How Small Business Participation Has Differed Among Key Gender, Race, and Age Populations in Contemporary Cuba: The Quantitative and Qualitative Dimensions of Cross-Demographic Entrepreneurial Involvement in the Cuban Tourism Market, 1993-2019

Master’s Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Brandeis University
Department of Global Studies
Dr. Elizabeth Ferry, Advisor

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts
in
Global Studies

by
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May, 2019
Acknowledgements:

I would like to first and foremost thank my primary advisor Dr. Ferry for her indefatigable passion and hard work that guided my progress in writing this thesis. I would also like to thank the Global Studies Director Dr. Kristen Lucken and Global Studies Committee Members Dr. Chandler Rosenberger and Dr. Gregory Freeze for their investments in including my work in the 2018-2019 round of Global Studies thesis production. I also could not have continued to approach my research with such enthusiasm and adventure were it not for my ever-supportive and congenial Global Studies colleagues.
ABSTRACT

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A thesis presented to the Graduate Program in Global Studies

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This thesis offers group-focused analyses of how tourism entrepreneurship participation modestly varies along demographic lines in the country of Cuba. Firstly, the thesis argues that state-led gender empowerment initiatives have prepared Cuban women to excel in private hospitality venture management. Secondly, it demonstrates how the chronic political repression of brick-and-mortar community networks and state inaction on ameliorating income and Internet access inequalities have discouraged Afro-Cubans from attempting to run startup hospitality businesses that cater to tourists. Lastly, the thesis shows readers that Cuban entrepreneurs between the ages of 18 and 49 have developed innovative digital mechanisms to effectively market their restaurants, shops, and guesthouses to tourists while Cubans over the age of 50 who espouse ideological reticence to technological development and marketization have been less likely to engage in pioneering tourism startups.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Select Demographics Disparately Perform Tourism Entrepreneurship within Cuba

How does one manage and market a shop, restaurant, or guesthouse in an island autocracy where wireless Internet became legally available to the public as late as 2015?[1] As Simoni states in *Tourism and Formal Encounters in Cuba*, "combined with more permissive privatization, tourism opened up a field of entrepreneurship for individual Cubans and households" beginning in the so-called "Special Period" of the 1990s when the government lost Soviet material aid and needed to stimulate local industries to survive without the USSR.[2] Europe-based anthropologist Valerio Simoni deems the private ownership of Cuban hospitality venues by Cuban civilians as central to tourism entrepreneurship in the Cuban case. Throughout recent decades, key racial, age, and gender groups have reacted differently to Castro-promulgated entrepreneurial reforms that have begun privatizing small business operations in the Cuban tourism sector. In September 1993, Fidel Castro enacted Decree-Law 141 which stipulated that Cuban civilians could work *por cuenta propia*, or offer small-scale “commercialized” hospitality services under the regulatory watch of the State Committee for Work and Social Security.[3] Although underground restaurants, nightclubs and shops had opened long beforehand, Decree-Law 141 represented the official introduction of civilian-level tourism enterprise activity into the economy of Castro-ruled Cuba. In 1997, Castro passed Decree-Law 171 to permit Cuban civilians to rent living spaces to guests even though civilians could not start hotels upending military hegemony in the tourism sector.[4] Decree-Law 141 let locals manage private guesthouses and escape state salaries that, as anthropologist Mona
Rosendahl observed, “sufficed for less and less” as shortages plagued post-Soviet Cuba. As the Cuban government began establishing reformist frameworks enabling civilian engagement intourism entrepreneurship, certain political and socioeconomic inequalities disparately informed how women, Afro-Cubans, and youth and elders would participate in tourism entrepreneurship.

Firstly, state-sponsored workforce inclusion and education initiatives have well prepared Cuban women to succeed as private hospitality managers at the turn of the twenty-first century. When the Castro regime created the National Institute of the Tourism Industry under Law 636 on November 20, 1959, it aimed to grant all Cubans “access” to state-run hospitality facilities corresponding with the “cultural” and “social” values of the country. Throughout nationalized restaurants, bars, and resorts, the government has promoted the continued development of customer service and facility management experience among the Cuban women who have worked at such touristic sites. In 1961, the Federation of Cuban Women (from here on referred to as the FMC) and the Ministry of Education encouraged 55,000 young women to physically oversee the implementation of literacy learning plans among 707,212 Cuban peasants and city-dwellers. While serving as state-employed teachers, young Cuban women felt empowered to hone their human resources management skills in supervising student progress in reading and writing courses. Today, enterprising Cuban women realize startup opportunities through nongovernmental organizations that the state has let help locals strategically plan and operationalize their private-sector hospitality businesses. After Cuban-American executives partnered with the Catholic Church of Cuba to start the CubaEmprende Foundation in 2012, 1,730 Cuban women including serial restaurateur Niuris Higueras Martínez and IslaDentro directory application developer Indhira Sotillo have run their own ventures that do business with thousands of tourists every day.
traditionally endorsed the professionalization of women in the Cuban tourism sector, increasing quantities of Cuban women have used such labor expertise to fulfill private hospitality management roles.

Conversely, the chronic state repression of community organizing and inaction on ameliorating remittance and Internet scarcities have complicated any large-scale entry of Afro-Cubans into tourism entrepreneurship circles in contemporary Cuba. The capitalist-fascist and socialist dictators who have ruled Cuba before and after 1959 have harshly surveilled “too ‘black’” abakuá societies where Afro-Cubans have attempted forming startups with peer support.\[9\] During the early and mid-twentieth century, ruling autocratic regimes discriminatorily policed potentially subversive entrepreneurs who interacted in clandestine non-state spaces. Furthermore, despite the August 1993 enactment of Decree-Law 140 that allowed Cubans to receive U.S. Dollar remittances from friends and family abroad, non-white Cubans still get “less than half” the $85 yearly remittance receipt that the average white Cuban accesses.\[10\] With such microscopic remittance incomes at their disposals, Afro-Cubans have struggled to pool the finances needed to open hospitality businesses and connect with tourist visitors on the Internet. Because Afro-Cubans continue facing intense community organizing surveillance policies and material shortfalls, few Afro-Cubans have ventured to form tourism startups in twentieth and twenty-first century Cuba.

Thirdly, marked gaps in the technological aptitudes and ideological dispositions of younger Cubans and their more elderly forebears have splintered the demographic distribution of tourism entrepreneurs along age lines. 22 year-old Rafael Antonio Broche Moreno has helped develop the “streetnet,” an offline digital communications system that has enabled roughly 2,000 users to share music, marketing content, and “instructional texts and videos” on flashdrives daily
since 2001. Youthful local distributors have sold external drives (known colloquially as *el paquete*) to hospitality businesses so that hospitality businesses can advertise themselves to locals and tourists who buy access to *El Paquete* via external drives and thereby acquire music videos to play for customers visiting their venues. Additionally, 37% (overshadowed only by those who sought tax decreases) of a 78% 18-49 year-old population of 397 Cuban entrepreneurs demanded the government “ease the ability” for business license acquisition, increase license types available, allow Cubans to franchise “their business” or “an international brand,” and allow Cubans to import and/or export goods in 2017. Many 18-49 year-old Cuban entrepreneurs have voiced their desires for deregulating the tourism sector so that their guesthouses, restaurants, and shops may generate sustainable profits. Contrarily, Freedom House researchers heard from elderly respondents in 2011 that the future would be in “good hands with the government” if Cuba could retain sage Castro family leadership for the next few years. An undeniable traditionalist streak runs through the minds of many members of the more elderly Cuban constituency of the socialist regime and may indicate an elderly hesitancy to embrace deregulation and digitalization in tourism entrepreneurship. When gerontologist David L. Strug interviewed 78 year-old social worker Alicia in 2011, she commented about “young people” who “watch TV. [And] those who travel see things abroad that they want here but which are not available. Young people want everything, but don’t want to work.” In her commentary, this informant vocalized considerable skepticism towards technology aiding the advance of marketization and the weakening of social services in reformist political and economic camps. Besides their ideologically conservative apprehensiveness towards the privatization of local tourism ventures, state-employed Cuban elders may feel uncertain about leaving behind pensioned positions when no unemployment insurance exists in the country. Thus, as the
fourth chapter of this thesis will more quantitatively and qualitatively substantiate, few elderly Cubans who value preserving social welfare policies and national sovereignty while questioning technological innovation have made significant inroads in tourism entrepreneurship. Considering the technological and ideological disparities introduced above, many youth have pioneered digitally adaptive growth platforms in tourism entrepreneurship while elders have less notably participated in modern-day tourism entrepreneurship growth.

Not All Cubans Have Reaped Lucrative Material Benefits from Tourism Entrepreneurship

While this thesis acknowledges the prolific involvement of certain demographic segments of the Cuban population in recent tourism entrepreneurship growth, it also seeks to dispel surreal perspectives that a significant proportion of (if not all) Cubans have become financially wealthy from private tourism exploits. When Agence France Presse reported that "the state still controls 80 percent of economic activity on the island, but the other 20 percent [of non-state controlled economic activities] is making some Cubans relatively rich" in an article entitled Nouveau-riche bling blossoms in emerging Cuba, their semi-sensationalist media coverage glossed over the unforgettable inequalities between specific groups in the Cuban population.[16] While foreign mass media outlets may acknowledge in passing that Cuba is not an entirely wealthy financial paradise, the headlines and some of the language that Western journalists use to describe tourism entrepreneurship in Cuba gloss over the stratified prosperity access gaps that this thesis seeks to address in more detail. Unlike other tropical island dictatorships such as the Maldives, Cuba faces an ongoing embargo and receives $33,000,000 less in U.S. aid than its neighbors and therefore lacks a “cordial mainland hegemony” to “bring prosperity” to civilian tourism entrepreneurs.[17] Undoubtedly, as the socio-political constraints of tense U.S. relations and domestic economic structures that still keep non-state entities from dynamically upending the socialist status quo
have acutely made material survival more difficult for select demographic groups within the Cuban population than for the residents of other authoritarian dictatorships. During the author’s four-month Fall 2017 residency in the Havana neighborhood of Vedado, he observed brand-new Mercedes S-Class sedans parked in front of apartment buildings that both contained chic bakery-cafés and units without any air conditioning. Because Cuban tourism entrepreneurship development has not been able to shake off rather stark socioeconomic inequalities, incoming U.S. tourists might be surprised to encounter spaces where some locals have not been able to open palatial guesthouses adjacent to trendy shops. Disaggregating the participation of demographic groups in opening small businesses that cater to tourists reveals problematically varying intergroup levels of material and psychosocial success in entrepreneurial endeavors on the island.

**Topical and Demographic Parameters of this Thesis**

This thesis will examine how extensively Cuban women, Afro-Cubans, Cuban youth, and Cuban elders have engaged in tourism entrepreneurship activities in contemporary Cuba. In order to be clear on the specific concepts and categories used in this thesis, the author will define these concepts and categories in the following paragraphs of this subsection. In this thesis “tourism entrepreneurship” refers to the civilian management (or assistance in management of) private guesthouses, restaurants, shops, nightclubs, and tourist attractions in Cuba. Cuban youth studied in this thesis fall between the ages of 18 and 49. The author defines more elderly Cubans as 50 years of age and older. The author defines material success as the number of customers that tourism entrepreneurs do business with and (where measurable) the monetary revenues that their hospitality enterprises generate.
The author defines "psychosocial success" as the willingness entrepreneurs have to run tourism businesses and the satisfaction they get from receiving customers and growing tourism enterprises. As seasoned business marketing administrators Alain Jolibert, Hans Mühlbacher, Laurent Flores, and Pierre-Louis Dubois stipulate, the "satisfaction" of an organization's "stakeholders" with the "value creation" systems of attracting consumer interest in products the organization sells "will also have a strong impact on further preference and word-of-mouth" leading ideally to the "increased retention of customers" that positively impacts the economic success of a "select market position."[19] Translating the findings of this transnational team of business administration and marketing experts into more local terms, psychosocial success refers to the vocal endorsement of and satisfaction with tourism entrepreneurship activities that Cuban tourism entrepreneurs speak of as well as public opinion indicators evoke pro-entrepreneurship sentiments from Cuban informants.

Socio-historically tracing the evolution of female involvement in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship illustrates promising female breakthroughs in managerial agency over hospitality facilities towards the turn of the twenty-first century. Before reading this thesis, concerned audience members might think that gender-based income inequality in Cuba exactly mirrors the cross-gender relative wage percentile ratio of 106.6 in male earnings over 88.8 in women’s earnings (with 100.0 in women’s earnings as the comparative base for these statistics) that characterizes the entire Latin America and Caribbean region.[20] Basically, readers might blindly think that Cuba has extreme gender income inequality because neighboring countries do before readers learn about the concrete business management involvement Cuban women have had in tourism entrepreneurship growth. Although machismo and sexism still permeate the socio-economic institutions of every country in Latin America and the Caribbean, female Cuban
academics and businesswomen offer hope that Cuban women have begun reversing traditional gender roles and materially and psychosocially succeeding in tourism entrepreneurship. University of Havana sociologist Marta Núñez has found that Cuban women have adaptively “gained flexibility” in private-sector employment and further ethnographic data presented in chapter 2 corroborates that high percentages of women have had material and psychosocial success in opening their own hospitality startups.\[21\] Admittedly, sexist attitudes and wage inequalities continue plaguing the public and private sectors of the Cuban economy. University of Florida human rights scholar Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol still worries that although Cuban women hold jobs in "every field of work" today, a "prevailing...machismo culture" explains "areas that resist change" within the labor market including the sexist exclusion of women from executive positions in Cuban enterprises.\[22\] Nonetheless, Cuban women have made far deeper professional forays into tourism entrepreneurship than scholars concerned with machismo in such a reductionist fashion might believe before evaluating quantitative and qualitative data on the matter.

