

Revisiting the Machiavellian Dove:
The Life, Work and Ideas of Dr. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi

Master's Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Brandeis University
Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies
Dr. Yehudah Mirsky, Advisor

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts
in
Near Eastern and Judaic Studies

by
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May 2016

ABSTRACT

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What is the best, most sensible and fair way to move forward in the Israeli-Palestinian and, in general, Arab-Israeli conflict? How did the current circumstances of these conflicts come to be? To what extent are either or both of the parties to the conflicts responsible for the trajectory of the conflicts? The numerous written and recorded works of the late Dr. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi (1926-1994) provide important insight for addressing and answering these questions. A proud Zionist, as well as a prolific military and political theorist, Dr. Harkabi, over the course of his career, observed and critiqued social and political trends in both the Arab states and in his native Israel in the hope of ultimately bringing about peace between these belligerents. An examination of Dr. Harkabi's works illustrates the evolution of his ideas and political positions over the course of his life, as well as the nuances in these positions. This examination, in turn, sheds light on the hazards posed to Israel and its environs by maximalist ideologies, both Arab and Jewish alike.

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Introduction

Dr. Gen. Yehoshafat “Fati” Yarkabi (1921-1994) devoted his life to the defense of the State of Israel. He first gained experience in warfare fighting for the British armed forces during WWII.¹ This familiarity with combat would serve him well upon his return home to Palestine, on the eve of the expiration of the Mandate. During the subsequent 1948 War of Independence/*al-Naqba*, the young Harkabi served as a company commander in Jerusalem. For the following eleven years, Harkabi rose through the ranks of the Israeli Defense Forces. By the time of his 1959 retirement from the military, Harkabi had reached the rank of major general and the post of Chief of Military Intelligence. He was not, however, finished as a public servant. After a two-year break, during which time he earned a Master’s degree in Public Administration from Harvard University, Harkabi returned to Israel and joined the senior staff of the Ben-Gurion administration. A year after taking on this position, deputy director Harkabi also accepted the post of Head of Strategic Research for the Ministry of Defense. This position, which he held for five years, would be his last posting during the Ben-Gurion period.²

In 1968, one year after the submission of his doctoral dissertation, *Arab Attitudes toward Israel*, and of course the geopolitical shock of the Six-Day War, Harkabi joined the department of International Relations at the Hebrew University. Just as in the IDF, Harkabi’s star rose quickly and, within a decade, he earned the position of full Professor and head of the department. Also like before, Dr. Gen. Harkabi proved incapable of completely shunning public

¹ Avi Shlaim, “Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi,” *The Independent*, September 13, 1994,

² Ibid

service. He returned to the Ministry of Defense in 1975, this time to serve as Assistant for Strategic Policy to then Defense Minister Shimon Peres. Harkabi was, thus, an established and experienced member of the Defense and Intelligence communities by the time of the Likud's rise to prominence. In the aftermath of this moment of major Israeli domestic political upheaval, Harkabi agreed to serve as Prime Minister Begin's Intelligence Advisor.³ As Dr. Harkabi's books later attest, this collaboration was inescapably hindered by a fundamental disagreement between the two former warriors over the future of the Palestinian Territories. Whereas Begin, a mostly secular Jew intoxicated by the concept of a "Greater Israel," sought to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the State of Israel, Harkabi, concerned by demographics and international political trends, vehemently opposed such a move. Ultimately, the Prime Minister and the General proved professionally and ideologically incompatible as Harkabi, unable to persuade Begin to curb the Likud's territorially maximalist policies, eventually returned to full-time academic work.⁴

Harkabi returned to the Hebrew University until his 1989 retirement, and continued to lecture on strategy at the National Defense College nearly until his death in 1994. This lifetime of scholarship and service earned him the 1993 Israel Prize in Political Science, the highest honor a scholar can achieve in Israel.⁵ Over the course of his intellectual career, Dr. Harkabi published dozens of books, as well as numerous articles and other shorter written works, on warfare, International Relations, political science and, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

³ Avi Shlaim, "Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi," *The Independent*, September 13, 1994, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-yehoshafat-harkabi-1448686.html>

⁴ Joel Greenberg, "Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israeli Spy and Advisor, is dead at 72," *International New York Times*, August 27, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/27/obituaries/yehoshafat-harkabi-israeli-spy-and-adviser-is-dead-at-72.html>

⁵ Shlaim

He is considered one of the first scholars to turn the conflict into a respected field of academic inquiry, and was the first to translate the Palestinian National Covenant, the statement of the principles of the Palestine Liberation Organization, from the original Arabic into Hebrew.

Remarking on Harkabi's death, Chaim Herzog—former President of Israel and Harkabi's successor as Director of Military Intelligence—stated that the Jewish state had suffered a “great loss.” Meanwhile, Dr. Avi Shlaim, a widely respected scholar of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and friend of Harkabi's, wrote:

The loss of a friend and colleague is always sad, but the loss of a scholar of Harkabi's stature has a further dimension. Scholars take many years to accumulate knowledge, to mature and distill wisdom from their learning. Harkabi was an unusual scholar because he moved so freely and continuously between the world of action and the world of ideas, and because he had the courage to speak truth to power. His death thus represents a national loss to the country he served with such dedication and unswerving loyalty both as a soldier and as a scholar.⁶

Professor Harkabi thus earned the respect of his peers, even those with whom he disagreed on Israel's history and culpability for the early years of the conflict. Moreover, in his words and deeds, he provides an excellent case for the study of intellectuals in democratic societies, in general, but also for that of intellectuals in the State of Israel, in particular.

