

History and Peacebuilding: The Role of Colonialism and Authoritarianism in Serbia and Rwanda

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ABSTRACT

History and Peacebuilding: The Role of Colonialism and Authoritarianism in Serbia and Rwanda

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This thesis studies the role histories of colonialism and authoritarianism had in effecting the types of peacebuilding processes that developed in Serbia and Rwanda after their conflicts in the 1990s. It contends that while Serbia's history developed into a society that depended on civil society networks to act as a bridge between the population and the government, Rwanda's created a society where the population depended on central authority. As a result, in the wake of conflict Serbian society depended on that history of civil society to foster healing and reconciliation, but Rwanda fell upon its history of central authority involving itself in culture and cultural institutions. As a result, Serbia's civil society forms the vast majority of peacebuilding programs, but in Rwanda the government focuses on legal procedures and national programs. This thesis concludes that while both models of peacebuilding have benefits, one without the other cannot bring true reconciliation.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1990s were marked by violent conflict, as was the rest of the twentieth century. Two of the most infamous conflicts from the end of that century were the conflicts in Rwanda and Serbia. On the surface, these two conflicts are very different. They took place on different continents, for different reasons. For the most part, Serbian aggression was committed by military or paramilitary units against the newly independent nation of Bosnia Herzegovina that broke away from Yugoslavia. The war involved military forces, but the majority of Serbians had little involvement in the conflict. The Balkans war was perpetrated by leadership that continued to retain power in Serbia even after the conflict had ended. The Rwandan case, on the other hand, was a genocide enacted from below, a conflict involving neighbor against neighbor. It had the involvement of the majority of the people along with the support of the government. There was no context for the war, and the perpetrators lost power at the end of it. However, there are more similarities between these cases than appear at first glance. In both cases, a brief period of intense violence appeared to erupt suddenly, despite decades – or longer – of conflict between the two parties. Both violent eruptions occurred after an unexpected and volatile shift in political power. Both proved to be conflicts over ethnicity that had perpetrators treating victims as “outsiders,” or at least others. Both conflicts took place under semi-authoritarian governments that were both postcolonial.

Despite the conflicts being more similar than they initially appear, the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts that emerged were vastly different in nature.

Peacebuilding in Serbia manifests itself primarily through protests, art exhibits, performances, alternate education, and training on issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. The primary actors in the field are civil society actors and activists, with limited and reluctant involvement by either national government officials or neighboring governments. In Serbia, peacebuilding is an informal process dependent upon spreading the desire for reconciliation to younger generations by non-governmental means. This is not how peacebuilding looks in Rwanda. Not only is civil society largely controlled by the government in Rwanda, but peace and reconciliation are government projects. These efforts manifest themselves in the forms of local, community-centered trials and government initiatives to redefine identities among Rwanda's people. While community-based efforts to foster reconciliation do exist and are vitally important in Rwanda, the focus has been on bringing perpetrators to legal justice and downplaying the role ethnicity plays on the national stage. In Serbia, peacebuilding efforts rely on a bottom-up approach, while in Rwanda the efforts come from the top down. It is noteworthy that peacebuilding efforts are generated in the reverse order as the conflicts themselves. While conflict in Serbia came from the top down, orchestrated and carried out by government officials and the military, the nation's peacebuilding efforts were grass-roots initiatives coming from the bottom up. The opposite is true of Rwanda. While the government of Rwanda did orchestrate the genocide and every level of society was involved in perpetrating violence, peacebuilding efforts were generated by the government itself.

One explanation for these differences stands out. In Rwanda, the perpetrators no longer controlled the government and new leaders attempted to reconcile warring factions. In Serbia, particularly because that genocide did not occur on its own soil, the perpetrators were able to distance themselves from a conflict they initiated and sustained, retaining power and influence

for several years after the war ended. However, this explanation does not paint a complete picture. First, peacebuilding efforts in the former Yugoslavia, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the worst crimes took place, have enjoyed little support from the government. Across the region, peacebuilding efforts are led by civil society actors attempting to foster conversations about past crimes. Second, the current government of Rwanda is not without its share of the guilt. Largely ignored by the international community are the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front – the military organization that ended the genocide and took over the government of Rwanda in its aftermath. These crimes range from extrajudicial or summary executions, to deliberate massacres of groups of unarmed civilians, to abduction of civilians and pillaging of property **Invalid source specified.** Therefore, to claim that the involvement of the government in peacebuilding in one case and not the other is fully explained by who is in power does not offer a complete explanation as it ignores these facts.

This paper will attempt to further investigate differences between peacebuilding programs in Serbia and Rwanda. It will look at historical and cultural contexts that may have contributed to specific differences emerging between these two peacebuilding programs. More specifically, the paper will examine how histories of colonial control, authoritarian regimes, contested histories, and socially constructed ethnic or racial differences have affected current peacebuilding efforts in Serbia and Rwanda. Finally, this paper asks how history and culture shape peacebuilding strategies in the aftermath of violent conflict. Moreover, how are the histories of Serbia and Rwanda – examined through the lens of colonialism and authoritarianism above – similar and different? What accounts for the great difference between Serbian and Rwandan peacebuilding efforts?

This paper draws primarily on secondary source material gleaned from literature on the the history and culture of both nations. Additionally, writings on local peacebuilding initiatives are incorporated into the analysis. Beginning with an overview of important historical themes will be an overview of peacebuilding efforts in each country. Connections will then be drawn between the two case studies to point out common themes and variables. The research unfolds in six chapters. The introductory chapter includes a historical overview of the conflicts in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, including the respective civil wars and a basic overview of the crimes committed. Next, this chapter will include a literature review to define certain theoretical terms and establish a foundation of theory for this research. Chapter One will offer an overview of the conflicts in question along with a review of literature that influenced the development of this research. Chapter Two will be a history of Serbia and Rwanda prior to the conflicts that have recently defined them, and in particular will trace histories of authoritarianism, colonialism, and ethnic tension. Chapter Three provides an exploration of peacebuilding programs in Serbia and Rwanda respectively, will compare and contrast the two case studies, offering a brief critique of both models. Chapter Four will offer this study's conclusions.

CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXT OF CASE STUDIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW

An Overview of the War in Yugoslavia

In order to properly understand any discussion of peacebuilding in Serbia, it is necessary to understand why peacebuilding is necessary. This requires not only an overview of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that followed, but a brief discussion of the crimes prominent Serbians were accused of. Because peacebuilding in Serbia takes requires the population to face crimes committed in the name of the Serbian people, knowledge of those crimes is the first step toward a discussion about it. In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and began the dissolution of this multi-cultural state that led to a protracted and bloody civil war. While many felt the Balkans crisis came out of nowhere, the first signs of dissolution began in 1980 with the death of Josip Broz Tito, the larger-than-life communist ruler of the former Yugoslavia. During his rule, Tito created a federation that united disparate national groups under a prosperous system for over forty years. However, with his death ethnic nationalisms and tensions that had been suppressed under his rule reemerged, particularly when the Communist Party began to decay in tandem with the deterioration of his health. The fraternal socialist system collapsed as the socially constructed loyalty to Tito's multi-cultural, centralized political system gave way to ethnic nationalism. Ethnic loyalties were cemented by the government structure left behind after Tito's death. The eight-person presidency made up of representatives from each of the six republics – Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia - along with the two

autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, soon would unravel. This unwieldy system made it difficult for Yugoslavian leaders to retain centralized power, because each republic and province had differing agendas. (Silber and Little, 1995). The result was civil war, as Croatia and Slovenia gambles on their chances to gain sovereignty, a bet that didn't account for the significant human toll that would take place.

Sovereignty was not a new idea in Yugoslavia. As early as 1981, Kosovar Albanians, under the long-reaching arm of Serbian control, began to demand independence. Kosovar Albanians wanted their own republic within the federation. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became second in command of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and in 1989 was sent to quell a rebellion in Kosovo. As this event was occurring, and as Slovenia prepared to leave the federation, Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president began to consolidate power. He launched a purge of the Belgrade Communist Party; used smear campaigns, rebellions and Serbian nationalist rhetoric to gain influence; in essence, Milosevic won Serbia three votes in the presidency. As this was happening, Yugoslavia had its first multi-party elections since Tito came to power, and the Communist party lost the election. The Communist party of Yugoslavia dissolved along federal lines, though remnants remained in the aftermath.

Shortly thereafter, in 1991, Slovenia declared independence after months of careful preparation. Croatia quickly followed suit. While initially Serbia launched attacks on both Slovenia and Croatia, the lack of ethnic Serbs in Slovenia led Serbs to quickly abandon that cause (ibid, 113-114). However, between Croatia (former Hapsburg territory) and Bosnia (part of the Ottoman Empire) is a crescent-shaped strip of Croatian land called the "Krajina" or "frontier" where a large community of ethnic Serbs had migrated in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries to escape Ottoman rule. When in 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum and declared

independence from Yugoslavia, both Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman were furious, as they both had made claims to half of this territory. Though both Serbia and Croatia launched military and paramilitary attacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina based on territorial claims, Serbia launched a siege on Sarajevo that lasted the length of the war, and annexed a region called Republika Srpska in which the majority of Bosnian Serbs resided (ibid, 218). Ethnic Serbs also fought over the Croatian Krajina territory until 1995, when two military operations by Croatian forces enabled them to regain their territory and end the war in their favor. During the conflict, ten major massacres occurred, three in concentrations camps where Croatian prisoners of war were held, while an estimated 130,000 Croats were expelled from regions Serbs sought to control.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is known for its appalling war crimes, perpetrated while the impotent NATO troops stood by watching helplessly. Among the most severe campaign was the ethnic cleansing of the Lašva Valley, which resulted in the Ahmići Massacre where about 120 Bosnians were shot at point blank range trying to escape the town by Croatian troops. Also noteworthy were genocidal rapes numbering in the tens of thousands, and above all the genocide of Srebrenica (Crowe, D., 2013, 343). The Srebrenica genocide occurred on July 11, 1995 when over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys were ethnically cleansed from a safe zone guarded by United Nations forces (Introduction to Srebrenica, 2014). Within sight of the Dutch peacekeeping troops who had been charged with protecting them, Serbian forces flooded the safe area around Potocari where the United Nations base was located and rounded up Bosniak men and boys. Over the course of a few days, many of the survivors were found in the surrounding mountains through which they had attempted to escape. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and divided Bosnia into provinces based on the ethnic

majority residing there. Republika Srpska, an autonomous province operating mostly on its own, remained intact. The three provinces each have a president to represent them, but each province has a different ethnic majority and politicians are required to identify as one of the three major ethnic groups to hold public office. As a result, the three-person presidency holds one president for each of the three major ethnic groups (Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Muslim, and Bosnian Croat).