This thesis also reminds readers that neither pre-Revolutionary fascists nor the Cuban Revolution nor recent market reforms have catapulted Cuban people of African descent into materially and psychosocially prestigious positions in tourism entrepreneurship. The mere ascendancy of mixed-race general Fulgencio Batista to the Cuban Presidency and the Proclamation Against Racial Discrimination that Fidel Castro delivered on March 23, 1959 have not foreshadowed the complete elimination of access barriers to current-day tourism entrepreneurship opportunities across Cuba.\[23\] Racism has long been an issue that has deeply pervaded the Cuban state and societal apparatuses and its socioeconomic implications have remained complex and heavily debated for centuries. Even though, as Chapter Three of the
thesis acknowledges, Afro-Cubans are presently living longer lives and becoming more formally educated than they had been pre-1959, the government has not sufficiently acted to redistribute remittance incomes or startup subsidies that would erase the structural obstacles haunting Afro-Cuban communities. As scholarly critic Roberto Zurbano has observed and further findings will show in Chapter Three of this thesis, Black Cubans "have less property and money [than, as Zurbano states in the sentence before this one, white Cubans who 'tend to live in more upscale houses, which can easily be converted into restaurants or bed-and-breakfasts'] and also have to contend with pervasive racism" when interacting with private-sector dynamics in the Cuban economy[24] Simply put, fundamental income and social support shortages have prevented multitudinous Afro-Cubans from running their own tourism enterprises throughout the recent past and the present. Regardless of periodic pinings for pluralism espoused by political leaders, the systemic untenability of material and psychosocial resources for Afro-Cubans has exceedingly circumscribed Afro-Cuban participatory advancement in tourism entrepreneurship.

Lastly, comparatively analyzing the contributions of young and more elderly Cubans in tourism entrepreneurship unveils critical junctures in its future and past, respectively. U.S. readers will be surprised to learn that young Cuban entrepreneurs have managed to attract tourist interest in their ventures within a restrictive technological environment. 31 year-old Ashley Arbolaez Malboa has been able to “make money” in a “country largely off-line” by starting Mi Escarpate, a “platform for buying and selling used clothing” that serves tourists and the Cuban diaspora and computer science student Carlos Manuel García Vergara has created the Kewelta application to help restaurants and nightclubs advertise promotional specials to locals and tourists using the “faster than Internet” Kewo Cloud.[25] Using digital systems apart from the Internet such as local beacon transponders encrypted in Virtual Private Networks, these young
entrepreneurs have enthusiastically begun reaching international visitors eager to patronize Cuban hospitality establishments. By contrast, as ethnographic data from gerontological and public opinion disciplines introduced in the problematica at the beginning of this chapter and expounded upon in Chapter 4 signal, elderly merchants and concerned citizens continue objecting to the incursion of private (even small-scale) tourism enterprises upon the interaction of the socialist state apparatus with Cuban society.\[26\] Chapter 4 will help readers realize that vociferous members of the 50+ year-old Cuban constituency still resist an inundation of touristic capitalist waves upon Cuban shores even though some Cuban elders also supplement their income by running traditional guesthouses in Cuban cities and towns. Not all Cuban demographic groups have entirely welcomed foreign investment and digital connectivity into the Cuban tourism sector. Thus, this thesis comparatively examines the energetic advancement of youthful trailblazers in digitally aware hospitality networks with elderly skepticism towards such new avenues for tourism entrepreneurship development to inform readers of the deep intra-generational rifts over tourism entrepreneurship within Cuba.

**Thesis Methodology**

This thesis interrogates quantitative and qualitative data from public and private-sector discourse and interdisciplinary accounts to inform readers about tourism entrepreneurship in the Cuban case. This thesis references remittance, salary, migration, race, gender, age, and labor statistics to quantitatively ground readers in the varying socioeconomic dimensions of material inequality and success in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship. Qualitatively, this thesis presents humanities and social sciences literature to narratively delineate Cuban and foreign academic perceptions of demographic divides in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship participation. The thesis anchors its discussions of hospitality venture expansion in Cuban government publications
stipulating business licensing freedoms and restrictions that enable or complicate the civilian openings of shops, restaurants, and guesthouses across Cuba. Descriptive reports from non-governmental organizations and trade associations substantively illustrate the increasing involvement that key gender and age demographics have pursued in managing establishments that cater to tourists. Finally, the thesis incorporates insightful journalistic explanations of socio-historical phenomena into its body to chronicle local reactions to entrepreneurial growth as well as opinions held by foreign businessmen and émigrés on small business development in Cuban tourism. Integrating information from diverse disciplines on the social, political and economic proportions of Cuban tourism entrepreneurship, this thesis aims to expose readers to this rapidly evolving field of productive activity in the country of Cuba.

**Limitations of Research**

Any researcher who seeks to investigatively describe how tourism enterprises grow in politically isolated and resource-strapped Cuba must patiently navigate the underdeveloped field of Cuban tourism entrepreneurship studies to address the topic in an entire thesis. Few foreign social scientists have overcome fears of police retaliation against inquiring about public opinions in polls or ethnographic interviews with informants who reside in the autocratic dictatorship of Cuba. Due to its autocratically tinged legacy as part of the post-1959 political regime, the National Office of Statistics does not specifically count how many women, black people, youth, or elders designate remittances to fund startup or Internet access needs, use the Internet to do business with tourists, import material goods to furnish their businesses, or how many restaurants, shops or guesthouses all members of each demographic owns. Readers can attribute state demographic data collection reticences at least in part to utopian state views on racial and gender equality and state reluctance to admit that a plurality of Cubans desire market reforms.
Therefore, patchy and scarce data exist explicitly quantifying state regulations that disproportionately affect Afro-Cuban communities. Nonetheless, the Cuban government has failed to sufficiently redistribute remittances among Afro-Cubans that might empower them to start private businesses. Additionally, even the elderly entrepreneurs who have employed app-sharing and paquete technologies to found and market their businesses remain under-documented by Cuban and international civil records and polling agencies. As much as the international public remains fascinated by the geography, culture, and people of Cuba and the government may want to incrementally democratize certain aspects of the tourism sector, non-Cuban suspicions of visiting Cuba and the continued domestic enforcement of dictatorial control over Cuba have barred the establishment of a solid data collection track record on Cuban tourism entrepreneurship. Hopefully, both foreign investigators and local officials will work to bolster electronic databases of and ethnographic material regarding demographically disaggregated business and labor figures and more extensive coverage of Cuban opinions on tourism entrepreneurship if relations significantly improve between the Cuban government and major members of the international community such as the U.S. Despite the aforementioned informational limitations that the author of this thesis faced while writing the thesis, the thesis still strives to impart knowledge on the under-publicized topic of Cuban tourism entrepreneurship to its readers.

**Chapter Outline**

This thesis consists of five chapters beginning with the thesis introduction of Chapter One. Chapter Two historiographically charts the work experience and political empowerment-fueled entry of Cuban women into private tourism entrepreneurship management positions. Chapter Three lays out the structural impediments that have, over time, politically and
socioeconomically hindered the large-scale upward mobility of Afro-Cubans in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship such as the emerging obstacles of remittance and technology shortages that complicate Afro-Cuban advances in tourism businesses. Chapter Four explains the ideological and technological factors that have led to contrasting levels of material and psychosocial success among youth and elders who run restaurants and bars, coffee shops, boutiques, and guesthouses in Cuba. Chapter Five synthetically contextualizes the demographic trends and entrepreneurial practices described throughout the thesis and recommends policy reforms based on the findings posited in the first four chapters of the thesis.
Chapter Two

Female Tourism Entrepreneurship in Contemporary Cuba: Dynamic and Difficult

How can Cuban women leave behind subservient positions in the home and in hotels to open their own guesthouses without incoming remittances? To succeed amidst dire socioeconomic straits on the island, female Cuban innkeepers must use societal-instilled ethics of empowerment to run nonstate small businesses. Since the Spanish colonial era, a plurality of male breadwinners has made wives perform domestic labor and not seek employment opportunities outside the home. Patriarchal political actors traditionally repressed women such that women faced higher levels of economic underdevelopment than men in Cuba. Yet, the post-1959 socialist regime has essayed to help women find meaningful jobs in professional settings. With its Federation for Cuban Women (FMC), an agency serving working women nationwide, the Cuban state has tried hard to bring Cuban women managerial status in the workforce. Thus, the Cuban state has lessened the political repression and the economic underdevelopment that traditionally characterized the socioeconomics of gender through female workforce inclusion initiatives.

But, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the beginning of the so-called Special Period, more women have turned to the service sector for material survival. Into the twenty-first century, women have made up the majority of hospitality workers in Cuba. The military has hired many women to staff all-inclusive resorts in tourist areas but few women have received high salaries in the mass tourism positions available in these institutions. Nevertheless, those working as waitresses and concierge members have acquired sales and customer service
expertise that they have used to excel in guesthouse management roles. When Castro legalized entrepreneurship in 1994, Cubans began forming black-market networks to funnel startup funds and supplies into their small businesses. Despite some sexism and stifling statism persisting in contemporary Cuban society, a syndicate of female innovators has sought managerial leverage in the private sector. Cuban women have networked with Catholic and Evangelical churches as well as smugglers employed by import firms to run resilient businesses in the guesthouse industry.\[27\]

This chapter will show how Cuban women couple the psychological forces of gender empowerment and market resourcefulness to overcome deeply ingrained socioeconomic sexism and become successful guesthouse owners. Women can apply mass tourism training and collective mobilization tactics honed in state anti-gender discrimination campaigns to social network development and guesthouse administration work in contemporary Cuba. This chapter argues that the lessening of the political repression of women in Cuba has resulted in increasingly lower rates of economic underdevelopment for female Cuban tourism entrepreneurs.\[28\]

**Domestic Patriarchy Must Keep Abating for Women to Further Guesthouse Development**

Before considering how working-class women fund guesthouses in contemporary Cuba, one must analyze how gender inequality pervades female tourism entrepreneurship in socio-historical context. According to the United Nations, 16.32% of women still perform “unpaid domestic chores and care work” in twenty-first century Cuba while more than three times fewer men do so; while it bears noting that Cuba is not much more unequal with regards to gendered labor division than most other Central American and Caribbean countries including Costa Rica, where 21.31% of women perform unpaid domestic work even though just 8.15% of Costa Rican men do so and Colombia 16.29% of women do unpaid work at home while just 4.375% of
Colombian men do, gender inequality still at least somewhat exists in Cuba and all these countries.\[29\]

While more Cuban women have carried out the drudgery of home maintenance in the past few centuries than men, women have traditionally had less household decision-making mobility than men. Certain gendered behaviors must continue to change for women to feel empowered as new household heads and then want to convert their homes into guesthouses. This section of this chapter will show that Cuban women may advance in guesthouse administration when leading residential renovations and culinary management initiatives on their properties.

Cuban men must stop marginalizing women and instead let them determine living space arrangements for all family members to empower women into greater positions of household authority. In 1869, when Ana Betancourt de Mora proposed liberating women from the “dark and tranquil corner of the home” to nationalist male rebels, they ignored her request to overthrow the Spanish male-perpetrated repression of subservient women in domestic roles and offer political power to Cuban women.\[30\] Undoubtedly, sexist male political leaders did not relent in relegating women to conditions of economic underdevelopment in 19th and early 20th century Cuba. According to the 1953 Census, only one out of seven Cuban women worked outside the home; furthermore, historians concur that women disproportionately experienced socioeconomic injustice in male-run pre-revolutionary Cuba where "under the Spanish civil code, women were incapable of exercising autonomy over themselves or their children or of administering property."\[31\] As men governed the new polity of Cuba, they repressively prevented Cuban women from departing subservient domestic labor roles and economic underdevelopment in the transition from Spanish colonial rule to Cuban independence from Spain.
Even after colonial times and towards the present, Cuban women have still struggled to enter leadership roles in and outside the home. In 1986, factory worker Rosario Fernandez confessed she had cleaned five bedrooms in a family home for seven pesos a month to make ends meet.\(^{[32]}\) Even as someone with union membership in her other factory job, this woman had to come home to make beds as a superior instructed her to do. Ms. Fernandez could not petition to install air conditioning or satellite television in the home she worked in without the consent of the patriarch.\(^{[33]}\) More Cuban men will have to continue letting women oversee bedroom renovations instead of following repressive bed-making demands for more Cuban women to feel completely strong in developing their own guesthouses.

Nevertheless, Cuban women have also begun holding greater socioeconomic agency in tourism entrepreneurship by spearheading culinary management initiatives in guesthouse environments to more efficiently run their guesthouse properties. Traditionally, Cuban men have commanded their wives to make meals for the family. In an interview with author Conner Gorry, University of Havana sociologist Marta Núñez stated that “gender norms in Cuba hold” that husbands expect their wives to cook for them.\(^{[34]}\) But, as more Cuban women have started guesthouses, they have written guest menus from which their male employees have prepared dishes for guest consumption according to female orders. The proprietresses of Casa Cecilia and Casa Sarita buy “freshly bought products” which go into dishes on their guesthouse menus that their chefs make as meals for guests so that female innkeepers can "lead" their properties as evolving gender norms contemporarily shift transform female tourism entrepreneurship participation into the hospitality facility administration realm.\(^{[35]}\) With greater decision-making power as guesthouse owners, female innkeepers have opted to have their staff offer guests \textit{nouveau} concoctions at mealtimes. No longer do women alone prepare meals; increasingly, men
make guests food that female property administrators order them to prepare. As Cuban women attain fuller control of household managerial practices and continue overcoming the political repression of gender in the domestic sphere, their culinary management strategies will augment their authority in guesthouse development.

In conclusion, this section suggests that a reversal of traditional gendered labor division might galvanize female Cuban entrepreneurs to gain a greater degree of power in the guesthouse industry. To run successful guesthouses, women must curate guesthouse menus that their kitchen employees follow and oversee bedroom renovations instead of making beds under male orders.

In furthering the “socialist concept of the family,” the Cuban Family Code has aimed to center contemporary “relations of common existence” on “affection” between men and women.\[36\] When Cuban women experience abusive household responsibility dynamics in relationships, Cuban women struggle to overcome repressive machismo and run their respective households.

The socialist belief espoused in the aforementioned Code that more demographic groups deserve fuller participation in society inspires women to not subserviently listen to men but to take charge of household management in private-sector guesthouse enterprises. Furthermore, Cuban women possess increasing social mobility in getting employees to comply with the guidelines for culinary workflow that Cuban female innkeepers set for their properties. Their culinary advances in guesthouse oversight reflect the lessening of economic underdevelopment among female tourism entrepreneurs on the island.