According to both Professors Shlomo Sand and Michael Keren, that Harkabi came into adulthood during Israel's first decade as a sovereign state had important ramifications for his intellectual development. According to Keren, the Israeli intellectual community in the 1950s was purposefully tame in its criticism of the country's political landscape. Eager to take Ben-Gurion's side in the annals of Jewish history, Israeli academics and social commentators generally opted to be, “...active participants in the nation-building process,” rather than risk

⁶ Avi Shlaim, “Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi,” *The Independent*, September 13, 1994, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-yehoshafat-harkabi-1448686.html>

being footnotes—or worse, obstacles—to their country’s progress.⁷ Sand further laments the lenience the academic community showed to the leaders of the military during this period—specifically, the manner in which Israeli scholars, “...submissively accepted...the veneration of members of the army.”⁸ This grand collaboration between the leaders of the political, military, intellectual and cultural communities eroded in the early 1960s, as major shifts in Israel’s circumstances took place. Military threats to national security seemed far less imminent, the economy was relatively strong, the shock of the mass-immigration of Jews from the Arab states had largely worn-off, and old socialist ideals gave way to a greater emphasis on the individual.⁹ In this transformed environment, the incumbent national leadership, including Ben-Gurion, became the focus of increased public scrutiny. Disenchanted with the elderly statesman, especially in light of the Lavon affair, a contingent of faculty from the Hebrew University, “...signed a petition accusing Ben-Gurion of anti-democratic arbitrariness and of exploiting the state apparatus for personal power,” in 1961.¹⁰

This dramatic fall from grace led to the appointment of Levi Eshkol as Israel’s second Prime Minister. Whereas Ben-Gurion ascribed to the Zionist endeavor a sort of cosmic, supernatural character in line with the themes of the Torah, Levi Eshkol, Keren asserts, “preferred reality over myth.”¹¹ More pointedly, the bespectacled government leader

⁷ Michael Keren, “Intellectuals and the Open Society in Israel,” in *Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies*, ed. Alain G. Gagnon (New York: Praeger, 1987), 145

⁸ Shlomo Sand, “Between the Word and the Land: Intellectuals and the State in Israel,” in *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, eds. Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch (London: Routledge, 1997), 111

⁹ Keren, 147

¹⁰ Sand, 112

¹¹ Michael Keren, “Intellectuals and the Open Society in Israel,” in *Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies*, ed. Alain G. Gagnon (New York: Praeger, 1987), 147

preferred the pluralistic, intellectually vigorous society to the single-minded, socialist approach of his predecessor. Many political groups once kept marginalized under Ben-Gurion—organizations the Yishuv leader no doubt believed detrimental to national unity--were now allowed greater freedom of participation in the national dialogue.¹² In addition, Eshkol rescinded the state of military law to which the Arab citizens of Israel had been subjected since the country's creation, and also relaxed the government's grasp on the state's early mass media sector.¹³ According to Keren, it was because of these reforms by Eshkol that the state enjoyed, "an era of prosperity in scholarly, literary and artistic activities."¹⁴ This period, for better or worse, ceased abruptly on June 5, 1967, with the outbreak of the Six-Day War. It was in the immediate aftermath of this seismic development in Israel's history that Harkabi began his professional academic career.

From his increasingly prestigious office in the International Relations department at the Hebrew University, Dr. Harkabi's focus shifted with the flow of events on both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide. A favorite motto of his, by the end of his life, was, "choosing between bad and worse." His early works, wherein he invests a great deal of attention on the origins of the conflict and the stances of the parties up until the late 1970s, seek to raise the awareness of Israelis and, ultimately, anyone who would care to listen, of the dangers emanating from the Arab side. For Dr. Harkabi, this Arab vitriol constituted the "bad": it may have sought to destroy the state, but it proved incapable of doing so, on its own, either militarily or diplomatically. On the other hand, from the rise of Likud in the late 1970s until his final statements on the conflict

¹² Ibid, 148

¹³ Ibid, 147

¹⁴ Ibid, 148

shortly before his death, the former general turned his attention to the political and cultural circumstances of his own country. Far from the pragmatic pluralism of Eshkol, Begin and his ilk sought to realize the catastrophic dream of “Greater Israel.” To achieve this unrealistic end, the Likud leadership inspired in their constituents unrealistic levels of optimism in the ability of the Jewish people and their military to realize their God-given destiny and defeat any foe—the Arab world and the international community need not be of concern. This shift in power and in Israeli national attitude toward the peace process constituted the “worse”: the Jewish State, once rational and measured in its response to Arab hostility, was becoming overly hostile in its own right, and was bound to alienate its allies around the world, in the process.

