muhammad Ali led to increased entanglements with European powers, thus leading to colonial domination of Egypt. Being a former Ottoman military commander, Ali was greatly interested in military exploits and imperialist expansion. Having one of the world's largest standing armies and engaging in military campaigns, however, was costly. According to Jakob Petersen, author of *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State,* in order to maintain his military related activities, Ali financed the armed forces through trade with Europe, and more specifically, with France and Britain. As Petersen points out, "Trade with Europe, which had begun centuries before and had expanded in the 18th century, came to dominate already around 1820 . . . and Muhammad Ali favored the growth of rice, sugar, and especially cotton."[92] Clearly, he believed that increased trade with Europe could bring more money into the country and fund his military desires.

While Muhammad Ali began the process of Egyptian modernization under European influence, it was during the reign of Ali's grandson, Ismail Pasha (1830-1895) that Egypt fell to European colonial domination in the 1870's. Ismail was a very westernized man. He had been educated in Europe and saw Egypt as more European than Ottoman.[93] His vision of Egypt as a Europeanized country had large consequences, namely because it undermined Ottoman imperial power through the formation of an Egyptian nation-state. His break from Ottoman rule took place over time, largely due to the fact that while Ottoman power was waning, Egypt's political and economic power via colonial influence was increasing. During the 1860's, Ismail gained independence from the Sultan when making treaties and financial arrangements for Egypt, and borrowed heavily from European powers in order to finance his military ventures and modern public works projects. "His pursuit of his conquests in the Sudan, his massive and continuous borrowing abroad to finance both his public projects and private affairs, the expenditures entailed in the digging and opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, all led to near bankruptcy and the imminent interference of certain European powers in the affairs of Egypt."[94] Up until 1871, France was Egypt's largest financial backer. By that year, however, France's power waned and Ismail looked to the British for financing. Due to increasing interest in their eastern colonial acquisitions as well as Ismail's efforts in granting British firms engineering contracts for public works and projects related to the Suez Canal, Britain increased its presence in the country. In addition to inviting the British into Egypt, such public works projects, like the construction of a vast railroad and several new buildings, would invite to the country thousands of European workers who had the technical skills to construct such projects.[95]

The 1870's saw the diminishment of Egypt's independence. In the mid-1870's, the Egyptian government found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. After the end of the American Civil War (1860-1865), Egypt lost its dominant influence in the cotton trade. During the war, the United States Union forces had blocked cotton exports from the Southern states. The Egyptian cotton industry was able to benefit from this blockade. However, once the blockade was removed, Europe resumed importing American cotton at a relatively cheap price, greatly reducing Egyptian exports and leaving the majority of the Egyptian population in poverty. At the same time, Ismail continued to pursue military expeditions in places such as Crete and Abyssinia and promoted large public works projects in spite of Egypt's economic fragility. In an effort to make money, Ismail sold all of his shares of the Suez Canal Company to the resource hungry British (a total of 176,602 shares) and essentially lost control of the Canal.[96] In 1876, he requested British help in bailing out Egypt's failing economy. As an indirect result, the Caisse de Dette was formed by representatives from various European creditors and gained control of Egypt's debt. Ultimately, this led to dual control by the British and French of revenue and expenditure in the country and the establishment, at the insistence of the European powers, of a constitutional ministry. After Ismail dissolved this ministry in 1879 in protest against his subservience to the colonial powers, Britain and France used the influence of the Ottoman Sultan to remove Ismail and elect his son as ruler. While essentially ruling Egypt through a puppet leader, by 1882, the British held some of the highest positions in government, the military and business.

Resentful of the power and influence that the British had gained, the Egyptian political and military elite increasingly called for their ouster. In 1882, after a rebellion

led by Egyptian army general Ahmed Urabi (1841-1911) tried to remove British elites from leadership positions, Great Britain responded by using its superior military technology to squash the rebellion and bombed Alexandria and Cairo at the Battle of Tel el-Kabir. Following the battle, Britain occupied Egypt as a colonial power and would do so in some form until 1952.

While the British saw their occupation as temporary, they did everything in their power to influence the infrastructure and society of Egypt. After all, they wanted an easy and efficient passage to their eastern colonies via the Suez Canal. In order to achieve financial stability, British colonial administrators set out to reorganize Egypt's financial and agricultural system. Between 1890 and 1895, numerous taxes, such as the land tax and taxes on the peasantry, were reduced as they were likely seen as aversive to productivity. Britain also wished to modernize the hydraulics and agricultural system of the country and was able to do so successfully. In government, officially, the British only had consultative powers, but in reality, they were the ones in charge. The British were restricted to advise in the Ministries of War, Public Works and Finance. After 1890, their influence in the Ministries of Justice and Interior, formerly restricted to Egyptians, increased.[97]

Perhaps the most important thing the British did in Egypt in regard to the rise of fundamentalism in the country was their encouragement of westernization of the population via education and culture. This began under Ismail. During his reign, as Egypt became more influenced by Europe, the growing Europeanized elite became concerned with Egyptians acquiring Europeanized education, which they believed was a requisite

for a modern Egypt. Prior to the 1850's, education was mainly dominated by the clergy and religious elites. The Muslim *ulama*, or Muslim legal scholars and clergy, generally went to religious schools to learn about Islam, but secular educational opportunities were scarce. Intellectuals, as well as Ismail, believed this had to change. In 1868, a Primary School Law was passed, which created "a general system of primary schools with central administration and control, funded by public donations, fees and awqaf."[98] In 1873, a school for girls was opened. Because of Ismail's efforts, it is estimated that 17.5% of children age six to twelve received an education. This is in contrast to 5% during the time of Muhammad Ali.[99]

When Britain occupied Egypt, it expanded public education even further. "By 1906, there were about 4,500 village schools under government control teaching some 170,000 pupils."[100] Subjects that were taught included Arabic, French, English, geography, math and sciences.[101] Furthermore, British educational policy allowed institutes of higher learning (such as law and medical schools) in Egypt to thrive. For example, in 1902, the number of Egyptian medical students was 28. By 1911, it had more than doubled.[102] The main reason Britain encouraged an expansion of education was because they wanted to create a more technologically efficient population of Egyptians and an educated class of bureaucrats. Primary and secondary schools became mandatory for government service.[103] Thus, the British not only encouraged public education for the masses, but a western higher education for the elite. Furthermore, a whole new generation of Egyptians studied in Europe. The heads of Egypt wanted it to be Europeanized because they believed that would lead to progress.[104] Additionally, more western

literature and ideas were available to young men and women in Egypt. Such policies would create the future politicians and intellectuals of Egypt.