**How the Socialist Regime has Publicly Professionalized Women**

This chapter section charts the state instillment of progressive work ethics in the female labor force as a tenet of the so-called Social Revolution in Cuba. The state-ordained inclusion of more women in the workforce catalyzed the lowering of political repression and lower economic
underdevelopment among contemporary Cuban female tourism entrepreneurs. In August 1960, FMC founder Vilma Espín swore to bring “women out of the home and into the economy” and reorganize “peasant households that keep women in subservient positions.” In the decades following 1960, the Cuban government has hired many women to do industrial and technical as well as services jobs. By 1986, 101 of the 204 technicians at the Ariguanabo factory were women and the female proportion of services workers increased from 72.1% in 2000 to 81.8% in 2016.[38] On the job, many Cuban women have advanced with state-supported quantitative and qualitative training. As described below, socialist leaders have gradually prepared tenacious women to cooperatively oversee facility operations and interact with hotel guests to successfully manage private guesthouses at present.

Firstly, female state employees have honed teamwork skills on collective educational mobilization campaigns since 1959. The socialist regime essayed to begin socioeconomically reversing repressive gender power dynamics in ways unimaginable in the times of Ana Betancourt de Mora. During the National Literacy Campaign of 1961, Nancy Palacio and María Martínez worked with the “same extended family” and made male peasants from Pinar del Río province literate.[39] Teaching men how to read and write, female Cuban government workers developed group empowerment tactics that today help them collaboratively supervise guesthouse management procedures through social networks. In 2016, The Guardian recognized the apparent entrepreneurial inroads of teacher Aliuska Rizabal who runs Casa Estudio de Arte with her husband Jesus Soto and two daughters.[40] In this guesthouse, the woman has much managerial say in how her family maintains the property. Aliuska has instructed Jesus to arrange his paintings upon the guesthouse walls in an aesthetically pleasing manner for guests to enjoy while her daughters look after the grounds.[41] While women taught female and male peasants to
read and write at the beginning of the Revolution, women today educate their relatives in how to ready guesthouses for tourism. It seems that Cuban women have begun applying the collective mobilization tactics they have gained as state-employed educators to family guesthouse management systems in the private sector. In other words, early state-directed labor mobilization programs may have helped Cuban women to start overcoming both political repression and economic underdevelopment in tourism entrepreneurship.

Post-1959, the Cuban Ministry of Education and the National Tourism Institute have professionally readied women for tourism positions in the private sector. As political scientist Nicola Murray finds, educating women “has been a priority since the start of the revolution” and by 1975 41% of National Tourism Institute employees were women.[42] Fidel Castro realized that women could vitally fuel economic output with well-honed technical discipline. Before entering university, Cuban women must pass entrance exams twice as competitive as those taken in other countries like Switzerland.[43] The multitudes of Cuban women with access to professional university degrees have proven themselves considerably apt for tourism and commerce positions. Since its “initial stage of work” began, the Ministry of Education has opened 322 centers offering hospitality training to students “in harmony with” the socioeconomic development of the country and may have included many women in professional tourism management coursework, although the quantitative gender breakdown in tourism education between Cuban men and women attending the Centers remains understudied.[44] To preface the further discussion of female employment in government hospitality ventures, readers should note that all-inclusive resorts in Cuba could not function without skilled female staff. Cuban education officials have lessened gender repression and economic underdevelopment to make Cuban women into hard-
working employees who bring professional service industry backgrounds to the tourism business today.

The military has trained female beach resort employees to professionally multitask, and such training prepares them for other forms of hospitality management like guesthouse ownership. At present, women hold 81.8% of service industry jobs most notably including food service, reception and retail sales positions at hotels owned by military conglomerate Gaviota.\[45\] Everyday, Cuban women must document and complete hundreds of meal and drink transactions and preserve the functionality and appearance of resort facilities. In 2009-2010, the number of Cuban women working as managers increased by 6% even though women still get paid half as much as men.\[46\] Although female resort employees do not earn as much as their male counterparts, women often carry much maintenance management responsibility for insufficient pay. Still, learning how to manage business with customers, female employees have begun to incrementally overcome political repression and economic underdevelopment by advancing in resort employment. As resort workers, Cuban women become resourceful multitaskers while state-controlled tourism enterprises train them for guesthouse administration in the private sector.

Altogether, this section has shown that Cuban women have exercised the cooperative interpersonal skills they have learned in the state sector to preside over their private guesthouse ventures today. Women could not have continued entering into contemporary tourism entrepreneurship ventures without state education initiatives including more of them in the workforce and thus lessening political repression and economic underdevelopment among them. Initially, the revolutionary government recruited women to disseminate literacy to rural Cubans in the 1960s. Presently, more female teachers have decided to enter the vocation of tourism entrepreneurship because they can implement congenial yet authoritative administration
strategies in familial guesthouse operations. After the state employed women in mass educational mobilization efforts, it further honed the customer service and “floor management” expertise of female workers in resorts run by military conglomerates. Since greater opportunity exists for advancement in private-sector work at present, more women today than in past centuries feel empowered to translate their state-supported education and tourism business experience into prosperous guesthouse management roles. As the next section illustrates, many women used social connections on the black market to transfer their business endeavors from public to private-sector tourism during the destitute 1990s.

**Surviving High Taxes and Material Shortages: Women Innkeepers on the Black Market**

This chapter explains that female Cuban innkeepers in particular performed “underground” black-market activities to start businesses in the Special Period because socio-structural inequalities dissuaded them from remaining governmental employees. As wages declined in state jobs while the relative access to currency increased in private entrepreneurial ventures, more women wanted to start guesthouses outside the public sector. Political repression was not necessarily higher at this time against working women since Castro did not intend to cut female wages much more than he did male wages. Yet, women realized that they could escape economic underdevelopment in the Special Period by starting their own tourism ventures such as guesthouses. The black market also beckoned female entrepreneurs because no proprietor wanted to lose profits in purchasing licenses and paying taxes instead of surviving in new and possibly prosperous businesses. Cuban women were already underpaid for burdensome labor considering remittance and domestic income scarcities, so they sought underground solutions to successfully execute their guesthouse business plans. Women innkeepers could not have gotten supplies for their fledgling properties without frequenting actual markets within the black market. While
they visited Cuba in 1999, U.S. sociologists Elisa Facio, Maura i Toro-morm and Anne R. Roschelle noted their female innkeeper informants implying that "those who do not have access to salaries in American dollars...have turned to other methods to gain access to dollars for daily necessities" even beyond tax evasion." [51] Thus, as this chapter will continue explaining with further documentation from ethnographers on female guesthouse management strategies during the Special Period, black-market support mechanisms enabled Cuban women to open guesthouses and endure the economically crippling Special Period of the 1990s.

When the public sector collapsed without Soviet funding, industrious Cuban women may have wanted to leave state jobs to earn enough currency to survive in the new economy. Logically, most Cubans departing government jobs for private sector work entered tourism.[52] While working in shops, restaurants and inns, more women realized that they could more directly obtain hard currency from tips at private-sector tourist establishments than in government-run hotels. Throughout state-run hotels in Havana, waitresses had to relinquish fifty percent of their tips to non-waitress staff and so women wished to realize more lucrative opportunities through self-employment in non-state hospitality properties.[53] Consequently, greater financial opportunity pulled resourceful women out of government positions and into civilian enterprises during the Special Period. Female entrepreneurs may have not left public-sector jobs because Castro behaved in a discriminatorily repressive manner towards them in the workforce, but to relatively successfully avoid economic hardship at the time.

The prospect of getting around the harsh caveats present in Castroist reforms during the Special Period may have seemed attractive to female entrepreneurs. One must note that the Castro regime needed to generate revenue to itself survive and did not necessarily mean to enact harsh fee caveats for entrepreneurs to make more political repression lead into rampant economic
underdevelopment for local tourism entrepreneurs. It is likely that women preferred to save and earn money as innkeepers than to lose relative profitability to regulatory officials even if those cash-strapped officials did not intend to discriminatorily repress the people in demanding licensing fees from entrepreneurs. As historian Daliany Kersh has found, restrictions and taxes that the needy government placed upon guesthouses motivated women to bend the rules in trying to run successful properties. When more women considered opening guesthouses, they did not want to have to pay licensing and tax fees that would reduce their entrepreneurial profits. It does not appear that most Cuban women who wanted to become entrepreneurs during the Special Period had sufficient income from other jobs or remittances to finance startups alone. As sociologist Ted Henken observed, women innkeepers sustained their businesses by under-declaring guest capacity to accept more guests than legally possible and underreporting incomes to pay fewer taxes. While, as Henken found, a substantial proportion of Cuban women held legitimate guesthouse licenses they also employed illegitimate means to survive in scarce times. Castro had not intentionally increased the political repression of female entrepreneurs during the Special Period. Circumstances of nationwide material shortage beyond both state and civilian control motivated more women to evade economic underdevelopment by developing private guesthouses. Therefore, Cuban women intrepidly employed illicit fiscal practices to manage guesthouses and relatively capitalize on the entrepreneurial reforms that Castro promulgated in the 1990s.

Lastly, with few foodstuffs and furnishings available in ration centers, female innkeepers adeptly shopped for guesthouse supplies in unofficial street markets. Before acquiring material goods in underground locales, a number of Cuban women needed to hustle funds together in extra-legal ways to afford black-market imports. To pay for black-market necessities,
enterprising women like Dalia “could make more in one night” than their husbands could make in months if tourists "liked" them enough to pay them for having sex on a regular nightly basis.\[59] Truthfully, some Cuban women without disposable income from regular jobs and remittances would turn to sex work to make dollars they could spend on imports in black-market markets. Then, as Cuban journalist Mirta Calderón explicates, more Cuban women started frequenting shopings to purchase much more affordable milk, bread, eggs, and poultry for family consumption.\[60] Clearly, Cuban women furthered their guesthouse ventures by leaving government work for the private sector and purchasing scarce materials underground. While state officials did not necessarily discriminate against working women, working women understood that starting their own tourism ventures could help shield themselves from the economic underdevelopment prevalent during the Special Period.

In summation, this section has addressed the black-market impetuses for female engagement in tourism entrepreneurship amidst the socioeconomic upheaval of the Special Period. Cuban women quit their government jobs not only because little advancement appeared possible as downsizing set in, but more pragmatically to earn cash in private businesses.\[61] The political repression of female entrepreneurs in particular was not necessarily higher than it had been before 1989 but greater private-sector opportunities promised lower economic underdevelopment for women uneager to remain state employees amidst widespread shortages. To retain whatever profits their guesthouses could yield, women proprietors resorted to misrepresentation of tax and licensing responsibilities to insolvent local authorities. When Cuban women innkeepers could no longer obtain sufficient food items from rations, they purchased sought-after merchandise at black-market markets. Progressing into the twenty-first century,
Cuban women continued practicing collaborative procedures for guesthouse advancement purposes through church administrators and state buyers.

**The Role of Priests and Other Third Parties in Tourism Entrepreneurship Development**

When the government began granting Cubans greater religious and economic freedom and consequently lowering its political repression of society, Cuban women in particular adapted to social change by partnering with third-party agents to support their businesses. Since the reformist era of the 1990s, the Catholic Church of Cuba and smaller Protestant denominations have helped support female entrepreneurs in their efforts to start guesthouses.\[^{62}\] While the state has begrudgingly let the Catholic Church offer CubaEmprende to entrepreneurs, the sponsorship networks present in Evangelical churches are more informal in nature.\[^{63}\] In both Catholic and Evangelical cases, the state has chosen not to excessively repress entrepreneurs and has allowed driven female churchgoers to keep overcoming economic underdevelopment through their tourism ventures. When women want to deliver food and furniture to their properties, they have solicited the help of import-based commercial enterprise employees to buy them at discounted prices.\[^{64}\] This section highlights how, as post-Soviet economic shock receded into the new millennium, women partnered with priests and smugglers to equip tourist-ready guesthouses in Cuba.

As CubaEmprende has held workshops for women entrepreneurs across Cuba, more women have developed business plans with further management training from the state-sanctioned Catholic Church. After 3,000 members started 1,500 businesses in 2016, CubaEmprende named Cuba-Room executive Wendy Plana as one of the ten most accomplished entrepreneurs in Cuba.\[^{65}\] CubaEmprende has made a slew of female entrepreneurial success stories possible in the guesthouse sector across the island. Beyond its Havana headquarters,
CubaEmprende has run Empowerment Days in the “provincial cities” of Cienfuegos and Camaguey to inspire women in urban and rural settings to run successful guesthouses. Based on its achievement metrics, CubaEmprende has fostered the greater inclusion of female innkeepers in diverse entrepreneurial communities throughout the country. In advancing the CubaEmprende project with little state repression of it, a growing number of Catholic bishops have cohesively promoted female empowerment and the overcoming of economic underdevelopment among women through nationwide tourism startup campaigns.

While the Pentecostal and Evangelical Lutheran Churches of Cuba lack nationwide entrepreneurship programs, they have discreetly allowed women to form informal small business networks at the parish level. Again, despite their informal natures, little state repression has impeded the Evangelical entrepreneurial networks from forming and supporting female involvement in guesthouse management. The Pentecostal Church of Cuba (ICPC) encourages small-town parishioners to network collectively, but the ICPC has no program like CubaEmprende formally uniting small business development efforts. ICPC President Elisero Navarro has alluded to “current goals” to help rural followers “develop income streams through small enterprises” and make these profits circulate within parishes. Although the ICPC more directly offers financial aid to enterprising community members than does CubaEmprende, no ICPC ministry exists that uniformly promotes entrepreneurship across Cuba. Additionally, United Evangelical Church of Cuba-Lutheran Synod (IEU-SL) bishops have extolled ecumenical relations among women in church communities, but have not yet explicitly connected such communitarian philosophies to tourism entrepreneurship. Even though the IEU-SL itself has not officially organized entrepreneurship initiatives among Cuban Evangelical Lutherans, it has spread the cooperative values necessary for women to gain traction in business. The unofficial
entrepreneurial networks existing within the Cuban Pentecostal and Evangelical Lutheran Churches have begun coalescing ecclesiastical resources to help parishioners start hospitality ventures. Absent the Castroist regime monitoring their activities in repressively rigorous manners, female Evangelical parishioners have further advanced in tourism entrepreneurship and begun surmounting economic underdevelopment in contemporary Cuba.