The ensuing sections of this work focus on Dr. Gen. Harkabi’s observations on the Arab-Israeli conflict over the course of his career as a professional and public intellectual, as expressed in several of his books and interviews on the topic. In particular, this study illustrates how, in some respects, Dr. Harkabi remained remarkably consistent in his views, including those on the Arab world’s objectives, while in other respects transforming significantly. Understanding that Dr. Harkabi lived through numerous formative periods in the history of the State of Israel, this study also accommodates for the impact of important developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict on Harkabi’s intellectual journey. In addition, further developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the passing of the “Machiavellian dove” do challenge some of his conclusions on the issue. This challenge, however, is partly answered by contemporary experts on the conflict who have come to the same conclusions as Dr. Harkabi, whether in spite-, or because of, the hardships Israel has faced in the last two decades. That this message, conveyed by Gen. Harkabi and other members of the Intelligence and military communities, seemingly

does much to undermine one of the major arguments in favor of continued Israeli policy vis-à-vis the West Bank and the Palestinians therein, also makes the late professor worthy of greater attention.

This study relies primarily on the English translations of several of Dr. Harkabi's books on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as on interviews either conducted in English or subsequently translated to English from another language. While there is, admittedly, the potential risk of occasional inaccuracies or inconsistencies on the part of the translators of these assorted media sources, the existing scholarly consensus on Harkabi's overall body of work vouches effectively vouches for the accuracy of these English-language publications. Beyond these sources directly tied to Dr. Harkabi, numerous secondary sources are also consulted. These sources chiefly shed light on the various contexts—political, historical, etc.—in which Dr. Harkabi formulated and, gradually, modified his positions. This study also utilizes the firsthand accounts provided by other observers of the Arab-Israeli conflict—that of Thomas Friedman, in From Beirut to Jerusalem, as well as those of several former heads of Israel's Intelligence services, as depicted in the documentary film, "The Gatekeepers." Mr. Friedman's book both attests to the persuasiveness of Dr. Harkabi's argument, at least in certain academic and intellectual circles, during the latter's lifetime, and also provides an important lens for evaluating Harkabi's message. The documentary, meanwhile, attests to the longevity of Dr. Harkabi's conclusions, and also demonstrates that Gen. Harkabi is not, by any means, alone among the ranks of Israeli Intelligence experts in calling for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank.

So far as this researcher can surmise, this study is among the first to undertake an extensive examination of Dr. Harkabi's overall body of work, at least in several years.

Reviewers of Harkabi's publications largely concentrated their analyses on individual works, rather than on his larger corpus of scholarship. Meanwhile, obituaries for Dr. Harkabi largely merely summarized his observations, ideas and political transformation, at the expense of finer details. With the exception of Mark Berman's article, written while Dr. Harkabi was still alive, this researcher was unable to find any in-depth studies of the life's work of the late general, especially since his passing. As such, this study functions just as much to reinsert Dr. Harkabi's name into the larger academic and public discussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the twenty-first century, as it does contribute an additional dimension to the discussion of the impacts and legacies of intellectuals in liberal democracies. As Israel's policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the future of the West Bank continue to cause controversy in the international community and place Israel's allies in increasingly difficult political positions, it is important to heed Dr. Harkabi's warnings about the Jewish State's need to be respected by the rest of the world's states, rather than condemned by them. As Harkabi frequently reminds his readers, Israel came into being because of the assistance of other states, and her future, like that of any other country, is dependent on her relations with the rest of the world.

Chapter One: Arab Attitudes Toward Israel

In his introductory section to *Arab Attitudes*, Dr. Harkabi first explains what is entailed by the very notion of the “Arab attitude.” That the Arab world wishes to see Israel disappear is certainly true. It is the extent to which members of the myriad Arab societies pursue this goal that varies the greatest. For the majority of the Arab world, according to Harkabi, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in fact, a minor part of life: it is known of, but not extensively dwelt on, and, “has no concrete reality,”¹⁵ for those Arabs not in the immediate vicinity of the Levant. As such, Harkabi concedes, it is not fully accurate to ascribe to all the Arab leaders, much less the Arab street, the passionate hostility he goes on to discuss throughout the rest of the book. Indeed, as Harkabi further concedes, there could, in fact, be a moderate camp within the circles of Arab leadership that seeks peace with Israel. If such a camp exists, though, Harkabi retorts, its members have failed to significantly contribute to the national dialogues or even, for that matter, the scholarship on the conflict in their respective states.¹⁶ Harkabi attributes the overwhelmingly hostile tone of the Arab mass media on the conflict to this dearth of input by whatever moderates there may exist among the Arab leaders. These two important qualifications made, Harkabi also admits that there is actually, “meager” commonality among the Arab societies, even vis-à-vis the conflict with Israel. However, what the Arab media convey in common—the message the “molders of public opinion”—is the aim of removing

¹⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), xvii

¹⁶ *Ibid*, xvii

Israel from the map. Such a desire, Harkabi notes, is rooted in the, “complex of ideas and emotions,” that comprises the Arab attitude.¹⁷

