The Outcast

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Weiai Fang

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ABSTRACT

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Brandeis University
Waltham, Massachusetts

By Weiai Fang

By assigning citizenship according to people’s blood relations and their geographic residency, the Chinese Household Registration System (Hukou) not only segregates rural and urban spaces, but also unjustifiably categorizes and entrenches the its citizens through long-lasting restrictions on social welfare, human capital, and upward mobility. This research project attempts to add to the understanding of Chinese internal migration in two ways: a) by offering a systematic examination of political, normative, and cultural forms of social exclusion embedded in hukou that intersect with the idea of citizenship and create ‘intra-cities’ urban migrants; b) a comparative analysis of two exclusive institutions—India’s caste and China’s hukou. By highlighting the generalized features of these two systems, this study hopes to promote coalitions across fields, frames and contexts to better illuminate the inadequacies of current welfare states. Subsequently, an onomasiological analysis of the institutions of social exclusion will be presented to explain how hukou is mobilized by the ‘remnants’ of the past and functions as a form of caste-like system. Lastly, policy measures and recent reforms of the registration system will be addressed. This research hopes to inspire people to eventually transcend from the ontology of systematic exclusion and contrive what is truly vital in the process of liberation.
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One day I was taking a taxi home. After I told the driver my destination, he asked me, “You are an outsider (Waidiren), right?” I was surprised. “How could you tell?” He replied with slight scorn and arrogance, “I figured out you are not from here the moment you spoke. There are outsiders everywhere now.” That was my eighteenth year in Beijing, the place I called my hometown (Weiai Fang, Beijing, 2011).

Chapter I: Introduction

The contemporary Chinese Hu Ji or Hu Kou system (or the Household Registration System), is a system that collects, confirms, and registers citizens' basic information such as birth, death, kinship, occupation, legal address and so on according to the law. Here ‘hu’ means households, ‘ji’ means status or origins, and ‘kou’ means the population. This household registration system is more than a simple census; it has far-reaching implications for an individuals’ opportunity structures and freedom of mobility. Strict regulation of movement across cities/provinces is the most crucial implication of hukou. A second, and related issue addresses hukou’s control over the distribution of social welfare and other resources, such as employment, education, housing, medical care, and social security benefits (Wang et.al 2015). Chinese citizens find it difficult to acquire these community-based rights and privileges anywhere other than where they are registered by the hukou system (Dutton 1998; Wang 2005). Authorization for changes to legal permanent residency is only granted by the government (Li 2009; Sagerson 2016). This can be as difficult as ‘climbing up to heaven without a ladder.’

The prosperity of China’s economy does not release the poor, uneducated and unattached migrants from the harsh regimes of control and exclusion (Dutton 1992: 85). Section four of the 1958 PRC Household Regulations states that: “the household (registration) books and the items
entered therein shall be valid proof of the identity of citizens” (Dutton 1992: 211). People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizenship is understood as affording individuals the right to “full participation” in a particular community. This definition is similar in nature to the concept of national identity, fabricating social boundaries that contrast insiders with outsiders, and treating cultural identities as “socially constructed, ideological justifications for social closure” (Silver 1994: 46). Exclusion is an expression of incomplete citizenship (Silver 1994: 37), which essentially constructs inequality. By assigning citizenships according to people’s blood relations and their geographic residency, the registration system not only erects a high wall between the city and the suburb, but also unjustifiably categorizes and entrenches the citizenship identity. The objective of this paper is to examine the consequences of this ‘incompleteness’ and limitations of this type of citizenship and explore possible alternatives. This requires an onomasiological dissection of the institutions of social exclusion: 1) the hukou system as a substructure of exclusion galvanized by historical ‘remnants’ of the past and functioning as a caste-like system; 2) the deficiencies and consequences of the existing household registration policies. This research hopes to inspire people to eventually transcend from the ontology of systematic exclusion and contrive what is truly vital in the process of liberation.

Most studies from Chinese and international research communities have focused on the economic implication of the urban–rural dichotomy created by the hukou system. This binary system registers individuals as agricultural (nongye hukou) or non-agricultural (fei nongye hukou), with the intention of using agriculture (nongye) to support industry (gongye) (Dutton 1992; Wang 2005; Sargeson 2016). Existing scholarship tends to objectify internal migrants as the gauge of regional and national levels of economic development and the result of globalization forces (Logan 2002). Their incentives to migration are generally believed to align
with the conventional pushed and pulled factors driven by the labor markets (Zhu 2007; Davin 2012). Scholars tend to view the Chinese hukou system ubiquitously with the household registration system in other countries, that it is a technical and rational device of demographical reference (Dutton 1992: 89).

This research project attempts to fill in the gaps in the literature on internal migration by investigating two types of socially exclusive institutions. First, this paper will provide a systematic examination of political, normative, and cultural exclusions in China that intertwine with citizenship identity. From a macro-sociological perspective, this research paper argues that an individual’s afflicted conditions do not absolutely disadvantaged them, but are relative to a person’s unique situation (Silver 1994: 36). Although key institutional elements of hukou are discussed in several studies, they either limit the exclusion to a condition or identity, or concern themselves primarily with rural workers that are segregated in urban areas. Furthermore, most attention drawn to social exclusion focuses on discrimination against migrant workers who are marginalized in urban cities. This research paper focuses primarily on how hukou manipulates the Chinese citizenship status to reinforce social inequalities through multiple forms of exclusion, and demarcates a society that thrives on the basis of stratification of internal migrants through the household registration system. This study will include intra-city migrants who, after China’s recent social restructuring, hold urban hukou but have residences that are not located in their registered locations. This creates a population distinct from rural migrants and urban locals.

Second, by comparing hukou in China with the caste system in India, this paper will offer an analysis of exclusive social institutions beyond the national context. Past scholarship has focused predominantly on the comparison of these two countries in terms of their economic, political and military development; also on the dominating features of developing countries such
as poverty, gender equality, and education. Few studies have engaged in the discourse of the fundamental similarities behind the production of social disadvantages. It may seem imprudent to draw an analogy between hukou and caste, as both are ancient civilizations with unique political structures, ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and so on. However, when examining their functions in terms of social exclusion, India’s caste system and China’s hukou have similarities in reinforcing stratification and restrictions on mobility. The distinctions and classifications in these two systems bear exclusive nature as they are closely tied to social benefits (Silver 1994: 8). More importantly, caste and hukou are dynamic instruments of exclusion in the enduring process of the accumulation of social disadvantages, which eventually lead to social disqualification (Silver 1994: 9). By highlighting the generalized nature of these two systems, this study of exclusion helps to promote coalitions across fields, frames and contexts in order to address the inadequacies of these two current welfare states.

Chapter Two will begin with a comparative analysis of two social exclusion institutions—China’s hukou and India’s caste. Certainly, hierarchy, inequality, exclusion, and discrimination are inevitable by-products of organizing humans through social divisions (Wang 2005: 1). While many countries have experienced exclusive and stratified social systems in the past and present, China and India are two countries in which inequalities have perpetuated in many dimensions, including social, economic, caste, class, gender, and culture; and most distinctively, the biologically and geographically-based divisions. The development of the hukou system has gone through parallel trajectories with the Indian caste, and both systems have been through modifications along with shifts in political regimes. To find out the rationale behind the governing regime in implementing exclusions, this paper will examine genealogically these two institutions from the Vedic period (C.1500) and Shang Dynasty (C.1600) to the post-independent
era. Consecutively, this chapter will discuss the ways in which the bureaucratic structure of the two modern states has deprived the population of basic needs, provisions, and opportunities to participate in the major social and occupational activities. These multiple layers of restrictions reinforce one another and create generational deficits that are difficult to overcome.

The third chapter discusses the development of the exclusive institutions in modern China and India. The last chapter gives a close examination of the introduction of ‘work units,’ ‘rice iron bowl’, and land tenure rights. This chapter then argues that hukou and caste use the boundaries of citizenship to fabricate social closure on people who do not share similar social, cultural, political, and economic identities. In addition, a detailed investigation of the social security system in both countries will be presented, as it represents not only the centralization of state power, but also the creation of rhapsodic stratification and urban-rural division based on individuals’ household status. Consecutively, possible modifications of existing policies and suggestions will be addressed. There is a necessity and inevitability for a fundamental change, for the fact that a nation’s institutional composition, well-being, record of achievements, and its international standing are closely associated with the way its citizens are organized and the extent of stratification they suffer.
Chapter II: The Emergence of Caste and Caste-like Institutions

Unlike Western welfare states, social exclusion in China and India is not a consequence of profound economic restructuring in the post-war period, but instead is an inexorable, long-term trend of history. The exclusive institutions emerging within these two countries--caste in India and the ancient Baojia system in China--are dynamic expressions of the ways in which they constituted and regulated their people over time (Dutton 1992: 5; Silver 1994: 9).

The Ancient Caste and Hukou system

The term “caste” does not have an Indian lineage but is derived from the Portuguese term *casta*, which means “race” or “tribe,” although the Portuguese *casta* does not carry a similar social structure as is seen in Hindu society. In India, the term “caste” stands for two distinct systems: Varna and Jati. Varna refers to the division of society into four groups, whereas Jati refers to thousands of groups that were originally determined by occupation and locality (Jacobs 2010: 58). The origin of Varna was first found in *The Hymn of the Cosmic Man* (*Puruṣa Sūkta*) as outlined the Hindu sacred text, the *Rig Veda* (10:90-11,12). This scriptural passage dating to between c. 1500-1200 B.C. E. suggests that the cosmic man sacrifices and dismembers himself in exchange for the creation of human life in its many dimensions. “His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior, his thighs the People, and from his feet the Servants were born” (58). Although this hymn expresses that “society is an organic whole, homologous to the structure of both the cosmos and the body,” there is no evidence shown that
Vedic society of that era was organized based on this structure (Jacobs 2010: 58). The four hierarchical groupings are only clearly defined in the later dharma texts—*The Laws of Manu* (1:88-91), written a millennia later (c. 200 B.C.E.).

As one of the most ancient exclusion framework, Caste has existed for thousands of years. The social historical theory dated its origin back to the period around 1500 BCE when the Aryans or ‘Noble Ones’ arrived in India. It is widely believed that the Arya originated from the Caspian Sea, migrated west into today’s Iran, after which their routes were bifurcated, some continuing west into Europe, and others migrating south into the subcontinent (Jacobs 2010: 8). Underlying the principle of opposition between purity and pollution, the Aryans arranged the Indian society into four Varnas— 1) *Brahmans*: the priests. 2) *Rajayana* (later changed to *Kshatria*): warriors and rulers. It is said that in the political struggle between these two groups, the Brahmans gained control of Aryan society and were able to occupy the highest Varna. 3) *Vaisyas*: farmers, artisans and traders. During the Aryans’ conquer, the *Vaisyas* became the landlords and the businessmen of the society; the locals became the peasants and the craftsmen. Between the outcastes and the three Aryan Varnas is 4) the *Shudra* Varna: those who serve other groups (Jacobs 2010: 58). The *Shudras* consisted of two communities-- locals who were subdued by the Aryans and descendants of Aryans who intermingled with locals. In order to maintain their domination, the Aryans monopolized the occupations of priests, warriors and businessmen. Beneath the four strata are the *Untouchables*, which is not classified as a Varna group and its members are deemed ritually impure (Jacobs 2010: 59). Skin color was an important categorization in the ancient caste system as Aryans had fair skin. The meaning of the word "Varna" was not class or status but skin color. In Hindu religious stories, there were many warfare between the good Aryans and the dark-skinned demons, devils and slaves, who were in
fact the native residents of India. Over the course of time, the four divisions have become as
distinguishable as people’s skin color, for the fact that the same professions were inherited by the
families for generations. Later on, these families were expanded to communities and developed
social relations among different families, and gradually these communities have become
solidified within the distinction of castes (“The Caste System of India” 2016; Ilaiah 2009: 183;
Jacobs 2010: 58).

While there are four categories under the Varna system, there are unlimited numbers of
Jatis. Each Jati, or clan/tribe can be subdivided into sub-castes. The Jati system is “a taxonomy
of all life forms including animal, human and celestial beings. Members of the same jati are
believed to share the same body substance, which distinguishes them from members of all other
jatis” (Jacobs 2010: 59). Correspondingly, a person’s Jati is both ascriptive and immutable and
requires the endogamous tradition of marriage (marriage within clans), yet this does not imply
the impossibility of social mobility. In the colonial period, the British tried to map the Jati system
onto the Varna system but without much success. Despite the fact that the Jati system is also
hierarchical, there is no direct correlation between the two systems and it is problematic to
categorize a specific Jati into a particular Varna (Jacobs 2010: 60). What makes them most
distinctive is that Jati is not a religious but a sociocultural phenomenon, whereas Varna is a core
principle of Hinduism (60).

Though not possessing the similar colonial and religious heritage embedded in India’s
caste system, China organized its people through various divisions of households for millennia
(Wang 2005: 1). Because for dynasties agricultural production had been the main source of state
revenue, the history of the household registration system in China was always tied to land and
taxation. The rudimentary form of the household registration can be traced back to Shang
dynasty (C.1600-1046 BCE), when local officials were required each year to send to the central government data, such as population statistics, tax revenues collected, expenditures, and their projected budget. During the period of the Warring States (475-221BCE), the population records were used for levy, recruiting labors and troops, and classifying citizen’s occupations and class standings. From Qin to Han dynasty, minor changes were made in the registering approaches. However, hukou has shifted from maintaining equality before the law by identify group interests (in the Qin), and moved to use the record as the medium of imposing differences on social and familial status (in the Han) (Dutton 1992: 40).

The registration system most similar to the contemporary hukou was the Baojia system, which appeared in Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) and had persisted until the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912 CE). The system of Baojia, in which ten households count as one jia, ten jia count as one bao, was the forebearer of the household registration system and used family and clan as the standard units for population management. Derived from the notion of “descending” individuation instead of operating on the individual subject, Baojia was organized around a collective family-centered subject (Dutton 1992: 50). The notion family had been structurally confined to a form of government through the reinforced internal hierarchical relations with the recognition of the family head as the legal head. Moreover, the collection of genealogical records of aristocratic families ensured “the monitoring of this class as well as a capacity to intervene, on the basis of the records, to uphold distinctions” (Dutton 1992: 85). The distinctiveness and hierarchies existing in the Chinese concept of “family” was beneficial to the state because it made the populace visible and allowed them to be organized in a centralized fashion (Dutton 1992: 25). Baojia has never been an instrument for the construction of power; rather it helped the state to intervene in and alleviate potential opposition from clan, gentry, and local village heads. By
legally establishing these family-based rights, it also accentuated the boundaries of those rights and made it convenient to monitor any transgressions (Dutton 1992: 86).