The war in Kosovo between Serbs and ethnic Albanians did not officially break out until 1998 and lasted only until 1999. However, this conflict was preceded by at least a decade of oppression by Serbian forces of Kosovar Albanians and years of uprisings staged by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997, before the war officially began, the KLA acquired arms from Albania and attacked Yugoslav (by this point Serbian) forces with more regularity, resulting in increased activity by Serbian paramilitary groups in the region. When the war and massacres intensified, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) authorized bomb strikes on Serbia in 1995. A cease fire was negotiated and a NATO force was established to protect civilian areas and certain religious institutions that is still in effect today (Kosovo conflict, 2011).

With few exceptions, Serbia was the aggressor in each of the three separate wars of dissolution in the former Yugoslavia. Though the three wars are frequently considered as one, the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo had three separate beginnings and conclusions. Though war crimes were committed by all parties, the clear majority were perpetrated by Serbian or Serbia-aligned forces. These were not civil wars, but conflicts between newly independent nations and the former multi-ethnic state to which they once belonged. They were brutal, violent, and ethnically nationalist in nature. At the end of each conflict, ceasefires or peace treaties were negotiated that did not attempt to contend with the remaining ethnic tensions, nor was regime change required for peace. The end to these wars a new, ethnically segregated

system was put in place that did not effectively end tensions or ethnic nationalisms. Despite the subsequent international criminal tribunal that investigated and sought to punish war crimes, there were few tangible consequences for the regimes that orchestrated the violence.

Overview of the Genocide in Rwanda

Similar to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide of Rwanda began in earnest with the death of the president. However, while Tito died of natural causes, President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated with the president of Burundi when his plane was shot down in April of 1994. President Juvenal Habyarimana came to power in 1973 in a coup against Gregoire Kayibanda who had declared independence for Rwanda in 1962. (Melvern, 2004, p. 8) After a decade of exclusively Hutu governance, accompanied by the birth of Hutu nationalism, Habyarimana was a brutal military leader who sought stability after Tutsi killings had risen. Though they stopped after he came to power, he was an authoritarian despot who despised both Tutsi and southern Hutu (ibid, 12). He died in a plane crash along with the president of Burundi on April 6, 1994 and this event served as the catalyst for one hundred days of mass killing. By the time of his death violence had been reoccurring for almost have a century, and Hutu nationalists both within and outside the remaining government exploited Habyarimana's assassination to incite genocide. In the days after his death, officials and radio shows blamed the Tutsis, claiming them and the rebel army the Rwandan Patriotic Front had assassinated the president.

Violence erupted in the 1950s with the Hutu manifesto, which claimed the Hutu people of Rwanda had been subjugated by both the Belgians and Tutsis and demanded better treatment and emancipation. As Belgian authorities ousted Tutsis from power after a colonial tradition that highly favored them, anti-Tutsi killings began to spread (ibid, 6-7). Around this time, a UN

special commission declared that the hostility against Tutsis had been engineered and had grown to a racism that bordered on Nazism. Between 1959 and the beginning of what scholars consider the Rwandan genocide a series of smaller genocides occurred, though that term was not used to describe them (ibid, 7). Though the numbers of deaths ranged, the methods remained the same from 1959 to the end of the genocide in 1994 and 1995. In each massacre, propaganda spread a lie about a Tutsi plan against Hutus, roadblocks were set up in remote villages to ensure no one could escape, and a minister supervised. In most massacres, Hutus would use whatever they had on hand to kill their neighbors (ibid, 8-9). It was this message that was used to exploit the assassination of President Habyarimana to incite Hutus to violence.

Habyarimana's regime saw the creation of youth gangs attached to each political party. The biggest of these was of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), the president's party. This gang was called the Interahamwe, and they would be the enforcers of the genocide (ibid, 23-25). Though Habyarimana's regime was considered a golden age for freedom of the press in Rwanda, it was marked by anti-Tutsi propaganda funded by his party, the military, and the intelligence agency of the government. (ibid, 49). Amidst this violence and tension inside the borders of Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed in 1987 out of the former Rwandese Alliance for National Unity, an organization of refugees and children of refugees from Rwanda in Uganda. The organization and army especially was formed out of a desire to return to Rwanda.

In October of 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda, starting the Rwandan Civil War. Initially, the RPF was quickly pushed back into Uganda when the Rwandan Army received help from Belgium, France, and Zaire. Paul Kagame, who would lead the RPF through the end of the genocide and into the subsequent government, returned from the United States to become the

commander. Under his command, RPF victories increased with a new guerrilla attack strategy. By 1992, he had gained control of much of the country and a ceasefire and peace accord was negotiated in 1993. That ceasefire ended with the president's death. Though the circumstances of the plane crash are somewhat unclear, what is clear is how quickly violence erupted. Colonel Bagosora and a group of eight other Hutu power officials from the government and military formed an interim government. Members of that interim government quickly organized killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutus in Kigali, along with prominent supporters of the Arusha Accords. The members of the new government, along with a popular Hutu Power radio show, spread word of the killings and urged others join in.

There are two things of note about the Rwandan genocide. The first is that the RPF invasion and guerrilla civil war was a separate conflict, despite the RPF invasion of Kigali ending the genocide. The Rwandan Patriotic Front did not initially invade Rwanda out of a fear of Tutsi genocide or as a result of it. Though the two are intertwined, the history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the civil war of the early 1990s has a separate set of complex roots. Second, the beginning of the genocide was orchestrated by those with the most power in the Rwandan government. For decades they spread Hutu nationalist propaganda and used the assassination of President Habyarimana to incite the population to violence, despite no one ever knowing for sure who actually committed the assassination. A significant percentage of the Hutu population participated in the genocide, frequently using crude weapons like machetes. But that violence did not occur without context.

Literature Review

This research seeks to analyze the field of peacebuilding from a historical and cultural perspective. Although there is a significant body of research on peacebuilding, scholars have

paid little attention to how history and culture can affect it. As a result, the theoretical literature this paper is grounded in has required analysis based on assumption and inference. An overview of the field of peacebuilding as it is currently understood is necessary, but so is an understanding of some of the disparate academic theories used in this research. This literature review will address the theoretical foundations of this research and provide a brief overview of the various fields of thought that will be used to explain peacebuilding in the two case studies. This section will address how certain scholars influential in the formation of this research have framed peacebuilding, post-colonialism, nationalism, ethnic identity, and authoritarianism, along with outlining how these terms will be used in this research. This is far from an exhaustive review of the scholarship available on these subjects, but is a review of literature used specifically to frame the theoretical foundation of this research.

At its heart, the primary topic of this research is peacebuilding. That term refers to something different than the term commonly associated with conflict, peacekeeping. Therefore, it is important to offer a brief discussion of both. Peacekeeping refers to four types of actions, which include "preventative diplomacy and peacemaking; expanding...the prevention of conflict and the making of peace; the implementation and verification of negotiated peace settlements; and assisting post-conflict micro-disarmament" (Heathcote & Otto, 2014, p. 5). In other words, the negotiation of peace settlements such as the Arusha Accords or the Dayton Agreement are examples of peacekeeping, not peacebuilding. These scholars distinguish peacekeeping efforts that took place before, during, and after the conflicts in Serbia and Rwanda, and these types of actions are not the focus of this research.

Peacebuilding, by contrast, is defined in a multitude of ways. Importantly, it must take place after a conflict is over. Beyond this, the peacebuilding can include a variety of definitions,

some of which are rather strict. These stricter definitions generally include only formal efforts taken to develop a post-conflict state socio-economically, such as economic or governmental reform. Many of these stricter definitions consider peacebuilding to be an extension of peacekeeping, often undertaken by the same forces (ibid, 6). However, other scholars understand peacebuilding to include less official duties, such as "building trust between opposing parties, recognizing the need for coexistence and interdependence" and "fostering justice and human rights" in addition to the more official, classic actions (Anderlini, 2007, p. 60). For the purposes of this research, the broader definitions are important. Serbian and Rwandan peacebuilding has included both types, however the conflict in the Balkans took place outside of Serbian territory for the most part. The stricter definitions generally only include actions undertaken at the site of the conflict, usually aided by international peacekeeping forces. As a perpetrator state, Serbia is not included in these definitions. Broader definitions that include these formal activities in addition to building trust, coexistence, and human rights are the only definitions that consider Serbia a cite of peacebuilding.

Peacekeeping troops and international intervention did not take place on Serbian soil, though they did take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Though there was an intervening international force in Rwanda, it did not remain after the conflict ended to take over the "assumption of a longer term role over a number of years" or addressed "the expansion of peacekeeping operations" in either country (Heathcote and Otto, 6). Both Serbia and Rwanda have a deep distrust of international institutions and outside aid. In Serbia, this coupled with a still-nationalist government reluctant to assist in peacebuilding, resulting in a lack of formal peacebuilding programs. In Rwanda, the victorious RPF formed a government which placed a

great deal of blame for the genocide on the international community, and though they collaborated with formal judicial procedures, they largely scorn other outside assistance.

For the purposes of this research, both coexistence-driven peacebuilding and peacekeeping expansion will be included in the definition. This research will use both Anderlini's definition of peacebuilding that includes peacebuilding not only done by formal institutions and the formal, legal actions referenced by Heathcote and Otto. Anderlini's definition encompasses more of the types of peacebuilding that emerged in Serbia, including civil society efforts and the reform of political institutions and human rights work. Her definition focuses on justice and coexistence rather than formal economic development and the implementation of peace plans (Anderlini, 60). Heathcote and Otto's definition prioritizes countries that experienced a violent conflict within their border, received international aid to develop afterwards, and focused on the rebuilding of government institutions and development of legal justice frameworks. These types of actions best characterize Rwanda's model of peacebuilding.

Together, these definitions make up the two types of work that must be done to truly rebuild a society. In order for a society to truly heal, trust and coexistence must be rebuilt for both victims and perpetrators. To that end, peacebuilding is not only official governmental or international projects, it is also art, cultural projects, and street activism. All these actions will be considered under the scope of peacebuilding. Similar to peacebuilding is the concept of transitional justice, a term whose definition frequently includes criminal proceedings, truth and reconciliation commissions and other official processes intended to bring justice to the perpetrators of violent crimes in a conflict. More generally, it is the process or processes that helps two parties heal after a violent conflict, and a broader definition can also encompass grassroots initiatives, street activism, and artistic or cultural work. One type of work is not

enough to produce lasting peace. Not only do government institutions and legal justice need to be rebuilt, but informal processes intended to foster reconciliation and coexistence are also important. Therefore, this research understands successful peacebuilding to include both.