Finally, female tourism entrepreneurs have called upon Cubans who work in non-state commercial organizations and shops that laissez-faire state officials run to help supply their properties with discounted smuggled furnishings and foods. Among Chinese-Cuban community members in particular, well-stocked hospitality ventures including guesthouses have boomed into the twenty-first century. As Australian anthropologist Adrian Hearn noted during his 2000s sojourns to Cuba, Yrmina Eng Menéndez founded the Grupo Promotor in the late 1990s to offer entrepreneurs kitchen equipment and “other items” imported from China.\(^{[69]}\) Despite the fact that the Cuban state would soon attempt to monitor Grupo transactions between importers and entrepreneurs, Grupo proved that tourism entrepreneurship could flourish with under-the-counter assistance. In the wake of Grupo establishing mutually-beneficial ties between small business owners and import merchants, 35 guesthouses have opened within one mile of Chinatown in Havana.\(^{[70]}\) Thus, Chinese-Cuban women have run more successful hospitality businesses through non-governmental mercantile networks that supply them with the appliances, furniture and foods needed to accommodate guests. Working together with friends employed in so-called diplodstores, hospitality proprietors have also purchased merchandise receipts to buy imported foodstuffs in bulk without fear of authorities closing their businesses.\(^{[71]}\) Because store-bought receipts effectively mask underground food transactions from undiscriminating officials, female innkeepers have confided in store-employed partners to give them the imported goods needed to
run their guesthouses. Aided by priests and other third parties in the underground economy, female innkeepers have made the interpersonal connections and acquired the goods and services necessary to operate functional guesthouses while both political repression and economic underdevelopment decline.

Since the Revolution of 1959, Cuban women have cumulatively made themselves into catalysts for social change in the Cuban economy. The professional training of Cuban women, now oriented towards a more service-centered economy, has prepared them to participate in the contemporary labor force. State-orchestrated workforce inclusion initiatives in the mid-20th Century represented incremental decreases in the political repression of and economic underdevelopment among female Cuban tourism entrepreneurs. Applying their advanced educational backgrounds to state factory and then resort jobs, many Cuban women have well-prepared themselves for entry into the demanding realm of private tourism entrepreneurship. Chronic socioeconomic sexism invalidates any misconception that Cuban women have not had to overcome traditional *machismo* to persevere in the evolving guesthouse sector. Most of the sexism remaining persists among male civilians who abuse their wives at home. Yet, entering the new millennium, certain patriarchal behaviors have promisingly begun to subside with state support. While Cuban men once relegated women to subservient labor positions in the domestic sphere, women now increasingly direct men to complete culinary and renovation tasks in female-managed guesthouses and overcome economic underdevelopment as relatively prosperous innkeepers.

Examining the enduring marketization of the Cuban economy, Cuban women may keep encountering third-party actors with whom they may partner in tourism entrepreneurship into the near future. Despite the unavoidable presence of certain fiscal and operational fees during the
Special Period and today, Cuban women have formed legitimate and underground social networks to outfit and maintain their guesthouses for tourists. From priests to black market partners, Cuban women have resourcefully found astute allies who have helped them ameliorate ongoing shortages and continue crafting their plans for hospitality ventures. Although inequalities within the mixed-market economy may complicate entrepreneurship entry for Cuban women, they have hustled to start guesthouses and reinvented managerial strategies to stimulate civilian participation in tourism growth.
Chapter Three

Ongoing Structural Barriers Remain: Afro-Cubans in Tourism Entrepreneurship

Which political actors have repressed entrepreneurial communities of color in Cuba? Subsequently, how has this political repression led to economic underdevelopment among Cuban people of color considering working in tourism entrepreneurship? For centuries, Cuban heads of state have cracked down on Afro-Cuban civilians who attempt to cooperatively draft business plans in communal spaces. Starting in the early-to-mid 19th Century, Cuban people of Nigerian and Cameroonian descent formed Abakuá lodges across Havana as vehicles for “organizing labor” and shaping “neighborhood life.” By networking with other people of color in their respective barrios, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs could ideally garner financial and emotional support in their various trades. However, Spanish officials policed mass Abakuá gatherings throughout the 19th and 20th centuries to ensure that Abakuá members could not start businesses serving both Afro and so-called white Cubans. Experiencing dire material impoverishment and discriminatory law enforcement tactics during colonial and republican rule, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs could not pool enough ideational and monetary capital to form successful businesses.

Throughout the mid-20th century, Afro-Cubans lacked the on-the-ground networking opportunities and financial assets to progress in entrepreneurship of any kind. As police officers continued barring Afro-Cubans from discussing business in public and private locations and few remittance-sending Afro-Cubans emigrated, Afro-Cubans experienced state-exacerbated economic and legal grievances at home. From the mid-20th century to present, structural
dynamics of socioeconomic inequality and state repression have made little social networking and remittance-based resources available to potential Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs.

Today, Internet access scarcity and menial labor prevalence affecting communities of color characterize the disadvantaging intersectionality of political repression and economic underdevelopment among Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs. Black women have struggled since the Special Period to depart non-managerial service positions for guesthouse management because “the racial past of slavery is not over at all.”[76] Examining the end of this chapter will reveal that Cuban women of color continue hyperbolically depicting cigar-smoking theatrics in service to camera-toting tourists and serving male tourist sexual needs to access hard currency in contemporary Cuba. Unfortunately, not many Afro-Cuban women have reached dominant levels of hospitality management in the private sector and continue acquiescing to semi-inhumane touristic performance demands for survival. As an analysis of socioeconomic symbolism will show later in this chapter, many Afro-Cuban women remain entrapped in subservient vendor and sex jobs of low prestige in tourism entrepreneurship. Furthermore, while no disaggregated data shows that few Afro-Cubans can afford Internet access, many Afro-Cubans cannot logically afford Internet on “modest peso-dominated incomes.”[77] Consequently, not many Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs have been able to connect with guests on Airbnb and other electronic hospitality platforms comprising contemporary tourism entrepreneurship in Cuba. Therefore, unequal technology access and advancement opportunities excruciatingly accentuate the political repression and economic underdevelopment that Afro-Cubans still experience in tourism entrepreneurship.

The chronic state repression of social network formation and inaction on ameliorating material inequality has prevented Afro-Cubans from escaping socioeconomic marginalization in
tourism entrepreneurship. Unable to invest sufficient funds in tourism startups and partner with community members to implement business plans, many Afro-Cubans have not found material or psychosocial success in tourism entrepreneurship. This chapter argues that the political repression of social mobility and the crippling poverty embodying economic underdevelopment systemically disadvantage Afro-Cubans in tourism entrepreneurship.

**Quashed Subversion: Early Secret Societies and Abridged Entrepreneurship**

Readers can see that political repression and economic underdevelopment began adversely affecting Cuban entrepreneurs of color between the mid-to-late 19th and early 20th centuries. Spanish royal leadership permitted freed people of color to found administrative organizations fulfilling “self-help charitable functions” known as *cabildos*.\[78\] Ostensibly, Afro-Cuban artisans could share monetary resources and trade information at *abakuá, lucumi, congo,* and *mandinga cabildos*. However, Spanish colonial officials prohibited Afro-Cuban tourism ventures from serving the so-called white public for most of the mid-to-late 19th and some of the early 20th centuries.\[79\] Additionally, imperialist republican dictators ignored that socioeconomic inequality adversely affected entrepreneurs of color when the state hegemonized agribusiness and mass tourism in the early-to-mid 20th century. Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs began experiencing political repression and economic underdevelopment with the state-induced quashing of *cabildo* activities and support of U.S.-allied economic monopolies around the turn of the 20th century.

One may begin examining the narrative of promised entrepreneurial stimulus and denied socioeconomic mobility among entrepreneurs of color in the San Nicolas de Bari community. In 1854, the Free Colored Militia started the Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos el Gran Poder de Dios *cabildo* in the downtown Havana neighborhood.\[80\] This *cabildo* served as a site where members
could draft street vending and shop startup plans. By 1888, the government had made this cabildo and white-run masonic lodges call themselves “mutual aid societies” to embrace “ethnically and socially diverse” charitable efforts across Cuba. The possibility of increased entrepreneurial prosperity permeated the Afro-Cuban psyche at the time. Nonetheless, Spanish-descended writers began discursively criticizing contradanzas carried out in cabildos fearing these dances would instigate “the decline of Cuban civilization.” While Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs could sell retail items to other Afro-Cubans within cabildos, many so-called white Cubans did not want non-Afro-Cubans to see Afro-Cuban businesses advertised through contradanza. Therefore, so-called white politicians began cracking down on “immoral” Afro-Cuban contradanza productions and segregating Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial efforts in the mid-to-late 19th century. Following such repressive social network curtailment, economic underdevelopment reared its ugly head as abject material poverty plagued Afro-Cuban communities towards the turn of the 20th century.

Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, small business ownership declined and inequality intensified among Afro-Cuban people. With the advent of U.S. sugar corporations monopolizing rural land control, Afro-Cuban run family farms lost prestige and influence. Between 1899 and 1931, the percentage of black-owned farms across the island shrank from 24.7% to 11.6%. With ongoing advertising restrictions on cabildos as well as disappearing farming clout, the U.S.-allied republican regime repressively abetted economic underdevelopment among Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs. The Cuban state clearly “consolidated and expanded racial and ethnic divisions” in the private sector, and so-called whites “predominated” power positions at the turn of the 20th century. Non Afro-Cuban consumers remained unaware that Afro-Cuban farmers sold crops within cabildo confines because Cuban politicians
made Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs invisible in favor of U.S. agribusiness firms. With declining agency and sources of sustainable income from business endeavors, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs inhabited politically repressed and economically underdeveloped environments as Cuba became a dictatorial republic.

When the republican dictatorship repressed *comparsa* dancers by outlawing their interaction with tourists in 1930s Cuba, the government explicitly condemned Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurship to economic underdevelopment. Foreigners “chose to vacation in Havana” to see Afro-Cuban troupes dance *comparsas* but discovered upon arrival that the state legalized such performances to quell Afro-Cuban participation in republican society. With the *comparsa* ban that General Gerardo Machado stalled on overturning, his regime prevented Afro-Cubans from leaving *cabildo* confines to monetarily profit from tourist interactions. Furthermore, even white Cubans faced severe legal repercussions in advocating for greater social mobility in Afro-Cuban communities under Machado. In 1927, Machado imprisoned author Alejo Carpentier for supporting the subversive *Grupo Minorista* manifesto that “questioned the inferior status of blacks in the United States and Caribbean.” The racist apathy of the Machado regime eliminated the possibility for white Cubans to materially and socially aid Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs in the early-to-mid 20th century. Unable to network with shopkeepers of all races outside *cabildos* or dance for tourist currency, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs remained socioeconomically disadvantaged beneath the dictatorial reign of Machado.

Continuing to lord political repression and economic underdevelopment over Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs, Fulgencio Batista offered at best figurehead status to black community leaders in 1940s and 1950s Cuba. During his second presidential term, Batista made handpicked Afro-
Cuban officials revitalize Cuban partnerships with U.S.-based sugar and gambling interests to materially marginalize Afro-Cuban small business owners. As Afro-Cuban intellectual Esteban Morales Domínguez recounts, Batista appointed “some blacks” to “high posts” in the army to “fool” Afro-Cuban constituents into thinking they could “access the power structure.” While Batista granted certain men of color representative positions in military administration, he directed the military to welcome light-skinned gangsters in controlling tourism at the expense of Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs. Batista established the ironically-monikered Bank for Economic and Social Development in 1954 to facilitate $55 million in resort investment, especially from North American mafiosos, with cooperation from military officials. Few businessmen of color could afford to compete with the mob in erecting beachfront art deco hotels across Cuba. Batista solidified an elite military hegemony over the Cuban tourism sector while leaving Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs with few tourists to lodge in small-scale properties during the 1940s and 1950s.

In summary, Spanish and Cuban politicians curtailed social networks and worsened socioeconomic inequalities among Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs at the turn of the 20th Century. When the Crown repressively prohibited cabildo members from selling goods and services to white civilians and tourists, material and psychosocial destitution began dissuading Afro-Cubans from engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Unable to compete with other retail businesses catering to the general population, Cuban entrepreneurial communities of color fell into pessimal states of tourism market underdevelopment. This subsection has indicated that both colonial and (supposedly) postcolonial imperialist regimes made political repression and economic underdevelopment characterize Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurship into the 20th century. The following subsection shows that at least some members of the Castro regime
belittled Afro-Cuban social network dynamics and neglected ameliorating racial emigration disparities to suppress Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurship in mid-20th century Cuba.

**The New Regime Suppresses Private Afro-Cuban Tourism Entrepreneurship**

Although the Cuban Revolution promoted social equality among the various groups comprising Cuban society, Castro et. al. prevented Afro-Cubans from running relatively lucrative private tourism ventures after 1959. Commendably, the Castro regime centered its new mode of governance upon developing comprehensive universal healthcare and education programs. Nonetheless, Latin American law expert Naomi Glassman concurs with Alejandro De la Fuente and political scientist Devyn Spence Benson that the anti-Batista revolutionary movement did “not actually eliminate racism” because the new revolutionaries overtly disseminated racist anti-capitalist propaganda among civilians as described in following paragraphs. As the Castro regime initiated a secularization crusade to justify cracking down on cabildo networks, the new government incessantly repressed Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial activities. Meanwhile, Castro did little to racially balance the mass departures of bourgeois Cubans of European descent during the so-called Golden Exile and Freedom Flights of the 1960s and 1970s. Afro-Cubans did not emigrate in relatively substantial numbers until Castro agreed with ex-U.S. President Jimmy Carter to let aggrieved community members leave Cuba in 1980. With little Castroist encouragement to leave Cuba and egalitarian policies constraining extreme upward mobility, Afro-Cubans could not establish prosperous émigré communities that would aid tourism entrepreneurship in coming decades. This subsection chronicles the Castroist repression of social networks and the economic underdevelopment of un-ameliorated emigration disparities and opportunity-abridging domestic collectivism that suffocated Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurship soon after 1959.
As Castroist Cuba formed, the anti-Batista movement that Castro led belittled already-established Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial networks they believed supported a Batista-run fascist market state. Sadly, the Castroist elimination of the capitalist monopolies that Batista welcomed in turn racistly abridged living wage opportunities for Afro-Cuban small business owners. The official July 26th Movement newspaper advocated for raising “salaries of workers who earn the least” yet the anti-Batista coalition at the heart of the movement “frequently portrayed” private-sector Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs as “black monkey” Batista supporters unworthy of political recognition. The new regime sought to obliterate individual entrepreneurs from the Cuban social landscape as it recruited laborers to man state-run factories, farms, and resorts. While Fidel “tried to build a relationship” with Joe Louis to market military-managed resorts to black tourists, “tourism police” tortured Afro-Cubans who attempted entrepreneurially overcoming minuscule wages. Entrepreneurs of color had to renounce innkeeping and hotel management dreams to join their compatriots in mass communal labor campaigns in 1960s Cuba. As the new regime settled in, some officials under Castro still used racist rhetoric and behavior to repress Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs who supposedly supported Batista before 1959.