The household registration system (Baojia) in China's traditional society has been used to classify the population into different categories based on social, economic, and political standings that parallel in many ways the emergent Indian caste system. It is interesting to note that since the period of the Warring States--between the fourth and second century BCE--ancient Chinese society was divided into four categories, known as the government officials (Shi), peasants (Nong), artisans (Gong), and merchants (Shang). Because ancient empires depended heavily on agriculture, peasants were given the second highest status in society. Workers and businessmen made the least contribution to national revenue at that time, therefore were placed at the lowest stratum. The aristocrats had a number of political privileges; officers and scholars were given preferential treatment of tax relief. In the early Shiwu policy drafted by Shang Yang (390–338 BCE) in Qin Dynasty, only the statuses of the producer (the peasant) and the warriors were reinforced. With the establishment of Baojia, the register was gradually divided into three classes based on the division of labor: 1) military households (field officers, junior officers, and soldiers); 2) citizen household; 3) worker households (cooks, servants, tailors, grooms, and fishermen). The civilian households were responsible for farming, paying taxes to the state, and participating in the corvée service. The military household was obliged to serve in the military, while the workers’ class was obliged to provide services and supplies to the rich, the royals, and the state-run industries. People in each category must take on the hereditary career and were not allowed to change to other occupations (“The History of China's Household Register System”, 2014). The officer household in Song Dynasty was the most typical type of the privileged household, but such privilege was disappeared after Song. By Ming dynasty, the differentiation
of ‘households’ had become much more minute with a more meticulous emphasis on classification (Dutton 1992: 72).

Before the Warring States Period, China’s military household held high social standing as the warrior caste in India. It was the privilege of the nobility to seize for higher position and power in the royal court, thus plebeians were not permitted to serve in the army. But with the escalation and amplification of warfare, there were frequent needs for a great number of soldiers. Gradually, the universal conscription system was introduced. Due to the high risk, high casualties and tough living conditions, this profession had been degraded to be the class lower than the civilians. By the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, the military households had been gradually separated from the general citizen households. People who were classified as military households not only had to serve in the military during his lifetime, his future generations also had the obligation to be enlisted and were not allowed to change their occupations. Even inter-household marriage was prohibited. For a long time, military households were treated as a low social class. Later during the Tang, Song, Yuan Dynasty, people with officer and local gentry households were given legal and extrajudicial privileges (“The History of China's Household Register System”, 2014).

Like the division between the four castes and the untouchables in India, the huji system in different periods of dynastic China has grouped people into the privileged huji, the plebeian huji, and the pariah huji with clear boundaries. The privileged were qualified to become state officials, enjoyed taxes relief, and could be exempted from certain punishment and lawsuits. The plebeian was the majority, including civilians, artisans, cooker and business owners and so on. These people were important sources of national taxation and corvée. Pariahs were lower than the status of the plebeians, which enclosed the soldiers (Junhu), fatigues(Zayi), entertainers(Yuehu),
and beggars (*Gaihu*) (Zheng& Min 2003). In Wei dynasty (386-535 AD), as family background became the primary criterion in determining social and political status, genealogical records became the reference for marriage considerations and official appointment. It was devised to establish the status of the lowly born and aristocrat, and to identify the eldest male child who was eligible for corvée (Dutton 1992: 31). Consequently, distinguished families [*Shih-tsu*] and plebeian families [*shu-tsu*] had developed into two distinct social groups, the former being the upper class while the latter the lower class (Dutton 1992: 56). In the Six Dynasties period, scholars and officials were selected exclusively from the *Shih-tsu*. Marriage between these two classes was expressly forbidden, and the ruling families usually married among themselves (56). The register enabled the old established aristocratic families to preserve their status till the Sui dynasty (Dutton 1992: 57).

Later during the period of the Tang dynasty (618-906 AD), the power and influence of the aristocracies began to vanish. The Tang Court ordered the burning of all family records, which were genealogical files that allowed the gentry class to build up power, influence, and status. But alternatively, Tang had solidified inequality through two *huji* categories—the ‘registered household’ and the ‘non-registered household’. The former was civilians (people who had freedom); the latter was pariahs or the untouchables (people without freedom). National policies only benefited parts of the people since the untouchables were not eligible for registration and could only be attached to their masters’ households. The pariahs of the Tang dynasty were mainly consisted of the servants of the government officers and the slaves of the aristocratic families. They were treated as private property and could be traded as goods (“The History of China's Household Register System”, 2014).
In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the ‘untouchable’ class was called *gaihu*, also known as ‘the great poverty,’ who were banished and with no visible means of support. People with *gaihu* households were not allowed to marry, reside, or live with ordinary civilians. Because of their different customs and status, they had been living in misery and under contempt. Moreover, the *gaihu* was deprived of taking official examinations or careers (Dutton 1992: 85). According to historical records and folklorists’ studies, the widely-accepted explanation was that *gaihu* originated in the early Southern Song dynasty. It was during that period when the Jin empire’s troops launched a large-scale invasion of Song, and general *Jiao Guangzan*, along with his troops, betrayed Song and sought refuge with Jin. However, the Jin empire was eventually defeated by Ming. Jiao and his subordinates not only received great contempt from the people, but were also degraded to the *gaihu* household imposed by the Ming emperor *Zhu Yuanzhang* (Zheng& Min 2003).

Throughout China’s history, the system of registration has operated as a form of class identity and class division and thus, was the basis of negotiation of superior/inferior positions (Dutton 1992: 56). The registration system established new social structures that enabled the group of elites to evolve into gentrified clans that monopolized political power, economic privileges and high social status. Consequently, the compilation of the genealogy was highly valued and intra-clan marriage was strongly reinforced in order to maintain the nobility of lineage. Yet people of the unregistered class were enslaved by the aristocratic families, who not only lost their land and property but also their independence, trapped forever at the bottom of the society.

The Baojia system appearing in the Song dynasty paved the way for the household registration system to be well-developed into the modern era. The reason that this system has
remained so powerful in China was not just because of the vertical restrictions enforced in the process of collecting and classifying household information, but also its related horizontal limitations. Hukou’s long-held restriction on spatial mobility distinguished itself from the many parallels shared with the Indian Caste structure. Because the population was tied to taxation and corvée (labors exacted to serve the authority), the government made every attempt to constrain the flow of the population in a specific geographical scope; leaving one’s location was accounted as a crime. As a component of Baojia, Guanzi’s policy scheme of shiwu formulated the location system (difang zhidu). It stipulated that individual's’ activities had to be limited within a mile of their household; any person away from their hometown need to receive official documents issued by the local government, otherwise they would be exiled or executed. Shiwu fettered peasants to the land and restrained their free movement of residencies; the neighbors were obligated to notice the government officers if anyone had not returned after two years. This stipulation that was based on “mutual spying and the denunciation of fellow villagers and friends for legal transgressions” was reinforced by Shangyang.

In the agricultural society, land-based production and the self-sufficient lifestyle were already the precondition of restricting people’s movement; the rigid system of registration has further strengthened the constraints on relocation. This kind of personal confinement led to an isolative society and impaired the socio-economic development of the state. Moreover, this weakening of people was a means of policing as it upheld the divided interests among individuals. On the one hand, people had to live with the risk of being implicated in illegal or immoral acts of their neighbors. On the other hand, because the imperial states prohibited the right of migration and free movement, it was impossible to avoid such social or physical consequences of an ‘unlawful’ action (Dutton 1992: 73). This location system was essentially the
instrument for human resource planning, which was followed by all subsequent dynasties and consequently it had become one of the fundamental feature of the modern hukou system (Dutton 1992: 30). Since then, registration turned away from mutual harmony and embraced mutual division (Dutton 1992: 29). The *One Hundred Day’s Reform* (1898-1899) had brought together the two previously separated administration—the public security and the baojia system. Under the Western influence, the modern concept of policing was therefore introduced. This reform was regarded as an advancement of the traditional form of baojia to enhance “organization and control at the grass-roots level of local society” (Dutton 1992: 191).

**Hukou: Transition from the Classical Society**

Though the ruling of classical China was highly coercive and centralized, it would not successfully maintain societal harmony for dynasties without an advanced system of documentation that emphasized on the family and policed through mutually self-checking units (Dutton 1992: 3). As the dynasties and the baojia system disintegrated, a new form of registration system has emerged, undermining family’s status as the central unit and the model of governance. The emphasis of power concentration is no longer on fortifying regional semi-autonomy but on strengthening state intervention. In other words, this is a shift from the “community/family based charity and philanthropy to state-based welfarist intervention” (Dutton 1992: 192). The ancient operating principle of morality and subjectivity gave way to the accentuation rationality and legitimacy (Dutton 1992: 27). But at the same time, the necessity of welfare and economic development increases state’s concern with the demography and human resource planning toward its population.
Though identified as scientific modernity that diverges itself from the traditional construction, the Hukou system in post-independent China is “a re-articulation” of the classical structure. There are three ongoing features: 1) the function as the statistical basis for “the ordering, policing and detailing of hierarchical systems of power relations”. Here the population figures not just play the role of social control; the more important role it assumes is its influence on the nation’s economy (Dutton 1992: 41). 2) The medium as mutual-help and mutual-discipline among communities. 3) The family order is consolidated and policed by using the traditional family household as the basic unit of social accounting (Dutton 1992: 24).

The modern household registration system leans heavily towards economic concerns, however the social unit of the family never fully exited the stage as an administrative classification. For either the family unit or the individual unit, the focus has shifted to the mobilization and organization of laborers and workplace (Dutton 1992: 189). The modern Huji (the household record) incorporates both its traditional role of specifying family household status and its modern role that recognizes and classifies the status of individuals. In the early 1920s, for the first time individuals were assigned new roles by receiving "the rights and responsibilities of parents, of marriage partners, of divorcees, in order to arrange army duty and corvée (levying) labor," two functions that sustained the Chinese state (Dutton 1992: 163). Household status records thus revealed detailed information about individual and family status and gave the government detailed demographic information on the population so they could conscript troops and organize taxation, police, and education (163). This specification of individual registration establishes a relationship between the individual and the government administration, thus signifying the construction of a modern state. Since that time, the mission of the hukou system has shifted to include keeping track of the population by highlighting its active participation in
societal, economic, and political life rather than simply recording its statistical representation. This new role allowed the government to establish a stronger level of social control over the population.

**Hukou and Propiska**

It would be difficult to interpret China’s hukou and its doctrine of labor reform without a close examination of the history of the socialist register in the USSR, whose purpose in controlling migration was similar in many ways to the modern hukou system. Russia has had a long tradition of keeping household and work-based registration systems, which used internal passport laws as the central mechanism to regulate migration. Both of the Chinese and the Russian register systems were deemed revolutionary not because they were the harbingers of a more scientific and rational institution, but the fact that they broke the traditional bond between family and economy and instilled the ethically based role of the collective labor process (Dutton 1992: 190).

During the Tsarist era, people’s class standing determined the type of passport they would receive, thus leading to different types of rights and the degree of freedom citizens had in the process of migration. This system served the upper classes and blocked entirely access of the lower classes, especially peasants, to travel documents (Dutton 1992: 197). Until 1861, the peasantry were largely serfs and could only travel under the permission of their lord. After emancipation, peasants remained tied to the land because of the redemption payment laws, which gave administrative power to the villages to police migration and to proscribe the peasants’ movement. With the abolition of redemption laws (1908), the responsibility for restricting free movement fell on the head of households rather than on the state. In 1918, following the October
Revolution and resulting civil war, the Bolshevik government created the “workbook,” which incorporated compulsory labor and the registration of all bourgeois elements into national jurisdictions to keep track of the amount and quality of labor. It was referred to as the “workbook,” in part because the state deployed a labor force to perform menial and dirty tasks for troops fighting at the front (Dutton 1992: 198).

According to Lenin, the workbook system was first introduced to the bourgeois class and then was gradually extended to the whole population. This workbook system was designed to oversee the bourgeois workers’ performances and to regulate them and their organizations. This was not just refining the bourgeois line, but was used as a way to dilute the workers’ control and to establish a disciplinary and centralized planning system (197). The Bolshevik leaders expected that the workbook would become a certification ensuring that there would no longer be “men who do not work” (Dutton 1992: 196). The high level labor shortages since 1919 led to a greater level of discipline. The workbook then became a vehicle to geographically restricted labor in urban areas and to direct them into desired fields of production. Compulsory labor was abandoned in 1921; the legislation of the citizen’s identity certificate and residency certificate was pass consecutively in 1923 and 1925. However, the social mobility of the rural population was further attenuated because they were left out of the labor distribution process and were deprived of unemployment accommodations (Dutton 1992: 199).

The Machist philosopher A.A. Bogdanov provided a rationale behind the USSR registration system. The primitive form of labor organization was regarded as unproductive and the proletariats were seen as lacking internal discipline and an ‘amoral’ attitude (Dutton 1992: 201). Hence, it was necessary to rectify this situation through a centralized plan and advanced technologies, implementing socialism on a scientific and economic basis. Thus, workforce
discipline was used replace earlier moral standards by making workers feel a sense of obligation toward their place of employment and contributing to the ‘collective experience of labor’ (Dutton 1992: 202). In this way, an advanced form of labor organization would be established in the Soviet Union. Aside from the purpose of implementing labor force discipline, Russia’s registration system was intended to enhance population statistics and eliminate “loafers and parasites” (202). But the essential driving force behind its implementation was the fear of massive rural migration to the urban areas. Introduced in 1933, the Russian Propiska system required that all urban residents must have a residence permit (Propiska in Russian) stamp on their passport. A change of residence must be reflected on a change on the residence permit, so that the ‘spontaneous’ mass migration could be controlled. There was a heavy penalty for people resided in urban areas without a propiska. The rural population was not entitled for passports therefore were precluded from obtaining a permanent residence permit. Consequently, rural migrants were degraded to organized units by receiving temporary permits (Dutton 1992: 202). The Russian legislation made it clear that “permission to change one’s residence was given or denied in the best interests of society. Those without a passport were given ten days to leave the place where they were illegally resident or, otherwise, face exclusion” (202).

The inception of the Propiska system has facilitated a trend in which the labor registration was made a prerequisite for all states based on command economies (Dutton 1992: 203). As a result, under the instruction of the Soviet Union, China has grown to be more centered on socialist planning and has emphasized the complete deployment and regulation of the masses. Nevertheless, unlike the Soviet system that operates on individual labors units, the Chinese registration system uses households as its smallest unit. But different from the ancient huji system, the contemporary hukou gives no privilege to the biological family as there no longer are
patriarchal values attached. Instead, the Chinese household has become a unit to be divided, reorganized, or collectivized according to state needs. It is crucial to highlight the Soviet heritage in the construction of the hukou legislation, despite its differences with the Soviet systems. Essentially, both registration systems were constituted to fortify centralized state planning and privilege distribution of the workplace according to two different interpretations of Marxism (Dutton 1992: 206).
Chapter III: The Modern Institutions

The Modern Household Registration System in China

Hukou has been enforced over time in various forms as an institution designed for population management, taxation, mobilization, and social control. It functioned throughout various dynasties and also was seen when the Republic of China (ROC) was formed (Wang 2005: 24). In the early period of ROC, the hukou legislation only involved residents in small to medium-sized cities. It was not until 1958, when the 91st session of the National People’s Congress passed the ‘Resolution on household registration in the People’s Republic of China’, that it was extended to all citizens, including rural residents (Dutton 1992: 207). The early form of the contemporary Chinese register is configured by its unified economic plan, which was derived from the Soviet model (207). But how this system has proceeded after PRC’s departure from the USSR and with its sequential economic reforms? In fact, the economic restructure is compatible with the existing form of registration, which served as a prerequisite for a form of mass mobilization.