Unfortunately, the very policies of economic modernization and education championed by the British created an even sharper division between rich and poor. While the poor consisted of a majority of Egypt's population, a very small %age of people carried most of Egypt's wealth. This was especially true in the rural parts of the country. A passage in Robert Tignor's *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* provides an excellent picture of the situation of most Egyptians in 1914:

> The agricultural and administrative reforms sponsored by the British tended to increase the economic power of the large, landholding classes . . . Furthermore, the continued extension of private landholding rights and the rationalization of the judiciary enabled the big landholders to aggrandize their holdings at the expense of the smaller peasantry. . . The emergence of both rural and urban proletariats in Egypt indicated the fragmentation of communal and kinship Egypt into distinct social and economic classes.[105]

There were no significant changes to the situation of most lower class Egyptians after 1914. During this period, perhaps because of a world war and a global economic depression, cotton and other agricultural exports saw a sharp decline. This greatly affected the majority of those living in the countryside relying on agriculture. "Nearly half the peasant families were landless, and millions of others owned miniscule plots that could not provide even minimal subsistence." [106] By contrast, a small percentage of wealthy landowners owned three quarters of the land.[107]

As landowners thrived and conditions grew worse, many rural peasants accelerated a trend that had been occurring for decades: they migrated to the rapidly

expanding cities hoping to earn better wages. The urban population of Egypt greatly expanded in the early 20th century. A good example is the largest city in Egypt, Cairo. Between 1882 and 1937, Cairo's population is said to have tripled. In 1882, when the first census was conducted in Egypt, the population was 347,000. In 1907, this number had climbed to 678,433 inhabitants. Thirty years later, the population had reached 1.3 million.[108] By 1947, the population had reached 2.1 million, roughly 12.2 % of Egypt's entire population.[109] The populations of other urban provinces such as Alexandria and Gharbia, had reached 928,237 and 2.3 million respectively. Britain's involvement in World War II led to further rural to urban migration, as the need for industrial manpower and wartime services increased. "At the height of the war effort, Allied army workshops and services employed over 200,000 Egyptians, of whom some 10,000 were male clerks, and some 80,000 were skilled or semi-skilled workmen."[110]Thousands of rural Egyptians migrated to cities such as Cairo to reap the benefits of this industrial increase.[111]

The problems faced by the average rural peasant did not end after moving to the city. A story that often accompanies rapid industrialization through capitalism is the impoverishment of the majority. The masses of Egyptians who had migrated to the cities lived in squalid conditions. Wages for laborers were low and work conditions were poor in factories and other sectors.[112] At the same time, modern social welfare systems were not particularly developed under the British. This was the case for most industrialized countries in the early 20th century. As more impoverished Egyptians populated the cities, urban slums increased. In Cairo, a process similar to the 'white flight' of 1950's and 1960's America took place, in which elites and foreigners fled the old part of the city and populated more modern neighborhoods. Andre Raymond, author of *Cairo,* explains:

> The more well to do had abandoned the old city [older sections of Cairo], preferring to live in modern neighborhoods that had more amenities of every kind, and the old quarters were tending to become a refuge for the most downtrodden and recently arrived segments of the population. As the old city became more proletarian, its decline accelerated, as was evident in its increasingly shabby appearance and reduced business activity.[113]

This sense of socio-economic disparity was particularly noticeable to Hassan al-Banna, the future founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. When Banna arrived in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia in 1927, he was disgusted by what he saw. In the 1920's, Ismailia and other areas near the Canal were full of foreign influence. "Here were not only the British military camps, but, equally hateful to Banna, the Suez Canal Company; complete foreign domination of the public utilities; and the conspicuously luxurious homes of the foreigners overlooking the 'miserable' homes of their workers."[114] When World War II drew to a close in the mid-1940's, allied troops were withdrawn from Egypt, promptly aggravating the process of urban decay. Upon withdrawal, an estimated 250,000 Egyptians became unemployed.[115]

Egypt's poor were not the only ones who were unhappy in the first half of the 20th century. Due to the sense of ethnic and cultural superiority that British imperialists demonstrated toward Egyptians at the turn of the century, the elites that had been created through Europeanization and Western education were restricted in their mobility. After 1890, the British dominated the higher positions in Egyptian society. In 1920, it was reported through official British sources that Egyptians held less than a quarter of higher positions, despite the fact that since 1905, the number of Egyptian officials in the government had increased from 45 to 51%.[116] The dissatisfaction of the political and economic elites, as well as the peasantry, led to a rebellion in 1919 against the British

occupiers. Elites were angered by British domination in business and the legal exemptions that foreigners held in the country; the peasantry was angered by the conscription of 1.5 million Egyptians into a war that most of them didn't have a stake in. Following the war, a growing group of lower middle class Egyptians continued to face restrictions by the British influenced constitutional monarchy.[5] With the global depression of the 1930's, this group also faced unemployment.

The economic modernization and secular policies of Ismail and the British had a lasting impact on Egyptian society. The elites wanted more power and mobility; the peasantry and lower middle class wanted employment and better conditions. Additionally, due to European colonization and Egypt's distancing itself from the Ottoman Empire, what was once an Islamic society had now become secular and westernized. This set the stage for the formation of an intellectual, anti-secular current that would pose the greatest challenges to the British, but also to succeeding generations of secular minded rulers in Egypt.

The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt: Early Thinkers

In the early years, Islamic fundamentalism was first and foremost a reaction against European domination and the very changes that colonial powers brought to the region. As was shown, modernization through Europeanization brought changes to almost every area of Egyptian society. Agriculture and irrigation were modernized, taxes became systematic, public education became widespread and a vibrant middle class and elite had formed in Egypt. Additionally, Egypt's cities became cosmopolitan

[5] The lower middle class included merchants, civil servants, artisans and other men of this sort.

communities full of Europeans and middle and upper class Egyptians who emulated Parisians and Londoners in appearance, intellect and cultural knowledge. What's more, Egypt had distanced itself more from its Islamic past, as legal courts moved from Sharia law to secular laws, and education was expanded beyond the clergy.

While many Egyptian intellectuals championed liberalism and secularism, several scholars of the late 19th century were disgusted by the fact that Egypt had become so heavily influenced by Europe that its true identity had disappeared. In the late 19th century, many intellectuals believed that Islam and Islamic society had become corrupted and because of this, Egypt had fallen to the colonists. These feelings were at the heart of Islamic fundamentalist ideologies. Around the 1870's, a political activist named Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) had moved to Egypt and began preaching about an ideology that chastised Islam for becoming too mystical, decadent and superstitious. Additionally, he believed his faith had become further corrupted by the rigid and orthodox *ulama*, the body of Islamic scholars and clerics who teach, preach, and interpret Islamic law. In sum, al-Afghani believed Islam had become irrelevant in the world. He proposed reforming Islam and stressing that its basic essentials were compatible with modernization and rationality. As author David Zeidan explains of al-Afghani:

> [He] was dedicated to resisting imperialism and to reviving Islam's lost glory by reforming a decadent and superstitious Islam . . . He tried to bridge a gap between modern secularists and religious traditionalists, stressing that reason had been integral to early and classical Islam and that Islamic essentials are compatible with science."[117]

In al-Afghani's understanding, pure Islam was a "comprehensive way of life encompassing the societal and political as well as the personal spheres.[118]

Another intellectual, Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), an Egyptian Islamic jurist, agreed with al-Afghani that Islam had become irrelevant because of a corrupt *ulama*, as well as the prevalence of superstition and mysticism within the faith. ‘Abduh promoted a return to ‘pure’ Islam and believed that the fundamentals were not in conflict with modernity. "’Abduh’s reforms aimed at discovering the real intent behind Islam’s unchanging fundamentals and implementing them in educational and social reforms that selectively appropriated aspects of the West not contrary to Islam."[119] The ideas of ‘Abduh and al-Afghani influenced Salafism, a movement most associated with Rashid Rida (1865-1935), a Syrian who moved to Egypt in 1897. According to one author, Salafism saw Islam as "the religion of reason, nature and science, and sought to restore its initial vitality by freeing it from traditionalism."[120] It was a call for a rational religion that rejected mysticism and the rigid traditions of the *ulama* and demanded a return to Islam’s original sources and texts to redevelop Islamic laws and government. Rida witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1920. He believed that the original Islamic sources and laws could be used as the basis for a restored Caliphate that would work as a sort of democracy in which representatives would govern through consultation with the people.[121] Furthermore, the Salafi movement advocated educational and social reforms, which included increasing the number of schools and creating welfare programs for the poor.[122]

Islamic Fundamentalism and the Muslim Brotherhood: 1928-1952

Out of these ideas, especially those of the Salafis, emerged the first major Islamic fundamentalist organization in the world—the Muslim Brotherhood. In the first decade of

the 21st century, it has become the most influential entity of its kind, with branches in nearly all of the Arab countries. From June 2012 to July 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was the dominant force in the Egyptian government. Nearly a century ago, however, it was a developing organization looking to see how it could challenge Britain and create a new Islamic society. Its history is the story of how modern Islamic fundamentalism came to proliferate in Egypt and across the world.