One last concept is important to understand in order to grasp the peacebuilding aspect of this research project. Though not all the peacebuilding programs identified in this research fall under the auspices of civil society, civil society programs are an intrinsic part of peacebuilding. The literature on civil society offers a variety of definitions. The scholar Bojan Bilic, in his study of anti-war efforts in Yugoslavia, explained that civil society in an Eastern European context "has frequently been referred to as a set of groups, organizations (NGOs) and initiatives, separated from [the] direct state...whose aim is to facilitate the transition to democracy" (Bilic, 2012, p. 51). He goes on to define civil society as a set of actors serving "as an intermediary between the legislators and the citizens" (ibid, 104). They do what government and citizens cannot accomplish alone. Rwandan civil society is somewhat different. Throughout the history of civil society in Rwanda, it has tended toward service delivery, are client-based, and mostly apolitical. Rather than working to challenge or reform government institutions, Rwandan civil society works in collaboration with government initiatives.

The theory of postcolonialism is vital to this research. Though postcolonialism is rarely applied in earnest to the social sciences as a lens through which to view history or politics, a large portion of this research depends upon analyzing how colonial legacies have influenced conflict and peacebuilding in Serbia and Rwanda. Therefore, it is important to explain what is meant by some of these terms. For the purposes of this research, I have used a definition of "empire" that includes protectorates or colonies of indirect rule. In his work on postcolonial theory and its relationship to the social sciences, Julian Go defines empire as "a transnational

political formation by which a state exerts power and influence over weaker societies" (Go, 2016 203, footnote 1). This definition describes a colonial empire as a formal empire, where the imperial state declares direct sovereignty over another state. Both the case studies examined in this research, according to this definition, are formal colonial empires.

Go's definition of postcolonialism is used by this research as well, as his work is one that closely relates postcolonial theory with social science. He contends that "the word postcolonialism... refers to a loose body of writing and thought that seeks to transcend the legacies of modern colonialism and overcome its epistemic confines" (ibid, 9). Later, he goes into further detail, pointing out that "empire has been central to the making of modern societies" and in fact that modernity itself is a result of imperial projects (ibid, 19). He claims that colonialism has not only affected the cultures of the colonized, it has also affected the culture of the colonizers, and this includes "high culture: art and literature, for instance. But it also includes racial ideologies, discourses, ideas, attitudes, everyday practices, and so-called objective knowledge itself" (ibid). In other words, Go contends that all states involved in colonialism are permanently affected by it, regardless of their relationship to colonialism.

Under this definition, Serbia qualifies as a postcolonial state despite never having been analyzed through that lens. Part of the theoretical project of this research is to determine how much being postcolonial has influenced Serbian culture, if at all. There are difficulties of applying postcolonial theory to the Serbian case. For one thing, postcolonial theory contends that history and much of what is "objectively known" was written by the center of imperialism, which is Europe. Under this definition, Serbia is a complicated case. It is a European nation, and its primary colonizer was an Eastern one. This is where Maria Todorova's theory of the Balkans as a bridge between east and west comes to bear on this research. She claims that not only are the

Balkans a cultural bridge between East and West, but also "a bridge between stage of growth, and this invokes labels such as semideveloped, semicolonial, semicivilized, semioriental" (Todorova, 2009, 16). It is not a fair characterization to simply call Serbia a European nation when they have always been more culturally complicated than that. Additionally, though postcolonial thought was not founded with the Ottoman Empire in mind, they were one of the biggest and longest lasting empires in history. Therefore, to analyze Serbia through a postcolonial lens is representation of the school of thought.

Also important to explore is the theory of nationalism as it relates to ethnic violence. Though the term "nation" is frequently used as a synonym for "state", this is an incorrect usage of the concept. In its proper usage, nationalism does not refer to loyalty to any state or government, as that is properly termed patriotism. In its true sense, "a nation refers to a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related" (Connor, 2004, 23). In other words, nationalism can be identified as the largest group of people connected by a thread of common ancestors. However, this is an imprecise definition. Benedict Anderson, the forefather of nationalist theory, offers a more concrete, descriptive definition of the concept. While he does contend that nations are imagined communities tethered together by artificial, cultural and historical threads, he also claims that nations are imagined as sovereign. He cites Enlightenment thought, claiming it was "destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" (Anderson, 1991, 5-7). He states that in this new realm of thought, every "nation" dreams of being free, and that "The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state" (ibid). Thus, under Anderson's foundational definition, there cannot be nationalism without at least the dream of forming or belonging to a sovereign state.

Another foundational text on nationalism, written by John Breuilly outlines three basic assertions that are required for "nationalism". Of these three assertions, two involve political independence or sovereignty. In fact, Breuilly values political sovereignty above culture and feelings of comradeship or ancestral ties. He states that for a nationalist argument to be made one of the requirements is that "There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character" and that it "must be as independent as possible" (Breuilly, 1985, 6-7). Though culture is a vital aspect of any shared belief that could be called nationalism, most scholars agree that there must be at least a desire for a sovereign state for it to be called such. This research will operate under a definition of nationalism that distinguishes itself from ethnic identity, which can be identified as a similar set of beliefs, values, and shared descent or heritage without the necessity of identifying with a specific state. However, despite being separate concepts, ethnicity and nationalism can become tangled. While in Serbia, nationalist and ethnic loyalty coincided with loyalty to a sovereign state or desire for a sovereign state, this was not the case in Rwanda. In Rwanda, separate ethnic groups had loyalty to their ethnic group, but both identified with the same sovereign state. Hutu and Tutsi identity did not preclude identifying as Rwandan, but ethnicity was the criteria by which control of the state was deemed legitimate. Insofar as Hutu or Tutsi "nationalism" seeks to eliminate the other group from the Rwandan state, as Hutus sought to during the genocide, it can be considered nationalism in the true sense of the word. Otherwise, ethnicity and nationalism are considered separate ideas for the purposes of this research, but ethnic prejudice can disguise itself as nationalism.

CHAPTER TWO: COLONIALISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

The end of the twentieth century was marked by violence and tragedy. The two most notable conflicts were the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda. On the surface, these two events seem wildly different. The conflicts themselves were different, as were the civil societies and peacebuilding programs that emerged in their aftermath. While in Serbia, civil society and activists dominate the conversation about peacebuilding, in Rwanda civil society tends to fall under the thumb of the government. Rwanda's peacebuilding program is controlled by the post-genocide regime, with much of the civil society actors also under the influence of the government. Despite the differences between the violence that occurred and how civil society has since emerged, there are certain historical and cultural themes that are similar between the two countries. This section will examine how a history of colonialism and authoritarianism affected the conflicts and the emergence of a civil society geared to peacebuilding.

Rwanda

Colonial Administration in Rwanda

Through briefly tracing colonial history, along with Rwandans' eventual overthrow of colonial authority, a history of citizens' involvement in the government will begin to form. A system of government existed prior to colonial control in Rwanda. It is estimated that Rwanda as a state emerged much the same way many states in the region emerged, as a group of disparate chiefships that eventually coalesced into a single kingdom around a leading clan. This single

kingdom was built on an alliance of Tutsi pastoral groups and depended on client-patron relationships to work and incorporate Hutu agriculturalists (Mamdani, 2001, 63). The way these client-patron relationships worked, relationships normally involved “the exchange of protections and/or benefits from the person of higher status (the patron) for general loyalty and service from the lower-status person (the client)” (Newbury, 1988, 17). These relationships were constantly changing, and degree of reciprocity could shift at any time. The direction of change in these relationships, however, tended to be towards less reciprocity and more exploitation, particularly as state power grew (ibid). As central Rwandan precolonial authority grew, envoys of the Rwandan court were installed in rural regions, establishing a history of domination by central authority (ibid, 30). It was these relationships and traditions that the colonial authority built on, indicating a history of central domination that lacked involvement from subjects

Once the colonial powers arrived and took control of the patron-client relationships that had sustained the Rwandan state, the reciprocity of those relationships eroded and inequality intensified. The entire system of colonial governance was created to subjugate Hutu and raise Tutsi status. (Mamdani, 65). Early Rwanda had strived to incorporate Hutu agriculturalists into an organized state by granting them the majority of land chiefships, but as colonial powers gained legitimacy, they dismissed these chiefs and replaced them with their own collaborators who were frequently Tutsi. They then created a system and shaped cultural institutions to perpetuate this primacy. The changed clientship relationships entailed mandatory manual labor to the local hill chief as payment for allowing them to occupy the land. This expected manual labor was only imposed on Hutu, who had previously freely possessed much of the land. Hutu lost land at an accelerated pace as Tutsi accumulated land and cattle through collaboration with the colonial powers (ibid, 70). Additionally, the colonists streamlined the system of administration

that had existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, a system that ensured reciprocity and a level of equality among the citizens. Instead of the complex system of various chiefs, they combined three different chiefships to one position, increasing the despotic nature of the colonial regime (ibid, 90-91). Chiefs unwilling to cooperate or force their Hutu commoners to work were replaced with Tutsi who were willing, and who would benefit from their cooperation with the colonial state (ibid, 97).

The administration of various rural localities wasn't the only system the colonial powers manipulated to perpetuate Tutsi primacy. Arguably the most important institution that shaped the racialization of Tutsi and Hutu identities was the colonial school system. There was a dual system in colonial Rwanda and the language of instruction depended on whether the student was Hutu or Tutsi. Schools such as the type the Belgian authorities introduced were a Western invention, and most were run by religious figures. These schools had two streams of education. The first was in French, intended for Tutsi who were being groomed for chiefships and other elite positions where they would encounter Belgian, French-speaking authorities. The second was for Hutu, taught in Kiswahili, and left open an opportunity to go to seminary and not much else (ibid, 111-113). Eventually, the Tutsi chiefs appointed by the Belgian administration had all been fed a constant diet of superiority, and believed that to be given chiefships and privilege was their birthright (ibid, 91). The colonial powers manipulated native institutions when they could use them to exploit the Hutus, whom they saw as inferior to the Tutsi ruling class. When they couldn't manipulate native institutions, they created new ones such as the two stream Christian education system. As a result, all institutions in Rwanda had explicit colonial influence that poisoned them with ethnic prejudice.

By the mid-twentieth century, there were whispers of decolonization. In Rwanda, however, decolonization was a process, rather than a singular event, and its different parts can be traced to colonial institutions, as is the case in many colonial nations. Decolonization was the result of an internal social movement “that empowered the majority constructed as indigenous against the minority constructed as alien” (ibid, 103). In other words, it was precisely because of the polarized separation between Hutu and Tutsi that the revolution of 1959 took the trajectory it did. Similar to other colonial cases, education inflamed Hutu nationalist rage against the injustices they were experiencing. However, that rage was not only pointed at their colonizers, but also at the “alien minority” that had been the collaborators of the colonizing power.