The modern Chinese registration system, as Dutton (1992) points out, was neither borrowed indiscriminately from foreign countries, nor resembles the old Chinese dynastic system. It marks a radical partition from the centralization of traditional Chinese rural families. The modern household registration system across the world can be differentiated in both a broad and narrow sense. In a narrow sense, it refers only to a series of legislations that reflect and record the demographic information of the population such as name, age, occupation,
educational, marital status, and address. Therefore, many countries incorporate it as a means of administration. The broad sense of the registration is closely related to a series of social management stipulations, which is what currently practiced in China. The size of the population that China’s registration divides and organizes, the power and rigidity it has along with its lasting legitimacy, making the current PRC hukou system one of the best examples of institutional exclusion ever seen (Wang 2005: 24). Without a local hukou, people are disenfranchised for school enrollment, employment, political participation, military services, house ownership, or marriage. As Dutton (1992) states, “[Hukou] is a citizen’s passport into direct relation with the welfare state” (211). Citizens are therefore relegated to representations of a variety of criteria and then imposed with a new set of identities and social standing. In this way, hukou abstracts the wanted and the worthy from those who require more coercive organization (Dutton 1998: 8).

The Modern Caste system in India

People of India have experienced historical inequalities and finally they see the sign of the vacillation of this ancient structure of exclusion—the abolishment of caste discrimination. The extent of caste discrimination has clearly declined over the past decades because of the legislative modification in education, societal, and economic spheres (Dreze& Sen 2013: 219). The Constitution of India gives recognitions to three socially and economically deprived groups: the Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC). The members of the three groups receive legal protection under the Constitution, which not only refrains them from discrimination, but also provides reserved seats in the legislative assemblies at the state and national level, and in education and other institutions. However, as Ilaiah (2009) contends, “Reservation worsen caste divisions” (Dreze& Sen 2013: 137). It is likely that the
state’s protective enactment would turn into more of positive discrimination and would potentially intensify the protracted antagonism between different castes. Lower castes are legally and politically protected, but they still need to go through social and cultural struggles.

The social norms and value systems derived from the historical inequalities continue to thrive under the modern manifestations of laws, norms and institutions (Dreze & Sen 2013: 218). Varna is reinterpreted by many Hindus in the contemporary context that the Vedic seers recognized that society is an organic whole, and it requires different people to fulfil different functions. It is a shift toward classifying people based on their attitude and aptitude instead of their heredity. However, it is seems that over time this model of society has been reframed by the Brahmins in terms of heredity, for the purpose of sustaining power (Ilaiah 2009: 60). Many scholars see a divergence between the concept and practice of the modern caste system and its Vedic origin, and uphold this structure by asserting its compatibility with the meritocracy that formulates modern western societies. They demonstrate a prevalent opinion among India’s higher caste, which turns a blind eye to the systematically inherent inequalities existed in this exclusive institution that deprived the lower caste’s right of fair competition, and reduce the outcome of stratification to personal incompetence. Some anti-reservation demonstrations lead by higher-caste Hindus maintain that the Untouchables are inherently inferior; while many other opponents put the accent on fairness and merit (Ilaiah 2009: 61). This relational, class-oriented approach differs from the conservative cultural definitions in India, it defines instead the underclass as "that group of people who are not fully citizens because they are not able to participate in certain basic social activities" (Ilaiah 2009: 137).

India’s traditional hierarchical structure has been challenged by the modernized government. In some cases, the reformative policies and practices are well adapted in increasing
opportunities and equalities: the scheduled castes are given legal rights, better household amenities, increased incomes, and the enforcement of the affirmative action. Caste is unlikely to disappear as such, but it is in a gradual process of transformation. The caste status is no longer regarded a representation of the individual’s economic capability and the huge historical economic disparities among castes show signs of shrinking. Data from the National Sample Survey (1983 to 2005) show that the wages of Dalits have been approaching to those of non-scheduled castes (Bhagwait 2013). The national economic growth and the rise in the economic status of Dalits cannot obscure the values of social stratification and exclusion against the majority ingrained in the caste system. Accordingly, “this trend is far from uniform” (Dreze& Sen 2013: 219), rather the caste identities have remained insurmountable between rural and urban regions and in social life (Jacobs 2010: 61).

India' rural residents accounts for 68.84% of the total population (Chandramouli 2011), and the issue of casteism is most influential and widely practiced in rural areas. It is beyond the State’s ability to outreach its policies to villages; consequently, discrimination is still defined and practiced after the abolishment, especially in rural areas where the caste system is so engraved that it becomes the mechanism of the community and its institutions. One of the barriers to redress caste-based discrimination is that caste has become verboten to mention in polite society in India. Not only because any caste-based practice is associated with legal consequence, but also for the reason that any kind of caste consciousness is regarded as socially retrograde and reactionary. This may ostensibly eradicate caste identification, but it does not bring in any change. Some prejudices within castes such as the disapproval of inter-caste marriages, have been intensified rather than eliminated. Moreover, caste-based exclusions have changed into more subtle forms and have spread to groups where such system did not exist earlier, namely the
Adivasi, Muslim, Sikh and Christian communities. These are also economically and socially disadvantaged groups that are no better off than the lower-caste Hindus (Dreze & Sen 2013: 223). In addition, poorer Muslims as a category are exempted from Indian programs to promote affirmative action that give the scheduled castes and tribes preferential treatment in various spheres (223). They are confronting with the overlap of social stratification and economic inequality within and outside of their communities. Outlawing Caste discrimination does not make the modern India a class-based society; the concept of class and caste has mutually reinforced each other and contributed to great disparities in Indian society. As Ambedkar concludes, "while the class system has an open-door character, castes are "self-enclosed units" (Ambedkar 1916).

Scholars tend to regard the household registration as less rigid than the caste, since the former classifies its population based on the registered geographical locations of individuals’ residence. It is considered to have more flexibility than the Caste which is based on ethical or socio-cultural identity (Wang 2005: 11). However, hukou has created irrationality and wasted its human resources by dividing its population into multiple subgroups and prevents national labor mobility. India’s policy rectifications over the recent decades seems to be no more stringent than Hukou. After the abolishment of discrimination against the lower castes and the introduction of the quota system, it is widely believed that people are given the opportunities to climb the social ladder and that they are not handicapped by their caste identities in achieving higher economic status in Indian society (Bhagwait 2013). Under the economic perspective, globalization produced a labor-abundant economy. India’s economic-driven policies lead to specialization in the labor-intensive products, which increase the possibility for the poor to have more employment opportunities and getting better pay. The Indians have the freedom to switch from
lower-paid jobs in the countryside to higher-paid jobs in rapidly growing urban cities. For example, workers from Bihar and the Punjab have traditionally migrated to Mumbai and Kolkata for jobs. Dalits have been able to take advantage of the rapid growth and structural changes in post-independent India (Bhagwait 2013). But under the sociological perspective, the social mobility of the lower caste has a multivariate nature that a change in one variable does not necessarily lead to a conspicuous outcome. The degree of freedom people has in exercising their rights depends on how they are identified by the local communities, and how this identification in turn affects their own identity.
Chapter IV: Modern Practices of Social Exclusion in Conflict with Citizenship

A citizen of India is a person who “has his domicile in the territory of India and—(a) who was born in the territory of India; or (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or (c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years” ("Constitution of India (Full Text)- Article 5", 2017). While with its socially practiced casteism, a differentiated citizenship has become the defining feature of India (Weinstein 2014). The Constitution of China, on the other side, prescribes that the Chinese nationality is based primarily on pedigree and is supplemented by the place of birth. That is, the individual receives the nationality of China when he or she is born in China and one or both of the person’s parents are Chinese citizens. If the parent(s) is/are Chinese citizens but reside in foreign countries, and the individual is born with foreign nationality, he or she is not eligible for Chinese nationality. Hence, one must have a Chinese nationality in order to become a Chinese citizen (Xu & Liu 2010). Chinese national identity is “mythic, invented, socially constructed” (Silver 1994:43). Even though using the language of citizenship, Chinese citizenship has the susceptibility of exclusion.

Citizenship is a status granted to all members of the community, and the rights and obligations of persons with such status should be equal. In this case, the household registration system segregates people who should have equal civil rights into a quasi-caste system, which is the violation of the concept of "people" and the denial of citizenship and national identity. Social identity is a person’s perception that he or she belong to a social category or group. It is shaped
by an existing hierarchical society, and it is reinforced through social comparison in which individuals adopt a set of standards to label others as ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’ members (Iredale & Guo 2015: 8). Likewise, urban citizenship identity is established on the basis of the subordination of rural citizenship. Citizenship in China is not a uniform body of law, but a fusion with local hierarchies, statuses, and privileges in favor of metropolitan residents and elites.

There is an interesting correlation between the state’s specification of the household register and differentiation between the national and the foreigner. As hukou is a legitimate proof of citizenship identity (Dutton 1992: 211), the PRC citizenship is re-marked in terms of a myriad of criterion. It is necessary to note that there is a difference between the concepts of citizenship and the people; the ‘people’ is a political concept and ‘citizen’ is a legal concept. People are the owners of state power, and citizens are the main subject of legal rights and obligations. The scope of the citizen is wider than that of the people, for all the people of the nationality of the People's Republic of China are citizens, who enjoy the legal rights and assume the obligations of law. Whereas ‘people’ refers to all socialist workers, and people who are patriots advocate for socialism and embrace the sovereignty of the PRC (Xu & Liu 2010). Intra-city migrants are analogous to the concept of people, who are recognized with a sense of belongingness and whose duties and rights are not equivalent to citizens and varies by place and time.

Citizenship in China and India both guarantees freedom of speech and religious expression, political rights, and the right to participate in social and economic activities. Moreover, citizens have the right to access to a variety of social welfare provisions including education, health care, housing accommodation, pensions and so on (Kivisto & Faist 2010: 229). However, the process of defining citizenship inevitably delineates boundaries between members
and nonmembers (Kivisto & Faist 2010; Silver 1994). Boundaries can be symbolic, political and
distributional (Silver 1994: 36). Conflicts often emerge between expanding these boundaries and
narrowing them down them for the allocation of power and resources (Huang & Guo 2015: 174).
This section argues that hukou and caste use the boundaries of citizenship to fabricate social
closure on people who do not share similar social, cultural, political, and economic identities.

Social exclusion, therefore, germinates in the process of demarcating boundaries during
the process of specialization as “the social differentiation, economic division of labor, and the
separation of spheres” create indelible structural and institutional barriers for many citizens
(Silver 1994: 6). The correlation among social identity, boundaries and exclusion can be
explained by two propositions: (1) social identity, as a person’s sense of self, is related to
boundaries between individuals and groups; and (2) boundaries reflect social exclusion and
inequality in the society (Iredale & Guo 2015: 8). Social exclusion is the incompleteness of
citizenship that expresses the inability to enjoy social rights without external support and to
sustain basic standards of living, and have a minimal representation in the major social and
occupational spheres of the society. In addition, there is the feeling of inferiority and incapacity
to fulfill ones’ obligations; the vulnerability to be succumbed to the socially benefited and to
suffer from stigmatization in places they live, particularly in urban situations (Silver 1994:43).
People interact in all kinds of collectives with the result of include some and exclude others for
the benefits of membership at the costs of the excluded. As a state government becomes more
inclusive, citizenship would become a stronger form of exclusion. The history of hukou
demonstrates the transformation from collectivist to individualist codes of exclusion, which in
fact reinforces the collective notion of citizenship (Dutton 1992). It operates at the individual
level, while its algorithm is situated in the structures devised by cooperating and competing
individuals. In this case, the presence of China’s in-migrants has configured a new ‘imagined community’ of nationhood, in which they are the dynamic markers of its shifting boundary (Dutton 1998).

Social exclusion can be institutional and structural—these two forms often intersect across social spheres. The efficacy and strength of any institutional exclusion are determined by the nation’s political stability, economic growth, social development, and human rights (Wang 2005:14). A stable institutional exclusion keeps its political rule at minimal administrative cost and orderly organizes an unevenly developed and diverse nation by a centralized government. It serves a critical role of resources allocation and capital accumulation for the state, the ruling elite, or the able citizens to profit, or to implement economic development strategies or other policies from “the delayed decreased, or even denied concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the few haves” (14). It creates segregated and thus manageable mini-environment for institutional experimentation and provides a safe that ensures gradual but steady growth and legitimization of the new institution and norms.

India’s caste system is a type of institutional exclusion that is based on ‘who one is’. It includes numerous discriminations against racial, gender, religion and ethnic minorities. This differentiation is immutable as it refers to people’s inherent or inherited characteristics (Wang 2005: 9). Caste has a high managerial cost as a national system today, for this type of exclusion is often enforced by decentralized, unlawful, or even illegal societal forces, Therefore, it rests on a strong, willing, and forceful state to dismantle the persistent and obstinate societally maintained institutional sanctions (Wang 2005:12). As a democratic regime, India’s exclusive institution is featured in a so-called elite democracy, in which the political arena is dominated by a small number of people while the majority of the excluded are kept outside (Wang 2005:14).
Though the notion of caste has lost its legal validity, the present Caste exists in a way that it has been encroached by social institutions and the power elites, and continues to contribute to the disenfranchisement of the majority of Indians’ rights and opportunities (Jacobs 2010: 61).

The ‘feudal’ influences on Chinese systems of registration are more apparent in a number of related institutions than in the policing measures of the register itself. China’s household registration is based on ‘where one is’ (Wang 2005: 9). The divisions are created on the basis of one’s location and associations that are usually assigned by birth and legal registration. Registration not only categorizes people into categories of “included” and “excluded,” but also defines family or clan-based, regional-specific, and mutually exclusive groups (Dutton 1992:11). Hukou determines almost every social sphere of a citizen’s life as it functions well in retaining boundaries between different residential locations.

Both Chinese hukou and Indian caste institutions are constructed upon a hierarchy of difference which paralleled the existing social boundaries (Dutton 1992: 156). Regardless of geographical or horizontal stratification, both systems segregated citizens and forged cultural bias against the excluded groups—a process that would eventually harm national unity. Moreover, both forms impede the creativity and ingenuity, since it enervates people’s social mobility which usually fosters new ideas through exchange and competition (Wang 2005: 5). In a Weberian or Marxist point of view, these two institutions are exercised on a coercive social order that is braced by a set of hierarchical power relations. Inequality of the outsiders is perpetuated through the interplay of class, status, and political power. Social closure is then achieved when institutions and cultural identities frame boundaries to restrict the outsiders’ access to valued resources and to serve the interests of the insiders. Weber suggests that it is a process of one group monopolizing available opportunities and expelling outsiders who are
deemed inferior or ineligible (Silver 1994: 34). Borrowing from Silver’s (1994) thoughts, “The overlap of group distinctions and inequality… is at the heart of the problematic” of China’s and India’s systems (7).