While Castro improved post-1959 Afro-Cuban living conditions, corrupt officials denied significant raises to Afro-Cubans to keep black tourism entrepreneurs from subverting socialist hegemony over the national economy. Admittedly, the Ministries of Education and Public Health readied a healthier and more well-educated Afro-Cuban workforce for state employment than under Batista. As African diaspora historian Lisa Brock has written "in fact, by 1987 [decades after 1959, "employment, infant mortality, and life expectancy rates were better for Blacks in Cuba than anywhere in the world-even in the United States "while as transnational social worker Kyra Forman says pre-Revolution dictators “denied” Afro-Cubans healthcare services "in places
deemed 'for whites only'.” Nevertheless, Castro did not stop workplace managers from keeping Afro-Cuban salaries low because black capitalistic advances would threaten the industrial “domination” that the managerial “class” now held over the “race” of Afro-Cuban laborers in state factories. Under a new regime that pushed to cut imperialist capitalism down but did not strongly enough combat racist attitudes that some labor officials still held, a convenient dearth of opportunity existed for Afro-Cubans seeking to rise to even relatively high levels of material wealth from private entrepreneurial ventures. As Castro announced in 1974, monthly salaries never had “compulsive force” because 34.30 CUP in average non-agricultural wages ensured civilians could not become rich in socialist Cuba. If enterprising Afro-Cubans saved enough funds to start illegal private businesses, that would have threatened Castroist control over the Cuban economy. Even before the 1990s, supervisors staffed state-run resorts with “almost exclusively” white workers and prevented the few Afro-Cubans they employed from making higher wages than state limits permitted. Beyond state-proportioned jobs that did not break the base-rate of absolute civilian egalitarianism, not many Afro-Cubans learned how to work with tourists in 1960s and 1970s Cuba under Castro. Unable to save enough wages to run resorts that they lacked the training or ability to control, Afro-Cubans experienced de facto racial injustice that kept them from realizing lucrative tourism entrepreneurship opportunities under post-1959 regime rule.

Furthermore, the Castro regime claimed to eliminate religious divisions by heavily policing cabildo activities in the 1960s and 1970s but their crackdown destroyed entrepreneurial networks among Afro-Cubans. In 1960, Castro passed Law 890 to expropriate “all industrial and commercial companies” while as De la Fuente articulated racism “embedded” in the minds of factory managers who maintained discriminatory “color lines” kept ex-bolita managers
unemployed. As Castro transitioned Cuba away from its pleasure-seeking capitalist past and started intensely scrutinizing civilian networking relationships, communities of color lost opportunities to do business with tourists. Committed to an ideology of “scientific atheism,” the Castro regime neglected lifting the Spanish-created Ley de Asociaciones that essentially banned cabildo activities until 1976. To keep the public sphere virtually free of belief systems that allegedly interfered with collectivist “national unity,” the Castro regime ensured that cabildo-spawned businesses would never reach city streets. Entrepreneurs of color could no longer share private business plans in abakuá or mandinga lodges because that would undermine strict state authority over the Cuban economy. Journalist Nwachukwu Ezem notes that “from 1965, it was almost impossible to see any Black in a good position” with only one Afro-Cuban top Communist Party delegate in office. Afro-Cuban community leaders remained voiceless in macro-political decision making, much less private sector small-scale tourism entrepreneurship during the first years of the Castro regime. Following the intensified state repression of ostensibly faith-based cabildo networks, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs lacked opportunities to escape economic underdevelopment in Castroist Cuba.

With incomes low as Castro did not encourage working-class blacks to emigrate, few Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs joined whites in establishing lucrative foreign business zones throughout the 1960s. Leaving the island with social and material capital gathered through centuries of elite control over sugar and tourism firms, so-called white Cubans formed prosperous ethnic enclaves abroad. Becoming industrialist entrepreneurs themselves in 1960s Miami, participants in the “Golden Exile” wave found “rapid success” in profiting from a “large number of businesses” in “American Dream” fashion. Simultaneously, few Afro-Cubans had enough legal or financial resources to flee Cuba and generate profits from new enterprises abroad
remittable to Cuba as startup funds in the near future. As esteemed Afro-Cuban social scientist Roberto Zurbano has written, the Revolution had not entirely “begun” for blacks-just 7 percent of Cuban-Americans were Afro-Cuban between 1960 and 1964 and Afro-Cuban per capita income did not near $1,000 until 1973 while as geographer Emily Skop has enumerated so-called "white" Cuban immigrants to the U.S. still earned $6,178 more in Median Per Capita Income than nonwhite immigrants in 1990.[105] Apathetically ignoring the racially-motivated labor discrimination and poverty noted earlier, Castro denounced promoting Afro-Cuban emigration pursuant to materialist goals of socioeconomic betterment. As he returned to his Presidential Palace from New York in 1960, Castro found it “sad” that Cubans left for a “cold, hostile country” to “make a living.”[106] Not admitting that socialism did not offer Afro-Cubans sufficient incomes to overcome poverty abroad, the Castroist dissuasion of emigration permitted “embedded interests, habits, and hiring practices” to crush local Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial dreams.[107] Indeed, vile income-limiting racial discrimination on supposedly anti-capitalist bases remained ingrained into post-1959 labor structures and Castro did not actively fight to overcome ongoing racism quickly enough. Castro still did not push factories to hire a “predetermined quota of black workers” even in 1960.[108] Repressively inactive in not facilitating Afro-Cuban emigration in 1960s and 1970s Cuba, the new regime under-promoted Afro-Cuban emigration to cripple black tourism entrepreneurship within Cuba.

Even when Castro let Afro-Cubans emigrate to the U.S. towards 1980, he set quotas so that not enough Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs could materially undermine socialist authority through transnational business ties. Mariel represented the first significant post-1959 outflow of Afro-Cubans to the U.S. although it was not sizeable enough for Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs to gain much socioeconomic prestige abroad. After 10 U.S. Congressmen diplomatically connected
with Castro in 1977, Castro let roughly 50,000 Afro-Cubans raft from Mariel port to South Florida between April and October 1980. Although some Marielitos did start small businesses in Afro-Cuban South Florida neighborhoods, their enterprises generated considerably less material and social capital than did white Cuban-American-run corporations. By 1990, Marielitos remained “virtually invisible” in Miami without executive positions in “the larger Cuban-American community” and 33% of Marielitos fell below the U.S. poverty line. Few Marielitos earned enough remittable money in the U.S. to funnel into Afro-Cuban tourism businesses on the island in the coming decade. Arguably, the Castro regime constricted Afro-Cuban emigration during the Mariel wave of 1980 to tacitly disserver Afro-Cubans seeking to start private tourism ventures in Cuba from foreign funding bases.

This subsection shows that the Castro regime has not historically empowered Afro-Cubans to start private tourism businesses in Cuba that would generate enough profits to weaken state market controls. Despite making vital improvements in health and education indicators among Afro-Cubans following 1959, the Castro regime did not prevent racist officials from financially marginalizing suspected Afro-Cuban capitalists at work. Additionally, Castroist cabildo crackdowns conducted under secular pretenses severely circumscribed private Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial growth in the national economy. Without significant assistance from Castro to overcome socioeconomic inequalities that permeated early post-1959 emigration waves, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs lacked external support to prosper in tourism approaching the 21st century. The next subsection describes the tragic intensification of socioeconomic marginalization among Afro-Cuban tourism entrepreneurs during the Special Period.
Unfulfilled Possibilities: Private-Sector Subservience Returns to Millennium-era Cuba

When Castro began legalizing private entrepreneurship in the 1990s, Afro-Cubans could hypothetically materially and psychosocially succeed in ways unthinkable twenty years earlier. In September 1993, Castro passed Decree-Law 141 permitting civilians to start select types of businesses and he enacted Decree-Law 171 in May 1997 to allow private guesthouse formation across Cuba.[111] Unfortunately, recurring de facto structural inequalities complicated any rapid and linear ascension of Afro-Cubans to positions of power in private guesthouse management. Without large homes to rent to tourists or many remittance-sending relatives to help fund renovation costs and registration payments, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs performed busking and sex work roles to chase tourist currency as privatization became further embedded into the socioeconomic dimensions of 1990s Cuban life.[112] This subsection demonstrates that Castro still repressed entrepreneurial opportunities for Afro-Cubans who could not afford to escape the economic underdevelopment of social and financial disparities in 1990s Cuba.

The Castro regime strictly imposed guesthouse registration fees upon the civilian public so that Afro-Cubans lacking leverageable property or remittances to cover costs could not escape economic underdevelopment through private hospitality endeavors. Afro-Cubans acutely faced socioeconomic disadvantages in Special Period tourism entrepreneurship due to structural remittance shortages and a strict underbelly of Castroist fiscal policies conveniently limiting Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial growth. Afro-Cubans making $20 dollars monthly and collectively receiving $120,000,000 in annual remittances could not afford the $150 “special license” fee when Castro enacted Decree-Law 171 in 1997.[113] Officials understood that Afro-Cubans could not afford guesthouse startup costs and did not subsidize fees for them to minimize subversive black capitalist competition with military-run resort facilities. Exiled philosopher Jesús Díaz stated that the government practiced this sort of “tourism apartheid...among [Cuban] nationals-
truly second-class citizens-and tourists” to continue dissuading greater Afro-Cuban involvement in local tourism entrepreneurship as racist police officers condoned the "segregation" of tourist facilities between dark-skinned Cubans and light-skinned tourists.\[114\] Although civilians of color could technically start certain tourism enterprises in 1990s Cuba, authorities still feared Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs would kickstart an imperialist resurgence if the state full-heartedly endorsed their businesses. Thus, Castroist market controls suppressed upward Afro-Cuban mobility in private tourism entrepreneurship and Afro-Cubans faced underdeveloped incomes and remittance flows in 1990s Cuba. This subsection will next explore the unabashedly gendered divisions of urban tourism labor that emerged during the so-called Special Period in 1990s Cuba.

Tough Castroist fiscal regulations on private tourism entrepreneurship and un-ameliorated structural inequalities forced Afro-Cuban women to subsist upon “photo-ops” and sex work with tourists.\[115\] As anthropologist Nadine Fernandez observed, Afro-Cubans without sufficient wage or remittance incomes had to be “inventive in their search for dollars” and subsist upon jineterismo or tourist hustling.\[116\] Aware that U.S. Dollars could lawfully circulate in Cuba after 1993, many Afro-Cuban women posed for photos smoking cigars and in other stereotypical roles for black Cuban women. Some Afro-Cuban women worked as sex workers to survive the Special Period. These occupations were relatively “leading” yet volatile income sources in Havana, Varadero, and other cities and towns in the 1990s.\[117\] Obviously, jinetero roles existed for many male "street hustlers" to "fulfill tourist desires for meals, cigars, housing, or sex."\[118\] Numerous self-employed males thus also marketed material goods and corporeal pleasures to male and female visitors to Cuba. Nonetheless, jinetera work offered women in particular marginal subsistence as their entrepreneurial prospects diminished in 1990s Cuba.
In turn, Afro-Cuban men sought tour-guide and mechanic positions as Castroist fiscal suppression and economic underdevelopment erased their hospitality management potentials during the Special Period. While they also tended to face socioeconomic constraints of menial undercompensation in tourism entrepreneurship, Afro-Cuban men pursued slightly more masculine private-sector labor than did their sisters of color. Set against the backdrop of the aforementioned state-perpetuated “tourist apartheid” paradigm, Afro-Cuban men could most easily make “contact points” with foreign tourists as private guides. Able-bodied Afro-Cuban men became private guides to try escaping the materially repressive tentacles of racist state labor supervisors but still earn $225 less annually than guesthouse managers. Thus, Afro-Cuban male guides remain underpaid for their touristic toils. In addition, as political scientist Danielle Pilar Clealand recorded her cabdriver saying at the turn of the century, “the white people drive the cars and the mulatos fix them.” Sapping physical strength to make their livings, male Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs attempted to endure the 1990s economic crisis as mechanics and guides. Tragically, neither line of emotionally-exhausting work yielded substantial monetary returns for them as social conditions ultimately restrained their material and psychosocial prosperity in Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial communities.

In summation, Afro-Cuban civilians struggled to effectuate the ostensible promise of entrepreneurial expansion beneath a regime that continued to not sufficiently alleviate their political and economic grievances. As Afro-Cubans could not accrue remittances from relatives who had not emigrated to finance guesthouse startups, entrepreneurs of color essayed to occupy peripheral professions in private-sector tourism. Regrettably, many Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs needed to perform humiliating and arduous services for insufficient material and psychosocial remuneration to ride out the societal storm of the Special Period. The last topical subsection of
this chapter will convey that nagging socioeconomic inequalities and state repression exacerbate lagging digital tourism entrepreneurship agency among Afro-Cubans in the 21st century.

**Repressive Internet Inequalities and Policy as Barriers to Digital Entrepreneurship**

While more incoming tourists seek accommodation options online, Internet restrictions and usage costs have impeded the widespread participation of Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs in electronic hospitality platforms. Although Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel finally permitted civilian mobile data use in December 2018, the state telecommunications agency ETECSA has strategically restrained public access to “limit any potential threat” to socialist authority.\(^{[122]}\)

Until the end of 2018, state policy markedly complicated universal Internet access among entrepreneurs of color residing in the capital city. By January 2017, a mere nine “public Internet spaces” existed across Havana with just two of them in the populous *barrio* of Centro Habana where many Afro-Cubans reside.\(^{[123]}\) Additionally, ETECSA levies astronomical public usage and home connection prices on customers of color such that their ascendancy in contemporary tourism entrepreneurship has remained rather unfruitful. This last subsection evinces that repressive public Internet access restrictions and fees severely delimit Afro-Cuban advances in tourism startup development.