While the standard independence rhetoric that presented the Tutsi elite as the customary power and demanded independence meant a return to that “tradition” did exist, it was a marginal phenomenon in late colonial Rwanda. The important rhetoric came from the newly emerged Hutu elite. These elites came from the precolonial elite in the north who had been forcibly incorporated into a Rwandan state (ibid, 106). These elites, who had never let go of the precolonial hierarchy, could tap the resentment of Hutu peasants against Tutsi elites and mobilize them. In 1954, the United Nations sought to end the client-patron relationships, but did not have corresponding reform to redistribute the land that Tutsi patrons had controlled. This left Hutu cattle-owners still dependent on their former patrons for access to land for pasture and did not result in improvement for Hutu peasants. It was failed reforms that convinced the small Hutu intelligentsia that only radical change would improve the plight of the Hutu majority (ibid, 115).

This information is important because it demonstrates the point that Rwandan decolonization and nationalist rhetoric departs from typical rhetoric. In the Rwandan struggle for decolonization, the Tutsi argued for independence first and called for a return of power to the

Tutsi king. The Hutu, however, called for democracy first on the basis that they were the indigenous majority. In most anti-colonial movements, calling for a return to tradition *is* calling for a return of power to the indigenous majority. However, colonial power had accentuated the Hutu identity as one of lack of and struggle for power versus the Tutsi identity as one of power (ibid, 117). As Hutu began to wear their identity as a socially oppressed people as a badge of pride, the more they ignored Tutsi claims of “traditional power”, repeating colonial-era claims that the Tutsi were non-indigenous (ibid, 118). Considering “Tutsi nationalism” was a relatively marginal movement, the loudest cries for independence called for a creation of completely new institutions or a radical reform of institutions that sat on the foundation of ethnic exploitation. There were almost no positive institutions or traditions left for them to build on.

When violence broke out in 1959 between the racially-aligned local political parties the Belgian authorities declared a state of emergency. When this did not work and it became clear that the focus of the violence was on Tutsi chiefs, the Belgian state decided the presence of Tutsi as subchiefs and chiefs was disturbing the peace and replaced them with Hutu (ibid, 123-124). With this change, the new Hutu chiefs gathered up all burgomasters and councilors, along with the minister of the interior, the president of the guard, and the temporary prime minister to declare Rwanda a republic. What followed was five years of struggle before Belgium finally ceded power of Rwanda in 1963 after at least 100,000 Tutsi had been killed. The revolution and subsequent Hutu government would not have been possible without Belgian aid (ibid, 124). Anti-colonial independence movements in Rwanda were inherently ethnic in nature as well, particularly because Hutu-aligned parties wanted to escape Tutsi exploitation as much as colonial exploitation. This complicated the subsequent development of post-colonial institutions, which also developed along racial lines.

Rwanda's Post-Independence Authoritarianism

Much of the administrative systems in place under colonialism remained once colonialism ended. The system of councilors, burgomasters, and local chiefs remained and continued to be manipulated by the post-independence government. These local leaderships would be manipulated through the end of the genocide. Colonialism had left behind a legacy of manipulating state institutions and government appointments to fit the political and racial agenda of those in power, and this legacy remains. In 1953, local elections occurred, and in 1956 there was a general election, but the councilors elected in these elections served merely advisory roles. Even after a republic was declared in 1959, transitions of power in Rwanda have been violent or bloodless coups. Though it calls itself a republic, power in Rwanda has never been decided by elections. Though numerous presidential elections have occurred, almost every one of them has occurred with an incumbent who runs with no competition. Furthermore, opposition parties were illegal for much of Rwanda's postcolonial history, and are limited in power even today.

The first regime after independence, Gregoire Kayibanda's regime, officially began in 1963 despite his significant importance throughout the Rwandan Revolution as the leader of the Hutu faction. His regime was based on Hutu supremacy, and ruled with the mantra of "demographic majority and democracy", despite the bloody repression that had allowed their rise to power (Prunier, 1999, 58). He ruled in a top-down method that did not allow for dissension, similar to the pre-revolution feudal monarchy and the colonial regime (ibid, 57). Other political parties such as Rwandese National Union (UNAR) were banned due to the concern for national safety and peace after the violent clashes.

Military leader Juvenal Habyarimana launched a bloodless coup in 1973, replacing Kayibanda as President due to the feeling that his reforms were insufficient in stemming Hutu

unemployment and underrepresentation in higher education. He marked the day of his coup, July 5, as a day of peace and reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. He enacted yet more reforms, particularly in the realm of employment, to attempt to redistribute jobs to reflect the demographic statistics of the country, both based on ethnicity and region (Mahmood, 139-140). Tutsi were redefined as an ethnicity rather than a race, but were still excluded from positions of local authority as they had been under Kayibanda. Until 1990 media under Habyarimana, was controlled by the government and used as a space for propaganda, frequently with an anti-Tutsi slant. Additionally, Habyarimana's post-1973 government undid electoral reforms and allowed local administrative chiefs to recreate patron-client relations, including forced labor, obligatory gifts, and other coercive practices (ibid, 144). Though his regime claimed to support peace and reconciliation for Hutus and Tutsis, it was also inarguably exploitative, exclusionary, and undemocratic.

Habyarimana's regime, under the aegis of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), drafted a constitution that created a single-party system in Rwanda. Though the country did have periodic elections, as a single-party state with Habyarimana the founder and subsequent sole leader of the national party, there was only ever one candidate on the ballot. Additionally, he dissolved the National Assembly, successfully installing himself and his advisors and ministers as the only people with any real power. Habyarimana had strict control of the national media until reforms in 1990, but even after those reforms were enacted and some freedom of the press was allowed, nationally-controlled media was still popular. Additionally, his government despised the idea of power-sharing with opponents and despite the allowance of different political parties, long put off allowing the transitional government set up by the peace accords to take power. Furthermore, the existence of Habyarimana's specially trained death

squad, the Akazu, and the local Hutu militias, the Interahamwe, cemented his regime as one of top-down absolute control. Similar to other African states in the region, he also cemented military power as the key determinant of the regime and regime change in Rwanda.

Serbia

Ottoman Colonial Administration

There were a number of differences between the Ottoman Empire as colonial administrators compared to the European colonists in Rwanda. First of all, while the Ottoman powers did divide their conquered lands into smaller administrative and military units, called sancaks, these divisions normally followed geographic realities or pre-colonial divisions. The Ottoman Empire was much more military-focused than European empires in Africa. The leaders of these sancaks were military leaders whose responsibility it was to keep law and order in peacetime and lead locally stationed soldiers into battle in times of war. As the Ottoman Empire grew, their interest in complete control over all their conquered lands decreased. Regardless, the Ottoman Empire was an authoritarian state, albeit one uninterested in manipulating the cultural and religious practices of their people, unlike the regime in Rwanda.

The Ottoman Empire had all the benchmarks of a closely centralized state, including “periodic surveys of population and land, a central treasury, a bureaucracy...and a system of control through the sultan’s own slaves” (Heper, 1980, 83). Though in the early Ottoman Empire, conquered lands loosely resembled a feudal system, as the empire grew this relationship diminished. Newly conquered land in the Ottoman Empire was eventually confiscated by the state and divided up into “timars” or fiefdoms that were controlled on behalf of the central state. The holders of these fiefs had very limited powers, mostly related to collecting taxes and

ensuring the cultivation of land by tenants who resided on those lands. They had no control over other administrative or legal matters, which were the domain of different centrally appointed governors or judges. Their extensive system of rules and regulations, and the ability of the sultan to create new regulations with no regard to precedent or tradition, implies a desire to rule from the center, rather than to delegate to regional powers (ibid, 84).

As the Ottoman Empire matured, the sultans lost the identity of being the embodiment of the state, but the state did not lose its central power. The subtle authoritarianism of the Ottoman Empire is further evident by the complete lack of an aristocracy. When the Ottomans came to power, Turkish aristocracy was abolished and much of the activities that are associated with a landed aristocracy were not present. Overall, though the peripheral “elite” did take advantage of their position to increase their own power, they did so within roles the central state saw fit for them, and rarely rebelled or created a countervailing force (ibid, 88). Similar to Rwanda, the colonial regime in Serbia was authoritarian with control stemming from the center to appointed regional officials. However, those regional officials had limited power, and the Ottomans had little interest in exploiting their subjects to the extent that the colonial regime in Rwanda did.

The key difference between Ottoman administration of its colonies and the strategy of other colonial powers was their lack of interest in the daily lives of their subjects. In fact, the administration of the expanding Ottoman Empire was not only influenced by the production of an Orthodox Islam with which to base all its institutions on, but also by the empires that preceded it, such as the Byzantine and, to a smaller extent, the Serbian and Bulgarian empires (Shaw and Yapp, 2016). The Ottoman Empire did not seek to manipulate native institutions or create new ones in their place, unlike the German and Belgian regimes in Rwanda. Christians and Jews, though given certain privileges if they did convert, were not restricted in the practice

of their religion. Their administrative units followed pre-colonial and geographic realities. The central power had little involvement in the administration of these local units aside from keeping the peace and collecting taxes. Even in the collection of taxes local systems were weaved into the overarching empire rather than dominated or erased. In fact, they collaborated with local powers far more than European colonial powers.

There were unintended consequences on Serbian national consciousness as a result of the millet system, as this system was intended to keep the peace between volatile religious hatreds but did not usually succeed. Serbian national consciousness was tied to religious affiliation, and Serbs believed anywhere the Serbian Orthodox Church existed was Serbian land. In short, while the Ottoman Empire was powerful and expanding, the sultan allowed his subjects extensive freedom and depended on existing geographic realities and native traditions to run his empire. The lack of involvement by the sultan in the daily administration of his empire allowed for heterogeneity. However, though precolonial hierarchies, ethnicities, hostilities, and nationalisms did not subside during their colonial reign, they were also not exacerbated such as Rwanda. While this is a simplification of life under the Ottoman thumb, their lack of involvement with their colonies is important to note, as European meddling into Rwandan identity was a huge contributing factor to subsequent violence (ibid). The result was a Serbian society much more used to running its own affairs with little involvement from an albeit centralized government.

It was not until Ottoman power started waning that they became at all oppressive, and in fact, the oppression came from the lack of centralized control as a result of waning power. The patriarchate, which was the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox millet, was abolished in 1766 and Greek priests and bishops replaced them, causing resentment (Crampton and Danforth, 2015). As the Ottoman powers in Serbia terrorized the peasants, they revolted under a new dynasty, the

Karadjordje dynasty. This revolt was the culmination of a society that heroized individuals who rebelled against the central authority. In 1878, independence was officially recognized and the kingdom of Serbia was created. However, this victory was not complete, as a huge amount of the territory Serbia considered its own still remained in either the Habsburg or the Ottoman Empire (ibid). It was not until after World War I that both of Serbia's colonizers were vanquished and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created, though it lasted but a brief time. While the Ottomans undeniably had a strictly ruled centralized state that was in no way democratic, it was not totalitarian. Serbians retained native institutions and traditions unaffected by colonial rule. Furthermore, one of the greatest traditions left by the Ottoman regime was a society used to having its cultural institutions run the country, serving as a necessary bridge between regime and subject. Though civil society did not exist in Serbia under any definition by this point, the foundation was there. Whereas in Rwanda, colonizers left behind an exploited people dependent on the central regime, the Serbian people had experience running themselves and subjects who staunchly preferred it that way.