It is widely recognized that caste restricts social mobility while hukou restricts spatial mobility. In fact, these two systems be so clear cut in terms of social and spatial mobility, because the concept of space is not constrained to territorial domains but refers to larger opportunity structures within social spaces. To be without a place is to be excluded normatively, culturally, economically or politically with immediate and grave consequences (Dutton 1998: 22; Kivisto & Faist 2010: 140). Hukou does not simply divide people into groups of included and excluded. Instead, it creates numerous categories that are family or clan-based, regionally defined, and mutually exclusive groups. Class-division could be obtained within the homogenous communities, and discrimination or hostility could be directed toward people with either same or different cultural or socio-political identities. These two institutions are impenetrable not just because they reproduce poverty, inequality, unemployment, alienation, but they are conjoined with the dynamic course of social status and identity (Silver 1994: 29).

Compared to institutional exclusion, structural exclusion is more internal, and is germinated from systematic consequences of the national state’s development. It is the outcome during the process of establishing a permanent categorical relationship. As Silver (1994) contends, “Exclusion becomes structural as it is continually recreated through social relations and practices” (7). Simply altering individuals’ inclusive or exclusive status does not affect the structural existence of the social boundary. Its social reality is reaffirmed when movement across the boundary elicits reactions like distancing, fear, or regulations (Silver 1994: 7). Structural exclusion is constructed on regulations and policies of the dominant institutions and the behavior
of the ruling regimes who implement these policies and control these institutions. Confronting institutional and structural exclusion of the state requires the reexamination of its fundamental principles of social, economic, and political elements.

Political, bureaucratic, and military powers have rested in the hands of urban Chinese gentry, just like that of the Brahmans, since the dynastic era in China and the Middle Kingdom in India. Regardless of the political regime in power, the caste-like distinction has perpetuated the socioeconomic and political fate of commoners through hukou. The complex social structure of China cannot be understood simply as the gap between the rich and the poor; ignoring the social distances forged among classes would reduce the subject matter to the “caste is class” argument in India (Singh 2006: 254). Social classes are considered as one of the status groups, whereas status groups are not limited to class but many other criteria. As Weber suggests, though social classes preclude outsiders from competing for valuable resources, they are not always status groups as the latter status reproduces exclusion and thus inequality (Silver 1994: 34).

Internal Migrants in China

Inter-national migration has been a heated issue over the years, but it has been more or less camouflaged by individual motivations and economic incentives. Compare with the massive international immigration community, inter-city/provincial migration would be considered as a minority. Since it has not drawn enough attention from the academic field, internal migrants often fall to the category of economic migrants. Bourdieu points out that the narrow economic interpretation of the rationale of the practices overlooks the individual and collective agents’ history “through…the structure of preference that inhabit them are constituted in a complex temporal dialectic with the objective structures that produced them and which they tend to
produce” (Thuno 1999: 174).

It is important to revisit the historical timeline for the rights of mobility in China before going into further discussion. The Constitution of China (1954) stipulated that PRC citizens had full freedom of movement. However, in 1955, the State Council issued a new policy instruction that negated the freedom of movement in practice. Of course, this legislation was unconstitutional. In order to resolve legal contradictions, the 1975 Constitution removed freedom of movement from civil rights. Successive Constitutional amendments in 1978 and 1982 remained acquiescent on this matter and did not restore this right (“Freedom of Movement”, 2011). Freedom of movement in China today is solely an administrative action that the government can manipulate, rather than being the basic inalienable right of citizens. Restrictions and impediments to people’s mobility artificially forged inequalities and deprivation of citizenship.

Before the 21st century, China’s internal migration consists primarily people with agricultural hukou. Though rural migration to cities has grown steadily over the past three decades and China now has 55.6% urban population ("Country Profile: China", 2015), there is a certain distance from the complete urbanization. Demographic data only measure the de facto urban population size but could not reflect in the full sense the ‘legal’ and social economic definition manifested in the hukou system (Chan 2015: 35). As the geographical mobility control becomes less rigid, simply manipulating resources and opportunities is not enough, thus the boundaries and division between rural and urban groups are at the verge of collapse (Huang& Guo 2015: 175). Hence, it is necessary to involve urban migrants in this discussion, since with the economic development, structural reorganization, and the subsequent resources relocation, internal migration has become more and more heterogeneous with people from villages, towns
and cities. There are not only incentives to escape from the rural-urban dichotomy, but also the disposition to break the barriers between social classes. This illustrates a picture different from the past, making the registration system more complex and its exclusion more extensive. As Dutton (1998) states, “household registration has become a means by which the people’s freedom is limited and the problem of alienation has reached amazing levels” (Gong 1989: 84).

A Structural Cause of Migration: China’s Land System

According to News of the Communist Party of China, the reform of the household registration system (Huji Zhidu Gaige) and the implementation of the household responsibility system (Jiating Lianchan Chengbao Zerenzhi) since 1980s, have been extensive and in-depth improvements of Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Household Registration (1958). This hukou reform introduced by the Chinese government was a revolution to ‘liberate’ peasants (An 2014). This section argues that the land tenure policy reform, in relation with the modification on China’s household registration, have systematically restrained the possibility of urban migration and consequently produced a peasant caste (Logan 2010: 78).

The themes of exclusion build up over time. It could be based on circumscription of human, cultural and economic capitals, residential locations, citizenship rights, or access to land. The land has played a recurring role in the practice of social exclusion (Silver 1994: 35). While there exist historically-evolved rural groups and divisions, artificial divisions were created by the government and were further strengthened and weaved together, to prevent the former from consolidating local power (Dutton 1992: 87). Rural residents’ access to land, and their participation in and remuneration from collective production are monopolized by the state. The regime has adopted “collective management of labor, compulsory state procurement and the
suppression of agricultural markets” to compensate for industrialization and public services in urban sectors (Sargeson 2016).

Beginning in the 1950s, every household was registered as either agricultural (nongye hukou) or non-agricultural (fei nongye hukou). People with non-agricultural hukou are given subsidies for necessities and are allocated to jobs in the state-owned and urban collective sectors. However, those with agricultural hukou are left with land to sustain themselves—without work or travel documents, they could not obtain basic civic and social security rights anywhere other than their places of registration (Sargeson 2016). As a result, millions of peasants left the villages to find job opportunities in the cities. Then the Great Famine during 1958 to 1962 triggered an even greater outflow of the rural population (Huang 2003).

In 1978, during the Chinese economic reform, the land system was replaced by the Household-Responsibility System, in which local farmers were required to produce a fixed quota of goods, and were responsible for the profits and losses of their lands. However, the fact that little cultivable lands available to the huge population generated a surplus of labors in the countryside. This stipulation increased farmers’ pressure on agricultural production and greatly attenuated their financial gains (Sun 1993: 135). The development of the rural areas has entered into a state of stagnation, while the gap between rural and urban regions has widened. Meanwhile, as China transformed from an agrarian economy to a manufacturing economy, the government has loosened restrictions on private-owned enterprises and in some degree encouraged migration since 1990s because of the growing demand for cheap labors in the industrial sectors (Huang 2003). Numerous migrant workers are employed with the lowest wages and benefits for performing the hardest and dirtiest tasks.
The 1603 *English enclosure* laws may shed light on the operation of rural hukou. The English law limited the common use of lands which were available for all. Without land or capital to support themselves, farmers were forced into the city in search of work. Marx indicated that it created a mass of ‘free’ and ‘unattached proletarians’ as the fact of the disintegrating structure of feudal servants (Dutton 1998: 11). There were no enclosure laws in China, but the similarities are found in the rigid measures that confine people to the land and “the recognition of the need for a migrant labor force—recognized albeit in the margins by tell-tale signs such as the issuance of the (more mobile) resident identity card system” (11). Both systems have led a large rural population comes to cities in search for jobs (11).

From the 1980s onwards, China began the land reform that separates the land use right and ownership (Wong 2014: 2). Free and indefinite land use is changed to a paid and limited use, making it enter the market as a commodity (Wong 2014: 1). Several problems emerged in this policy shift: the boundary of land property is ambiguous; the state expropriates lands without giving farmers financial compensation (Wong 2014: 4). Moreover, the communal tenure negates individual rights and favors group rights (Feng 2013). Farmers constantly face insecurity of land tenure therefore is discouraged from increasing productivity and efficiency, which are fatal to agricultural development and social progress (Peters 2007: 5). Concurrently, the state started to invest in many infrastructure projects and urban construction, and loosen economic restrictions on private-owned enterprises. The expansion of foreign investments in industrial enterprises, as well as companies in villages and small cities, has produced a huge insufficiency of cheap labor forces in tertiary industry, which is the premise of the inflow of rural migrants into urban cities (Dutton 1998: 77). In other words, the growth and development of this group are the result of the development of municipal, social, and economic life (Sun 1993: 133). It is the transformation of
money into state capital and therefore farmers into proletarians (Dutton 1998: 10). Interestingly, the income gap has widened simultaneously with the beginning of China’s economic reform in 1978 (Tobin 2011).

Before 1949, the state land use rights are gratis and indefinitely but cannot be transferred between land users. Article 2 of the *Law of Land Administration* (2nd Amendment, 2012) stipulates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) exercises the socialist public ownership of the land, which comprises state ownership and the communal ownership. No organization or individual may encroach on, sell, lease or use other ways to transfer land illegally ("Implementation Regulations for PRC Law of Land Administration" 2005). Under the current conditions of the household registration system, rural land is still the last resort of the farmers. In order to continue to generate land revenue, the migrant workers often opt for illegal transactions with the village committee and enterprise developers (Wong 2014: 5). The inefficiency and scarcity of China's land assessment and measurement agencies give the communal organizations or township governments opportunity to forcibly alter the land contract relations (Feng 2013). Hence, the peasants’ land rights are likely to be interfered or infringed by local leaders or private investors (Zhao 132). This also brought up the cost and reduced the efficiency of the transfer process. Besides, the following reasons illustrate how the fragile land tenure security system fails to protect farmers' interests: 1) land leasing period is too long and the rent is too low. 2) There is weak supervision on land revenue distribution and the stipulations are unreasonable. 3) Farmers’ re-employment after the transfer of land is not easy and may lead to the loss of both land and work. 4) During the process, there is the absence of proper market competition in establishing subcontracting costs and rents. As a result, issues with artificially determined land transfer prices
and vaguely construed rights and obligations in the contract make the current rural land transfer into a vicious circle of conflicts and disputes and affect its further development (Tu 2015).

Peasants would find themselves trapped in a ‘prisoner's dilemma’ that they could never win no matter what choice they make. Advance mechanized production has liberated a large number of agricultural workers and lured them to cities for job opportunities. Meanwhile, the fact that agricultural production moves toward high cost, high risk and low return compels peasants to leave the countryside to participate in non-agricultural activities. However, because the land tenure policies tie them to their land, they could not opt for long-term migrant for job advancement or to get employment skill training; instead they have to face employment exploitation in cities to take mostly temporary jobs because of their seasonal migratory nature. What is permanent is the rural-urban divide—wages and prices of agricultural products in urban cities rise substantially while things have remained relatively low in rural areas (Wong 2014: 2).

Geographic asymmetry of economic restructuring has fostered segregation among groups, stigmatizing entire areas where the disadvantaged are concentrated (Silver 1994:61). Because of these effects, hukou might have eternalized the deep-rooted rural-urban distinction in a social structure traditionally and historically dominated by the urban gentry (Singh 1993: 253).

Rural residents are also politically disadvantaged in relations with other households: they are under-presented in the central Party and government, as well as in the major organizations. At the beginning of PRC’s independence in 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) membership consists overwhelmingly peasants. From the 1950s to the late 1970s, the membership of the working class and the military outnumbered that of the peasantry (Sargeson 2016). In fact, agrarian workers are a minority increasingly marginalized in community governance. Registered as an agricultural household entitles all adults the legal rights to vote in
village elections and assemblies, to apply for contracts to farm land and a house site, and receive a share of any dividends paid from collective income. However, in developed villages, non-agricultural residents (including commercial farmers, business people and off-farm workers) began to outnumber, and outvote, peasants. In Zhejiang, by 2009 entrepreneurs held leadership positions in around two-thirds of villages; in 2014 and 2015, 28 out of the 32 leadership positions were held either by business people or by commercial farmers. Similar trends were found in villages throughout China’s coastal provinces. Even in less-developed provinces such as Yunnan, village leaders tended to be more highly educated and involved in business than most peasantry residents (Sargeson 2016).

The Creation of Work Units in China

It is puzzling that the rapid economic and technological revolution through globalization has not been able to affect the control and stability of the Chinese government. Organized opposition is unlikely as every PRC citizen is politically, economically, and socially stratified, almost permanently by the government; in particular the floating population, who are closely monitored under the so-called zhongdian renkou (target people) management scheme (Wang 2005: 27). The registration’s stable, lasting, and rigid nature has nourished authoritarianism and even totalitarianism with incidental rebellion and revolutions. When the excluded are the majority body, there is hardly a viable way to minimize its institutional impact (Wang 2005:14). China has created a huge chain of bureaucracy, the work unit, that functions as administrative infrastructure to select and serve primarily the non-migrants, the wealthy, and the talented. Furthermore, it helps to manipulated the migration flow at various levels of local government
and social institutions. This section will begin by discussing the formulation of China’s work units and its exclusive nature against migrants.

Although greater freedom of movement is legislated into existence since the economic opening-up, it is always accompanied by tighter regulations against ‘blind movement’ and unharmonious elements (Dutton 1998: 80). The government has adopted two strategies for coping with this inevitable flow: freedom and restriction, in which people are legally ‘granted’ with greater freedom but it is tied with stringent regulations against the socially suspicious subjects (Dutton 1998: 10). The migrants’ movements, especially those from rural villages, are accompanied by the increasing degree of surveillance technologies over them. Throughout Chinese history, the register has disengaged from the concept of direct reprisal (corporal punishment or expatriation) for non-registration, to a concept of exclusion that hinges on a less direct form of reprisal which proscribes the access to social welfares (Dutton 1998: 67). Correspondingly, the community-based self-support process has transformed into the professionalized welfare regime, which signifies the centralization of state power (Dutton 1992: 190).

As early as 1954, the Chinese government initiated *laodong gaizao*, which literally means to reform through labor, springs from the compulsion to transform society and secure the process of the regime transformation. No matter how things changed, the dream of constructing the utopian institutions of discipline has remained central to the state (Dutton 1992: 292). Bentham's Panopticon conceived a disciplinary model that separated and isolated each inmate, enabling individuals to be visible to the central monitoring tower. This mechanism is much more powerful than heavy physical constraints, since control could be achieved by internal monitoring—the apprehension of potential risk of being observed (Dutton 1992: 293). The principle of the
Panopticon has permeated into every aspect of modern society. As Gutting (2016) denotes, “it is the instrument through which modern discipline has replaced pre-modern sovereignty (kings, judges) as the fundamental power relation” (Gutting 2016).