Having provided an initial description of the meaning of “Arab attitude,” Harkabi next elaborates on the nature of his other contribution to the intellectual lexicon on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “politicide.” This term, which Harkabi defines as, “the murder of the political entity,” is meant to emphasize the scope of the endeavor the Arab leaders wish to undertake.¹⁸ The majority of the Arabs in Israel’s immediate surroundings, according to Harkabi, seek not only to destroy Israel, but also do away with the vast majority of her Jewish population, by whatever means necessary. After all, there cannot be a Jewish State if there is not a significant enough Jewish population to require such an entity. For this reason, Arab leaders’ assurances that the discontinuation of Israel need not result in massive loss of life—indeed, a potential genocide—are, according to Dr. Harkabi, utter nonsense.¹⁹ At best, these statements reflect the best case scenario conceived by Arab military leaders: a short, decisive and ultimately glorious campaign against the Zionist hardcore, proceeded by the mass emigration of the remaining Jews—no longer held against their will by the Zionists—from the newly liberated Palestine.²⁰ Harkabi is not, however, primarily concerned by the passion the Arabs feel for the conflict. Rather, his main concern is the success the Arab world has enjoyed in concealing their destructive intents from the international community.²¹ This ruse is the result of classic political ambiguity and double-speak on the part of Arab political and media elite.

¹⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), xviii

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 37

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 40

²⁰ *Ibid*, 30

²¹ *Ibid*, 15

To the uninitiated—largely those outside the Middle East, though also, in Harkabi’s eyes, an alarming number of Israelis, as well—the Arab leaders seem fully in the right in calling for Israel to immediately abide by international law, as articulated in United Nations Resolution 242, as well as other Resolutions critical of Israel. In turn, those who are persuaded by this message come to frame the conflict as one between the Arabs, who abide by international law, and Israel, whom the former request follow suit.²² That the international community frequently accepts this portrayal of the conflict is, Harkabi grants, based on the former’s assumption that the Arabs’ calls for Israel to abide by Resolution 242 also signifies the Arab states’ preparedness to recognize Israel, per the very same Resolution. Though understandable, the international community’s assumption on the Arab leaders is deeply mistaken, according to Gen. Harkabi. In the event that Israel were to unilaterally retreat to the pre-1967 borders, this would only provide the Arab armies better positions from which to launch their attacks against Israel. Even in the highly unlikely event that the Arab states were to agree to a peace treaty, realistically there is not a great deal preventing the Arabs from later canceling the accord and resuming open hostilities. This very point was stated to the Arab masses in the aftermath of the 1967 War: diplomacy was merely an intermediary step toward rectifying the *Naqba*.²³ In either case, Israel’s act of compliance with international law serves only to endanger her very existence, either immediately or ultimately.

Within the Arab world, the ultimate goal of cleansing the land of all traces of Israel has remained largely unchanged since 1948. Indeed, this goal is rooted in the Mandate-era objectives of the Arab communal leaders. Under British rule, Arab political elites sought to first

²² Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 21

²³ *Ibid*, 21

keep the Jewish population in Palestine low, so as to bolster the claim that the only group in Palestine that ought to achieve self-determination were the Arabs.²⁴ Once Partition became reality, the goal was simply modified from preventing a Jewish state on population grounds, to unmaking Israel and, moreover, ensuring she could not be resurrected, by significantly lowering the number of Jews between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.²⁵ For Harkabi, writing in the late 1960s, this sentiment remained strong in the Arabic-language popular media: it was simply a question of whether this sentiment was expressed openly or more subtly. Within the various refugee camps, Harkabi notes, media contributors do their part to keep the humiliation of the *Naqba* fresh in the Palestinians' minds, and assure them that they will see justice done.²⁶ In the various Arab states, however, state-run media conveys a slightly different, more nuanced message. Concerned primarily about national stability and conscious of Israel's current superior military strength, these media outlets publicize the governments' purposefully obscure pledges to eventually achieve some sort of nondescript victory over Israel. By doing so, the government leaders greatly lower the amount of pressure the public exerts on them to pursue confrontation with Israel. This is not to say, though, that the goal of liquidating Israel is totally removed from the dialogue. Rather, the members of the public understand that their leaders seek this goal, and see reaffirmations of this objective in the more subliminal messages these leaders convey.²⁷

That the Arab leaders are able to so effortlessly transmit these messages signaling their ongoing commitment to the conflict illustrates, for Harkabi, the extent to which the Arab

²⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 48

²⁵ *Ibid*, 48

²⁶ *Ibid*, 16

²⁷ *Ibid*, 44

entities have cultivated the sentiments and intellectual energies of their peoples. It is these same rulers, after all, according to Harkabi, who are chiefly responsible for developing the Arab attitude into what it is.²⁸ Harkabi describes a fundamental difference in stewardship of the national ideology between the societies of the Arab and Western worlds. As the professor states, “in the West, ideologies have been developed by intellectuals, who have given them a historio-political character,” whereas in the Third World, including the Middle East, “...it is the ruling circles that give the tone in the development of ideologies...”²⁹ That the leaders of developing countries expend valuable resources on reproducing the desired ideology is illustrative of the importance of the ideology in the national agenda. The ideology, for Harkabi, is the, “intellectual aspect of the attitude”—the justification for one’s cause, particularly where recruitment and retention of followers is concerned.³⁰ Returning his attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Harkabi observes that, much in line with his statements about the Third World, overall, “...on the Arab side there are a wide variety of ideological activities in connection with the [conflict],” while, on the other hand, “there have been little ideological treatment of [the conflict] on the Israeli side.”³¹

Having familiarized his readers with the concepts of “politicide,” the Arab attitude and its core, the ideology, and how all this is conveyed by Arab leaders to parties both within and outside the Middle East, Harkabi switches gears and contextualizes this reality within the broader historical narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In doing so, he provides a kind of contrarian view to the post-colonial sentiments of the Arab world. According to the Hebrew U.

²⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 51

²⁹ *Ibid*, 51

³⁰ *Ibid*, 50

³¹ *Ibid*, 50

professor, a great deal of the Arab attitude, as documented in the late 1960s, was rooted in the feelings of humiliation, disillusionment and inadequacy the Arabs experienced following the departure of the Western powers from the Levant. The Arabs had expected that their countries would flourish after independence; that this failed to take place, understandably, deeply angered them. To Israel's detriment, rather than blame themselves—as Harkabi asserts the Arabs should have done—these disillusioned masses laid the blame for their stagnation on the Jewish state. It was not the Arabs' fault, according to their mindset, that their reality failed to equal their expectations: rather, the State of Israel, acting on behalf of the European, Imperialist powers, was actively holding her Arab neighbors back from realizing their full potential.³²

At its core, therefore, Harkabi identifies the conflict as stemming from one of competing, largely secular, nationalisms that became reinterpreted as a clash of religions. The Arabs of the Palestine Mandate viewed themselves collectively as the sole legitimate sovereign of Palestine. That they were denied this sovereignty, understandably, greatly upset them. As Harkabi concedes, “the Arabs’ ...anger at losing [their country] and their refusal to acquiesce to its loss, should not be ascribed to unique Arab traits,” as no one could be expected to simply tolerate such a devastating loss.³³ Where the former general cannot show understanding toward the Palestinians is in the anti-Semitism that now prevails in many of their societal spheres. The manifestation of modern anti-Semitism in Palestinian circles, along with numerous other cultures, as well, is directly linked to the events of 1947-48. Moreover, once the concept of the malevolent Jew was reintroduced into the Arab public dialogue, it was all but

³² Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 122

³³ *Ibid*, 128

inevitable that this concept be connected to certain interpretations of the Qur'an. Once this link was established, the resulting emotions and ideologies that spawned from it served only to add innumerable further complications to the conflict. An integral part of everyday life for peoples in the Middle East and, indeed, around the world, Islam became a valuable tool for recruiting new combatants to the conflict. It represents part of indigenous Arab culture, as opposed to the foreign ways imposed on them by the Western powers,³⁴ and provides a powerful set of incentives for participating in resistance activities. For this reason, Islamic themes can even be found in many of the recruitment materials produced by more secular resistance groups.³⁵

This volatile combination of nationalism, post-colonialism/pseudo-Marxism and religion can be easily observed in the Arab attitude toward Zionism, according to Harkabi. In the eyes of Arab nationalists, Zionism, from the beginning, has sought nothing less than, "...to steal a territory that belonged to another nation."³⁶ As such, the struggle against Zionism is a zero-sum game. The goal of Zionism is, "not possible without the displacement of the Arabs and injury to Arab nationalism."³⁷ This group makes its views inescapably clear in the Palestine National Covenant.³⁸ For the post-colonialist school, Zionism is synonymous with the supremacist, dehumanizing practices of the Jewish settlers. In the eyes of this group's constituents, the Zionist pioneers, "...took no account of the Arab character of [Palestine]," as

³⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 138

³⁵ *Ibid*, 133

³⁶ *Ibid*, 171

³⁷ *Ibid*, 172

³⁸ *Ibid*, 180

the latter went about “Judaizing” the area.³⁹ Moreover, this camp holds, the Jewish conquerors viewed their new Arab neighbors as sub-humans; much in the same way the Nazis viewed their Jewish victims.⁴⁰ In addition, Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis her own Arab populace, to say nothing of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, is characteristic of a state built on the pillars of, “...colonialism, racism and discrimination...”⁴¹ Meanwhile, the theological roots of Zionism—the concept of the Jews as God’s “chosen people”—are seen as both selfish and disingenuous.⁴² After all, how dedicated to protecting these “chosen people” can the Zionists truly be, when Zionism, as Arab commentators observe, “...thrives on the persecution of the Jews”?⁴³

Such persecution and hostility toward the Jewish people, Harkabi contends, is prevalent throughout the Arab world, both past and present. Beginning with the Arab assertion that Jews, Christians and Muslims lived in coexistence under Islamic rule, and that the Muslim world took in the Jews when the latter were expelled from Europe, Harkabi retorts that this coexistence was, in fact, “...a tolerance of inferiors,” on the part of the Muslims toward their Christian and Jewish neighbors. That is, non-Muslim monotheists were permitted to live in the Muslims’ realms, so long as the former accepted their subordinate place in society—their status as second-class citizens.⁴⁴ Part, though certainly not all, of Arab anti-Semitism is rooted in popular interpretations of the Qur’an. As Harkabi states, “the Islamic factor is neither a primary nor a principle one in the Arab attitude, but it is one of those that affect its character.”⁴⁵

³⁹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 172

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 176

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 174

⁴² *Ibid*, 173

⁴³ *Ibid*, 177

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 219

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 223

Because anti-Semitism is less prevalent in the Muslim world outside the Middle East, though, Dr. Harkabi asserts that it is more the Arab aspect of Israel's adversaries, rather than their common religion, that defines their hatred of Jews.