Serbia's Communist Authoritarianism

In its brief periods of independence from foreign rule, Serbia was led by strong national dynasties. Serbia's unique authoritarian government after World War II was shaped by specific historical experiences. A Soviet-style party state was developed in the former Yugoslavia earlier than in many other Soviet-style states. It also did so without the aid of Stalin and the Soviet Union, but on its own. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) led a mass liberation movement from foreign occupiers and retained a status as the only multi-national political group. They came to power, due to their role as "liberators" of a sort from World War II horrors, much quicker than other communist parties in Europe and they did so with real legitimacy. The

Partisans, rebel communist fighters during World War II who became the CPY, were yet another example of Serbian people motivated to fight oppression without involvement from government institutions (Vladislavljovic, 2008, 26).

Though similar to other Stalin-style parties in their economic strategy, throughout the early rule of the CPY they encouraged public participation through appellate party organizations such as the People's Front of Yugoslavia, The Anti-fascist Women's Front, People's Youth, and the League of Trade Unions. Furthermore, they allowed small local initiatives to improve their local economy and aid in post-war reconstruction, which allowed the population to feel they were involved in their government (ibid, 29). On the other hand, like in all communist countries, the military and secret police were huge contributors to unity. Communist ideology was harshly imposed, along with the idea of a Yugoslav national unity that had never been authentic to the exclusion of ethnic identities that had existed for centuries. Propaganda was disseminated widely, control of the media was tightly held. Yugoslavia may have been a unique communist regime, more decentralized than others and with religion unsuppressed, but many of the repressions that existed in other Eastern Bloc countries also were present in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was decentralized and authoritarian. It both encouraged participation by the people and tightly held control of the country. Nationalist tension and resentment left over from World War II was frozen and no reconciliation occurred, leaving the country ripe for conflict. Additionally, Serbia began to develop political civil society networks outside of the government's control before the Communist regime was even removed. In Rwanda, the issue of ethnic tension and violence was confronted by the government, even if the resulting Hutu regime was also exploitative. No such efforts were made by the Yugoslavian Communist regime, who believed that unity was best achieved by focusing on building Yugoslavian national identity to

the exclusion of previous ethnic identity. With no history of government who took notice of ethnic tension, civil society in Serbia had always been required to do it instead.

Effects of Colonialism: Comparison

The main difference between the peacebuilding programs of Serbia and Rwanda is the government's involvement in them. As stated earlier, Rwanda's peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is controlled top-down by the government. The Serbian government, however, has no interest in being involved in any rebuilding or post-conflict healing. Instead, it continues to proclaim its victim status. While a large part of this can be explained by the Tutsi victory over the Hutu after the conflict, it cannot explain it completely and it offers no explanation for the Serbian response. As a result, further explanation is necessary because victimhood and victory in the conflict cannot explain the actions of either government appropriately.

Another explanatory factor is how deeply involved European colonizers were in every part of their colonial administration. While both Rwandans and Serbians were used to an authoritarian regime with a very centralized organizational structure to their government, Rwandans had a colonizing power that was involved in every aspect of daily life. Rwanda's colonial regime was characterized by manipulation of every level of society. Serbia's was characterized by cultural institutions filling in the huge gaps in governance left by the distant regime, and it was this foundation that would eventually grow to a vibrantly political civil society that did the same thing. Serbians had no history of direct involvement with the government, or with the government being involved in the daily life of its citizens. If post-colonial theory recognizes the inherited traditions and institutions left behind by colonial powers, it is important to recognize that Serbia had very few of those leftover institutions. Rwanda, however, had no institution or tradition left that had not been touched by colonialism.

Another important factor in determining how peacebuilding developed is political primacy. Mamdani, in his exploration of the roots of Hutu/Tutsi conflict, pointed out that there are two types of genocidal impulses rooted in colonial power. The first is the genocide of the native by the settler, but “the second was the native impulse to eliminate the settler” (Mamdani, 10). Hutu violence against Tutsi was native violence against a group with a privileged relationship to power and political primacy who had been branded as alien. Due to decades of preferential treatment by colonial powers, Tutsis came to be equated to settlers despite centuries of coexistence. Serbian violence against Kosovar Albanians and Bosnian Muslims can also be identified as native violence against the settler. Though it had been centuries, Serbians viewed Albanians and Muslims residing as residing in lands they perceived as their own. Therefore, they viewed those groups as settlers. In both cases, Hutu and Serbians were enacting violence against groups who they still considered foreign who had, through centuries of culture and coexistence, ceased to be actual foreigners.

Both Serbians and Hutus regarded the groups on the other side of their violent nationalism as foreigners who had benefited from colonialism who needed to be punished or exterminated. But when the violence started – 1959 in Rwanda and 1990 in Serbia – one of those groups had political primacy and the other did not. Serbians, though they lacked political primacy under the thumb of the Ottoman Empire, had received political primacy with their independence in the late nineteenth century. They were a group who perceived themselves, and continue to perceive themselves, as victims long after they had shrugged their subaltern identity and regained political primacy. Serbians were undeniably the primary actors and beneficiaries of Yugoslavia. Hutus, on the other hand, began committing violence in 1959 when they had an entire cultural history of being the subaltern group in their own land. Both groups committed

violence from the perspective of the subaltern, but Serbians were no longer a subaltern group. In the postcolonial period, Hutus also lost the subaltern role they had previously filled, but the violence had already started. As evidenced by the periodic massacres that occurred through the second half of the twentieth century preceding the official start to the genocide, all the violence perpetrated against the Tutsi was a result of the Hutu people's subaltern role preceding 1959. Between 1959 and 1994, they were still reacting to being exploited despite no longer being subaltern in Rwandan society.

The Serbian reaction to the violence they had committed reflected the fact while they perceived themselves to be subaltern, they were not. Their reaction to violence was from a political primary position. They were not in a subaltern role, and their position of political primacy allowed them to refuse to come to terms with the violence they had committed. Hutus were in the position of the subaltern when the violence started and when the violence was over, they were again in the subaltern role. Therefore, they were forced to come to terms with the violence they had committed. The Tutsis who had experienced the violence had spent thirty years (from 1959 to the time of the genocide) in the position of the subaltern in Rwandan society, but had a history of being the privileged in society. Therefore, they became involved in forcing Hutu to deal with their crimes but had no interest in dealing with their own.

Colonialism and its effects are long-lasting and complex. However, if scholars are to explain or understand African politics from the perspective of a post-colonial state, that lens can and should be extended to states that are infrequently considered post-colonial. Serbia was forced to deal with the effects of colonial power as much as Rwanda, and understanding the history of the effects of colonialism on the creation, manipulation, and perpetuation of national and ethnic identities is vital to understanding the actions of its people. Colonialism permanently affected

both Serbia and Rwanda, albeit in different ways. Their respective peacebuilding programs were shaped by their different colonial experiences, the way religion interacted with colonial powers and colonialism-affected creation of nationalisms.

Colonial-era authoritarianism in Serbia and Rwanda manifested quite differently. While the Ottoman regime was inarguably authoritarian, or at least non-democratic, it also held very little interest in controlling daily life and culture in the colonies. To the contrary, it depended on various religious and cultural bodies to help govern principalities and thus allow the central state to continue expanding. European colonists, Germany and Belgium included, were heavily involved in every aspect of the daily lives in their colonies, especially religious and cultural institutions. The key difference was that the Ottoman Empire respected the people they conquered, respected their traditions, religions, and local institutions as being vital to the successful governance of such a large empire. European colonists only conquered people they did not respect, and sought to replace local institutions and traditions with Westernized ones. As a result, these empires built different traditions in terms of involvement with governance. The Ottomans depended on separate institutions to help them govern, and European colonists sought to control or end local institutions that might translate into a history of civil society.

Just as the colonialisms in Serbia and Rwanda manifested differently, so did authoritarianism. While Rwanda was a single-party state, it was a single-party state that was based on a lack of involvement in public life. Regime change in Rwanda, as in other post-colonial African nations, was accomplished through violent revolution, civil war, or military coups. Mass popular support for regimes frequently faded quickly, leaving the authoritarian leadership to perpetuate their power by a combination of military or militia force and obligatory labor. Conversely, Serbia, as a communist government, controlled all aspects of the lives of its

citizens and strictly controlled the information and culture they had access to, but simultaneously encouraged their involvement in government and politics. Rwandan authoritarian regimes sought to control the citizens by force and violence, whereas Serbian authoritarian leadership sought to manipulate the public into believing the communist government remained in their best interest. Rwanda discouraged citizens from becoming too involved with or informed about the government, and encouraged violence as a response to dissatisfaction. This particular brand of authoritarianism did not allow for a healthy development of civil society organizations and activist networks.

Communist governments in general are founded on at least the illusion of proletariat and working class empowerment, even if those ideals are not upheld. Though force was used, and Serbia did have secret police to fear, military power was not the sole root cause of power in Serbia. Tito's communist government in Serbia was made up of leaders who had come to party leadership through an underground fight against foreign rulers in a war against fascism in the Partisans. They enjoyed a remarkable amount of support by the people, who also allowed them a bit more involvement in their own lives than most communists did. As a result, their unique experiences in the second half of the twentieth century bred different levels of comfort with extra-governmental involvement in governance. Additionally, the way they came to power also presents an important factor in the difference in the level of comfort with civil society. Regime change in Rwanda was either done by military elite or by violence, or both. It was frequently top-down and lacked involvement from those on the ground. Serbia's change to communist power was a direct result of mass support by the people. Not only was mass protest common among Eastern European communist countries, Yugoslavia included, but the unique nature of communist authoritarianism allowed for and somewhat encouraged civil society organizations or

political organizations to emerge. Combined with the different styles of colonizer, the result was that Serbia had a history of involvement with the government through separate institutions and Rwanda had a history of the opposite.

CHAPTER THREE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND PEACEBUILDING IN SERBIA AND RWANDA

Civil society is often viewed as one of the benchmarks of democracy. A healthy civil society, and the regime's relationship to it, can be a sign of how healthy a country's democracy is. Additionally, civil society can be vital in implementing peacebuilding programs on every level of society, particularly in community initiatives. Civil society bridges the gap between government and citizens, advocating for them and rendering services the government cannot provide. But a country's relationship to its civil society and the health of its civil society differs greatly even between democracies. Serbia and Rwanda have radically different relationships to their country's civil society, and the role those groups take in peacebuilding differs greatly as well. In Serbia, civil society is wholly independent of the government, and has also taken a leading role in peacebuilding and human rights in Serbia. In Rwanda, a monopolistic government has left most of civil society unable to be completely independent from the government. With exceptions, the government takes the lead on peacebuilding in Rwanda, with most major projects being top-down campaigns.