The centrality previously ascribed to community and family was replaced by a regime which focused on the national economy and the work unit. Henceforth, the registration of households would be concerned less with family ethical considerations and more to the discipline of labor and its relation to the overall national economic plan (Dutton 1992:190). There have been constant urban-rural exchanges, or migration, in the past, either due to natural disasters or political reasons. China’s economic reform in the 1970s unfettered peasants from the bonds of land and labor, bringing in abundant employment and investment opportunities. It helped to disperse farmers’ dependence on agriculture and gave a large population of rural workers the incentive to go to the cities. Nevertheless, this freedom is conditioned with certain restrictions that would ensure a steady supply of wage slaves in the booming cities along the east coast. Fear of regulatory transgression failed to outweigh people’s desire for economic gains in the city, resulting in a massive growth in temporary or circular labor movement known today in China as the ‘floating population’. Within this specific group, members are often referred as Minggong (migrant workers) or Liumang (vagrants) (Dutton 1998: 78).

National-wide mounting criminality in 1978-1988 draw great concerns to the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership. As it was both threatening to its authority and the social order, the emphasis of state’s defensive governance that was largely counted on mutually self-disciplinary has been refined to social disciplinary (Dutton 1998: 68). CPC stressed in a national campaign that the state’s coping mechanism was a ‘severe strike against criminal elements who seriously jeopardize social peace’ (68). Hukou has then become a vehicle for administering
individual files so that the police can supervise the ‘special’ population (69). Because it was nearly impossible to keep track of every liumang, the restrictive scope of hukou has been extended to the entire rural population. There has been a popular interpretation that associates migrant workers with liumang, seeing that to be without a stable work or living place means “exclusion from the norm and exclusion from an acceptable social position” (Dutton 1998: 62).

This preconception, again, bears the imprints of the traditional Chinese society. Appeared in Qing dynastic, liumang was originally called You min or Liu min that addressed specifically those who did not participate in agriculture, artisan work or mercantile activity. Many liumin and youmin later became liumang, who formed a special group that loiters, disturbs social order, and engages in illegal activities (Dutton 1998: 64). Therefore, the policing technologies of classification, surveillance and reform used in laodong gaizao (carceral) in the 1950s, along with the internal migration law, were first exercised for the criminal are later implemented to the society in general (Dutton 1992: 352). Consequently, peasants are able to ‘leave the soil but not the village’ and ‘enter the factory but not the city’ (Wu& Li 2002: 18). More importantly, the term liumang has went beyond criminal activity to incorporate all those people who are ‘without a place’: the most obvious identification is those that are outside the work unit (Dutton 1998: 21).

The Chinese work unit (danwei) emerged silently during the 1950s and early 1960s. Its origins are obscure and complicated and four possible factors may push forward the inception of work units: 1) many of the CPC leadership during that time grew up in rural areas and had spent most of their time in the army and in the “disciplined and all-embracing life of party branches” ("China - Work Units", 1987). 2) It is another instrument of resource allocation besides hukou that CPC utilizes to consolidate top-down authority due to the fragmenting proclivity of the
social and political apparatus (Chan 2015: 38). 3) Many urban residents come from the countryside and do not have familiar rural networks and traditions to rely on (Bjorklund 1989:20). As a result, work unit becomes the core of social, political and economic life in this shifting constellation (Chan 2015: 38). Although the work units’ influence has declined along with the administrative powers of the lower-level governments since the command/planned economy in Mao’s era, the multi-tier hierarchical structure in both the governments and the work units continues to operate for the next 30 years or so after the opening-up reform (Chan 2015: 38). Work units, by definition, are large-scale bureaucratic infrastructures led by the Communist Party that employ most people in economically developed regions. The unit is highly specialized to produce a single service and monopolized in terms of its administration, whose employees are classified and rewarded based on their performances (“China - Work Units”, 1987). Work units provide their members with a form of mutual security while limiting their individuality (Dutton 1998: 11).

Nowadays work units have expanded to enclose many more enterprises and institutions. China has a unique pattern of management division between institutions and enterprises. Enterprise units contain state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, which are generally productive units for profit. Their employees’ salary and benefits depend on their own profit gains. Since enterprises undertake consequences of loss and profit, they have a certain degree of autonomy. Institutions are public welfare units that perform social management and service functions of the government, mainly engaged in education, science, technology, culture, health and other spheres. These work units are supervised mostly by the government’s organs or administrative departments, whose employees’ salary and benefits come from state’s financial
appropriation. Their actions and decisions have legal authority, therefore possess coercive power (Zhao & Gong 2009).

No matter how the definition or categorization evolves over time, work units are a tangled web of ‘face-based’ relation with an operation that assembles the traditional Chinese clan system. It dictates the material and ethnical privileges of the workplace by collaborating closely with the household registration system (Dutton 1992: 194). Enter the state-owned enterprises and institutional units means getting an ‘iron rice bowl’ (Tie fan wan). In which ‘iron’ highlights its lifetime membership; ‘rice bowl’ means the numbers of benefits associate with it. In the past, if goods were in short supply, they would be rationed through work units. Housing resources are usually controlled and assigned by work units, whereby people who are from the same work unit live together and share the childcare and recreation facilities provided by the work unit. In addition, danwei also takes care of the health care, insurances, pensions and funeral expenses of their employees (Bjorklund 1989:24). Therefore, its membership sets high criterions:

(1) birth or adoption into a danwei family, (2) assignment from a state or provincial ministry for employment, (3) temporary or permanent assignment from another danwei, or (4) personal request with approval from current danwei leaders and acceptance by prospective danwei leaders. Most members enter a danwei by either of the first two routes (Bjorklund 1989:22).

The pre-requisite for meeting these qualifications is certainly a possession of a local urban hukou. Wang (2005) sees that the formulation of danwei impedes China’s economic development (101). Danwei is confronting with a shortage of skilled workers by only recruiting members in their lineages, which would last for generations as people could inherit position from their parents. Hence, all forms of structure remained stable at the place of residence not the group members ever changing, albeit the policy modifications made over the years (Wang 2005:46). It is not simply a state supplied ‘iron rice bowl’ that satisfies the desire for stability, but are also state-sponsored units for the production and reproduction of social strata. Aside from the
historical stigmatization of ‘liumang’, the state’s attitude towards migrants, especially those from the countryside, enduring an exclusive nature that is fabricated through the establishment of the work unit. To be without a ‘unit’ is to be without a home and, to be devoid of any sense of entitlement. To ‘float’ without a work unit is to be an outsider, a stranger, a vagrant. In this code of life, to be an outsider in any sense is to be a potential danger (Dutton 1998: 21).

The insular, cohesive and closed nature of work units has created a total community, and the membership within is “the single most significant aspect of individual identity in contemporary China” (Bjorklund 1989:24). Apparently, the millions of Chinese migrants are deprived of their identity. Ironically, they are stigmatized for not belong to a work unit, at the same time their hukou status bars them from entering in. Both the registration system and the work unit operate to exclude migrants from all sorts of social benefits. Employees in the work units continue to enjoy the subsidize housing that is below the market price, while the outsiders are under-paid, are not entitled for home ownership other than in their hometown, and many could not even afford to rent (Mahadevia et. al 2010:16).

The *Baotashi (Pagoda) Structure*

Status groups are motivated by material and ideal interests that are generated from the structural constraints, and they maximize benefits by foreclosing opportunities and resources. Status groups, especially in China, are a manifestation of power relations. Their members encompass people from the work units, people with the metro city hukou, or often times an overlap with multiple statuses. Apart from the internal specification, the exclusivity of their social status is externally enhanced with material, legal or other forms of privileges. Characteristics acquired at birth, such as race, ethnicity, religion, the cultural capital of one's...
family, are important determinants of their membership in the status group. In China and India’s case, the *habitus* of the scheduled caste and the migrant workers such as family structure, language/dialect, sociopolitical origin, lifestyle, and access to commercial culture are important ascribed components. If the individual does not (or partially) attain these characteristics, the other venue would be through achievements (credentialism) (Silver 1994: 35).

Still, there are various forms of cultural capital beyond Bourdieu’s scope—many of them are incommensurate and overlapping thereby cannot be merged to a single category. Moreover, the definition of social status differs across cultural or ethnical contexts (Silver 1994: 37). No matter how an ascriptive status is defined, it is for sure that persons who do not share similarities would be perceived as aliens of the status groups, as these are visible characteristics convenient for exclusion. Individuals’ affiliation with the work units and the urban hukou status, or the higher caste status gives them social esteem, develops their group identity, and shapes their consumption patterns and style of life. This is the process of which “norms legitimating exclusion” (Silver 1994: 34).

The local governments of China are classified in order of importance into central, provincial, prefectures, counties, and towns and townships, and are given in accordance with administrative powers and responsibilities. The quantity and quality of state-provided services (such as education and urban infrastructure services) and welfare are highly correlated with this rank. Moreover, the major urban centers or regions are more favored by the state government in terms of investment, subsidies, or policy flexibilities (Wang 2005: 24). Only a few cities ranked ‘the highest’, right below the central government; whereas the number of lowest-level governments (township) is vast (Chan 2015: 38). Contrary to the role that the ‘public sector’ (government) plays in most other countries, China’s public sector “redistributes benefits in the
reverse direction—towards locations and population groups that are already advantaged” (Chan 2015: 39).

Such a down-ward pointing triangle structure for sure cannot maintain an equilibrium without coercive controls to inhibit immense pressures and incentives to move upward. The household registration system helps to dilute these pressures and is developed to penetrate state authority to “its outermost regions and its lowest levels” (Dutton 1992: 45; Chan 39). The strength of the state now has become inseparable to the effectiveness and thoroughness of the system of registration (Dutton 1992: 45). This is a Baotashi (Pagoda) structure (Dutton 1998), in which different locations of household residency affect the opportunity structure thereby forming new social stratum and groups. These group distinctions facilitate access restriction in group competition and in struggles for scarce resources, thus constantly creating an overlap of belonging and inequality. Same as the relationship among the city governments, lower level work units follow the example of those above while having weak and tenuous with other units, generating problem especially for the economy (Bjorklund 1989:24).

Subsequently, different levels of economic development build up multiple dimensions of hierarchy revolve around the hukou status: a) urban to rural areas; b) eastern to coastal cities; c) western to inland regions (Wang 2005: 27). Divisions and stratifications are more perpetuated with different combinations of these hierarchies. More importantly, it gives local governments the liberty to control the geographic mobility of people within its administrative boundaries, leading to the formation of local protectionist ‘fiefdoms’ (Chan 2015: 40). Hence, for the protection of local interests, accompanied with the considerations of political factors, local authorities have no choice but to give preferential treatment to their own areas. This leads to a lack of talented people, which are one of the key factors that restrict economic development in
the current economic reform period. For instance, Beijing graduates will be offered greater employment opportunities from the job market, and a work unit’s ability to choose the best talent will be infringed because they will not have the ability to choose outsiders (Dutton 1998:101).

Nevertheless, residents from a higher level of government or institution (in terms of economic, geographical, and political importance) will be more politically informed and will be more aptly in defending their benefits. On the one hand, the cities with different hierarchical positions are impelled to strengthen the discrepancies of benefits through hukou to attract or keep the talented and skilled labors; on the other hand, since intellectuals are largely concentrated in the central cities and are granted with urban households, the privileged will act to fortify the disparities to protect and guard what they have. In consequence, different levels are mutually resistant with objectives to forestall change and guard self-interests, and to enhance the household registration system. A logic has spontaneously developed to “interpret transfers from lower levels to higher levels to be against their own interests” (Dutton 1998:83). Each hierarchy experiences exclusions at certain degree comparing with its higher level. Weber indicates that when excluded groups receive in-group privileges, they may redraw the boundaries in such a way as to exclude the less powerful groups even less powerful than themselves, which Parkin (1974) defines as "dual closure” (Silver 1994: 37).

A study on Chinese class and occupation ratio outlines ten major social statuses/classes (“Non-Profit organization advocacy manual” 2011: 13): ①State and societal administrators; ②managers; ③private business owners; ④professional skill worker; ⑤office workers; ⑥individual business owners; ⑦services providers; ⑧industrial workers; ⑨agricultural laborers; ⑩urban and rural unemployed or semi-employed. Among them, the state and societal administrators at the highest position refer to the executives or directors in the state-level
government agencies and their affiliated public institutions. Together with their subordinates, the office workers (some of them are called ‘civil servants’), forming a dominant and privileged group. The entrance to this group is ostensibly open to the general public after the introduction of the national civil servant examination in 1994. However, after the salary and benefits of civil servants have become increasing higher than those of ordinary workers, the local selection of these office employees depends mainly on the ranking of individuals (families) in the order of power and acquaintances and with the requirement of a local hukou status (14).

The second stratum is the managerial, professional personnel in the administrative or technical monopoly services. In the state-involved industries such as oil, chemical, and engineering, the power factor still plays an important role. Other technical industries, including IT and the news media, have inextricable links with the state as well, but its impact has attenuated because of the growing market competition in recent years. With the economic reform, private and industrial business owners, service providers, and industrial workers have formed the dominant occupational groups in the market. Migrant workers are mainly involved in occupations emerged from the market competition, especially in domestic services or the informal sectors (“Non-Profit organization advocacy manual” 2011: 14). China’s household registration system poses profound consequences for it grounds a new economic structure that brings all status groups to a sense of insecurity. This is people’s fear of downward mobility that they may lose what they expected to have—a socially accepted or customary style of life (Silver 1994:13).
The Exclusive Nature of Being Internal Migrants in China

The Hukou system still enjoys a strong legitimacy in China, perhaps largely because its familial and locational differentiations are more seemingly natural and prevalent than most other human differentiations (Wang 2005: 23). Peasantry remains to be the only profession that is manually made to be inherited for generations. Their agricultural status is so imprinted that there is little room for escaping. Here hukou possess the characteristic of caste that the type of hukou categorization they will receive is completely determined by that which has been given by their parents (Wang 2005: 190). With minor modifications, the binary registration system thrives into the 21st century. From 1980s onward, despite that the agricultural household embraces rural residents who do not engage in farm activities in the countryside, it continues to carry the ‘class-sorting function’, with the label ‘nongmin’ attached to represent the agricultural population as naïve, uncouth, or hick (Sargeson 2016). Farmers are the group that is unanimously labelled ‘outsiders’ in their own land. For a long period of time, the restriction on peasant household registration has left people with no choice but to work in the agricultural sector. Despite of being the main actors in the communist revolution, farmers could hardly escape from the shackles of the land; they were forced to remain in their place of origin with the fewest rights and benefits (Dutton 1998: 10).