This is to say that the early years of modern anti-Semitism in Arabic-language mass media was largely, and not coincidentally, contemporaneous with the growth of the Jewish community in Palestine. Harkabi notes how in the first half of the twentieth century, as the number of Jews in Palestine skyrocketed and partition became increasingly certain, "...books displaying anti-Semitic tendencies," likewise became increasingly ubiquitous.⁴⁶ Through government control of the printed media outlets—newspapers, book publishers, etc.—per the state's need to shape the public ideology and attitude, Harkabi holds that Arab anti-Semitism, "...can be controlled, directed and halted if the authorities so desire."⁴⁷ Considering the enormous prevalence of anti-Semitism throughout Arab popular culture, as well as the wide variety of anti-Semites Harkabi lists in 1960s Arab society—the religious anti-Semites, the Arab Leftist anti-Semites and the socially conservative ones, as well—it is clear that Harkabi is unsure of how much influence the Arab governments actually boast over their peoples' perceptions of the Jews. In addition, he expresses concern over the, "...increased emphasis on the Islamic aspects of the hostility against Israel and the Jews," that has characterized the Arab media since the Six-Day War.⁴⁸ This change of tone indicates, to Harkabi, that the Arab states have only become less likely to agree to any sort of peace with Israel.⁴⁹ After all, when a conflict is framed

⁴⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 223

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 224

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 269

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 284

in terms that imbue it with religious significance, and in turn one's adversary is branded an enemy of God, one is less likely to be amenable to make peace with this adversary.

This complicated, multi-faceted and constantly evolving conglomerate of emotions, religion, culture, politics and national- and individual memory, as described by Dr. Harkabi, constitutes the core of the Arab attitude toward Israel. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Arab people look upon the Jewish state with such pure hatred. It should also, in the former general's opinion, be a kind of rude awakening to his fellow Israelis. His compatriots, he believes, seriously underestimate the threat posed by the Arab entities—not just to the Jewish State, but also to entire Jewish population therein. According to the message propagated to the Arab masses, Israel is a, “satanic, vile entity, quite unlike any other state.”⁵⁰ This “vile entity,” moreover, is largely inhabited by a devious, ruthless people, who will continue to pose a threat to the Arab people until the former are expelled from the region. The Zionists' main weakness, according to the Arab media and leadership, is their “vileness.” This is to say that the Arabs perceive, according to Harkabi, that, “Israel can actually be liquidated, on the grounds that her organic vileness creates organic weakness.”⁵¹

The rectification of the *Naqba* plays on yet additional emotions among the Arab masses. Although it was the Arabs who began the War, the Arab leadership, with the blessing of its people, has since reimagined this narrative to portray Israel as the initiator of the conflict.⁵² Doing so, Dr. Harkabi explains, significantly improves the overall standing of the Arab claims, both domestically and internationally. To those outside the region, the notion that the Jewish

⁵⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 305

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 305

⁵² *Ibid*, 367

forces struck first makes the Palestinians' lot significantly more tragic and the overall Arab objective more understandable. Moreover, to accept the Israeli narrative of the War is also to accept the, "...counter-argument that if the Arabs appealed to the course of war they must accept its results."⁵³ Among the Arabs, meanwhile, it is far less painful to lose a battle one did not initiate, than a battle one did. This last consideration is of particular importance to the Arab leaders. Reiterating the externalization of guilt demonstrated by the Arabs, Harkabi adds that blaming Israel for their current predicament helps maintain what remains of their self-esteem. They consistently refuse to view the conflict through Israeli eyes, and come to terms with the role they played in rallying the Jews behind the Zionist leadership.⁵⁴

Harkabi concludes his debut book by reiterating that when the elites of Arab society call for the liquidation of the State of Israel, the masses to which they express this goal take them at their word. Moreover, by making such statements, the leaders' political stock improves, thus incentivizing the use of more incendiary language.⁵⁵ Though, even in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, passion for the conflict is strongest mostly in the vicinity immediately surrounding Israel, the number of people directly affected by the conflict greatly increased as a result of this crucial war.⁵⁶ In turn, the reputation of Israel, and by extension the Jewish people, further deteriorates worldwide.⁵⁷ This increase in anti-Semitic sentiment leads to a renewed passion among the Arabs for the conflict. While the Jews do not represent an existential threat to the Arabs, they nonetheless actively prevent the Arabs from realizing their full potential for

⁵³ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 367

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 365

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 390

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 400

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 407

prosperity and advancement.⁵⁸ As such, the hope fostered by many Israelis that Arab moderates will step forward and make genuine efforts toward peace agreements with Israel is, for Harkabi, quite, but not completely, unreasonable. There may not be moderates, as Israelis would wish for, on the Arab side just yet, but in time circumstances may change and new opportunities for diplomacy may arise. Until that time, though, Israel will continue to face the threat of annihilation by her Arab neighbors, with no desire for compromise on the part of the latter.⁵⁹