Relentlessly enforcing its hotspot and website monitoring policies, the Cuban government continues to repress Afro-Cuban capitalist developments in the guesthouse sector. For more than a decade, Castro monitored electronic communication among his Afro-Cuban constituents so that they could not subversively promote touristic capitalism in Cuban cyberspace. When the state passed Resolution 92 in 2003 in which only “approved” individuals could use “domestic chat services,” it enshrined the “disproportionate surveillance” of Afro-Cuban entrepreneurial networks online.\(^{[124]}\) The government thus legislatively signaled that no
innkeeper of color could do business with U.S.-based corporate saboteurs or too many individual
 tourists and digitally foment an anti-Castroist insurrection. Also, ETECSA did not create
 wireless hotspots in select locales where Afro-Cubans could use paid scratch-off cards to manage
 Airbnbs until July 2015. Geospatially confined to a few monitorable public locations in major
cities like Havana, Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs have faced extreme political barriers to operating
guesthouses on the island. The ongoing and omnipresent state repression of Internet-based
tourism platforms has unequivocally kept Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs from developing their
businesses in Cuba.

Secondly, ETECSA has made Internet access impossibly expensive for most Afro-
Cubans so that they cannot develop booming hospitality businesses that compete with resorts.
Paying for the Internet has undoubtedly influenced lyrical subject matter in Afro-Cuban media
outlets. Rapper Olvarría Gallegos of AfroRazones has voiced that the government has financially
dissuaded the “democratization” of Cuban society by imposing this “Internet inequality” upon
Afro-Cubans. It remains no wonder that few cash-strapped people of color have gained
socioeconomic agency through Airbnb startups in contemporary Cuba. Facing $2 per hour Nauta
costs on $20 to $40 monthly salaries, many Afro-Cubans cannot access this “marker of
privilege” that would enable them to generate guest-hosting profits. Today, the average
visitor would likely not stay in an Afro-Cuban home because not enough Afro-Cubans possess
enough resources to invest in prolonged electronic hospitality platform usage. Therefore,
financially-repressive Internet pricing structures appear to bar most Afro-Cubans from
successfully escaping economic underdevelopment and running private guesthouses in 21st
century Cuba.
Conclusively, scant advancement in contemporary tourism entrepreneurship appears possible for Afro-Cuban civilians if the government continues not enabling them to found digital hospitality startups in Cuba. Meager incomes have not kept pace with Internet access costs even as the new President purports to extend coverage to smaller cities and towns where Afro-Cubans live. Unable to connect with potential clients online and repurpose their properties as guesthouses, Cuban civilians of color remain crippling marginalized in their interactions with tourism. If the government does not decide to subsidize Internet access for Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs, then they may never experience true prosperity for the foreseeable future.

Both capitalist and socialist regimes have *de jure* and *de facto* marginalized Afro-Cuban participation in tourism entrepreneurship throughout the past and present. From colonial *cabildo* crackdowns to current Internet restrictions, the state has adversely repressed social network formation among Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs for centuries. Before and after Afro-Cuban entrepreneurs attempt engaging in business networking, they must contend with dire economic disparities that no leader has managed to wash away. Clearly, state wages remain too low for Afro-Cuban civilians to raise sufficient startup investment funds on their own. With few Cubans of color having emigrated to prosperous markets abroad, overarching remittance deficiencies have also continued inhibiting tourism entrepreneurship growth throughout Cuban communities of color on the island. After one factors in licensing fee and income inputs (or the lack thereof) to what Afro-Cuban tourism ventures have existed, material and psychosocial outcomes may appear heartbreakingly miserable. Whether circumstantially barred from pursuing capitalist endeavors or acquiescing to humiliating performative demands from condescending tourists, few Cuban entrepreneurs of color have experienced extensive success in tourism across Cuba. Afro-Cubans may never make significant socioeconomic inroads in tourism ventures if political
repression and economic underdevelopment do not stop haunting entrepreneurial communities of color.
Chapter Four

Generational Gaps in Praxis and Thought: Age and Tourism Entrepreneurship in Cuba

Have younger Cubans made greater advances in private-sector tourism entrepreneurship than their elderly compatriots? What material and psychosocial factors explain the relative success of younger Cuban tourism entrepreneurs as opposed to more elderly Cubans? Daybel Pañellas, Jorge Torralbas, and Claudia Caballero, who surveyed 419 self-employed Havana residents between October 2013 and March 2014, found that 30% or twice as many young people worked as private-sector entrepreneurs in comparison to the mere 15% of more elderly (although it is important to note Mr. Mesa-Lago failed to explicitly enumerate the age range for this study in his coverage of it) informants who worked for themselves. These data may then indicate, as the novel discipline of tourism entrepreneurship studies develops in the Cuban case, that more Cubans between the ages of 18 and 49 have started private tourism enterprises while fewer entrepreneurs between the ages of 50 and older have started their own tourism businesses. This chapter will explore select material and ideological factors that it proposes help to qualitatively explain the aforementioned age gap in private tourism entrepreneurship involvement.

In Cuba, emerging tourism entrepreneurship media entice Cubans between 18 and 49 years of age who use their technological savvy to generate relatively sustainable revenues from touristic ventures. Beyond Airbnb, young Cubans have developed offline data sharing applications to make it easier for them to do business with each other and tourists. Contrarily, Cubans who are over 50 and who may be less familiar with flash drives and the Internet cannot
derive material success from tourism ventures they lack the digital proficiency to manage. As this chapter will illustrate, young Cuban entrepreneurs possess greater technical aptitude to run profitable guesthouses, restaurants, and shops than do older Cubans. Consequently, as gerontological ethnographies and journalistic findings will elucidate in this chapter, the relative dearth of technical expertise among the elderly may have impeded significant progress for them in managing dynamic tourism ventures.

Furthermore, younger Cubans tend to value capitalistic inroads in tourism entrepreneurship while older Cubans embrace a hardline isolationism that decries touristic marketization. As Freedom House found in its 2011 survey of Cubans in Cuba, under-60 respondents “leaned more heavily toward individual advancement” while those over 60 “tended to favor” government responsibility. Where young Cubans cannot explicitly tell researchers in Cuba that a market democracy should overthrow Castroism, they voice support for Díaz-Canel opening tourism business to locals and visitors. Indeed, psychologist David L. Strug found that Cubans between 60 and 101 years old he interviewed “still” felt like revolutionaries and condemned “uncontrolled market forces” threatening the Cuban economy. Many elderly Cubans want socialism to continue strongly characterizing Cuban life and shun tourism entrepreneurship opportunities beneath the vestigially Castroist government. Hence, younger Cubans posit greater ideological investment in succeeding as tourism entrepreneurs than do their forebears.

As public opinion research from Freedom House and the International Republican Institute (the IRI) later cited in this chapter indicates, comparatively analyzing the exploits of 18- to-49 and 50+ year-old Cubans shows that participation in tourism entrepreneurship remains economically and ideologically disparate between these two demographics. Well-versed in
digital marketing and receptive of economic freedom, younger Cubans have made notable advances in tourism entrepreneurship across the island. On the contrary, elderly Cubans unaccustomed to technological innovation and supportive of socialist austerity appear poorly situated to take advantage of entrepreneurial growth in tourism. This chapter argues that strong technical capabilities and enterprising mindsets might enable a greater quantity of younger Cubans to succeed in tourism entrepreneurship while fewer older Cubans who lack technical capabilities and enterprising mindsets may advance in it.

How Data Sharing Bolsters Entrepreneurial Networking Among Cuban Youth

Before 18-to-40 year-old Cuban entrepreneurs even open their own businesses, they need to establish pragmatic communication methods to help them operationalize their business plans. Circumnavigating patchy Internet access remains a primary concern for aspiring hospitality managers who want to connect with guests but cannot constantly use the Internet to do so. Many young Cubans utilize the “cross-platform” Zapya app and paquete flashdrives to communicate with business partners and advertise their “local services” to locals and tourists using them. Without even relying on Internet connections, innovative young entrepreneurs load advertisements and facility ambiance inputs for their ventures onto flashdrives and offline applications to effectively cater hospitality venues to tourists. In particular, 29 year-old Yondainer Gutiérrez has “innovat[ed] under difficult circumstances” to earn “money from advertisers” and sat “firmly at the top of mind of hungry Cubans and tourists alike” through starting the offline AlaMesa restaurant search app. This subsection will soon further show that young Cuban entrepreneurs have physically arranged their hospitality enterprises according to design exchanges with international visitors. On the other hand, as the author demonstrates in his discussion of disadvantaged renter Alba Lara and brick-and-mortar coffee vendor Sandra,
elderly Cubans have not developed such promising business communications technologies. It may therefore be the case that older Cubans have not laid sufficient technical groundwork for advancing in tourism entrepreneurship. This subsection emphasizes that young Cuban entrepreneurs use content-sharing mobile applications, paquetes, and other qualitative data solutions to coordinate growth strategies and materially and psychosocially succeed in tourism.

Firstly, young entrepreneurs in tourist areas realize they can physically stock their venues to better serve visitors when they communicate with suppliers via mobile content-sharing platforms. Enterprising clerks like the pseudonymous joven Kamilo rely on individuals to “pass” them satellite-sourced media via Zapya so they can curate drives to disseminate el paquete for sale at their stores. In turn, unofficial tour guides purchase el paquete from clerks to help brick-and-mortar shopkeepers create welcoming dining environments for enthralled visitors. In 2018, Georgia Tech computer scientists bici-taxied between Havana restaurants as their 18 year-old driver gave restaurateurs access to el paquete to have “music videos playing for” diners on flat-screen TVs. As this ethnographic finding shows, technically-apt paquete salespeople know more tourists will support their restaurant partners when visitors hear pop music adding vibrance to restaurant environments.

In contrast, expert social scientists Mauricio Font and David Jancsics stress that “successful retraining and adaptation for market sector conditions are more challenging for older than younger adults,” which reflects the case of 67 year-old “small entrepreneur” Marta who complains she works “just to get by” while merely selling coffee from her front porch but does not know how to network using el paquete with other entrepreneurs and visitors to turn her property into a coffeehouse that serves tourists. Forming underground yet physically solid business communications networks, energetic youths have used Zapya and paquete technology
to fuel tourist venue growth across Cuba while their elderly forebears appear to have struggled to become adept at using *paquete* and app-sharing methods to successfully market their businesses to tourists.

Secondly, materially-industrious young Cubans produce hospitality advertisement content that tourists can view on integrative digital programs as they travel across Cuba. Shopkeepers, restaurateurs, and innkeepers have even essayed to insert advertisements for their entrepreneurial operations on the drives by which consumers access *el paquete* to reach locals and tourists throughout the Cuban economy. 26 year-old Elio Hector Lopez has let on-the-ground advertisers market to tourists and locals on this “most accessible open media consumption channel” since 2008.[137] Two directory applications promote restaurant and lodging listings for adventurous journeyers who want to visit up-and-coming hospitality sites throughout Havana and other major cities. Backpackers want to “see behind the tourism curtain” and sample the more than 600 eateries listed on AlaMesa and 5,158 room rentals catalogued on Revolico carried around on *paquete* drives.[138] Therefore, *paquete*-stored advertisements help Cuban entrepreneurs materially market their businesses to tourists and locals alike.

Thirdly, young Cuban entrepreneurs have relied on incoming tourists to help them ideationally plan facility decoration and personnel attire schemes for their enterprises. Hip Cuban business owners want to present their properties that tourists frequent with style. As marketing expert Noreen O’Leary has noted, younger Cubans are “students of international brands thanks to...tourists” who patronize their businesses and share facility design ideas with them.[139] With swanky common areas and trendy employee outfits omnipresent in their ventures, Cuban tourism entrepreneurs can convert the qualitative data points of tourist suggestions into aesthetically pleasing facility layouts. 24 year-old Claudia (who still realizes tourists want to buy
international-looking pillows and wine glasses even though she voices that they are “made in Cuba with Cuban ideas”) sells 75% of the home furnishings offered at her boutique PiscoLabis to foreign tourists, and student hosts “pepper” room rentals with “kitschy objects” donated by European and South American guests. Clearly, young retail and hospitality venue owners do not live under proverbial rocks—they realize that international tourists want to spend time at places with fancy décor and polished layouts and thus successfully adapt their enterprises to patron desires. Psychosocially incorporating popular seating and lighting motifs into nightlife establishments and furnishing tourist lodgings with foreign decorative accoutrements, young Cubans market their hospitality operations to ever-changing tourist tastes.

By contrast, elderly Cubans do not always easily handle guest communications using on and offline technology and struggle to inform themselves about such individualized marketing and management techniques even when they run guesthouses. Admittedly, as University of Northern Colorado geographer Charles O. Collins states, "some retirees are moving into the more lucrative tourism industry" where they drive taxis, run paladars, and rent rooms for tourist customers. Nonetheless, the level of technological advancement in guest communications and facility administration that elderly innkeepers wield remains questionable. Although proprietors like retired educator Norma Puente have rented rooms since 1997, “most still rely on the telephone or email exchanges, often relayed by third parties” to reach tourists. While older innkeepers may maintain connections with relatives who check emails for them and pay their phone bills, elderly Cubans have not comprehensively developed mobile technologies to manage bookings. Without stopgap procedures that significantly traverse the rocky digital landscape of Cuba, aging innkeepers may continue to struggle attracting as many customers as they could through innovative marketing means. 71 year-old Alba Lara expanded her apartment in 1994 to
welcome tourists but, as Naples Daily News journalist Maria Perez found when interviewing this elderly Cuban woman, Ms. Lara is “trapped with $3 to $5 a day in pay from cleaning apartments used by tourists...mak[ing] only enough for food and other needs” because she cannot comprehend guesthouse marketing technology and has thus lacked the financial and technical capital necessary to convert her home into tourist lodgings. Relatively disconnected from Internet and paquete data-sharing systems that would connect them to tourists and businesspeople, many elderly Cuban home-dwellers advance slowly or not at all in guesthouse management. Thus, older Cubans tend to lack the high-tech aptitude needed to grow hospitality business networks and thrive in the new Cuban economy.