Once migrate to the cities, peasants are circumscribed in triple dimensions: 1) they are required to pay excessive amount of money to the local city in exchange for their right to reside. The levying fee for the long-term residency was $6,022 in Beijing, $6,024 in Shanghai, and $2,409 in Tianjin, for the purpose of developing city infrastructure (Zhou 1994: 102). This so-called ‘outsider administrative fee’ has either revoked or reduced today, yet such regulations fail to be truly implemented into many of the local departments. Without a legal residence, migrants
would encounter frequently police interrogation and live in the fear of repatriation. It is necessary to note that from the 2010 national census, the annual income of rural residents was 5,900 yuan ($898) per capita, which was less than a third of the average income of urban residents at 19,100 yuan ($2,900) (Tobin 2011). 2) Once they leave the village, they will be closely monitored by the government and the police as potential criminals and the causes of social disorder; 3) they are viewed by urban residents as second-class citizens with dangerous inclinations (Dutton 1998: 80) therefore often receiving discrimination and unequal treatments.

Migrant farmers are also caught in a double bind: on the one hand, the household registration limits their employment opportunities and forces them to take the low-status and low-earning jobs that urban residents are unwilling to do, collectively referred as the 3D-jobs—dirty, dangerous, and demeaning (Pries& Pauls 2013: 11). T. On the other hand, the hardships in work and life compel many of them to become involved in illegal activities and they would end up receiving legal sanction, and once again return to the bottom of society. Statistics show that the peasants, as an occupational group, have committed over 70 percent of all crime and have caused serious social problems (Leuninger 1994:88). Despite that in urban areas the rate of street crime is relatively low, forms of petty crime such as pickpocketing, bag-snatching, and drug dealing are often owed to unemployed migrants (Eades 2014).

Even those with non-agricultural hukou can hardly acquire legal permanent residency and the various community-based rights, benefits, and privileges anywhere other than where his Hukou is—only possible through proper authorization of the government in which the opportunity is rare (Wang 2005: 23). Indeed, not all migrants suffer from the household restriction—people who are financially well-off can bear the consequences from leaving their registered residence, other than the levying fee mentioned above, they are even able to change
their registration status through the black hukou market with a price ranging from approximately $50,000 to $80,000 for a tier 1-ranked city hukou (Xu 2013). Internal migration has become a source of profit, and ‘the map of China is in danger of becoming an index of wealth’ (Wang 2005: 101). Besides, the highly talented in science and technological fields are exempted from hukou exclusion. The metropolitan-city-town multi-layer hierarchy in China also induces a unique pattern of sociopolitical, economic, and cultural stratification (24). Apart from those with higher economic capabilities or human capitals, urban migrants from small towns and less developed cities who do not have highly-demanded skills have been left out. It has been increasingly difficult as well for the urban migrants to climb up the ladder between each stratum. For them, horizontal movement may be relatively easier than vertical but is only applicable to areas of equal value or level of development (Gong 1989: 82).

The Social Security System in China

The state’s social welfare system extends categorical social rights but at the meantime fosters unexpected alliances or labor market segmentation, and legitimizes social discrimination. For instance, according to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, “the state develops social insurance, social relief and medical and health services that are required for citizens to enjoy this right”. And in article 44, “The state applies the system of retirement for workers and staff in enterprises and institutions and for functionaries of organs of state according to law…The livelihood of retired personnel is ensured by the state and society” ("Constitution of the People’s Republic of China", 2010). This clause indicates clearly that the beneficiaries are staffs of danwei (usually state-owned enterprises and institutions), which are the top two status groups in the pagoda hierarchy mentioned earlier. Most of the welfare services are carried out through the
work units in which the individual is located. A large number of migrants work informally or temporarily, therefore do not belong to any work units and are disenfranchised of social security rights. Even if they are affiliated with a work unit, their non-local hukou status is still a barrier.

The vast majority of migrants are excluded from the urban social security system not just because of the hukou restrictions, but also the city government and the employers’ reluctance to implement inclusive public services.

Migrants hardly enjoy any health-related rights in urban cities and the health expense is usually beyond their affordability. Immunization, maternal and child health care, and other basic public health services exclusively enjoyed by the urban residents. According to the 2015 Survey Report on Migrant Workers, only 17.6% of all migrants have medical insurance, 16.7% have old-age insurance, and 10.5% has unemployment insurance. Work-related injury insurance is currently the only one without institutional and policy barriers, while the migrant workers’ rate of joining is 26.2%. Thus, it is difficult for them to get disability compensation. The average monthly income of a rural migrant worker in 2015 was ¥3,072 (≈ $473), whereas the urban average was ¥4695 (≈ $755) (“2015 Survey Report on Migrant Workers”). In addition, it is very common that migrant workers are not paid in full or on time, or work excessive over time with little or no compensation. Data show that in 2015, 85% of rural migrants work more than 44 hours per week (“2015 Survey Report on Migrant Workers”). However, according to Article 41 in the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China,

The work hours to be prolonged, in general, shall be no longer than one hour a day, or no more than three hours a day if such prolonging is called for due to special reasons and under the condition that the physical health of laborers is guaranteed. The work time to be prolonged shall not exceed, however, 36 hours a month.

As citizens of the PRC, migrant workers are excluded from the jurisdictions that are constituted to protect its citizens. It is in question, then, whether or not migrants are citizens. It seems more
appropriate to refer them as second-class citizens, who are subjugated by others and suffer from
disparagement, reprobation, and a loss of independence, social standings and competency. As
Silver (1994) remarks, "In effect, the people who belong to the under-class are not quite citizens"
(41).

Education

China’s hukou differentiation in education has played a significant role in solidifying the
status of the floating population. Again, before going into more details, it is important to look
into the citizenship rights guaranteed in Education. Constitution of the PRC promulgated in
Article 46 that “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to
receive education. All citizens, regardless of ethnic group, race, sex, occupation, property status
or religious belief, shall enjoy equal opportunities for education according to law” ("Constitution
of the People’s Republic of China", 2010). Also in the Education Law of China, in article 36,
“Educatees shall according to the law enjoy equal rights in enrollment, admission to schools of a

At present, three factors affect the equal realization of citizens' right to education: 1)
regional-differential treatment. For a long time, colleges and universities have set up different
cut-off-lines for admitting the students in different regions, creating large discrepancies and
barriers on students’ academic performances. 2) Finance-differential treatment. Some schools,
ranging from primary to post-secondary insititutions, only enroll students who are willing to pay
extra money, even the other student who does not pay has the sufficient test score to get into the
school. Similarly, students who pay extra fees can be admitted to classes with higher quality and
more resources. Ironically, the ability of putting enough financial ‘investments’ in schools is to a
large extent has turned to a necessary condition for the equal realization of citizens' education right. 3) The type and condition of the school have different effects on citizens' right to education. Teachers’ quality, school resources, classroom facilities and state fund provided differ greatly between public and private schools, and between different city and region. Students with the same test scores end up going into different schools and receive unequal access to educational opportunities as well as inconsistent quality of education (Xu & Liu 2010).

Penetrated by systematic education inequalities, along with the restrictions that the registration has imposed on them, migrant parents find themselves in a limbo: either leave their children behind in the village with their relatives or grandparents, or bring them along to the cities. Either option accompanies a host of disadvantages. According to China Youth and Children Research Center, nearly 50% of left behind children had suffered accidental injuries and exhibited high rates of behavioral and emotional problems. Poor quality village schools and absence of proper guidance also pose negative impacts to children’s academic and personal development. For children who migrate with their parents, only a few quasi-illegal migrant schools of various qualities would enroll them. Among the limited numbers of migrant schools, most of them provide elementary education whereas high schools are almost nonexistent. Beijing has approximately 150-200 migrant schools to date and their number keeps dwindling. They are challenged by scant funding, limited resources, under-trained and underpaid teachers, safety issues, and outdated curricula. Many schools have to depend on tuitions from the migrant students but they also face the fact that most of the parents are poorly paid (“On the Margins: Migrant Education in Beijing” 2016).

Since 2006, Beijing has begun an ongoing crackdown on migrant schools; sixty of them were closed in the Fengtai district. The majority of migrant schools were pushed out of Beijing’s
center and are now located in the peripheral suburbs. *The Huffington Post* reveals that “almost none of Beijing’s migrant schools has an official permit to operate” (“On the Margins: Migrant Education in Beijing” 2016). Many are deterred by the costly permit application process that also involves political intervention and bureaucratic ‘norms’. Unsupported by the government, their facilities have not received appropriate inspection according to safety regulations, the curriculum has not been standardized, and diplomas they issue are usually not recognized. Wealthier migrant parents are not troubled with their children’s education, as they can send their children to expensive private schools or transfer their hukou through work.

In 2013, the national Chinese Ministry of Education created a system called “一人一生一尺码” (‘one person, one life, one number’), which provide easy access of school records and transcripts from all locations and standardizes the school enrollment and permit systems in many provinces and cities; every eligible child is given an electronic school enrollment number linked to their hukou status (Zhao 2013). As Beijing has more than one third of non-hukou residents, it implemented its own “Five Certificate Policy” in 2014 to accommodate the new electronic system: in order to be qualified for an enrollment number in a Beijing public school, migrant students must submit five items of paperwork including proof of employment and residence, temporary residential permit, the hukou booklet, and documentation of no guardianship available in place of origin issued by the household registration office or the township government issued (“On the Margins: Migrant Education in Beijing” 2016).

In fact, the *Five Certificate Policy* requires more than five documents. Some districts increase the difficulty of application by asking for both parents to submit the above paperwork. Besides, both parents need to fulfill onerous requirements in the flowing three categories: 1) employment: their identity card, labor contracts, social security records, the business license of
their employer, and the organization/company code (Ding 2015). Some districts demand labor contracts dating back at least six months to three years (“On the Margins: Migrant Education in Beijing” 2016). 2) Family: the marriage certificate, certificate of childbearing, the birth certificate of the child; 3) Housing: rental contract, rent and proof of tax payment, payment invoices, electricity and water bills, the landlord’s ID card, and property ownership certificate. If one could not obtain proof of property ownership, he or she needs to acquire a written document and a proof of residence from the village committee, stamped with the township government’s official seal (Ding 2015). All of these documents are interlocked, missing one of them would be immediately disqualified; not mentioning the difficulty and financial cost in obtaining these certificates from the bureaucratic offices and departments. Seemingly opens a channel for migrant students to study at Beijing’s public schools, the policy ensures instead that these children are filtered out through exclusive legislations.

Things would not be optimistic even migrant students eventually become eligible for public education. Students who attend an accredited elementary school are more likely to enter a publicly licensed middle school; consecutively those who have graduated from a public, accredited middle schools are more likely to attend public high schools— students are in great disadvantage if they do not have such continuity. Furthermore, only residents with Beijing hukou can take the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao). Migrants must go back to take the exam in their registered permanent residence where the curricula and educational contents are highly incompatible with that of Beijing, and the difficulty of Gaokao is associated inversely with the level of development of the city. Beijing has the best universities in China and has the easiest college entrance exam. The locals are given preferential admission as well, i.e., a high admission quota for Beijing students and a low admission score (Ding 2015). Consequently, this
regional-specific phenomenon yields a special group of migrants called gaokao migrants, who tries to take advantage by converting their children to Beijing hukou before the college examination.

Hukou transfer could only be done through becoming civil servants in government offices, working in state-owned enterprises, making intellectual contributions, or through resettlement of demobilizing from the Army (Weinstein 2014), which migrants have nearly no access. Education as a powerful tool for upward mobility become meaningless for migrant students in the metro cities, since the educational opportunity they have strived so hard leads them nowhere. More often than not, migrant students end up joining their parents in search of work. Study shows that the enrollment rate of students at Peking University from rural origins has dwindled from 30 percent in the 1990s to about 10 percent in the past decade. As an admissions officer at Tsinghua University describes, a typical undergraduate is a person who “grew up in cities, whose parents are civil servants and teachers, go on family trips at least once a year, and have studied abroad in high school” (Gao 2014).

It is more likely for people with city hukou to work at professional or state run institutions, whereas migrants are discouraged from apply many jobs as a local urban household is almost always included as the primary qualification of professional, managerial or office occupations (Davin 2012). Furthermore, college graduates from metro cities will have greater opportunities to become ‘civil servants’ (Gongwuyuan) in governmental departments or state-run organizations that take charge of the management of the household register, food supply, medical services, education, housing and so on (Wang 2005: 43). Unsurprisingly, a work unit’s ability to select the best personnel will be curtailed because they are unable to recruit outsiders. Metro city
residents have enjoyed privileges in all aspects of their life; at the meantime they are the primary decision makers work at the state organs to determine the rights and liabilities of the outsiders. As Wang (2005) points out, “people are treated differently according to their officially registered location and identity in almost every aspect of their lives” (22). The hukou system makes it less and less efficient for cities to accumulate resources and facilitate economic development while being more rigid in organizing its population. Because it separates people into a multiplicity of subgroups and prevents national labor mobility, therefore creating irrationality and redundancy in the allocation of human resources. Chinese citizens are chained down by their familial residency and their ascribed socio-political status. Just like the policy in Ming Dynasty that people could not leave beyond one mile of their registered households, both social and economic mobility of the modern Chinese citizens are circumscribed within the “one mile” authorization by the ruling regime and live on its mutable demands.

**Internal Migrants in India**

The beginning of intra-cities migration in India is similar in ways to "the privileged interregional Han movement and large-scale migration into Manchuria from other parts of China during the early twentieth century" (Singh 2006: 254). In Delhi's case, the in-flow of its Bengali population was triggered during the early twentieth century when the British Indian Empire moved its capital empire from Calcutta to Delhi and brought along the Bhadralok Bengali bureaucracy. Punjabis' in-migration was initiated by the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and furthered by other sociopolitical factors and movements in Punjab (254). In post-Independent India, however, in-migration should not be simply understood as economically motivated movements or an exercise of exclusions that is independent of the caste system.
Exclusion in India in recent decades needs to be looked jointly with inequalities embedded in the caste and class structure. It is the intersection between the exclusive structures and economic disparities that reinforce division and inequalities (Dreze & Sen 2013: 217).

In spite of being characterized as a relatively immobile society, it is estimated that three out of every ten Indians are internal migrants. The 2007-2008 National Census of India shows that internal migration accounts for nearly 30% of the total population, or 309 million. In census year 2011, the number of internal migrants will be approaching 400 million, which could even be an underestimation. Internal migrants in India experience economic, cultural, social and political exclusion and are often treated as second-class citizens. These are evident in their inability to get formal residency rights and identity proof; low political representation; inadequate housing; low-wage, and insecure or hazardous working conditions. They are also barred from receiving social security services and suffer from discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, class or gender (Faetanini & Tankha 2013: 4).