Predictably, Dr. Harkabi's debut work garnered much attention immediately following its publication. Of the more critical reviews of this book, that written by John D. Anthony provides some of the most substantive critiques of *Arab Attitudes*. As Anthony writes, Harkabi, "...encountered widespread criticism from Israeli readers, many of whom challenged some of [his] more controversial...judgments about Arab attitudes toward Israel."⁶⁰ In addition, Anthony criticizes Harkabi for, "...clinging...to some of the very same types of biases and distortions in...image-making and character-association of which he accuses many Arab writers."⁶¹ Anthony also criticizes the apparent lack of investigation by Harkabi into the "profound attitudinal and conceptual changes" that, Anthony contends, took place in the inner circles of Palestinian resistance groups in the period between the end of the Six-Day War, when Harkabi presented the dissertation on which *Arab Attitudes* is based, and the publication of the

⁵⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 423

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 464

⁶⁰ John D. Anthony, "Review: Israeli Attitude Toward the Arabs," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 1, No. 4 (1972), 126

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 127

book form.⁶² Most importantly, Anthony observes that of the numerous Arabic-language sources Dr. Harkabi consulted in writing his dissertation-turned-book, “the vast majority is of pre-1965 vintage,” and, more alarmingly, there appear to be no sources, “bearing a date of publication later than the 1967 War.”⁶³ Anthony concludes by seemingly dismissing Harkabi as a disgrace, stating that, “...to claim in a volume presented for publication in 1972 that...there has been no basic change in the Arab attitude toward Israel [since 1948] would be deemed, by most scholars, as inadmissible.”⁶⁴

Though Anthony’s review raises several important points about Gen. Harkabi and the book, perhaps the most important is his observation that Harkabi’s mindset toward the Arabs, as depicted in *Arab Attitudes*, is outdated for its time. By the time *Arab Attitudes toward Israel* was published, Israel had already successfully bested her Arab neighbors in 1947-48, 1956 and 1967. Far from an underdog existing at the mercy of the Arab world, Israel had now effectively demonstrated her ability to withstand the Arab armies and, in turn, to influence the diplomatic and political circumstances in the region. Harkabi’s tone, I contend, is a remnant of the mindset he, as well as numerous other Israelis of his generation, adopted during the Mandatory period. During the 1930s, the Labor Zionist community in Palestine, especially the youth movements within it, began to shrug off their initial pacifistic ideology toward the neighboring Arabs. From the perspective of the Jews of this time, young Yehoshafat Harkabi included, I believe, this shift in collective thinking was in response to Arab aggression against the undeserving Jewish communities and their inhabitants. As Anita Shapira writes, many Labor Zionists in 1930s

⁶² John D. Anthony, “Review: Israeli Attitude Toward the Arabs,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 1, No. 4 (1972), 129

⁶³ *Ibid*, 128

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 128

Palestine felt they had “no choice” but to take up arms to defend themselves against the Arabs.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Shapira states, “the slogan ‘no choice’ served simultaneously as an explanation of the situation and a justification for fighting. It placed the burden of guilt on the opposing side...”⁶⁶ This ideology did not fade with the major events of 1947-48. On the contrary, as Shapira notes, “the sense that there had been no choice was a key justification advanced in all the wars fought by the Jewish state up until 1982.”⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Anita Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 267

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 359

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 369

Chapter Two: Palestinians and Israel

Gen. Harkabi did not wait long to follow-up Arab Attitudes Toward Israel, releasing Palestinians and Israel a mere two years later. This brief interlude, however, was long enough to see the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War between Israel and the combined forces of Egypt and Syria. This melancholic chapter in Israel's short history cost her nearly 2,700 troops—the first 2,225 lost in just the first seven days of the conflict.⁶⁸ Though, militarily, Israel was victorious, the Arab forces' success in the early stages of the assault raised serious concerns throughout Israeli society about the competence and efficacy of their government. These concerns would ultimately lead to the resignations of, "...the IDF Chief of Staff, the head of military intelligence and several leading officers," as well as, by year's end, the resignations of Prime Minister Golda Meir and General Moshe Dayan.⁶⁹ The 1973 election, in turn, illuminated the decline of the Labor elite and the move to more defense-centric politics.

Though relatively leftist Zionists still occupied the highest offices in the government—Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister, Yigal Allon as Foreign Minister and Shimon Peres as Defense Minister—these officials placed far greater emphases on national security in their campaigns than had past left-wing Zionists. Moreover, the main right-wing parties, enjoyed unprecedented success at the polls, with Likud alone earning, "30 percent of the popular vote." After joining forces with their allies in the National Religious Party, the conservatives garnered

⁶⁸ Colin Schindler, *A History of Modern Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 144

⁶⁹ Schindler, 144

“forty-nine seats against Labor’s fifty one.”⁷⁰ As a party coalition need only have sixty-one seats in order to secure it control of the government, the Israeli right wing was already very close to dethroning its Labor opponents. One of the key points of agreement by the mid-1970s between the official Israeli political Right and Left, both among the politicians and within the general Israeli Jewish citizenry, was on the matter of settling the West Bank. Presented with a new territory seemingly ripe for settling, as the first Zionist pioneers did decades past, the Labor party, from the acquisition of the Territories up until Rabin, permitted Israelis to settle in Judea and Samaria. While, Gorenberg grants, the Labor regime, “never formally approved the Allon Plan,” these leaders nonetheless, “provided legitimacy for settlement and a solid start.” Indeed, Gorenberg partly attributes the fall of Labor in the famous 1977 election to the perception among religious Zionists that Labor may, “return a piece of the West Bank to Jordan.”⁷¹