The Muslim Brotherhood, or the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1948) in 1928. Professionally, al-Banna was a school teacher and imam in Ismailia, a city in Northeastern Egypt on the west bank of the Suez Canal. In 1923, al-Banna, then 17 years old, arrived in Cairo to study at Dar al-'Ulum, a higher teacher training school. In Cairo, he became exposed to things that horrified him as a conservative Muslim. According to Richard Mitchell, author of the 1969 book *The Society of the Muslim Brothers,* al-Banna was disturbed by attacks on tradition in the Muslim world, embodied by the secular Kemalist revolution in Turkey; the secular influences in universities; the secular nature of literary, academic and social societies and coffee houses; the secular nature of the media and most importantly, British dominance of all sectors of business and government.[123] He believed he saw the weakening of religion and the victory of British-induced secularism and decadence. Al-Banna made connections in Cairo and, along with several students from Dar al-'Ulum and Egypt's famous Azhar University, he began preaching about the importance of Islam and promoted an Islamic life as an alternative to westernization. He took his message to mosques, and also to coffee houses and other meeting places where young, educated Egyptians gathered. Al--Banna believed that youth was the best group to reach, because

they had been most corrupted by western education and ideas.[124] In 1927, he was hired in Ismailia, a city west of the Suez Canal, as an Arabic teacher after graduating from Dar al-'Ulum.

Having gained a reputation as an *imam*, or religious teacher among laborers and the lower classes, in 1928, al-Banna founded the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailia, where he was shocked to see the inequality between foreign elites and the urban laborers. The purpose of the Brotherhood was to promote the implementation of traditional Islamic doctrine in all aspects of life. During the period of colonization, it was seen as an "indigenous Islamic protest movement against the forces of change and modernity, government corruption and social and economic injustice, and foreign influence."[125] By 1930, it would become a center of the community and with the help of the Suez Canal Company, a mosque was built, followed by a school for boys and girls. Additionally, clubs were created.[126]

Throughout the 1930's, the Muslim Brotherhood was seen as an organization that provided both education and welfare to the lower and middle classes and it was for this reason that it grew popular. While acting in a philanthropic manner, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to propagate its ideas of a return to a more Islamic society. In the beginning, it can be said that its main concern was with social morality and education. The 1920's through the 1940's was a period of great social and political unrest in Egypt. On a political level, there was strong resentment of the British. In 1923, the British allowed for the creation of a constitutional monarchy consisting of a monarch with Egyptian parliamentarians. However, with the constitution came a continued presence of

British advisors and officials. Furthermore, the monarch would be heavily influenced by the British. This continued influence angered Egyptian elites, many of whom had rebelled against the empire in 1919.

While elites festered, conditions for most Egyptians were far from perfect in 1914 and this had not changed by the 1930's. Most Egyptians continued to feel economic burdens and disdained what they saw as a corrupt, westernized monarchy and an unfair economic advantage held by the Europeanized elites. In 1929, the Great Depression, which impacted economies across the globe, didn't make the situation any better as urban unemployment in Egypt increased.[127] During this same time, the Muslim Brotherhood had moved its headquarters to Cairo and expanded its preaching and welfare activities into more communities. Lectures at its headquarters became more frequent and increasingly popular. As one author said, "it was an educational movement fighting the powers of imperialism and crusaderism by building schools and clinics, arranging meetings, preaching and engaging people in social and religious work."[128] Some of the services it offered in the 1930's included hospitals and adult literacy classes held at mosques and coffee shops. In 1933, the Brotherhood took an even larger step towards spreading its influence when it purchased a printing press and opened a publishing company.[129]

By 1937, the Brotherhood claimed to have 216 branches. The number is said to have reached around 1,000 in 1940.[130] Initially, the organizational structure consisted of local branches, district representatives and a "central body" led by elected leaders. It also expanded its "Rover Scouts" program, in which young men were trained in athletics and

an Islamic lifestyle and conducted charitable work. They also connected with other branches and strengthened bonds. By 1940, there were over 2,000 members of the Rover Scouts program and units in 42 towns. In the eyes of many Egyptians, they were the face of the Society.[131] By the late 1930's, the Brotherhood was training young men to recruit people in the countryside and spread the message of an Islamic society. Through its youth and media campaigns, the Brotherhood successfully propagandized its message throughout all of Egypt.[132]

In the late 1930's, the Muslim Brotherhood expanded its mission to include not only the improvement of society through welfare and religious education, but also the complete change of government from a secular to an Islamic one. The mission of the Muslim Brotherhood would remain this way until the present day. In 1938, Hassan al-Banna announced in its newspaper *al-Nadhir* that the Brotherhood would begin engaging in politics. Its growth as an organization, disgust towards the lack of social welfare, and continuing anger against the British colonial influence may have contributed to its push into politics. The Muslim Brotherhood's entrance onto the political scene is often viewed as a reaction against the established political elite and parties. According to Mitchell, "[it] saw the Egyptian state as a colony under British tutelage; despite official independence in the early 1920's . . . It sought both to rid the country of undesirable forces and to establish an Islamic system."[133] Al-Banna also saw the existing political parties as incompetent and lacking in morality. He believed that there was a difference between politics and political parties and advocated for getting rid of political parties, arguing that they made decisions based on rivalries and self-interest and did not keep the will of the

people in mind. Parties were at this time also dominated by a political elite and patronage networks that were largely influenced by British advisors.[134]

The Muslim Brotherhood of the 1940's had two goals when it came to politics and governance. First, it proposed reforming the government to a system based on Islamic and Sharia law. Like the Salafis, the Islamic fundamentalist thinkers who were among the first to propose an Islamic government, al-Banna believed that Islam could embrace all aspects of life, including law and government. Second, the Brotherhood was a champion of economic and social reform, particularly those reforms that were considered to be more socialist in nature. It was these policies that made it especially popular as a political force. As author Brynjar Lia so clearly points out:

> The Society's reform program appealed particularly to the educated lower middle class not only because of its fervent anti-imperialistic stance towards the colonial powers but also because of the attention given to the worsening economic conditions of the effendia, in particular junior civil servants and professionals.[135]

Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood addressed "the economic grievances of wider sections of the lower middle classes, including petty traders, small landowners and artisans." The Society's emphasis on socialization and economic nationalization in politics became very popular with the lower middle classes and peasantry.[136] Hassan al-Banna had acquired so much of a following that he considered running for as an MP for the district of Ismailia in 1942. However, Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha asked him to withdraw. The leader of the Brotherhood did so in exchange for the abolishment of prostitution, government action against the selling of alcohol and freedom for the Brotherhood to continue without harassment.[137]

Something else that made the Muslim Brotherhood popular was its vocal and covert agitation against the British and Egyptian government. While the Egyptian government pledged its support for the war effort, the Brotherhood continued to criticize the British. In reaction, the British suppressed the Brotherhood's publications and arrested many of its leaders, including al-Banna, who was arrested twice for his activities.[138] To make matters more complicated, in the early 1940's, a military apparatus of the organization had been developed. One of the ideologies that espoused by some in the Brotherhood was *jihad,* or 'struggle' against those who are perceived as threatening Islam or Islamic societies. By this time, many were to quickly topple the government via revolution. At first, al-Banna wanted to take a more moderate approach. He advocated the idea of "Battalions," groups of civil servants, workers, students and merchants who would receive spiritual instruction and physical training. When ready, these Battalions would declare war on their enemies.[139] After this approach had apparently failed and some members demanding immediate military action broke off and formed an organization called 'Muhammad's Youth', al-Banna created an apparatus called "the Secret Organization," which was designed to dismantle non-Islamic governments.