In conclusion, a significant intergenerational rift has developed between modern-minded Cuban youth and their less technologically-adept forebears. Innovatively driven by Internet scarcity, young paqueteros, restaurateurs and innkeepers have crafted offline data sharing systems to market their enterprises to business partners and tourists. Using these platforms helps young entrepreneurs to feel materially and psychosocially successful in running their enterprises. Contrastingly, elderly Cubans appear to have not made major material or psychosocial inroads in creating similar technologies to market their homes and apartments as guesthouses to tourists, even though some do run guesthouses and restaurants without such expertise. It remains to be seen whether younger Cubans will help their parents and grandparents technologically ready themselves for participating in contemporary Cuban tourism entrepreneurship. The next subsection of this chapter will acquaint readers with the conservative comfort of the pension system that deters elderly Cubans from venturing into tourism sector work.
The Baseline Stability of Cuban Pensions Dissuades Elderly from Tourism Work

Cherishing their continued receipts of baseline state financial aid but wary of private startup insecurity, Cuban elders fear leaving behind pension receiving traditions and failing at tourism entrepreneurship. Elders may fondly recall 1983, when Cuban pension funds comprised the second-highest GDP percentage across the region, in respecting the underlying legacy of the Cuban pension infrastructure.[144] Today, elderly Castroists still voice hesitancies to lose pension support in the cases they might try becoming neophyte entrepreneurs seeking private-sector work. 22 over-50 respondents whom Freedom House surveyed in 2011 favored expanding retirement benefits following “revolutionary ideals” and nonagenarians like Juana Alemán admit “Grandparents’ Circles” offer them “very good” care.[145] Believing that the government can better feed and clothe them than can private employers, aging Cubans still hold more faith in pensions than in uninsured private tourism ventures. This subsection explicates that few elderly Cubans want to forego the relative material and psychosocial stability of state pension plans to precariously pursue risky returns from private-sector tourism ventures.

Considerable quantities of aged Cubans prefer receiving state-mandated pension increases over chasing revenues that have not significantly materialized for them in private tourism businesses. While fiscally bolstering social services subsidies in 2008, Fidel Castro increased minimum nominal pensions by 51.7 CUP or 22 percent to 235 CUP or USD$8.86 per month.[146] As this data that University of Pittsburgh economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has collected implies, Cuban pensioners have vocally applauded the pension increases anchoring recent reforms to retirement income distribution flows. In Spring 2014, Strug interviewed a 72 year-old ex-chaffeur who applauded the government for not eliminating the libreta supplement to pension welfare so that elders would not “go hungry.”[147] This Cuban retiree informant
pointed out to David Strug that he continued valuing the cradle-to-grave care praxis that socialist politicians fight to sustain because the state still essayed to offer him socio-economic subsistence where the market might not. Still appreciating the caring nominal pension and ration increases that the Cuban state has promoted, Cuban elders appear reluctant to try earning raises in private tourism jobs.

Few Cuban elders value leaving state jobs for private work without emergency compensation from the socialist government when they cannot succeed in non-state tourism enterprises. As Mesa-Lago has observed, “neither unemployment insurance...nor family allowances” are available for state employees to use as any sort of investment moneys in small tourism businesses. Afraid of their survival prospects in starting their own entrepreneurial ventures without insured compensation, older Cubans have held pessimistic attitudes towards transcending pension dependency traditions for capitalist uncertainty. When Strug conversed with 62 year-old coffee saleswoman Sandra, she claimed she faced “daily hardship” after becoming self-employed and choosing “not to join the pension system.” Elderly Cubans realize that abandoning baseline pensions to obtain licenses to sell coffee to tourists may not securely satisfy their subsistence needs. Recall that, as Strug states, “the majority of older persons due to age and lack of capital, find it difficult to start a small business.” Essentially, few Cuban elders want to engage in private-sector tourism entrepreneurial activity because they know that their unprotected efforts to live off of private business returns remain uncertain. Scared of dying in poverty while futilely chasing private-sector profits without state insurance, conservative elders have psychosocially preferred pension retention to tourism entrepreneurship experimentation.
This subsection has introduced readers to a concretely political embodiment of elderly material and psychosocial skepticisms towards entrepreneurial marketization in Cuba. Aware that the government still strives to maintain baseline pensions for them, older Cubans have expressed distaste for the uneven returns that non-state tourism entrepreneurship has offered them. The strong desire for pension preservation among the elderly demonstrates their hesitancy to embrace uncertain market outcomes in the tourism sector. The next subsection compares the elderly endorsement of anti-imperialist trade isolationism with youth advocacy for transnational capital inflows to highlight the age divide on trade impacting Cuban tourism entrepreneurship.

**Isolation or Marketization? Intergenerational Debates on Trade and Tourism Ties**

The political and economic effects of international trade on Cuban tourism remain polarizing centerpieces of ideological contention between hardline elders and young innovators. Chiefly, Cuban elders maintain guarded attitudes towards strengthening business ties between Cuban entrepreneurs and foreign (especially U.S.) investors. Still clinging to “revolutionary values,” only 14.3% of the 541 60-and-over Cubans who Solidaridad Española surveyed in 2005 thought that trade isolation represented the biggest problem in Cuba.\(^{[151]}\) Wary that capitalism could destructively encroach upon the sovereign state apparatus of Cuba, older Cubans have voiced doubts about fostering property management partnerships between local innkeepers and foreign financiers. Contrariwise, younger Cubans have discarded the “longtime propagated” values of “patriotism” and “solidarity” and felt motivated to “make a quick and easy buck” in connecting with foreign interests while performing "lucrative work in the hard-currency tourist industry" that mushroomed in 1990s Cuba.\(^{[152]}\) As German anthropologist Katrin Hansing hints above, young Cuban entrepreneurs may entice foreign merchants to help transform their guesthouses into neo-hotels and upend Castroist hegemony over the tourism sector. Thence, this
subsection contrasts elderly anti-imperialist trade attitudes with the youthful embrace of heightened mercantile ties to foreign interests supporting Cuban tourism entrepreneurship.

Elderly Cubans have applauded the Cuban government preventing U.S. corporations from softening the Embargo and coercing local entrepreneurs into partnering with corporate U.S. interests. When IRI polled 115 Cuban elders in 2008, the highest 16.5% of their sample opposed opening Cuba to trade marketization and 60% would freely re-elect Raúl Castro.\textsuperscript{[153]} Asserting vehement isolationism in their political opinions, older Cubans have derided the possibility that U.S. hospitality firms might aid expanding small-scale entrepreneurial activities across Cuba.

Samuel Farber historiographically highlights elderly anti-free market skepticism towards tourism entrepreneurship when he finds a “substantial number of Cubans” still detest a “unilateral abolition” of the U.S. blockade.\textsuperscript{[154]} Hardline thinking has solidified at the turn of the twenty-first century among older socialists who fear non-Cuban businesspeople undermining autochthonous tourism entities. In 1996, the almighty 65 year-old Raúl Castro himself declared that the government would criminally prosecute any “new crop of speculators [and] thieves” that attempted to de-nationalize Cuban tourism.\textsuperscript{[155]} Voluminous elderly discourse annuls the preconception that all age demographics within Cuban society would allow multinational corporations to extensively exploit entrepreneurial partnerships on the island. Therefore, persistent elderly resistance to trade imperialism in touristic commerce stands as an ideological obstacle to the proliferation of private tourism entrepreneurship across Cuba.

Contrarily, young Cubans have begun backing legislative referendums to demand greater entrepreneurial freedoms from the Cuban government. Analyzing poll data, recent electoral results and pro-marketization youth statements illustrates the increasing presence of such demands. The IRI found in its aforementioned 2008 poll that 85% of 587 18-49 year-old
respondents would “vote to change from the current economic system to a market economy system” while a somewhat lesser 75.8% of 50-and-older respondents would support such a market shift. Nationwide, young entrepreneurs wish to gain greater voice in legislative processes that might enable them to forge stronger ties with international business partners. “Daring” youths comprise many of the 700,000 Cubans who rejected a national constitution deeming markets “fact[s]of life” but not extending multinational investment options to local entrepreneurs. Accordingly, researchers have extended ethnographic channels to capture youth desires for increased entrepreneurial freedoms coming from political change. In 2011, 22 year-old Alfredo informed Canadian educator Michael O’Sullivan that opening your own business is “your own decision” and that politics should concern what people “think” and “need.” Exasperated with the hardline isolationist undercurrents of the dictatorship, young Alfredo suggests that extending transnational networking privileges to private citizens and international investors might desirably democratize the Cuban economy. Eager to make legislative inroads in achieving material and psychosocial success through entrepreneurial freedoms in tourism, young constituents have railed against elderly conservatism in politics.

Since the 1990s, young Cubans have encouraged civil society, if not officials, to advocate for the legalization of multinational investor-local entrepreneurial partnerships in Cuba. Before turning 30, marielito Hugo Cancio opened a Miami-based travel agency offering “Trips to Cuba” with a U.S. Treasury Department license permitting him to do business in Cuba. Fearlessly helping Cuban friends connect with investors and visitors, Cancio may have driven other young Cuban businesspeople to forecast transnational alliance construction with foreign hospitality interests. In 2016, 25 year-old consultant Manolo Valdes forewarned Brookings correspondent Richard E. Feinberg that foreign investment “administered by well-prepared Cuban managers”
would soon “flow in” to the “hippest” Havana restaurants.\textsuperscript{[160]} When the government permitted a U.S. corporation to rebrand a military hotel that year, the event may have inspired young employees to imagine startup planning with multinational assistance. Since Starwood still holds nominal privileges over the Four Points by Sheraton Havana, young bellboys and waitresses may contemplate “brotherhood and collaboration” with foreign firms into the near future.\textsuperscript{[161]} While scholars cannot yet explicitly record Starwood assisting local homeowners in expanding guesthouses into boutique hotels, enterprising youths may nurture such relationships if Diaz-Canel extends investment partnerships to civilians. Vocally considering managerial alliances with transnational hospitality conglomerates, young Cubans psychosocially driven to run materially sustainable businesses have seemed to progressively embrace civilian-level marketization in tourism entrepreneurship.

To conclude this subsection, readers can surmise that elderly anti-imperialist isolationism has clashed with youth-endorsed entrepreneurial marketization on international trade-tourism relations in Cuba. Older civilians and officials have concurred that letting U.S. corporations markedly infiltrate local tourism enterprises would betray the socialist sovereignty of the Cuban nation. In comparison, young voices have fought hard to more than countermand the hardline politics of aging authorities. Renouncing a constitution that does not let civilians acquire property management support from foreign firms, young entrepreneurs have legislatively attempted to begin challenging sluggish state reforms to the economy. Espousing striking optimism that foreign investment could still fuel hospitality enterprise growth in Cuba, young Cubans direct concerned spectators to ponder the imminence of entrepreneurial growth across the island.
Entering the twenty-first century, intergenerational gaps in technological aptitude and ideological attitudes towards tourism entrepreneurship have widened across Cuban society. As recent findings from the evolving discipline of age-disaggregated Cuban tourism entrepreneurship studies indicates, 18-to-49 year-old Cuban entrepreneurs have spearheaded electronic hospitality platforms to continue reaching tourists and business partners despite the extreme technical constraints the island faces. Using *el paquete* and app-sharing software to do business offline, young entrepreneurs have experienced relatively promising material and psychosocial successes in their local retail, dining and lodging ventures. Additionally incorporating facility design idea exchanges with international tourists into their entrepreneurial plans, young entrepreneurs resourcefully seek out brick-and-mortar qualitative data solutions to enhance their enterprises. Actively demanding that the Cuban government grants the people greater access to transnational business partnerships, young entrepreneurs remain driven to realize market freedoms and reform the Cuban economy.

Nonetheless, members of the elderly generation still vocally decry free-market influences they perceive as infiltrating the sovereign integrity of the Cuban state. Since Cuban elders retain considerable affinities to pensions instead of unstable private-sector returns, the older generation concretely anchors its conservative skepticism towards tourism entrepreneurship in endorsing social welfare preservation. Furthermore, elderly constituents and politicians appear hesitant to extend transnational investment access to civilian entrepreneurs and allow voluminous foreign mercantile activity to sabotage nationalized tourism entities within Cuba. While their inaptitude for technological innovation may weaken their scanty experimentation with tourism-related businesses, ongoing hardline skepticism of economic change typifies the insubstantial elderly presence in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship. Whether the not extremely aged 58 year-old Díaz-
Canel will offer on-the-ground Airbnb website access and transnational corporate assistance opportunities to every civilian remains uncertain. Although elderly conservatives discursively undercut the social, cultural, and political evolution of tourism entrepreneurship, younger entrepreneurial advocates seem unlikely to concede reform reversal across contemporary Cuba.
Chapter Five

Conclusion

One might find it rather improbable that international visitors can stay, shop, and dine at small-scale businesses that private local entrepreneurs operate within the authoritarian state of Cuba. Multitudes of tourists do feel enticed to visit the Caribbean island with its vibrant culture and tropical climate. Admittedly, state professionalization and empowerment initiatives have rigorously prepared Cuban women to start their own hospitality enterprises and Cuban youth have crafted innovative non-state networking methods to grow and market their ventures to tourists. Nonetheless, economic restrictions and social inequalities continue affecting local access to tourism entrepreneurship participation. Given that structural and ideological factors still interfere with widespread Afro-Cuban and elderly involvement in Cuban tourism entrepreneurship, the Castro dynasty has proven itself unwilling and/or unable to eliminate all group barriers to material and psychosocial success in tourism entrepreneurship. Even in one of the most supposedly benevolent states in the world that provides unquestionably impressive healthcare and education to its citizens, not every member of every demographic population segment can afford or willingly comprehend how to reach guests on electronic platforms or much less design chic storefronts. Perhaps no other country experiences as stark Internet access and material goods shortages as Cuba. Whether or not the Díaz-Canel regime will arduously attempt to subsidize technological connections and home furnishings or more pan-demographically redistribute incoming remittances among prospective tourism business owners
remains unclear. Unique political and economic struggles have reshaped the concept of civilian tourism involvement in Cuba even though the marginalization of people of color and elderly traditionalism certainly resemble social concerns common to most Latin American and Western countries.