The involvement of civil society in peacebuilding helps inform what types of peacebuilding occur. Serbia's civil society is involved in peacebuilding because their government is not, and largely serves as peace educators, attempting to influence Serbian society in favor of peace through education, cultural projects, and protest. There is little policy related to peace and conflict resolution, unlike in Rwanda. Though Rwanda's civil society is beholden to

the government, their government is very involved in peacebuilding, but important conversations do not always occur. This chapter will outline the role civil society plays in both Serbia and Rwanda, along with its participation in peacebuilding specifically. It will briefly trace the roots of civil society in each country and identify how civil society actors are involved in peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding in Serbia

An early iteration of civil society involved in peace in Serbia was the Centre for Antiwar Action, which was founded in 1991 at the start of the tension and conflict in Yugoslavia. The CAA worked with a variety of other more and less organized anti-war groups to launch public protests and performances in order to encourage Serbian citizens to take an active role in rejecting Serbian oppression and violence (Bilic, 140). In time, it became the center of most organized antiwar activities, providing political infrastructure and international contacts to a movement mostly made up of women and students. The organization's projects included a peace march against the Parliament in July, 1991, a protest against the attack to Dubrovnik in October of that year, multiple protests and projects against the war in Bosnia in 1992, and an anti-war rock concert called, "Don't Count on Us" (Fridman, 2006, 96). The CAA was most well-known for its nightly candlelit vigils to honor war victims. Their strategy was primarily to foment conventional popular protests and marches while also establishing a conference on humanitarian law in Italy. They sought to develop a culture of peace, democracy, and human rights in Serbia in opposition to the war.

Though ideological cleavages eventually weakened the CAA and it faded the background of the antiwar effort, their projects-based model and training programs on nonviolent action and conflict resolution remain a popular model in Serbia's civil society today. Another early antiwar

organization was the Belgrade Circle, a group of largely intellectual origins whose biggest contribution to the antiwar movement was their tagline “druga Serbia” or “a different Serbia”. They had a series of lectures and discussions called the Saturday Sessions, which attempted to show intellectual opposition to the regime of the time. The Belgrade Circle’s other contributions included an academic journal and the group MOST, a collaborative effort between them and the CAA. MOST was a group of psychologists who promoted cooperation and conflict resolution that eventually evolved into Group 484 to provide psychological and humanitarian aid to refugees and veterans. These organizations were not the only antiwar civil society groups in Serbia in the 1990s, nor were they the most important. However, they were influential to later groups, and reflect the popular model for civil society work in Serbia today.

Additionally, without the existence of these early groups, truly important antiwar organizations would not have emerged. Zene u Crnom, or the Women in Black, was founded by a group of women who broke off from the CAA because they were unhappy with how gender issues were treated by that group. Zene u Crnom was based off the Women in Black of Israel, and like that organization they are most well-known for weekly silent vigils where they wear all black to represent their mourning for the victims of the wars, both living and dead, drawing on the mourning rituals of their Eastern European and Orthodox Christian culture. In addition to weekly vigils, Zene u Crnom has published extensively and have been heavily involved with parallel peace movements in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. The Women in Black constantly organized alternative education on activism, transitional justice, anti-militarism, and other issues. Most importantly, the Women in Black frequently organized street actions that often incorporated artists, actors, musicians, photographers and other people in the arts. They organized theater performances and photography workshops for refugees, in addition to their

normal humanitarian aid projects. Their alternative education and workshops are the most extensive of any group in Serbia, despite Serbian civil society's inclination towards alternative education projects. Despite how active they were in the 1990s and how active they remain, they have refused any collaboration with the Serbian government and any real involvement in politics.

Zene u Crnom emerged not only due to a gender-based cleavage from the CAA, but also in response to the "Mother's Movement" antiwar opposition. Because images of motherhood in particular were being used by Serbian media to justify the war, mothers of Serbia and Croatia launched protests throughout 1991 to protest their sons being forced to fight in the Yugoslav National Army. They also appealed to public officials and organized protests against conscription (Hughes, D.M., Mladjenović, L., 1999). The Mother's Movement was important to the development of antiwar activism in Serbia, which was largely founded by women. Though this particular group was often nationalist in nature and relegated the space of emotional response rather than as a respected protest group, it was nevertheless important to the development of Serbian women into a true force of antiwar activity.

If antiwar activism was one half of civil society in Serbia during the war, the other half was anti-Milosevic action. Of these, it is important to note that although there were relatively successful political parties in opposition to Milosevic, they were neither anti-nationalist nor antiwar. The singular antiwar party in Serbia at the time had next to no political support, and true antiwar activity remained the job of civil society actors. The key opposition party leader, Vuk Draskovic, did not serve as a particularly strong-willed opponent to the Milosevic regime. He allied himself with other opposition parties and even, at times, the ruling parties. Drašković's "ideological flip-flops and policy u-turns" were a "paradigm of the weakness and chaotic state of the Serbian opposition" (Fridman, O., 2006, 78-79). This is important to mention because it

provides context for the importance of civil society actors as opposition during and after the Milosevic regime. Because political institutions were either the aggressors, complicit in the aggression, or too disorganized to be a real threat, influential political action became the duty of civil society actors.

In the realm of anti-Milosevic action, the most influential group was Otpor, a group named after the Serbian word for “resistance.” This was a group of university students whose agenda was to get rid of Milosevic, whom they believed to be a dictator. It is this group that historians credit as the main force behind Milosevic’s expulsion from power, though they were not in any way explicitly antiwar. They did describe their movement as nonviolent and against anyone who might use violence, and even published training manuals on nonviolent opposition. The antiwar, anti-nationalist, anti-militarist activists also involved in Otpor “mentioned with some regret their disappointment or discomfort with many Otpor activists who were, in fact, nationalists themselves who even employed nationalist rhetoric” (Fridman, 122). They feared that taking on other political agendas might divide the people they attempted to mobilize, and their only political stance was their goal to depose Milosevic (ibid, 120). Despite ideological shortcomings, it is Otpor that is credited with the ousting of Milosevic amidst massive popular protests after he refused to accept an electoral defeat in the fall of 2000. In response to Milosevic’ refusal to concede to his opponent, Otpor organized strikes, school boycotts, and public demonstrations for days that put even other political and social leaders under pressure. Although Otpor’s relevance rapidly faded after Milosevic conceded, they were instrumental in mobilizing the critical mass to publicly pressure him to step down (Kurtz, L., 2010).

Though the cacophony of oppositional voices has largely died down in Serbia since the 1990s, and most peacebuilding and human rights work has fallen into two of three models. These

models are cultural and artistic work, policy and law, and alternative education. Cultural and education projects make up most peacebuilding done by civil society in Serbia, either by groups with roots in the antiwar activity of the 1990s or groups founded since the war ended. Among these was the alternative media outlet B92, a radio station that was arguably the only free media source of the Milosevic regime. Despite the risks, it continued throughout the war to broadcast antiwar protests. Though it was initially just a student-run radio station and radio remains its focus, it has expanded to include television, radio, film, internet, music, and even publishing.

Other groups similarly focused on cultural and artistic projects are the Dah Theater Group, the Center for Cultural Decontamination, and Cinema REX, all of which have focused the majority of their efforts towards theater projects, art exhibits, and independent films aimed at confronting the truth of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and starting conversations regarding the 1990s. These groups have theater performances on a variety of political topics; launch art exhibits featuring emerging artists, particularly those that engage in political discussions; showcase and support cinematic projects; and work on projects in collaboration with less art-centered organizations such as the Women in Black. Examples include the performance by the Dah theater group entitled “Document of Our Times”, an experimental poetry, meditation, and storytelling piece about two old women who seek to carry a message of forgiveness and humanity despite the violent times. These projects share a similar goal of contributing to peacebuilding by attempting to launch a cultural discussion and change in favor of peace and truth. Though these groups do not engage in policy change or government reform that would create immediate, substantive change, their performances strive to create spaces where remembrance, healing, and the facing of difficult truths is possible (Milosevic, D., 2011, 30-31).

The other popular model of peacebuilding that Serbian civil society engages in is that of education. In fact, almost every peace-centered organization active in the country since the 1990s has organized some form of educational opportunity, ranging from lecture series' to university programs and publications. The most significant organizations involved primarily in this type of work are the Women in Black and the Women's Studies Center, whose primary focus is publication and educational outreach, particularly aimed at youth. Though many of these organizations have educational programs, lectures, workshops, and training sessions, the most notable is the Women's Studies Center. The Women's Studies Center began as a civil society organization with a specifically anti-nationalist, antiwar, feminist stance. Their goal was research, publishing, and education from the beginning, but eventually they realized their goal of becoming a recognized and accredited program at the University of Belgrade. They also have an independent program on transitional justice and human rights which offers leaders of other organizations in the field the opportunity to present their work. However, all but one organization important in the field of peace in Serbia has organized multiple educational, academic, or training programs.

The final type of civil society peacebuilding model is one of policy influence, organizations seeking to enact reforms, influence policy-makers, and otherwise engage in official political institutions. Among the groups engaged with the formal sector are the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and the Youth Initiative for Human Rights. These groups, though they engage in lobbying and other formal activities, also do cultural and educational programs. Though other groups in Serbia are involved in the formal sector, the most notable is the Humanitarian Law Center. Though they have published in the past, it is largely an extension of their other work. Members of the organization were directly involved in investigations into war

crimes allegations, collaborated extensively with the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, and were even awarded special consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. They also served as a documentation center for war victims, collecting testimonies and giving legal advice to those seeking reparations. They have largely remained in the formal sphere, collaborating with governments and international institutions.

This is not an exhaustive list of the work being done. Aside from the extensive work of the civil society actors in Serbia, the only real formal actor in the field of peacebuilding is the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia. It was established in 1993, and since its inception there have been 154 criminal proceedings with 83 sentenced, nineteen acquitted, thirteen transferred to national jurisdiction, and 37 with indictments withdrawn or the defendants deceased. The first criminal tribunal for war crimes since Nuremberg, it was also the first to indict someone for sexual crimes only. The ICTY also set a precedent for individualized blame and holding national leaders responsible when they were suspected of mass crimes, rather than laying collective blame. However, throughout the history of the ICTY, the Serbian government has been accused of refusing to cooperate with the proceedings. In the early years of the tribunal, Serbian leaders refused to admit crimes had been committed, refused to cooperate or allow investigations to take place, and refused to extradite radicals and other suspects. Though in recent years they have apologized for massacres that were committed, they still refuse to admit that genocide was committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, although extensive work has been done both by the ICTY and the civil society groups in Serbia, peacebuilding is incomplete. Without cooperation or any real policy change and reform, efforts by civil society groups can only go halfway. In Serbia, civil society is forced to do peacebuilding work on both formal and

community levels. As a result, though there are conversations about peace and healing, real substantive change is slow or impossible.