The members of the Muslim Brotherhood who promoted toppling the government and its nationalism in the post-war years led to the suppression and dissolution of the Brotherhood. In the years following World War II, both the dominant Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood were in agreement that Britain had to go. However, they disagreed on terms of negotiation for independence. In 1946, the Egyptian Prime Minister Sidqi Pasha returned to Egypt from London with independence negotiations that the Brotherhood found unacceptable. The Secret Organization promptly began to attack

British foreigners and Egyptian officials, including the president of the Court of Appeal, Ahmed El-Khazindar Bey, who was assassinated by members of this group. While attacking British and Egyptian officials, the Brotherhood sent members of its military apparatus to join Palestinians in their fight against the Israelis. Seeking to remove a force that was undermining its authority and interests, and wishing to gain favorable negotiations with the British in order to legitimize its power, the Egyptian government further suppressed the Brotherhood. When the prime minister was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood in 1948, the Secret Organization was dissolved. Furthermore, although he condemned the assassination and other actions against Egyptian officials, al-Banna was murdered by those suspected to be government workers.[140] The Brotherhood continued to push against the Egyptian government after al-Banna's death. Despite its role in the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the Mulim Brotherhood would continue to be suppressed by the government.

The conditions created by modernization and secularization in Egypt allowed for the creation and growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. The secular atmosphere that had accompanied the loss of Egyptian independence prompted Islamists to promote a pure Islamic society. At the same time, the modern economic as well as secular and westernized culture promoted by the last independent monarchs and the British colonists created dissatisfied classes of Egyptians longing for an alternative lifestyle. The Muslim Brotherhood offered such an alternative. It provided education and welfare while agitating against oppressive forces. Additionally, it preached about a way of living different than the one that was perceived by many to have caused so much distress. As will be shown in the next section, the work of the

organization and popularity of Islamic fundamentalism would not end in the 1940's as much of the same problems faced by the average Egyptian in that time would plague them in the second half of the 20th century as well.

From Socialist Revolution to Counterrevolution: Egypt from 1970-1985

During the late 1950's and 1960's, Egypt was characterized by Arab nationalism and socialism. Arab nationalism was an idea that was promoted by President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) that called for the unification of all the Arab speaking countries into one state standing in opposition to the West. It was an incredibly popular ideology that was championed by many Egyptians. The height of its popularity was in the late 1950's, when Syria combined with Egypt to create the United Arab Republic. Nasser's government was also very socialist. This new type of government had broad implications for the population. Nasser's regime greatly expanded the government bureaucracy, dominated industry, and at the same time, expanded public and higher education opportunities so that average Egyptians could work for the government. As author Tarek Osman explains:

> Land reform, the major assets-confiscation programme, the dramatic growth in university education, the expansion in industry and services and the creation of a dominating public sector flattened the social curve; millions of previously poor Egyptians, through education and jobs in the public sector, joined the middle class. . . . Doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers, journalists, army and police officers and the millions working in the public sector's administrative structure constituted the bulk of the swelling middle class.[141]

With the expansion of the government and increased incentives for young people to go to school, Nasser created a huge middle class in Egypt, much of which championed

the Arab nationalism that its leader promoted. Furthermore, Nasser's policies isolated Egypt from the West. He was often considered by American politicians to have an affinity with communist governments, such as the Soviet Union. He generally discouraged diplomatic ties with western countries and their allies, especially the United States and Britain. This was evident in the anti-western protests Nasser fired up in response to the 1958 Baghdad Pact between Jordan and the United States.

Beginning in the 1970's, after the death of Nasser, Egyptian economic and government policies seemed to take a turn in an entirely opposite direction. It is this change that had huge implications for the Egyptian population and contributed to a new wave of Islamic fundamentalism and revival of the Muslim Brotherhood. After Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), Nasser's vice president from 1969-70 and one of the officers in the Free Officer's Corps who had toppled the monarchy in 1952, took power and embarked on an entirely different course than that of his predecessor. In contrast to Nasser's isolationism, Sadat believed in opening up economic and diplomatic ties with the West and other countries and promoted free trade. He believed that Egypt could be prosperous only by reducing the power of the public sector, encouraging the growth of the private sector, and staying out of costly foreign wars in the region. Sadat's policies would create an Egypt with large amounts of foreign investment, a thriving private sector and cordial diplomatic relations with Israel and the United States. In other words, Sadat's policies reflected the "old" westernized way more than Nasser's socialist policies had done.

Sadat's *al-infitah* policies, the policies that emphasized the private over the public sectors, began after 1973 when Egypt struck a hard blow against Israel in the Yom-Kippur War. Sadat had more popularity in his country at this time and could embark on his new strategy. Believing that Egypt could no longer succeed as an isolationist country, he lowered the military budget, opened up the country to foreign investment and provided taxation and labor incentives to foreign businesses that were attractive. Furthermore, he relaxed state regulations over labor and capital flows.[142] At the same time, Sadat reduced the power of the public sector by increasing investment and private sector activity. "The changes that *al-infitah* brought deprived the sector of vital investments, and, to a large extent, worsened its many administrative and incentization problems."[143] In keeping with his emphasis on the private sector, Sadat also decreased the effectiveness of social welfare programs such as education, healthcare and housing.[144]

Just as British policy had a large effect on the Egyptian peasantry and the lower middle class before the 1940's, *al-infitah* had a similar impact on the middle class created by Nasser. The very pre-revolutionary conditions that Nasser and his associates aimed to eradicate seemed to return on some level during the 1970's. Sadat's policies helped to create a huge economic disparity in Egypt that would last into the present day. The heavy investment in the private sector and free trade created huge income disparities between workers in the public and private sectors. Millions of people in the public sector stayed in jobs with little mobility while elites and graduates of top universities entered the private sector and earned high wages. Historians Glenn Perry and Tarek Osman argue that many of the Egyptians who benefitted from Sadat's policies were rich landowners, military and intelligence officers, monarchy-era families who had previously lost land under Nasser's

policies, foreign businessmen and elite university graduates.[145] The middle class that Nasser had created, most of which had entered the public sector, greatly suffered while a few people earned millions. To make matters worse, as the middle class's earnings stagnated, their purchasing power decreased as inflation ran around 14 % between 1975 and 1982. [146]

Another characteristic of the Sadat era was that there were too many college graduates and not enough jobs. As stated earlier, Nasser's policies promised government jobs to thousands of college graduates. By the mid-1970's, what author Carrie Rosefsky Wickham calls a "lumpen intelligentsia" had emerged, or a large group of educated but unemployed individuals. Like Nasser, Sadat continued to provide opportunities to young men and women to pursue higher education in spite of the fact that there were not enough jobs to match the graduation rates. Between 1974 and 1978, he added eight new universities to Egypt. He also increased the number of students from 40% of those who took the baccalaureate exam to 60% in the early late 1970's. The annual output of university students tripled from 41,916 in 1975 to 115,744 in 1985.[147] Unfortunately, at the same time, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian graduates who prepared to work in the public sector found that it couldn't absorb them. Additionally, less money was being put into the government and more into the private sector. Many graduates were forced to take lower class jobs, such as mechanical work and painting. Those who did find jobs in the government saw that their wages were either stagnate or declining as, a result of the higher demand for private sector jobs.[148] Still, many of those graduates who could not find jobs joined the hundreds of thousands of people in the region who migrated to the oil rich countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain. Thus, a massive brain drain

in Egypt occurred during the 1970's as well. The *al-infitah* policies of Sadat opened up Egypt to foreign investment and eased its tensions with the West and Israel, but it also hurt the middle class and created a huge wealth disparity and a large class of Egyptians with jobs that didn't match their education.

The Resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism

President Sadat's policies both intentionally and unintentionally contributed to the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. While some of his actions embraced fundamentalism for political purposes, his other actions caused a major upset among young and educated Egyptians who felt they had been cheated by the government and its new direction. Furthermore, just the general policies that Nasser had created in regards to education and its volatile state by the 1970's caused hundreds of thousands of young Egyptians to feel resentment and discontent. The environment of Egypt in the 1970's was perfect for an Islamic resurgence.

From 1954 to 1964, when Nasser provided amnesty to all its members, the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and many of its members were persecuted and arrested or executed. However, unlike the Christian fundamentalists in the United States, Muslim Brotherhood members continued to advocate for political reform on the sideline. One of the most influential Islamic fundamentalist thinkers of the 1960's was Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian leader in the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb challenged Nasser's government, arguing that it was completely un-Islamic and secular. He believed that the Egyptian government was in a state of *jahiliyyah*, which is an offensive term for "ignorant" pre-Islamic societies. Having travelled in the United States and witnessing

liberalities that he found disgusting, Qutb also believed the same level of social decay existed in western-influenced governments. Qutb believed that “true Muslims” had an obligation to overthrow the *jahiliyyah* government and put in its place an Islamic government based on Sharia law and pure Islamic doctrine.[149] Through his works *Social Justice* and *Milestones,* Qutb described how he believed Egypt’s and *all* governments should be. He believed that anything non-Islamic was evil and corrupt and must be fought through *jihad*, while Sharia law and Islamic doctrine offered a complete system that could extend into all areas of life. In many ways, he was like the *Salafis* and the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1940’s. Qutb believed that the rule of God overrode the rule of man, and that God’s laws are the most important. Thus, he argued that the world must be freed from repression under man’s laws, which are corrupted and impure, through living under Sharia and Islamic law.[6]

In the mid-1960’s, Qutb acted upon these theories and attempted to assassinate President Nasser. As a result, he was arrested and executed in 1966. After having barely survived the 1960’s, the Muslim Brotherhood took a step back from the ideologies promoted by Qutb and their numerous assassination attempts of government officials. At this point, the Brotherhood began a process of what has often been called ‘normalization.’ This normalization occurred in the 1970’s as a result of a new policy by Sadat. As a result of his very open free trade and capitalist policies, as well as his reduction of investment in the public sector, Sadat acquired a number of enemies. Some of the most vocal opponents of the time were socialist and Nasserist groups that had supported Nasser’s policies of isolation and big government. Sadat tried to a great extent

[6] A good version of Sayyid Qutb’s *Milestones* was published by American Trust Publications in 1991.

to undermine the power of the Nasserists, including arresting and executing Nasserist military officers and political officials.[150] He also sought to undermine their power by strengthening the power of Nasserites' biggest enemies, the Islamic fundamentalists. In the early 1970's, Sadat released many Muslim Brotherhood members and allowed the organization to exist publicly. Tarek Osman explains,

> In his efforts to confront Nasserite and socialist forces in Egypt, President Anwar Sadat unleashed Egypt's Islamic forces. He released thousands of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders and members from jail . . . and allowed the Brotherhood's old newspaper the *Call* to be reissued.[151]

Furthermore, he allowed the Brotherhood to continue its operations and philanthropic work with education, hospitals and welfare. Even more importantly, Sadat encouraged Islamic groups to gather at universities and to form their own professional associations.[152]

Perhaps because Sadat had offered to the Brotherhood what appeared to be an olive branch, the Brotherhood began to compromise more with the government. They believed that, after the tumultuous 1950's and 1960's, they had been provided a window in which they could influence society more. This idea of societal influence had driven the movement forward in the 1930's, although now it took a less radical form. A resurgent Brotherhood wanted to rebuild its structure and influence. Starting in the early 1970's, the movement began to reject militancy and actions that had once branded them as radicals in the previous twenty years. It also began concentrating on "building wide-based networks of social-welfare, economic, educational, and medical services and on penetrating and controlling university bodies and professional associations."[153]

The most important indicator of the Brotherhood's strategy of normalization and cooperation with the government came with its incorporation into parliamentary politics and its influence on legislation in the 1970's and 1980's. While still criticizing the government on corruption to some extent, the Brotherhood also began to cooperate with the Wafd party to a greater extent. As the leader of the organization in the 1970's and 1980's, 'Umar al-Tilimsani once said, "The Wafd is a legal conduit and the Brotherhood has a popular base, so what is wrong with them coordinating in this area to bring about good?"[154] At the same time, the organization had become what Barry Rubin describes as an "Islamic pressure group," meaning that in exchange for votes, the Wafd party and other politicians in the government would comply with Islamic laws and standards promoted by the Brotherhood.[155] The Wafd party even won many seats in the 1984 parliamentary elections because it had secured much of the Islamic vote, or the support of those most in line with the Brotherhood's ideology.[156] Ultimately, in the late 1980's, the Brotherhood begin to run its own candidates within established parties. In 1987, the "Islamic Alliance" of Liberal and Socialist Labor party candidates won 60 seats in parliament.[157]

Through cooperation with political parties and the legal system, the Brotherhood was able to exert its influence in the 1970's and 1980's and even get Islamic-influenced legislation passed into law. It could also influence the many professional associations, welfare organizations and universities in which it had branches. The Brotherhood became especially popular in the 1970's because it was seen as a popular organization that could, as Gehad Auda described it, "channel the quest for political reform and liberalization of the political system through state political institutions and not through demonstrations,

violence or strikes."[158] The middle class, who had been negatively affected by Sadat's policies, wanted a voice in government, and many saw their best representation to exist in the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Islamic fundamentalist resurgence in the 1970's was not only characterized by the 'normalization' of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the proliferation of Islamic student organizations and increasing influence of Islam over young and educated Egyptians. Often times, student organizations were in line with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and other less radical organizations. However, many were also inspired by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb. These student groups, in particular, formed various terrorist organizations promoting the installation of an Islamic government through violent revolution. Radical or not, these student organizations were an important factor contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism from the 1970's to the present day.

In the late 1960's, President Nasser allowed students at universities to form independent organizations. By continuing Nasser's pro-Islam policies, Sadat added to this concession by encouraging the formation of Islamic student groups on campuses, and even provided them with resources, such as monetary funding. As with Sadat's other Islamic policies, they were implemented as a counter influence to leftist and Nasserite forces, many of which had infiltrated universities. By the early 1970's, these Islamic groups had proliferated across campuses. A few years later, Islamic student organization members had gained control of the General Union of Egyptian Students, which is the central body of student unions all over Egypt. Additionally, Islamic organizations were gaining control of individual student unions at various universities across the country.[159]

Students were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as by more radical elements. While winning elections, Islamic student groups organized many events on campuses. According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham,

> Student activists held religious conferences and seminars; disseminated Islamic books and pamphlets on designated 'Islamic Days;' offered classes on the Qur'an, the Sunna, and Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh)* . . . in addition, they initiated a wide range of services, such as copying academic books at low rates…"[160]

Why Islamic fundamentalists were gaining popularity in the universities in the 1970s is something that numerous scholars have tried to address. Barry Rubin has suggested that Islamic fundamentalist student organizations were able to connect to their members and satisfy students' needs, providing them with a sense of community and stability. Quite often, Rubin points out, Egyptian students, especially those coming from rural backgrounds, felt a sense of displacement in the big city. "Students are responding to problems caused by modernity: anomie, career pressures, big city life, and new roles for women . . . which their upbringing and ideas have usually not prepared them. . . Islam provides an anchor in a sea of frightening, confusing change."[161] Furthermore, he states that Islamic societies provided services for students, such as helping to pay for textbooks, providing housing and organizing social events for meeting new friends.