Ideally, both fresh-faced Cuban politicians and intergovernmental bodies will cooperate on continuing the demographic triumphs of tourism entrepreneurship involvement and mending ongoing challenges to nationwide participation in it. Since Cuban officials ostensibly remain faithful to further empowering Cuban women to fill tourism management roles, a United Nations push for microfinancing among local female entrepreneurs could keep advancing female hospitality administration careers within Cuba. If significant international pressure for racial justice mounted upon it, the Cuban government might renounce the discriminatory surveillance of Afro-Cuban communities and consider welcoming the re-emergence of cabildos as incubators for small-scale enterprise development among socioeconomically disadvantaged Afro-Cubans. When exiled antisocialists and longtime hardline Castroists decide to multilaterally approach Cuban trade and infrastructure policy debates, more Cuban elders than have thus far voiced their willingness to engage in such dialogue may sympathize with small-scale tourism growth at the local level. Likewise, the Cuban government would do well to more strongly endorse the technical prowess and venturesome actions of its younger constituents if it wished to see the crucial tourism sector sustain the Cuban economy in coming years. The future of Cuban tourism entrepreneurship may appear promising as new guesthouses, restaurants, bars, and shops continue sprouting across Cuban cities and towns. Nevertheless, tourism entrepreneurship cannot undergo more pan-demographically representative growth in Cuba unless Cuban and foreign-
based lawmakers, scholars, merchants, and travelers address protracted hindrances to such
growth in Cuban society.
TABLES

Indicator 5.4.1, Series: Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work, by sex, age and location (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reporting Type</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>ALLAREA</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.31444444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>ALLAREA</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.34722222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women as proportion of total labour-force (%)

| Ministry of Public Health | 64  | 31.5 |
| Ministry of Education    | 58  | 40   |
| Cuba Tabaco              | 53  | 8.1  |
| Ministry of Milk-processing Industries | 41  | 20.4 |
| National Tourism Institute | 41  | 15.7 |
| Ministry of National Trade | 36  | 26.6 |
| Ministry of Food Industries | 18  | 5.8  |
| National Institute of Agrarian Reform | 9   | 1.9  |
| Ministry of Sugar        | 7   | 3.3  |

Source: Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas, 1975.

Total Workers in Ariguanabo Factory, September 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production Workers</td>
<td>2985</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>4595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Workers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management (dirigentes)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3355</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>5211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, female (% of female employment)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, male (% of male employment)</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, female (% of female employment)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, male (% of male employment)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, female (% of female employment)</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, male (% of male employment)</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment, female (% of female labor force)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment, male (% of male labor force)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage and salaried workers, female</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage and salaried workers, male</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing family workers, female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing family workers, male</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator 5.5.2, Series: Proportion of women in managerial positions (%) IC GEN_MGTL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reporting Type</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Farms</th>
<th>Total Farmland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. War Department, Report 1899, 555; Cuba, Censo 1931, table 37.
Note: Black includes mulattoes.


tions/Gordy2.pdf, see pg. 18; Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), see pg. 319.


[18] Isaac E. Yglesias, Survey of Linea Avenue Architecture, Fall 2017, raw observational data, Cuba, Havana.


[22] Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, "The Culture of Gender/The Gender of Culture: Cuban


[24] Roberto Zurbano, “For Blacks In Cuba, the Revolution Hasn’t Begun,” *Afro-Hispanic Review* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2014), accessed February 14, 2019, [https://search-proquest-com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/docview/1780137053/fulltextPDF/B8E48783C5CB4A21PQ/1?accountid=9703](https://search-proquest-com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/docview/1780137053/fulltextPDF/B8E48783C5CB4A21PQ/1?accountid=9703), see pg. 115B.


[27] As later explained in this chapter, the Evangelical Lutheran and Pentecostal Churches of Cuba have not yet successfully sponsored the formation of many small tourism businesses across the island. However, they have strengthened ideologies of livelihood empowerment that are instrumental in keeping entrepreneurs focused on running successful businesses.

[28] Lessening does not mean the complete elimination of gender inequality in tourism entrepreneurship.

[29] “Sustainable Development Goal Indicators,” United Nations, accessed November 28, 2018, [https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=5.4.1](https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=5.4.1). Cuban socialism itself has not caused such gender inequalities, which appear in different countries with non-socialist regimes in power to resemble the machismo present in Cuba. *Machismo* pervaded Latin American life long before the Communist Party officially took power in Cuba in 1965. Nonetheless, Cuban policymakers must still recognize that they need to empower women to start small businesses if they want to stop patriarchy from haunting Cuban households anytime soon. See Table 1.


Intriguingly enough, 1986 is an alternate permutation of 1869—how history may repeat itself!


[33] Ibid.


[43] Mustafa Seref Akin, “An Analysis of Competition For University Entrance Test,” The Journal of Developing Areas 46, no. 1 (2012), accessed December 14, 2018, doi:10.1353/jda.2012.0001, see pg. 64. As recently as 2016, 40% of women were enrolled in
tertiary-level academic institutions while just 28.4% of men were enrolled at the tertiary level. Ergo, the post-1959 regime has promoted higher education among women to empower them in the labor force. See http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/country/cuba for more information.


[50] Ilene Grabel, The Political Economy of Remittances: What Do We Know? What Do We Need To Know? Working paper no. 184, Political Economy Research Institute, University of
see pg. 32. Dr. Grabel acknowledges that women in Cuba, among the many developing countries she has examined, may desire remittances. The gender divide in pay is unequal in Cuba even though remittance receipts themselves may be fewer in dollar amounts than those men receive. But, as remittances may have been rather scarce for women and the greater general population as the Special Period showed, Cuban women then used social networks to come up with business funding on the ground. Geographer Sarah Blue confirms in *State Policy, Economic Crisis, Gender, and Family Ties: Determinants of Family Remittances to Cuba* that no formal gender disaggregation of remittances exists in Cuba. Remittance money gets delivered informally to Cubans and the government has not supported any comprehensive recordkeeping system of which demographic groups receive varying quantities of remittances.


[53] John Andrew Gustavsen, *Tension under the Sun: Tourism and Identity in Cuba, 1945-2007*, PhD diss., University of Miami, 2009 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 2009), accessed December 6, 2018, https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1297&context=oa_dissertations, see pg. 277; Agnes Martha Wierzbicki, *The Cuban Black Market*, Master’s thesis, University of California, Berkeley, Fall, 2005 (Berkeley: University of California 2005), accessed December 6, 2018, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.1785&rep=rep1&type=pdf, see pg. 63. As Gustavsen and Wierzbicki indicate, self-employed entrepreneurs could not initially make U.S. Dollars from everyday interactions with customers in their own businesses. Yet, they could access greater quantities of *pesos* that they could eventually convert into *pesos convertibles* and then convert those *pesos convertibles* into Dollars. In the realm of tourism entrepreneurship, greater access to Dollars meant a greater ability to invest in guesthouse renovation supplies for Cuban women interested in starting guesthouses. Additionally, with greater investment power, Cuban women could also start marketing their guesthouses to tourists with Dollars.


[56] See the quantitative income and historico-qualitative remittance data from the United Nations and Dr. Grabel elucidated in footnotes 19 and 21 respectively.

[57] Theodore “Ted” A. Henken, “Condemned to Informality: Cuba’s Experiments with Self-Employment during the Special Period (The Case of Bed and Breakfasts),” *Cuban Studies* 33
Often times during the Special Period, women relied on "middlemen" in their social networks to hide their unlawful guesthouse expansion and non-taxed surplus profits. Sometimes, women would bribe authorities to evade taxes but they could not have as easily done even this without extra help. Women could not have selectively exploited black market practices to manage solvent tourist accommodations without collectively mobilizing underground third-party actors to help sustain their businesses. As additionally noted later in this paper, smugglers have supplied female innkeepers with commercial capital and material goods to supplant more contemporary scarcities in the twenty-first century guesthouse sector.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Mack Tanner and Larry Grupp, “Viva La Evolution!” Reason 26, no. 4 (August-September 1994), accessed December 7, 2018, http://go.galegroup.comresources.library.brandeis.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA15630165&v=2.1&u=mlin_m_brandeis&it=r&p=OVIC&sw=w#. While Castro did not gather quantitative data on sex work during the Special Period, author Pico Iyer wrote while in Cuba that sex work occurred throughout its tourism industry. In his 1994 New York Times article Castro’s Resilient Masses, Iyer considered sex work “pandemic” because many Cuban women could not avoid it if they sought material survival. As Iyer and anthropologist Nadine T. Fernandez concur, many women without dollars from relatives abroad performed sex work upon foreigners to feed and clothe their families with hard currency. For further insights from Iyer on sex work during the Special Period, also see pg. 196, Inside Cuba: The History, Culture, and Politics of an Outlaw Nation edited by John Miller and Aaron Kenedi in 2003.


[65] “Winners,” 10x10kCuba, accessed December 11, 2018,
Archbishops Juan Rodríguez of Camaguey and Havana and Domingo Lorente of Cienfuegos organized the 10x10kCuba startup competition in 2016 to help entrepreneurs perfect their business plans with ecclesiastical support. The one and only winner for running a pioneering guesthouse rental website or app was Ms. Plana and not a man—hence reflecting that the entrepreneurial drive that the Church has further instilled in female innkeepers translates into material and psychosocial success for female entrepreneurs. About Us, Cuba Room, April 23, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.cubaroom.net/about-us. This company headed by Ms. Plana has helped market 234 guesthouses within Havana and 253 guesthouses elsewhere in Cuba since its 2015 founding.


Adrian H. Hearn, “Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba,” The China Quarterly 209 (2012), accessed December 13, 2018, doi:10.1017/s0305741011001500, see pg. 120. The initially non-state Grupo Promotor helped jumpstart so many successful small businesses in the Chinese-Cuban community that the Central Havana municipal government eventually took it over.


Núñez, ‘Empowering Cuban Women,” interview.

Ivor L. Miller, Voice of the Leopard: African Secret Societies and Cuba, 1st ed. (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2009), accessed January 22, 2019, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/lib/brandeis-ebooks/reader.action?docID=840360#, see pg. 94. Abakuá is the most prominent Cuban subset of community organizations collectively known as cabildos throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Other prominent ethnic subtypes of the Cuban cabildo include the lucumi (of Yoruba origin), congo (of Bantu origin), and mandinga (of Malinké origin). See pg. 47 of Richard Gott’s Cuba: A New History for further information on the ethnic arrangements of various Cuban cabildo groups.


Christine Ayorinde, “Afro-Cuban Religions as Resistance,” in Swiss Society of Americanists,
proceedings of The Centennial of Cuba’s Independent Party of Color, 1912-2012, 2012, accessed January 22, 2019, http://www.sag-ssa.ch/images/downloads/larevista/bssa74_05.pdf, see pg. 25 for introduction to 1950s state repression of Afro-Cuban communities and the subsequent Castroist enforcement of “scientific atheism” over belief structures including Abakuá beginning in the 1970s.; Ten years after the Mariel boatlift of 1980, just 27,924 nonwhite Cuban émigrés had arrived in the U.S. while 97,349 “white” Cubans had emigrated there according to geographer Emily H. Skop. While neither the Cuban nor the U.S. governments have measured the racial breakdown of remittance receipts in Cuba, an absolutely fewer number of people of color had settled in the U.S. to send remittances back to Cuba.


[79] Moore, Nationalizing Blackness, see pg. 80.


[82] Quiroz, “Free Association and Civil Society in Cuba, 1787-1895,” see pg. 58.


[85] De la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba, see pg. 106 and Table 3.1.


[87] Moore, Nationalizing Blackness, see pg. 81.


January 30, 2019, doi:10.1017/s0147547900001976. While early Cuban Communists may have formed labor unions to assist Cubans of all racial backgrounds in finding state employment, General Machado did not stop private companies from discriminating against Afro-Cuban job applicants in their hiring processes. 


[97] De la Fuente, A Nation for All, see pg. 259, De la Fuente notes the critique that exiled political scientist Carlos Moore made of ongoing socioeconomic racism in Castroist state institutions such as labor in this quotation.

[98] Fidel Castro Ruz, “Calls For a New L.A. Grouping to Replace OAS,” (speech, Cuba,

[99] De la Fuente, *A Nation for All*, see pgs. 273-274.


Fidel Castro Ruz, “Return from United Nations,” (speech, Cuba, Havana), accessed January 31, 2019, http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600929-1.html. Castro claimed to count Afro-Cuban political leaders Antonio Maceo, J.A. Bosque, and Víctor Dreke as “revolutionary heroes” in their respective struggles against Spanish and North American imperialism. When Castro voiced to the public that “heroic” Afro-Cubans needed to stay in Cuba to aid state economic infrastructure formation, he rescinded any private sector entrepreneurial freedom for the Afro-Cubans he said should not leave Cuba. In not entirely stamping out persistent anti-Batista and anti-capitalist-centered racism espoused by labor officials, Castro entrapped Afro-Cubans who could have earned virtually unlimited incomes as private-sector entrepreneurs in positions where they faced salary limits and could not realize their entrepreneurial dreams beneath the collectivist market controls of the new regime.

De la Fuente, see pg. 274.

Ibid., pg. 274.


Katrin Hansing, “Race and Inequality in the New Cuba: Reasons, Dynamics, and Manifestations,” Social Research 84, no. 2 (Summer 2017), accessed February 8, 2019, https://search-proquest.com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/docview/1985657236?accountid=9703&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. The National Office for Statistics has not conducted its own studies on racial Internet inequality in tourism entrepreneurship nor permitted external researchers to record pervasively racial digital divides on Airbnb or other platforms for fear they would publicize the embarrassingly-low number of Afro-Cuban guesthouse owners living in Cuba at present.


Machinery, proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Palais des Congrès de Montréal, Montréal, QC, 2018, accessed February 27, 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f549a3b7411c736b42936a/t/5a61b255e2c483c497384f1d1/1516352085908/ElPaquete.pdf, see pg. 5.


[139] Noreen O’Leary, “A Change is Going To Come (Soon),” Adweek, July/August 2015, accessed March 2, 2019, http://go.galegroup.com.resources.library.brandeis.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T003&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA423817912&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=&prodId=ITOF&contentSet=GALE%7CA423817912&searchId=R1&userGroupName=mlin_m_brandeis&inPS=true, see pg. 13.


Strug, “Older Persons,” see pg. 17.

Strug, “Older Persons,” see pg. 4.


“Cuban Public Opinion Survey March 14-April 12, 2008,”