Peacebuilding in Rwanda

Like in the former Yugoslavia, in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda, an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created to bring perpetrators to justice. There were 93 indictments, 85 of which have faced criminal proceedings and eight transferred to either national or the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. 62 have been sentenced and 14 have been acquitted. Not only was it the first tribunal to deliver verdicts related to genocide, it was also the first to define rape as a means of genocide. Additionally, the ICTR is the first tribunal to find members of the media responsible for mass crimes in their infamous “Media Case” and the first to arrest, indict, and sentence a woman for crimes against humanity. Though three of those accused by the ICTR still remain at large, the tribunal finished the majority of its trials and those remaining are merely appeals. There have also been two cases against perpetrators of genocide in other countries’ national courts.

In addition to the international court system, the national court system of Rwanda has been instrumental in bringing all those guilty of participating in the genocide to justice. By 2006, the national courts had tried approximately 10,000 suspects of genocide, but some reports claim up to 100,000 were arrested shortly after the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power. The ICTR began transferring cases from their court to the national courts when, in 2007, the death penalty was abolished. However, this was after years of international help in rebuilding the judicial system of Rwanda and creating criminal legislation that categorized genocidal crimes. Under Rwandan law, there are four categories of crimes under which suspects can be tried. Category 1 includes those who planned or supervised killing and those who showed particularly

cruelty in killing. Category 2 includes those who killed or planned to kill under direction of others. Category 3 includes those who inflicted bodily injury, and Category 4 includes those who committed property crimes. The law was later amended to include rape as a Category 1 crime. Though thousands have been tried in the national courts of Rwanda, thousands more languished in prison, many without formal charges filed against them.

Finally, another key aspect of peacebuilding in Rwanda are the gacaca courts, created in response to the realization that there were simply too many cases for the national courts to try. These traditional community courts were not only created to deal with the backlog of cases, but also to attempt to foster peace and reconciliation on a grassroots level. These local courts allowed perpetrators to ask forgiveness of their communities and it allowed victims to learn the truth about crimes committed against their families. The gacaca courts consist of locally elected judges hearing cases for those accused of all crimes except planning genocide. Lower sentences were bestowed if the defendant was repentant and seeking reconciliation in the community, and many of those who confessed received no penalty or community service. By the time they closed in 2012, they had tried more than 1.2 million cases throughout the country (Justice Compromised, 2011). The court was followed by accusations of miscarriages of justice or judges not being properly trained, and some scholars and organizations have offered mixed evaluations of its success. Additionally, despite widespread RPF crimes in the years following the genocide, President and former RPF leader Paul Kagame declared a distinction between crimes of genocide and isolated incidents of revenge by the RPF. War crimes were taken out of the jurisdiction of the courts, and no RPF crimes were ever prosecuted under gacaca (ibid).

Much of the projects related to peace education and other cultural issues fall under the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a body mandated by the Arusha Accords signed

just before the genocide started. Set up in 1999 and initially created as a temporary body, the Commission was made permanent in 2002. The twelve council members of NURC are appointed by presidential order with advice from his Cabinet and the executive board consists of three cabinet members and a secretariat. NURC focuses peace education, which takes multiple forms. Under its peace education approach, the NURC work to fight genocide and division in the population, trains officials and other groups on leadership and trauma-related issues, and clarifies Rwandan history to develop a history curriculum. Finally, it also established forums for reconciliation in each of Rwanda's thirty districts to encourage communities to participate in reconciliation. These forums allowed for representatives from the community, religious leaders, NGOs to improve coordination and avoid duplicating reconciliation efforts. It is this body which is most well-known for programs similar to what are most common in Serbia. It investigates and releases publications on the root of conflict in Rwanda and how to mitigate them; organizes training seminars on trauma counselling, conflict resolution, and early warning signs; hosts a leadership academy to cultivate appropriate leaders in Rwandan youth; and hosts national summits related to issues such as good governance, human rights, national history, and security. Though it is NURC's responsibility to engage in peace education and involve youth in the reconciliation process, the government is directly and explicitly engaged in NURC's activities and it is a government commission (NURC Background).

Unlike Serbia, the Rwandan government cooperated completely with international efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, going so far as to accuse neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo of harboring fugitives. The Rwandan government, made up of the former leaders of the mostly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front, has taken a lead role in promoting reconciliation and community rebuilding in the wake of the genocide, along with

seeking justice for perpetrators. In addition to the formal institutions mentioned above, extensive legislation has been passed to avoid genocide denial, “genocide minimization”, and “genocide ideology”. These laws are intended to avoid a repeat of the genocide, particularly the dangerously violent rhetoric that was instrumental in inciting Rwandan citizens to participate. These laws are intended to prevent the divisions of society that made the genocide possible, and are mirrored by a number of laws against genocide denial in the European Union and in various European countries. Rwandan lawmakers have forbidden use of the words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” except in reference to the genocide, and insists all Rwandan citizens are only Rwandan. Criticism of the current Rwandan regime aside, they have taken a very active role in trying to prevent future violence and in bringing perpetrators to justice, a marked difference from Serbia.

Civil society’s involvement in post-genocide Rwanda is somewhat complicated. Prior to the genocide, civil society had no history of influencing policy in any way, unlike civil society in Serbia. The current regime in Rwanda continues to see civil society as service delivery, gap filling, and consultation, rather than a sector with the ability to challenge government policy. However, legislation was enacted in 2001 that granted the government the powers to “control the management, finances, and projects of national and international NGOs” (Gready, P., 2010). Among the important civil society groups in Rwanda is Penal Reform International, which has worked to train prison guards and clerks, improved prison prisoner file management, and research and monitor the gacaca courts. It is an international NGO, and used to adopt partnerships with local NGOs. However, this and other international justice organizations have recently begun avoiding partnerships with local Rwandan NGOs for fear they lack independence. Simultaneously, local NGOs have distanced themselves from international groups to more effectively collaborate with the government (ibid). Other international organizations involved in

Rwanda are the Human Rights Watch, which offers reports on the status of human rights and post-genocide reconstruction in Rwanda, and a number of African regional human rights organizations. These regional organizations included the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and the Interafrican Union of Human Rights, which worked to train human rights workers, litigate human rights cases, and in general promoted human rights and development in Africa.

There are a number of other organizations that provide reconciliation workshops, but many local civil society organizations working on reconciliation in Rwanda are church-related. They are either churches themselves or organizations connected to specific denominations. Many Christian organizations have become involved in peace education, trauma counselling, and other sources of promoting reconciliation. However, the peace education and cultural work is mostly done by NURC, as mentioned above. Other important organizations include survivor organizations, of which IBUKA is an umbrella organization of. IBUKA consists of fifteen member organizations, and leads joint or coordinated efforts to support survivors on a national level (IBUKA). These survivor's groups, along with church groups and the reconciliation forums were vital in community-based reconciliation. These regional, national, and international organizations, though they have trouble gaining independence from the government, their key strategy was to encourage local conversations that fostered reconciliation and healing, rather than encouraging separate organizations.

In contrast with Serbia, Rwanda's peacebuilding had a focus on legal justice and other formal channels of reconciliation. Due to the nature of Rwanda's democracy, all efforts at peacebuilding are in collaboration or cooperation with the government. Though nuanced conversations about the regime and ethnic divisions in Rwanda are impossible at times, Rwanda

is nevertheless far ahead of Serbia in some aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding. This is because of how actively the government pursues legislation and education against genocide, and how actively the prosecuted perpetrators, national and local spaces of healing have been created. However, Serbia's civil society and media is more independent, allowing for a more nuanced discussion of the crimes perpetrated there. Though Serbia's civil society has a harder time achieving the types of national reach Rwanda's efforts have, they nevertheless are more open and independent efforts.

The peacebuilding process in both countries has received criticism. Starting with the ICTY, which has been criticized for failing to generate normative change and reckoning with the past in its target countries, Serbia in particular. Political elites have been allowed to separate the extradition of suspects with any moral considerations, only extraditing suspects to gain favor with Europe (Ostojic, M., 2013, 230). Though a domestic truth-telling initiative was desperately needed in Serbia, the refusal of Serbian political elites to participate in initiatives proposed by civil society groups makes that difficult. Civil society was left to push for truth-telling and other peacebuilding, but this alienated some important intellectuals and more progressive politicians who refused the concept of collective Serbian guilt. Furthermore, without collaboration from the government, important regional peacebuilding initiatives cannot succeed, such as the movement for a regional truth commission. Though local civil society in Serbia collaborates with parallel organizations in other countries, the governments largely do not. This makes regional reconciliation impossible. In short, without cooperation and support from the government, true reconciliation is impossible in Serbia. Regardless of how open, active, and valuable the efforts of civil society are, they require national and regional support to be truly effective.

A key difference between Serbia and Rwanda is that, like most communist regimes in Eastern Europe, civil society was instrumental in bringing down the last authoritarian regime. The popularity and importance of these anti-war and anti-Milosevic groups ensured that civil society would not be repressed in the new regime. This is not to say the Serbian government has not attempted to engage in silencing, but to engage in outright repression would risk mobilizing those masses again. The government has made no attempts to wrest control of civil society like Rwanda has, but neither has it attempted to engage with any reconciliation process on anything but utilitarian grounds. This is partially because although civil society had been active in Rwanda prior to the genocide, it was apolitical, worked in a clientist or service delivery model, reinforced ethnic divisions, and depended on the state or international community for funding (Gready, P., 2011, 89). It operated in an authoritarian regime that did not encourage mass political involvement like Communist regimes did. As a result, political civil society in Rwanda did not have the strength or independence after the conflict that Serbian civil society had, and was easily controlled by the regime.

The major complaint about Rwandan peacebuilding is in the enforcement of the genocide ideology laws, which have been used to silence opposition. These laws lack precision, allowing for the RPF regime to use them against journalists, NGO leaders, and opposition politicians who voice criticism of the government. Opposition parties or candidates are rarely allowed to run for office, and no dissident opinions on government policies or documents are circulated or tolerated (Reyntjens, F., 2004, 185). Because of the lack of precision in the genocide ideology laws, which included legislation against “divisionism”, the RPF regime has been able to arrest those critical of government policies. There has also been criticism lodged at attempts to abolish ethnicity in Rwanda, claiming the efforts merely mask the complete domination of Rwanda by a small group

of Tutsi (ibid, 187-188). However, this means that constructive conversations about the roots of ethnic divisions in the country are impossible, and society is now divided into “perpetrators” and “victims”. In contrast to the Serbian government’s lack of involvement in reconciliation, the Rwandan government is too involved. The government holds strict control of any discussion of the genocide, ethnicity, human rights, or democratization. Civil society, often a source of pressure for governments to reform, is also strictly controlled. As a result, although there have been massive efforts to come to terms with the genocide, those efforts lack nuance, ignore crimes committed by the RPF, and have frozen ethnic divisions with little real discussion about ethnic realities.