It can also be said that students in universities in the 1970s recognized the economic and social hardships that they would be facing upon graduation and wanted to challenge those conditions. Islam offered an alternative lifestyle that was traditional and non-secular. They were inspired by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb. These points are made evident by the fact that student organizations were at the

forefront of the opposition to Sadat's government in the late 1970's. After the Camp David Accords in 1978, when Sadat showed that he would have cordial diplomatic relations with Israel, Islamic fundamentalists were outraged, including the Muslim Brotherhood and those in student organizations. Disillusionment among many student organizations led to protests and sometimes violence. In response to the growing number of students criticizing his economic and diplomatic policies, Sadat repressed these organizations. For example, in 1979, he decreed that university student organizations be eliminated and he limited student union positions, which had previously included students, to faculty members. He also required security forces at universities to monitor student activities.[162] Thus, as soon as the Islamic student organizations championed by Sadat began to thrive and become political, he greatly undermined their influence.

Despite Sadat's efforts, the work of student Islamic fundamentalists continued. This time, however, instead of focusing their efforts on campuses, young educated men and women joined others in promoting the ideas and philanthropic services of Islamic fundamentalist groups and spreading them across Egypt. As stated earlier, in the 1970's, Sadat's government allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to thrive and to continue its welfare and education efforts in cities and the countryside. Many other groups promoted similar programs, such as the *jami'yat.* The *jami'yat* was the name given to various organizations independent of the Muslim Brotherhood that promoted Islamic fundamentalism and provided social services to lower class Egyptians. They are also known as 'Islamic private voluntary organizations'. One author states that by the 1980's, the *jami'yat* had gained a crucial role among the Egyptian public by promoting a proper Islamic lifestyle and offering services such as clinics, schools, job-training and day-care centers.[163] Many

of these organizations are said to have received funding from wealthy Egyptian nationals living in the Gulf region, as well as from Islamic investment firms and banks.[164] While providing services for their communities, these organizations are known to have engaged in grassroots politics. Barry Rubin states that one group was able to successfully outlaw the sale of alcohol in a certain area due to effective campaigning.[165]

In the early 1980's, students and young educated Egyptians joined the *jami'yat* and Muslim Brotherhood in their community outreach activities. By the late 1970's, neighborhoods in Cairo and other urban areas in Egypt had become populated by young university graduates and their families. Author Carrie Rosefsky Wickham provides the best description of these *sha'bi* neighborhoods in Cairo:

> Cairo's *sha 'bi* neighborhoods contain tenement-style apartment buildings crowded together along narrow, often unpaved, alleyways. As of the early 1990's, some of these neighborhoods still had no indoor plumbing . . . Both within and across *sha 'bi* neighborhoods, residents varied considerably by education, income and degree of urbanization.

In the case of Cairo, young educated Egyptian professionals were attracted to these neighborhoods because of the housing shortage in the 1980's. Additionally, some people weren't being paid enough money to live in nicer neighborhoods. Thus, they were forced into these *sha'bi* sections of the city.[166]

It has been said that Islamic fundamentalism became popular in these areas for various reasons. First, the young educated professionals moving into the neighborhoods had been involved with Islamic organizations at their universities during the 1970's and along with the many *jami'yat* groups, became active in promoting Islamic values in their new communities. As Wickham states, "the typical Islamic activist at the neighborhood

level was a university graduate who had developed his or her Islamic affiliations as a secondary school or college student."[167] Many of the young professionals who moved to these neighborhoods were doctors, lawyers or engineers, and also served as *imams* on the side. A number of them volunteered with the various Islamic social services provided to local communities. Second, students that had their activities monitored and restricted by the government often became involved in outreach to these neighborhoods and joined *jami'yat* groups and the Muslim Brotherhood.[168]

It can also be said that the men and women who became involved with Islamic fundamentalism in these communities sought to create an alternative lifestyle to the socially-stratified, secular one created by Sadat. They believed the answer was to increase the role of Islam in the lives of their neighbors. The ideology that motivated them most was that of the *da'wa.* The *da'wa* is the obligation to spread the message of Islam and its doctrines to others. Committed Muslims are called to spread the Word of Allah and to encourage their audience to live an Islamic way of life. According to Wickham, "the prototypical target of Islamic outreach was the 'ordinary Muslim,' who was born into the faith, was more or less observant, but did not realize all the rights and obligations that a full commitment to Islam entailed."[169]

Because many in the western world assume that all Islamic fundamentalists are terrorists, it must be briefly noted that the violent jihadist message of Sayyid Qutb continued to resonate among a small minority of fundamentalists. In Egypt, these people have often been characterized as being part of the *jama 'at,* an umbrella term for all radical and violent fundamentalist groups existing in the country. Many of these groups

were formed in the late 1970's by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood and young university graduates in response to what was viewed as a compromise between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood and the unfair secular policies of Sadat. An example of such an organization was al-Jihad, which means, 'xxx'. Al-Jihad was formed in the mid-1970s at the University of Asyut, a school with a religiously conservative student body. According to Barry Rubin, al-Jihad grew under the leadership of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, an engineer in Alexandria. The organization under Faraj mainly attracted poor students from rural backgrounds. It consisted of three sub-committees: propaganda, military training and funding for the purchase of weaponry.[170] The climax of al-Jihad's popularity and success was when it assassinated Sadat in 1981. Soon afterwards, the government cracked down on all of its leaders, including Faraj.

Many radical *jama 'at* such as al-Jihad never gained a large base of support because of their cult-like nature. The *da'wa* activities of young student activists were much more appealing to the masses in Egypt. Clearly, they were also less dangerous than those engaging in terrorist activities against the Egyptian and 'infidel' governments. Thus, it must be understood that while some Islamic fundamentalists radicalized and became terrorists, the vast majority of Egyptian fundamentalists did not engage in such activities. This was true in the late 1970's and it has remained true into the present day.

Summary of Findings on Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt

When the British Empire seized Egypt from the Ottoman Empire in 1882, many considered this to hail the triumph of secularism and westernization over the Islamic Caliphate. Intellectuals such as al-Afghani, Rida and al-Banna proved them wrong. Just

as was seen in the United States, the basic variables of modernization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization, migration, and changing social, political and economic conditions across the country allowed religious fundamentalism to emerge and gain strength in Egypt. This took place in two eras. Early Islamic fundamentalists believed society was decaying under secular colonialism and offered an alternative path to those most disadvantaged by this new way of life. One hundred years later, even after a brief period of equalization, many Egyptians continued to feel marginalized by secular leaders who promoted some form of economic modernization. When, in the 1970s, Sadat's government gave them the opportunity to thrive, Islamic fundamentalists flocked to local neighborhoods and communities and once again promoted an alternative way of life. After the assassination of Sadat by fundamentalist troops in 1981, the Brotherhood and other conservative religious groups were once again suppressed. However, the events of 2011-2013 in Egypt have shown just how strong the impact that Islamic fundamentalism has had. After years of marginalization, Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, was elected as President of Egypt on June 30, 2012. One year later, a popular coup backed by the military removed him from power in July of 2013. Despite Morsi's ouster, clashes between pro-Islamist and secularist forces indicate how strongly Islamic fundamentalism has resonated among the Egyptian people. It also shows that the century-long battle between secularism and religion has not been resolved. Perhaps with time, reconciliation between these two opposing worldviews might be achieved.