For a long time, internal migration has been a peripheral issue in the government’s policy agenda and practice, partly because of the incomprehension of its extent, nature and magnitude. The report from UNESCO (2013) made it clear that “migration and urbanization are an integral part of economic development and societal transformation, and historical experience has shown that it cannot be stopped” (4). Migrant workers have made significant contribution to India’s GDP, yet their importance is overlooked in “socially dynamic, culturally innovative and economically prosperous societies” (4). Migrants are not homogenously organized as that of each caste; they are differentiated according to class, ethnicity, gender, language and religion (Faetanini & Tankha 2013: 5). Two types of migration inflow can be identified: a) Long-term migration, resulting in residential relocation. This type of migrant often has more capitals to
sustain themselves in urban cities and the ability to adjust the cost of migration (UNESCO 2015: 13). They are often people from higher caste with better education. b) Short-term or seasonal migration, involving circular movement between a source and a destination. Although the complexity of short-term migrants makes it difficult to measure and define, its population is estimated to range from 15 million to 100 million. This group consists predominantly people from Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), who are much more likely to be socially and economically deprived, have a high proportion of illiteracy, and less land. In terms of per capita consumption, they are concentrated in the lower quintiles (UNICEF 2011:18)

Indian migrants, particularly those stay for short-terms, are also given the name of ‘the floating population’ as the Chinese migrant workers (Faetanini& Tankha 2013:7). Migrants in India, as well as in China, tend to aggregate in labor-intensive industries such as construction, mining, agriculture, coolie, catering, cleaning, and domestic work, which are usually jobs the urban residents are reluctant or disdain to do. Many of these jobs are hazardous, noisy, and unhygienic, often without the necessary safety protections. At the same time, they are precluded from employment-related rights (“A Report on the Study of Migrant Workers in China”, 2007). In India, 36.2% of migrants are employed in the construction sector (i.e. mines and quarries), followed by 20.4% in agriculture (i.e. large-scale and plantation agriculture, sericulture), 15.9% in manufacturing (i.e. leather manufacture), trade and transport (i.e. rickshaws), and then in the other unorganized industries such as textiles, rice mills, salt pans, headloaders (Jacobs 2010: 61; UNICEF 2011: 20). The market is an important driving force, as the employers always prefer to hire flexible and short-term laborers in order to keep labor costs at the minimum level. As a
result, this results in an increase in informal employment and a stagnation, if not a decrease, in accretion of literacy and other human capitals in the workforce (UNICEF&UNESCO 2011: 3).

Internal migration in India is synchronized with the uneven development of the agriculture and industry sectors (UNICEF&UNESCO 2011: 2). As Singh (2006) points out, rural-urban division itself is very caste-like and extremely deep-rooted in both India and China (253). In 1999-2000, in rural areas, the gap of monthly households expenditure was about 38% between the Dalit communities and the upper castes; in 2011-12, the percent drops slightly to 37%. The income of upper caste households in urban areas in 1999-2000 was 65% higher than Dalit households, and the number has declined to 60% in 2011-12 (Varma 2015). These per capita expenditure data reveal not only the rural-urban disparities, but growing inequalities in urban areas as well (Dreze & Sen 2013: 217).

Unlike China’s coercive practices on its labor population, the state of India upholds the idea of the free market and democracy. However, India’s social structure may act as a substitute for a household registration system that effectively interferes the sectoral, occupational, and spatial mobility of Indians. It is the structural demand that dictates who would leave the villages and what status/positions they would get in cities. The rural laborers are usually socially and economically deprived and are from the lowest castes (Weinstein 2014; Varma 2015), certainly there are little or no demand for them in their own community and in coastal regions. Reports show that a large of Dalits have low education attainment, and have no assets such as land or house, therefore are stroke hardest by the ongoing agrarian crisis (Varma 2015; UNICEF & UNESCO 2012: 135). In the case of Punjab, the division of production and exchange is as clear as the religious and caste lines. The peasants are Sikhs living in villages (Jatis), mind merchants are Hindus (Khatris/Aroras /Baniyas) living in towns. Caste identity elicits unreasonable allocation of resources and enables
huge abuse on human talent. It leads to a noncompetitive and inefficient economy (Wang 2005: 10). For instance, caste divisions prevent the economically underprivileged from organizing and bargaining for a better deal, thereby blocking their way of upward mobility. The fact that economic capital accumulation is determined by ones’ social and class identity may lead to a reassertion of a more marked social differentiation than before (Singh 2006: 251). Together with ethnic and religious concerns, such economic structure also exacerbates protection over group interests and aversion, or even violence, against Dalits and “the outsiders” (Singh 2006: 258). This is aligned with the consequences caused by the administrative structure established in danwei and the city governments in China. In both contexts, a resilient division between the privileged and the rest in society would mutually fortify inequalities (Dreze & Sen 2013: 218).

Indian people’s incentives to migrate to more developed urban areas are often complicated. They are not just seeking for employment opportunities, higher wages at destinations, and to fulfill the market demand. Migration for many of them is a channel to escape from traditional caste hierarchies or restrictive social norms. This is reflected in the continued migration into occupations that require to work under harsh conditions and are poorly paid, which are usually proverbial positions that the local proletariats are unwilling to take (UNICEF & UNESCO 2011: 49). It may not be surprising to find out that even without the presence of a hukou system in India, the occupational barriers between agriculture and non-agriculture regions remained “clear and strong” (Singh 2006: 244). For example, urban residents in Punjab are reluctant to work in the factories and expect to take industrial entrepreneurship or white-collar jobs (Singh 2006: 256). If the Jat Sikhs become factory workers, they would be degraded to a lower social stratum. For them, to be poor is less demeaning than being at the bottom of the social hierarchy. People’s regional, provincial, and ethnic identities determine their levels of employment in particular sectors. As
Singh (2006) points out, “sectoral labor mobility in terms of occupations is closely tied with social mobility of classes” (256).

The occupational barriers that Indian migrants face are partially attributed to the clearly delimited criteria and the wholesale nature of the caste system that takes no account of individual ability and performance. And the constitution of India does not have the jurisdiction of social prejudice derived from casteism. A person’s class identity becomes obvious simply through the brief information provided on their documentation. Just as the hukou system in which people are represented by a series of numbers and their biological details, and to go beyond the name and number requires “knowledge and access beyond that available to the ordinary person” (Dutton 1998: 7). Indians know from instinct the caste and identity of each other—“if people don’t know these things about others, they try to find out!” (Singh 2006: 253). Thus, Indians do not need a hukou to become stigmatized: surname, caste, religion, racial features, and provincial identity give one away. These characteristics adversely facilitate group boundaries and serve “a source of domination potentially independent of social class” (Silver 1994: 29). Hence, it could be argued that in both countries, migrants are discernable in the extent of their “foreignness”, it is what they do not share with the mainstream community and it follows them wherever they go.

This foreignness is expressed by their dialect or accent, their appearance, their behaviors and reaction toward others. As two of the ancient civilizations, Chinese and Indians are organized in various forms of languages. Migrants and the locals are thus segregated in terms of ethnicity and linguistics/dialects. Those who migrate from the low-income states are often linguistically distinct from the high-income migrant-receiving regions (UNICEF 2011: 92). Their foreignness not only excludes themselves from others, but also symbols of perceived inferiority (Dutton 1998: 9). Weinstein (2014) makes it clear that the high degree of economic depravity
and social discrimination that the scheduled castes/tribes and Chinese migrant workers face is characterized by the ‘group inequality’— that the entire group is stigmatized instead of the individual members of the group (Weinstein 2014).

Apart from the exclusion that migrants face at the group level, exclusion at the individual level is more complicated. Social class divisions in both countries have gradually become subtler and less visible. Migrants in India are more difficult to identify in terms of social status as it is mixed occupational, provincial, and communal identities, etc. (Singh 1993: 253). For the reason that social identity and socioeconomic status in India nowadays are relatively more independent in urban contexts: one does not necessarily imply the other. Despite that the Chinese household registration system is viewed as a superficial form of exclusion that is based on distinctions of registered household locations, it is harder to recognize migrants because of the different nature of occupational status in China and the ambiguous distinction between the state and society (254). Construction workers in China can have higher or equivalent income compare with some white-collar jobs. As a result, the practice of discrimination and bias toward migrants has also grown to be less detectable.

The Social Security System in India

In India there is no legal obstruction on geographic accessibility between cities. The Constitution of India (Article 19) grants all citizens the rights to “move freely throughout the territory of India; to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India” (Faetanini & Tankha 2013). Free movement may not be restrained in India, but the precondition to be mobile is already an exclusion that affects a large population. According to Mahadevia et. al. (2010),

The citizenship of a place is defined through various documents that a person or a household holds: (i) a ration card – a Below Poverty Line (BPL) card or an Above Poverty Line (APL) card, which has the permanent address of the person/household (ii) An election card, that is a Voter’s
Identity Card issued to all those above age of 18 for the purpose of voting in elections held for the three tiers of government, local, state and national; (iii) for those having access to electricity and having electricity meters in their house, and getting an electricity bill, (iv) in urban areas, an Identity (ID) Card issued by the urban local government for those living in slums, based on a cut-off date, (v) in urban area a property tax payment receipt, (vi) in rural area land tax payment receipt, and (viii) a letter of identity issued by the local elected representative (10).

Unlike China where citizenship is determined through individuals’ household status, India seems to have more fluidity and there is room left for negotiation. The starting point of gaining full urban citizenship is to get access to affordable rental housing, or a piece of public land in a community, and then “negotiate to get name registered in the urban voting list through getting an urban patron” (10). Then onwards, is an abiding process of possessing a few of the above-mentioned documents to gain full citizenship (10). It seems that the Indians are provided with opportunities to break through caste divisions and social restriction and work with dignity and freedom at the destinations. In reality, internal migrants do not acquire the freedom and respect that the Constitution promises (Faetanini & Tankha 2013: 8). Policy makers and urban planners consider migration as an inimical element in the process of development therefore create an unsupportive and unresponsive environment.

Many Indians are facing difficulties in obtaining urban citizenship (Mahadevia et. al. 2010:10). Most social protection programs are discriminatory towards migrants that they require the submission of documentary proofs of identity, eligibility, local residence, and beneficiary cards, which are often hard for migrants to acquire. These exclusive features are interconnected—without proofs of identity and residence, they would not be able to claim social protection entitlements and social welfare rights. For instance, slum dwellers need to show evidence of residency prior to certain year or cut-off dates to be enrolled in slum rehabilitation, which precludes new migrants who just entered into the city. Although there are biometric smart cards issued under the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) and the Unique Identification Number (Aadhaar) that could potentially provide such proof of identity and claim basis
socioeconomic entitlements, it is unclear whether these mechanisms will be able to address a variety of complications (“For a Better Inclusion of Internal Migrants in India: Policy Briefs”, 2012).

Availability of affordable housing and employment in urban areas for Indian migrants is as vital as hukou for Chinese migrants. A local hukou in China, or the fulfillment of urban citizenship requirements in India, would be qualified for subsidized public housing (Mahadevia et. al. 2010:38). And the access to housing in both India and China is determined by their employment and income. So far, none of the states has come up with an efficient policy for facilitating social provisions or a housing policy that specifically address the migrant workers. But surely it would not be a problem in both the countries if migrants are able to afford to procure a house from the private housing market (38). Living in urban cities, Indian migrants constantly face harassment, abuse, theft, slum demolitions, forced displacements by urban authorities. Mahadevia et. al. (2010) notes that Adivasi migrants are inflicted with abuses from locals and the police, owing to their lack of identity or dwellings in urban areas. Many of them are likely to be falsely accused of theft or looting, and detained and beaten by police. Just as the term ‘floating population’ suggests, they are viewed as marginal and transitional people who are subject to prejudice, stigmatization and incrimination (30).

It is necessary to revisit the clauses stated in the Constitution of India. In article 29, it prescribes that the state shall make “…special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes…[including] special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions…whether aided or unaided by the State...” ("Constitution of India (Full Text)", 2017). The
constitution has outlawed caste discrimination, but consecutively it legally inscribed positive discrimination (Ilaiah 2009:137). Also in article 16,

(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them ("Constitution of India (Full Text)", 2017). Different from China’s case that its exclusive mechanism is legitimatized through delimiting citizenship rights, Indians of lower caste status are structurally and naturally manipulated to be incompatible with these state provisions. That is, they are granted equally access but lack the means to remain or to move forward in the system.

In transition to a manufacturing economy with a large population like China, internal migration in India has played a part in adjusting the imbalanced distribution of resources between sectors and being the engine of national economic growth (UNICEF&UNESCO 2011: 36). But the government’s expectation on migrants’ contribution is disproportionate to the social services, amenities and basic needs provision it invests. Migrants are denied access to subsidies of food, housing, drinking water, sanitation and health care; education and banking services are also in poor conditions (UNICEF&UNESCO 2011:35). The duration of migration spans from a few weeks to a few months (7–9 months), which consequently influence the frequency of migration during the year (UNICEF 2011: 16). Since people often migrate as a family unit, children have become the key players in this process. Migration induces detrimental effects to children: they are often disrupted by regular schooling, or never enroll in one to accompany with their parents, and are deprived of public health care during the migration period (UNICEF 2011: 15).

Especially for circular migrants, these children’s only option would be attending school between June and November since there is a duplication between the school sessions (June-
April) and the seasonal migration cycle (November–June) (Faetanini & Tankha 2013: 38). Re-enrollment in schools in their places of origin at the end of a migration cycle is unlikely; or that they are assigned to the same grade or class due to the schools’ inability and inflexibility to justify the learning deficits incurred during migration. Even if migrant children are able to attend urban schools, they are confronted with learning difficulties owing to discrepancies in academic curricula and language, especially in the case of inter-state migration (38). These children are not only disadvantaged from many critical inputs in their early years but the chances of their human capital accumulation are greatly curtailed. There is a great shortage of nurseries, early childcare services, pre-school education and facilitation that provide inclusive services; many of them end up becoming exploited child labors. Despite the 1986 Child Labour Act (Prohibitions & Regulation), migrant children continue to work for extensive hours with meager wages as unregistered and invisible workers in family labor units (Faetanini & Tankha 2013: 39).

The inadequacy of migration facilitating system incurs even higher cost for relocation. A majority of migrants are devoid of employment-related social security and legal protection; while they are regularly exposed to occupational health hazards and poor living environment. These workers’ low participation in healthcare services owing to several factors: high cost of utilizing private health facilities, limited autonomy of their schedule and availability of medical practitioners, fear of the consequences of absence at work, transportation and accessibility, discrimination and language barriers. Besides, families may gather all resources needed just to send one member away with the expectation that he/she will remit money (UNICEF 2011: 49). However, there is an absence of legal protection of safe remittance transaction to help migrants to support their left-behind families (“For a Better Inclusion of Internal Migrants in India”, 2012). In the meantime, the impetus to make cities attractive for global investment has also
exacerbated the exclusionary nature of urban policies (“For a Better Inclusion of Internal Migrants in India”, 2012).