The post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation processes in Serbia and Rwanda are imperfect and incomplete. Both have largely one-sided peacebuilding efforts, with Serbia dominated by civil society and informal processes and Rwanda dominated by the legal procedures and government programs. Both have succeeded in some respects, but both have only succeeded halfway. Rwanda has succeeded in bringing perpetrators to justice and starting a national conversation about the genocide and its causes, but fear of a repeat has severely limited open means of communicating grievances and pushing for democratization. Serbia has a very active network of organizations pushing for democratization, human rights, and airing grievances, but has done little in coming to terms with the moral consequences of the conflict. Though they have participated in legal efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, it was not because they believed that justice was deserved. Because in each country only one sector is largely involved, peacebuilding has only come halfway. Neither country’s model is sufficient for real, lasting reconciliation. Lasting reconciliation and a complete end to tension require both open

channels to air grievances and push for reform and an involvement in peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts by government.

CONCLUSIONS

Neither Serbia nor Rwanda have had a strong history of democracy, and neither country has a strong democracy now. The limits to their electoral democracies and restrictions on freedoms of press and expression are connected to histories of colonialism and authoritarianism that have been instrumental in the development of the governments, civic engagements, and peacebuilding processes in place today. Authoritarianism and colonialism significantly reduced the levels to which citizens could be involved in their own government, particularly when those governments were repressive. Moreover, histories of colonialism and authoritarianism in Serbia and Rwanda influenced the development of civil society in each country and the type of government that emerged after the conflict. These developments are explicitly connected to the type of peacebuilding models used in the wake of violent conflict.

Colonialism looked radically different in Rwanda and Serbia. European colonizers in Rwanda worked to manipulate societal forces to fit their own interests and narratives, whereas Ottoman Imperial authorities took relatively little interest in the details of how their conquered lands were run. In Serbia, the Ottoman Empire developed a citizenship structure based on religion. Religious institutions under Ottoman rule perpetuated the distinct national characters and cultural traditions of each nation. One of the distinct traditions of Serbia was resistance. Serbia resisted Ottoman rule frequently and violently, eventually succeeding in achieving relative independence in 1878. The Serbian nation has a history of resisting authoritarian and foreign regimes, and heroized those who led resistance revolts. This was one factor in

encouraging citizens' involvement in politics. Additionally, the result of the lack of involvement by the Ottoman Empire was a Serbia whose leftover colonial institutions were nearly nonexistent. The government that developed after independence was one that continued to not involve itself directly in the daily lives of its citizens. Instead, it was through cultural institutions, ranging from religious to political, that were influential in connecting citizens to the regime. As a result of the millet system, a history of organizations serving as middlemen between government and citizens developed in Serbia, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church and political activist networks like the Anti-Fascist Women's Front, Otpor!, and regional feminist networks.

The opposite was true in Rwanda. As was customary for European colonizers, the Germans and Belgians were involved in every aspect of their subjects' cultural institutions, seeking to manipulate everything they could, including ethnic identity. As a result, none of those cultural institutions remained untouched by colonial influence, which meant the Catholic Church, education system, and media were all susceptible to violent ethnic sentiments. By the time Rwanda achieved independence, every cultural institution was poisoned by the ethnic sentiments bred over decades of colonial-driven Tutsi preference, including remnants of pre-colonial native rule. Additionally, due to the thoroughness with which German and Belgian authorities controlled the lives of Rwandans, Rwanda had little history of any sort of rebellion. The lack of cultural institutions or citizen resistance to repression kept Rwanda dependent on European-styled government institutions more than Serbians were dependent on Ottoman structures.

Additionally, colonialism left both Serbia and Rwanda with a victim complex, regardless of who was in political power. Both Serbia and Rwanda perpetrated violence against those whom they considered to be "foreign"-- peoples who had long ceased to be cultural outsiders. In Serbia,

where national identity was eventually highly influenced by religion, the enemies were Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians who had benefited from colonial rule centuries before. In Rwanda, the enemy of the government was viewed as the Tutsi, a group that had received preferential treatment by colonial authorities because they were considered to be outsiders to Rwanda. These groups were perceived, regardless of political realities, to unfairly possess political primacy. Serbians, as a result of nearly five centuries of foreign rule, constantly feared for their national and cultural and sought to protect Serbian national interests. Meanwhile, Hutus, after decades of repressive rule under the Tutsis, violently repressed the minority Tutsi elite that possessed the political primacy they believed they deserved. The fact is that by the 1990s when these two conflicts occurred, neither Hutus nor Serbians were politically oppressed. Instead, both groups suffered from a victim's complex resulting from years of repression under colonial rule and a lack of self-determination. Serbs turned against Bosnians after this republic sought independence from Greater Yugoslavia. After the violence against Bosnia ended, Serbians refused to come to terms with the moral consequences of their crimes because their political supremacy left the government free from internal accountability to its own citizens. After a long period of repression by the Tutsis was overturned in 1959, Hutus similarly experienced a significant period where they dominated Rwandan society and politics (1959 to 1994), and turned against a feared competitor for power. Unlike Serbia, however, the Rwandan government paid penance for its actions and made efforts to reconcile the two ethnic groups.

The histories of authoritarianism, while quite different in these two colonial regimes, heavily influenced the type of peacebuilding that would occur after the conflicts. Communist authoritarianism is markedly different from the militarized authoritarian governments that characterize Rwanda to this day. Though Serbia's Communist regime tightly controlled access to

information, severely limiting freedom of the press, and prohibiting political opposition, these actions were intended to control the outcome of political life rather than prohibiting civic engagement altogether. Thus, rather than remaining in power solely through violence, Serbia's post-independence regime sought to manipulate the public into believing current political leadership was still legitimate and in the best interests of the Serbian people. Serbia's communist leadership came to power through legitimate popular support, and the regime encouraged citizens to get involved in public life more so than most communist regimes. As a result, civil society was already relatively strong when the Communist Party fell. Regime change in Rwanda was carried out by military coups and violence, and though many regime changes experienced temporary mass support, this usually faded quickly. Rwandan leaders depended on violence, fear, and obligatory labor to remain in power. Though Rwandan leaders have experienced electoral and popular support, they still benefitted from a lack of significant opposition in order to remain in power. Their continued power today depends on citizens' fear of resistance.

Each of these factors contributed to a specific atmosphere in Serbia and Rwanda that created unique models for peacebuilding. By the 1990s, Serbia had developed some history of citizen involvement in political affairs, at least to an extent. Serbia also developed a strong, politically motivated civil society. The removal of Milosevic from power in (date) would have been impossible without mass mobilization against him. As a result, the next regime could not repress civil society too harshly for fear of that same mobilization removing them from power as well. The particular nature of Milosevic's removal to pacify the international community, along with Serbia's desired alignment with Europe, allowed a greater political plurality in Serbia than is seen in Rwanda. Before the genocide, civil society in Rwanda did not have the same strength and independence as Serbia's civil society, nor was civic engagement particularly political in

nature. As a result, Rwandans were more susceptible to state control and lacked the ability to lobby for their own freedom or the freedoms of others.

Additionally, the distinct nature of Serbian and Rwandan peacebuilding models is important to mention. Peacebuilding in Serbia depends entirely on civil society to serve all functions, and lacks general support from the national government. Though the Serbian government has made surface gestures towards reconciliation, such as cooperating with ICTY investigations to gain European support, they have made almost no effort towards encouraging Serbian citizens to face the truth about their history. Rwanda is the opposite. Governmental institutions and efforts make up almost the entirety of peacebuilding in Rwanda. Rwanda has been remarkably successful at bringing perpetrators to justice and starting national conversations that help the country come to terms with what happened. However, Rwanda's RPF-run government refuses to admit to crimes it committed directly after the genocide, and there remains no open channel to air grievances or have open dialogues about it with the regime. With the state strictly controlling conversations about the genocide and ethnicity, the country as a whole cannot fully reconcile the two ethnic groups. As a result, neither country has successfully achieved reconciliation. Serbia has an active and open civic channel of communication about the governing regime that frequently voices criticism and encourages difficult truths, but has little governmental support with which to implement real change and progress towards lasting reconciliation. Rwanda has made significant efforts towards reconciliation and justice, but lacks an open channel of communication which would ensure that grievances and ethnic differences are addressed before they escalated to violence. Neither form of peacebuilding –freedom of expression with little government accountability in Serbia, nor government engagement with little freedom of expression in Rwanda--can be fully successful without the other.

These peacebuilding models are the result of compounded factors. Unique experiences of colonialism and authoritarianism in Rwanda and Serbia led to radically different levels of engagement with political regimes in each country. Whereas Serbians, under both colonial rule and authoritarian communism, were actively engaged in politics and resistance, Rwandans had a history of government engagement but with little political power given to its citizens. These trends continued in the nineteenth century and heavily influenced the peacebuilding models developing in each country. Civil society in Serbia focused on political issues, such as human rights and governmental reform, prior to the conflict in the 1990s. This is not the case in Rwanda. The Rwandan history of governmental involvement in and manipulation of cultural identity contrasts with regimes in Serbia that historically allowed independent cultural institutions to do that work. Each case represents a perfect storm of contributing factors. Serbia had a history of civil engagement in which the government allowed cultural identity to develop on its own. The Serbian population was encouraged to engage with the political system in order to resist outside oppression. Rwandans were governed by fear and violence for so long that citizen involvement was not expected. Rwandan regimes took particular interest in dominating the nation's cultural institutions and identity formation, leading to a weak civil society.

It is these historical factors that lead to the specific types of peacebuilding models present in each case. The goal of this research project is not simply to better understand the historical context of peacebuilding and civil society in Serbia and Rwanda. It also allows for more informed discussions on how to encourage forms of reconciliation not yet considered. Peacebuilding models and strategies do not exist in a vacuum, but are reliant on factors that contributed to the conflicts they attempt to resolve. Not only is understanding the historical context of conflict important, but so is understanding the cultural and political history of the

country in order to create useful forms of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and transitional justice in each case. Once a better understanding develops of the types of peacebuilding strategies likely to be adopted in post-conflict states, then more challenging forms of peacebuilding and reconciliation can be encouraged in the future.

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