Section Four: Analysis and Conclusions

The cases of Christian fundamentalism in the United States and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt provide two clear examples of how fundamentalist movements take shape and thrive in the modern world. Moreover, they clearly fulfill the criteria scholars outline for fundamentalist movements, which were provided in the first section of this paper. In concluding this paper, a final question is left to be answered: why write about both case studies specifically in the same paper? Some may argue that Christian fundamentalists should never be placed in the same category as Islamic fundamentalists, because the two groups promote completely different values. How could a movement that focuses on traditional Christian and 'American' values be compared to one that promotes Islamic beliefs and principles? Furthermore, why would anyone compare a movement seeking to replace a secular government with a theocracy to one that seemingly doesn't want to change the structure of its government at all? Surprisingly, there are just as many similarities between the American and Egyptian experiences with fundamentalism as there are differences. Therefore, it is important clarify how these two case studies relate to one another and where their similarities and differences lie.

It has been shown throughout this paper that the Christian fundamentalist movement in the United States and the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Egypt

emerged and gained strength in the context of similar historical forces. All of these variables--the secularization and urbanization of society, as well as widespread social, political and economic conditions--came into play because Egypt and the United States underwent modernization in the 19th and 20th centuries. While modernization impacted these countries in different ways, both nations share the experience of sweeping levels of societal change brought about by the forces of modernity. In the United States, rapid industrialization in the Northeast and northern Midwest during the late 19th and early 20th centuries led to mass external and internal migration, urbanization and increased pluralization of society. Later, in the 1960's, the South and Southwest, or Sunbelt, would experience the great economic and political change as well. Similarly, under secular and colonial rule, Egypt also industrialized and followed a path of modernization. In this case, migration from the agricultural regions and the rapid urbanization of the population introduced broad scale societal upheaval in the country. This urbanization pattern in Egypt continues to this day.

As the United States and Egypt modernized, both nations became more secularized. Christian and Islamic fundamentalism emerged as politicized forces reacting to the secularization of society. Both brands of fundamentalism began as intellectual movements that challenged the secularization processes encountered. In the case of Christian fundamentalism, the scientific rationality of secular-minded intellectuals and societies began to influence Christian theology. Feeling that their Protestant traditions were under attack, Christian fundamentalist intellectuals, particularly those at the Princeton School of Theology, challenged 'liberal' theologians who they believed were compromising their values. Similarly, in Egypt, the early Islamic fundamentalist

intellectuals were pushing against forces thought to hijack traditional lifestyles. In this case, Egyptian fundamentalists were upset by the fact that Britain had taken over the country and was secularizing society. They wished to reform and purify an Islam they believe had become corrupted and irrelevant, and replace the colonial government with a theocracy.

Later, these intellectual movements evolved into popular ones that challenged the broad scale secularization of society and government. Christian fundamentalists fought what they saw as a secular government's interference in social issues, such as the teaching of evolution rather than of creation. By the 1970's, as the American government and Supreme Court became more involved in issues such as abortion and gay rights, Christian fundamentalists became more vocal about their views and brought them into the political sphere. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood similarly moved into the political sphere in response to its fear that society had lost its religious roots. They called for an Islamic government and society that would replace the secularized form of government imported from the West. In the 1970's, after many years of being outlawed, the Muslim Brotherhood, along with other Islamic fundamentalists, were allowed to thrive following the death of Nasser. Under Sadat's governance, the Brotherhood's social programs proliferated, yet they continued to call for the replacement of the secular government with an Islamist one.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, rapidly increasing modernization and secularization created new social and economic demographics in the United States and Egypt. The modernization and secularization of Egypt in the 19th century via rapid industrialization

and colonial policy created a large urban lower class. Discriminatory British policies also formed a restricted, but educated group of lower middle class professionals. In the United States, rapid industrialization and modernization in this era allowed for an increase in urbanization and pluralism. Then identifying as Evangelicals, early Christian fundamentalists not only attracted those most disadvantaged by the many ills resulting from urbanization, but also drew rural Americans afraid of losing their traditional values in the face of ethnic and religious diversity.

Similarities between these two case studies intensify during the 1960’s and 1970’s, as a new socio-economic group emerges. During this time, both the United States and Egypt saw the creation of a new middle class, which enjoyed higher educational levels and expected better employment opportunities. In the United States, the business-friendly Sunbelt region attracted hundreds of thousands of conservative minded professionals seeking economic success with limited government interference. Many of these conservative Americans were disgusted by the liberal social movements flourishing in the country. Additionally, they became frustrated by increasing intervention from a secular government that seemed to undermine traditional American values. In Egypt, the socialist policies of President Nasser created a new middle class as citizens enjoyed greater educational and employment opportunities in an expanding public sector. By the 1970’s, however, the anti-socialist economic policies of President Sadat left many Egyptians in the middle class unemployed or underemployed. It is fair to say, then, that in both nations, the rise of the middle class, with its educational and economic advantages, added to the rise of fundamentalism.

As they challenged the secularization, poverty, and social ills that were the by-products of the modernization process, early Christian and Islamic fundamentalists attracted members of the lower classes through philanthropy. In the first half of the 20th century, while spreading their message in the country sides and cities, fundamentalists provided aid and education to the masses. However, while Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt would consistently engage in such philanthropic actions into the 21st century, their Christian counterparts moved away from these methods by the 1970s. Early Christian Evangelicals and Islamic fundamentalists were challengers of conditions that accompanied modernization, such as poverty and other social ills. While the Muslim Brotherhood aided those most marginalized by the westernized economic policies of the British in rural and urban areas, Evangelical fundamentalist Christians provided welfare to those disadvantaged in urban cities across the Northeast and northern Midwest. As they reached out to the needy, they propagated their messages. Evangelical fundamentalists called for a return to traditional American values, free of urban decay, corruption and religious pluralism; the Muslim Brotherhood denounced colonial rule and offered an alternative way of life and worldview. Ultimately, both movements gained popularity among the lower classes and sought to challenge secularization by influencing the government and legal system.

However, as stated earlier, these two movements would eventually differ in their approach to philanthropy. Once approved by President Sadat in the early 1970's, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others grew popular among the masses by providing education and welfare, while simultaneously offering their recipients an alternative way of life. Christian fundamentalists of the 1970s, on the other hand, were less concerned

with philanthropy than their Islamic counterparts. To a large degree, the shift away from philanthropy can be attributed to the increasing wealth of the Sunbelt and the waning need to use this tool to reach their constituency. While both fundamentalist movements attracted the middle class, Islamic fundamentalists mainly attracted those educated middle class Egyptians who were disadvantaged by Sadat's economic policies. On the other hand, Christian fundamentalists attracted affluent conservative professionals who benefitted from the Sunbelt's success and were discouraged about frequent government intervention in their lives.