The idea of political rights for migrants workers is merely an illusion in China. In India, even the poorest of the poor migrants acquire their voting rights the moment they enter the city (Dreze& Sen 2013: 255). However, they are not always guaranteed with equal practice of their political rights. Most migrants suffer political exclusion and are unable to vote for elections at their place of origin when they are away at the destination (“For a Better Inclusion of Internal Migrants in India”, 2012). By revisiting the concept of the work unit, analogies could be found that in both circumstances, the privileged have become the representatives and spokesmen of the majority of the under-privileged. But what makes these two apparatuses distinctive is that the influence of the upper castes has on institutions of ‘civil society' is even stronger than in state institutions. Even trade unions of workers who are mostly from the lower castes are often under the control of upper-caste leaders, which may be an indication of suppression from the bottom to ensure the social order. Dreze and Sen (2013) also see a potential tendency of reproducing the ‘old divisions’ within their own political activities (222). Furthermore, a study of Indian corporate boards finds that almost all of their members were from upper caste, with half of them being Brahmins. Scheduled castes and tribes hold only 3.5 percent of the seats (Dreze& Sen 2013: 223).

The large gulf in education, income, healthcare, and the unequal treatment received from the police and civil servants, have not been effectively bridged through the means of democratic rectification (Dreze& Sen 2013: 277). In fact, many policies are only made available to the top of each group. As Varma points out, reservation reaches only a small section of the Dalit communities and tribes, leaving the vast majority untouched and locked in economically and
socially backward villages (Varma 2015). The upper castes have the predominate control over public institutions, including the media press, trade unions, the university faculty, and the police office, NGOs, etc. It is not that the lower castes are absent in these institutions, but with the dominance of the higher castes, their presence and power are reduced to minimal. Dreze and Sen (213) find that “there was no evidence of any significant presence of Dalits in any of the sample institutions, with the partial exception of the university faculty, partly due to mandatory quotas” (219). As Ambedkar remarked, ‘the Caste system is not just a division of labor. It is a division of laborers’ (Dreze& Sen 2013: 214).

Exclusion and discrimination against migrants exist in political, socioeconomic, and administrative processes, and market operations. Migrants are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by the local administration, and as a burden on systems and resources at the destination. In India, there is a growing political support for the ‘sons of the soil’ ideology that appeals for political coalition along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. Media also gives negative portrayal that intensifies the gulf between migrants and locals. This leads to the marginalization of migrants in the decision-making processes of the city, and left them barehanded to undergo the fluctuating labor market and the risks of discrimination and violence. Thus, it is imperative to legitimate migrants and their families’ access to services and entitlements and making the urban communities more inclusive, as there is a foreseeable expansion in size and diversity of cities (“For a Better Inclusion of Internal Migrants in India”, 2012).

In resonance with the centuries-old Chinese household registration system, the traditional social institutions and identities under the state of India do not simply manipulate the market process, but serves rather as the guide of labor mobility in ways that allow labor to move whenever and into whichever regions and sectors cheap labor was needed (Singh 2006: 251).
Hukou creates systematic barriers against labor movements that “limit the rationalization of a young market economy in the PRC as the serious problem of underemployment continues to devastate the state-owned economy—and perpetuates poverty for the rural people as the surplus and excluded labor” (Wang 2005: 25). Nonetheless, since there is no legal binding of free movement, Indian society, in some sense, may have more flexibility.
Chapter V: Conclusion

China’s household registration system has been long perpetuated, largely because its exclusive nature is in fact the building blocks for the State’s governance system. From the very beginning, the right of mobility has been utilized as an administrative measure for social control and to uphold the ruling regime. While in India, it is the overlapping of historical remnants (from the Vedic period?), ethnicity, religion and belief, and the interests of different stakeholders that produced a variety of statuses and privileges. The scheduled caste will remain as a signifier of collective identity; the hierarchical distinction may become less severe, but it is unlikely to be eradicated (Jacobs 2010: 139). Caste and hukou are the reproduction of differences, are hierarchical and identity-based, and possess the ultimate control over people’s social mobility. Caste shares the hukou-like function of directing labor movement; whereas hukou has caste-like structures in confining people using discrete socio-economic categories—the difference is that the former is a result of the government’s passivity and acquiescence to “problems left over from history”; the latter is the outcome of the state’s increasing intervention in people’s lives and its insecurity about its central authority. These systems are unanimously biased against the migrant workers at the societal and state levels. The concretization of social exclusion is best illustrated on migrants’ denied access to their basic rights, which are supposed to be their citizenship rights that are protected and guaranteed by their country. The state and society’s misunderstanding of the internal migratory phenomenon is the crux of injudicious policies and their inactive attitudes toward migrant. This paper provides a holistic examination of internal migration through the genealogy of two institutions of social exclusion: caste in India and hukou in China.
Modern household registration system does not advance as the country’s economy and technology, rather it is the successor of the Baojia system. There have been the vicissitudes of dynasties, but Baojia has persisted throughout Chinese history. Baojia is enthroned not because it is an apotheosis for the totalitarian control of the state, but because of its imperfectness. It is a system that is efficient to interfere but inefficient to substantiate the power of the regime (Dutton 1992: 89). It emphasized the classical order of the family embedded in the Confucian virtue but has failed to restrain the power and influences grown from the family to extend its lineage to clans and gentries. The social order of the classical society was maintained through the mutual contraction and supervision among different levels of family units. People’s Republic of China has learned lessons from its ancestors thus attempts to amend the register system to not only discipline the population, but also to perpetuate the Communist Party’s authority.

Modern registration has weakened the status of the family, but concomitantly it fosters new forms of privileged groups through the redistribution of resources. The Communist government declared to eradicate the feudalistic system and let the people to become their own masters. However, Chinese people were disarmed in the very moment that they are ‘empowered’, as the autonomy given in the scope of self-regulation was replaced by state intervention. Baojia in ancient society was habitually practiced on the basis of shared community value, whereby the state played more of a supporting role in upholding this structure. Without such bind, modern society faces more regulative measures and the state has assumed the leading role in this process. The post-independent China realizes the necessity to construct hierarchical systems to make up the absence of the centuries-old patriarchal structures. As a result, governmental, regional, occupational hierarchies have developed around hukou, which are rather pseudonyms of aristocracies in contemporary society.
The Chinese government’s foreclosure on the possibility of urban inflows has produced a caste-like structure, in which inequalities are reflected in both socio-economical and spatial mobility. Today money buys mobility and helps to fortify class distinctions. The registration system has not only directed the movement of workers from the countryside into the city, but also their move to a solidified triangle. The CPC newspaper claims that economic reforms unleashed the peasant caste from the land and the production of obligations. But this freedom comes with limitations that transform peasant farmers into wage slaves working in the booming cities and manufacturing sectors. Although people with non-agricultural households in small towns and less developed regions have access to relatively more forms of capital, they are merely wage slaves with higher wages and a higher cost of living. The path for the migrating population to a higher social stratum has remained narrow, and only the horizontal movement among people of the same level are not inhibited.

It is not clear whether the household registration system has achieved to be the ideal form of discipline, but certainly its flexibility of deploying surveillance and mutuality mechanisms ensured policing the people, in particular the migrants, without disrupting the community and political structures. This system helps to facilitate collaboration among the neighborhood committees, the local security committees, and the work units to enforce the restriction. This is not simply maintaining community order but also that of social normalization (Dutton 1992: 340). The household registration is not merely a statistical record, but the representation of status and order. It is an ascribed destiny grounded on the physical terrain that people had no freedom to choose from the very beginning. Deviation from prescribed norms would lead to sanction and ultimately, exclusion. Norms are depicted by the included and the haves, and they are buttressed by the definition of citizenship rights in the national constitution.
For internal migrants in both China and India, being a citizen is not a sufficient and necessary condition to be able to enjoy the equality of rights as citizens. Citizenship under the governing of these two institutions is reduced to more of a hypocritical ideology of universal equality. The concept of citizenship here is implicated with 1) local hierarchies—community, village committee, and city government; 2) Status—caste identity, rural, township or urban hukou, work units affiliation, economic, culture, and human capitals, an so on. 3) Privileges—it is through the framework of a uniform body of law that the nation-states decide who is eligible to exercise the principles of citizenship that subordinates and coordinates all other identities such as religion, family, ethnicity, geographical origin, and occupations. The excluded are mobilized by the included ‘citizens,’ which makes them under-class citizens who are disenfranchised from many legal benefits.

The household registration system reform has initiated since 1980s, but it has been rather the same old stuff with a different label, without fundamental change within the system. This suggests that the Chinese government is reluctant to extend or redraw the boundaries. In 1997 and 2001, the state promulgated measures that permitted hukou conversions to small towns where state provided welfare was minimal. In 1998, people were allowed to transfer the hukou of their direct relatives if they or their children are already urban citizens. From the beginning of the 21st century, cities including several metropolises such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen offered local hukou status to the ones who have economic ability (i.e. investors and home buyers) or professional and technical talents that fulfill the local governments’ demand (Chan 2015: 32). They have also adopted an accreditation system that grants local hukou to people with high achievements, needed occupational skills, or educational attainments (Zhang 2016). Local
governments have also gained more power over the years to decide the threshold to convert eligible candidates to the local hukou (32).

In 2016, despite the absence of metro cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, a number of tier 2 and tier 3, small and middle-sized cities from 30 provinces, have either proposed, or begun pilot trail on revoking the distinction of agricultural and non-agricultural households. Besides, a policy breakthrough is that the rural populations are given a new urban hukou (with partial welfare benefits) in exchange for their permanent loss of land use right, an asset that can usually provide far greater present and future financial profits in an urbanizing region. This is not a simple alteration of hukou status, but the government’s new way of plundering peasant’s property (Chan 2015: 32). Furthermore, these new initiatives have little relevance for the majority of nonlocal rural migrant workers (32).

The civil right that should enjoyed by everyone has now become a form of reward and benefits with limited supplies. One of the most important roles of household registration is not to maintain the urban and rural distinction, but to control and manage the whole society across both urban and rural contexts. Although a dozen provinces and cities nationwide have abolished the agricultural and non-agricultural household categorization, there is a lack of successive policy accommodations to integrate migrant workers into the cities. Moreover, the social management apparatus in cities and countryside will not be unified because of a change in the characteristics of the hukou. In rural areas, the village committee serves as the supervisor; whereas in the city, the supervising responsibilities are distributed to the work units, sub-district offices, residential committees, and the (house) owners’ committees. Therefore, the target of the household registration reform is not a nominal abrogation of the agricultural and non-agricultural hukou, but the incorporation of migrants who are floating outside both of the rural and urban social
management system into the urban social governance structure. In this way, migrants would be able to enjoy the corresponding rights and benefits, at the same time to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities as citizens.

Likewise, constitutional annihilation of caste discrimination in India does not necessarily bring about changes in the rural-urban spheres in a short-term. Governmental rectifications would be more likely to become leeway to elicit new dimensions of classification. When the operating mechanisms in the binary system are inherently different and the exclusive structure is solidified, the plan of forcefully merging these groups without addressing the needs of urban migrants for shelter, basic services and social protection would only lead to failure. And the social, economic and cultural environment does not transform as instant as the legislative action, yet these are the most essential contributors to the profound social exclusion. Although in the urban contexts the hierarchical relation between different castes is becoming less acute, the SCs, STs and OBCs will increasingly be represented as social and cultural, rather than quasi-biological, categories (Jacobs 2010: 139).

Undoubtedly, India and China recognize the importance of augmenting the supply of affordable housing for the urban poor, as well as resolving their problem of employment and social security amenity. But few policies that are directed at migrants have generated effective outcomes over the years. Put aside the difficulty of implementing measures at the local level, the deep-seated reason is vested in the enduring debate between the nation’s development and the well-being of the vulnerable community. Excluding these people is deemed as “a necessary organizational cost of a human grouping of a nation” (Wang 2005: 19), that a stable and effective institutional exclusion should be upheld to support the economic and technological advancement of the state. An institution is effective if it continues to inhibit surplus and nonproductive
laborers from migrating internally and cross-sectors, and concurrently allowing talented and skilled labor to move. In this way, a stable sociopolitical order and a desirable environment for foreign investment will be created. Further, Wang (2005) justifies the purpose of exclusion by saying that it is to interrupt the vicious cycle of rural-urban economic inequality and an unlimited supply of cheap labor, and to accumulate capitals. In order to achieve a rapid economic growth and to gain competitive strength in the world market, a market-oriented industrial sector has to develop at the expense of those excluded. W. Arthur Lewis concedes that exclusion needs to be carefully maintained so that there would be 50% wage difference between the industrial sector and the traditional sector to bring the former sector “as much labor as it wants, without at the same time attracting much more than it can handle” (19).

In addition to a huge waste of money and resources, this exclusive model would produce the exact opposite of what it claimed. Exclusion would not break the vicious cycle of dual economy, it will instead substantiate and enlarge the gap; it does not help to attract skilled labors but rather curtail the country’s talented workers by blocking their way of upward mobility. People will stay nonproductive and unskilled if their environment is inimical to accumulate capitals. A vigorous society needs circular movements. What’s more, this exclusive is a pseudo-proposition of utilitarianism that it sacrifices the interests of most people, many of whom are already disadvantaged, to benefit the few. This is an act of defiance of citizenship and human rights, and an improvident scheme for the long-term development of the nation.

Other than mitigated through social welfare policies, exclusion must be addressed by insertion, integration, complete entitlements of citizenship and participation in social life (Silver 1994: 17). Integrating internal migrants is to moderate inequalities and to eliminate stigmatization. To achieve this, it is imperative for the central governments to promote measures
that secure employment and residence for migrants. Housing and occupation are pivotal to alleviate the inequalities confronted by the migrant workers in China and India because these two factors are pertinent to migrants’ access to all other social welfare benefits. Mahadevia et. al. (2010) suggests that “India can learn from China with regards to employer housing for certain segments of the urban labor force. China can learn from India with regards to policies for incremental housing” (38). The employment system needs to be improved to break the cycle of low social status, low income, and low security. On the one hand, change the power dynamic in the labor market to achieve the free movement of labor. Making the current occupations that migrant workers engaged such as construction, services, and other manual labor, to have salaries that are comparable to other competitive jobs. On the other hand, it is also crucial to empower migrant workers to be able to defend their legitimate rights and benefits; this would adversely increase the cost of informal employment and would be more effective to regulate the labor market.

The other tactic to combat social exclusion is the expansion of full citizenship that incorporates civil, political, social and economic citizenship (Silver 1994: 37). By doing so, the state government needs to recognize that the disadvantaged groups are excluded from all these spheres. Different from other vulnerable groups, migrants face double exclusion in the urban places because most of them have low socio-economic status and low mobility and they are considered to be ‘foreigners’ in cities and lose the protection of their places of origin. Inequalities would only be moderated if the social welfare benefits and rights are indiscriminately redistributed (Silver 1994: 43). A justified distribution should be neither nepotistic bonds in terms of exchange, reciprocity, and a high degree of social cohesion, nor a common identity or collective representation among status groups (Kivisto & Faist 2010: 143).
In both cases, systematic barriers have been made against labor mobility. In recent years, the concept of democratic citizenship has spread more extensively into societies of China and India, where national jurisdictions and contractual relations based on equal rights provoke people’s class consciousness and awareness of personal agency. It is not certain which exclusion framework is more obstinate, but if no alternative measures taken in the future, it is possible that the excluded would eventually seek for themselves the universal equality and respect that the state governments have long promised, by redefining a new type of citizenship themselves and establishing new versions of law.
References


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