Both movements have also been characterized by their politicization. Here again lie several similarities and differences. In some sense, Islamic fundamentalism was always a political movement. The intellectuals who developed this intellectual movement wished to replace secular government with an Islamic one. While acting as a welfare and educational organization at the beginning of its life, the Muslim Brotherhood became politicized fairly quickly. Today, it has a political party in the Egyptian parliament. Christian fundamentalists, on the other hand, were not always political. The theology that created the basis for the movement was anti-secular and anti-rational, but it was opposed to liberal Christianity, which promoted secular ideas. In the 1920's, Christian fundamentalists became politicized in reaction to secular laws and policies, most notably the teaching of evolution in schools. After becoming marginalized by various Protestant denominations, Christian fundamentalists and the institutions they established stayed out of politics. Christian fundamentalists would not emerge again on America's political scene until the late 1970's, when they sought to challenge secular legislation favoring gay marriage, gender equality and abortion. Thus, while both Christian and Islamic

movements became politicized as a reaction to secularization, Christian fundamentalists was not inherently political, while Islamic fundamentalists viewed religion and politics as inseparable.

Another important point to note is the way each fundamentalist organization developed. Organization and leadership had a huge impact on the effectiveness of fundamentalist movements both in the early days and during their resurgence. In the 1930's, Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt would be embodied by one representative group, the Muslim Brotherhood. The early form of this entity had branches in various cities, administrative offices and officials, recruiters and leadership. Leaders were elected to their posts. It was a highly organized and efficient association that operated clinics, schools and clubs while simultaneously sending out representatives to propagate the message of Islamic fundamentalism. While the Brotherhood did have internal problems, such as the tension between those who wanted to take moderate and violent action against the government, these frictions were never enough to completely undermine the organization. As a result, the Brotherhood was highly effective in gaining support and spreading its message. Fundamentalist Christians in the United States never reached this level of effectiveness in the early years. Unlike the Brotherhood, which was a single institution with multiple branches and elected officers, Christian fundamentalists represented a number of denominations and their efforts were very fragmented. In the early 20th century, fundamentalists were members of conservative Evangelical denominations within larger sects, such as the Northern and Southern Baptists Conventions. These denominations sponsored conventions and conferences in various parts of the country to establish their theological views. Furthermore, many of these

denominations established bible colleges and sent out Evangelical preachers to cities to preach about traditional Protestant Christianity. By the 1930's, conservative Evangelical fundamentalists were ostracized by Northern Protestant denominations and lost much of their influence. Furthermore, their split from mainstream Evangelicals in the 1940's and 1950's caused their activities to be limited to the Southern part of the United States, the poorest and least influential region in the country at that time. Thus, the organizational challenges faced by Christian fundamentalists greatly tempered the impact they had on Americans across the country.

By the 1970's, things had changed. Christian fundamentalists became more organized once they became politicized. This is largely due to the efforts of Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority. The Moral Majority became the representative for fundamentalists in the United States, and through its lobbying and fundraising efforts, was able to amass an enormous amount of wealth and to influence politics. Several other organizations followed its example. The 1970's and 1980's were times of organizational strength for fundamentalist Christians. Conversely, Islamic fundamentalists experienced the opposite trajectory in terms of organizational development. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer the only Islamic fundamentalist organization. After the death of President Nasser, Sadat's policies allowing Islamic organizations to flourish brought in competition for the Brotherhood. Islamic student organizations, private voluntary organizations and radical terrorist groups, such as al-Jihad, proliferated and the Brotherhood lost its monopoly in the religious market. The organizational diversity of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt seems to have allowed the movement to attract more members across a broader geography. This continues to be evident to this day.

Furthermore, some of the organizations in Egypt coordinated with each other. Muslim Brotherhood members coordinated with and funded student organizations on campuses. Often times, former Islamic student organization members would join the Muslim Brotherhood. Especially after their organization was banned in 1978, they would help fund private voluntary organizations in their outreach efforts. Some fundamentalist students would go on to contribute to the efforts of groups such as al-Jihad.

Another point to discuss when comparing the two case studies is the use of media in the outreach efforts of both groups. In both examples, fundamentalists employed mass media to spread their message. In the early years, Evangelical fundamentalists had pamphlets and little Bible books that they distributed to people in Northern cities. They established publishing centers in Bible colleges and other institutes of higher education, such as the Princeton Theological Seminary. *The Fundamentals*, which outlined the core beliefs of the group, was published in 1910 in such an institution. In the 1930's and 1940's, the Muslim Brotherhood also took full advantage of the print media. They had their own newspapers, pamphlets and various other print mediums to reach their constituents. The media helped these movements spread their message effectively and efficiently.

In the 1970's, the fundamentalist movements used not only print media, but also television and radio to transmit their ideology. In many ways, this is what helped them gain the most strength they would ever have. Prior to its politicization, Christian fundamentalists had already been broadcasting their mega-church services on television to many Americans. Once they emerged on the political scene, they could begin rallying

against secular minded government officials and asking people for money to defeat their opponents in campaigns. Across the Atlantic, in Egypt, Islamic fundamentalists also employed television and radio to reach new followers. Egyptians who could afford a television could tune into a program where charismatic preachers interpreted the Qur'an while promoting a fundamentalist way of life. In the meantime, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines continued to be circulated among the many educated Egyptians who could read and had a college degree.

A final point to note when looking at the fundamentalist movements in the United States and Egypt is the educational profile of their followers. Often times, people have perceived religious fundamentalists to be uneducated and backwards. In the early years, this was partly true. In the United States, the people who were attracted to Christian fundamentalism were generally Southerners and southern Midwesterners who lacked a higher education, as well as Northerners who were laborers and migrants. In Egypt, on the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood not only attracted uneducated, lower classes of Egyptians who suffered under the weight of modernization, but also drew lower middle class professionals who had received a westernized college education. In the 1960's and 1970's, both of the fundamentalist movements would mainly attract people with higher education. In the United States, Sunbelt residents who supported Christian fundamentalists were often affluent professionals who had moved there to enjoy the region's economic success. In Egypt, Islamic fundamentalism attracted students on college campuses who would graduate from university and preach about Islam to other young and educated Egyptians while working in another profession.

In 2012, Muhammad Morsi, the now deposed president of Egypt and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, was quoted as saying, "Egypt is now a real civil state. It is not theocratic, it is not military. It is democratic, free, constitutional, lawful and modern."[171] While many may argue that Morsi's references to democracy and modernity are not compatible with religious fundamentalism, especially the Islamic brand, the real message hidden within this quote may offer a deeper meaning. When this speech was given, Morsi had just been chosen as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. While his later actions didn't live up to the ideals he promoted, perhaps he was indicating that Islamists could work with secular leader to bring about positive change in Egypt.

The quote above is a timely one. The story of fundamentalist movements in Egypt and the United States is the story of a war between secular and religious forces, both of which emerged as a result of modernization. Those who oppose any major role of religion in government espouse the 'sacred' ideas of rationality and secularity. They believe that in order for society to progress, religion must be relegated to the private sphere. However, a traditional way of life continues to have its appeal, particularly to those who feel that secular values have been forced upon the against their will. As Islamist Egyptians battle secular citizens in the streets of Cairo, and as conservative Republicans push for anti-abortion and anti-gay legislation in Washington, it appears that fundamentalism and secularity will continue to fight for supremacy and power. The presence of religious fundamentalists in the world challenges the secularization theory, proving that modernity does not necessarily end in secularity. Meanwhile, proponents of secularization, like fundamentalists, are equally stubborn in promoting their ideals and will not give up any time soon. Thus, the big question for the 21st century is whether

these two forces will learn to compromise, or if they will forever live in a zero-sum world where the gains of one group necessarily undermine the success of the other. In asking these questions, we must think about the origins of these two forces and their meaning in today’s world. Only by doing this can we fully understand their significance for the future and their demands in the moment.

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