It is clear from Dr. Harkabi’s statements in Palestinians and Israel that while he is cognizant of the significant political developments taking place within his country, he nonetheless still considers the Arab world to be Israel’s primary strategic threat. The Arab leadership and public still seek to commit “politicide”: they have simply renovated the public façade behind which they conceal this violent intent. Whereas Arab Attitudes primarily focused on Egypt and Syria, then politically merged into the United Arab Republic, Dr. Harkabi turns his attention for his second book, as its title indicates, on the Palestinians. Bereft of a state of their own, Harkabi discusses the then-current situation of the Palestinians, both in the former Mandate and in the diaspora and, in so doing, reveals a certain amount of sympathy for their

⁷⁰ Colin Schindler, *A History of Modern Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145

⁷¹ Gershom Gorenberg, *The Unmaking of Israel* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2011), 69

condition. In addition, he attempts to outline possible future scenarios aimed at improving the Palestinians' circumstances. Though, he admits, nothing—neither military nor diplomatic means—will bring about the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, save the destruction of either Jordan and/or Israel, there is no reason that arrangements cannot be made between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians—at least, not once the Palestinians and the Arab world, as a whole, replace their respective leaderships with more reasonable members.

Having dealt with Arab politics throughout the first nine chapters of the book, Harkabi then moves on to what, at this time, was a more secondary concern for him: the political scene within Israel, itself. The Hebrew U. professor breaks down the Israeli body politic into three camps, based on their stance on making peace with the Arab world, and recommends a specific diplomatic course of action for his country to take. In the end, he stresses that his compatriots must view the conflict as it is—i.e., how he asserts it is—rather than with the idealistic lens he believes much of the Israeli electorate employ while assessing their geopolitical situation. Doing so, Harkabi holds, will allow Israel to properly utilize what little power it has in the conflict; the Arabs, as ever, collectively boast the lion's share of the influence for determining the future trajectory of hostilities.

This emphasis on the Arab states' actions is hardly surprising, in light of the surprise and bloodshed of the 1973 War. Insofar as it restored the country's morale, the 1973 War was a major victory for Egypt. As Rabinovich writes, the clash provided the Egyptian military the opportunity to regain its honor after suffering the shame of the Six-Day War.⁷² Moreover, as Gershom Gorenberg adds, Sadat defeated Israel, "by Clausewitz criteria," in that the Egyptian

⁷² Abraham Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 2004) 496

President succeeded in bringing about the change in political circumstances he sought to create when he first began the conflict.⁷³ This political victory came, however, at a great cost to both Egypt and Syria. As Rabinovich accounts, in materiel losses for the combined Arab forces, “the IDF destroyed or captured 2,250 enemy tanks,” and shot down 432 of their aircrafts.⁷⁴ The total human toll from the War is still disputed. As Gorenberg explains, “the number of Arab dead has been estimated as anywhere from 8,500 to 15,000,” with tens of thousands more injured.⁷⁵ As such, the ability of the Arab states to actually commit politicide against Israel and her Jewish inhabitants following the War was, by Gen. Harkabi’s estimations, very limited for the foreseeable future. This was not to say, however, that these states had any intention of abandoning the fight against Israel; they simply were now content to permit the Palestinians the opportunity to lead in the fight against the Jewish state.

For his part, Dr. Harkabi admits that he can, to a limited extent, understand the Palestinians’ opposition to Israel and anger over her very creation. As the staunch Zionist states, “Zionism did not, and could not, have a solution for the Arab problem it created.” That the realization of the Zionist dream necessitated the eviction of thousands from their homes constituted, “a heavy burden that Zionism will have to carry on its conscience.”⁷⁶ This sympathy for the Palestinian refugees is highly selective, however, as Harkabi also adds that, “if the Palestinians were displaced [after 1948], they mostly displaced themselves.” The professor explains this statement by contending that, “the atomization of [Palestinian] society, the

⁷³ Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977* (New York: Times Books 2006) 260

⁷⁴ Rabinovich, 497

⁷⁵ Gorenberg, 259

⁷⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 7

weakness of its social links, their lack of confidence in one another...caused Palestinian society to disintegrate.”⁷⁷ As such, the professor exonerates his country for most of the blame of creating the Palestinian refugee crisis. Faced now with a population living either in diaspora or under occupation, the Palestinian leadership and their supporters retooled the old message of simply undoing 1948, burdened as it was with the implication of large-scale bloodshed. In its place, Harkabi comments, the Palestinian leadership and its supporters began to call for the replacement of Israel with, “a lay, democratic pluralistic Palestine.” As ideal as this proposed resolution—the creation of a single political entity between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, wherein Jews and Arabs would reside as equals—seems, Dr. Harkabi warns that it is merely, “politicide in a new, ‘humanistic’ guise.” In order to ensure stability within this new entity, and realize the goal of an, “Arab Free Palestine,” Harkabi forecasts, “Jews will only be allowed to exist as a minority.”⁷⁸

Though they, allegedly, still sought to commit politicide against Israel and harbored deeply anti-Semitic worldviews, Dr. Harkabi nonetheless recognizes that the Palestinian people have suffered much the same as the Israelis have. The significant difference between these two peoples, in Harkabi’s eyes, is that the future of the conflict—when and how it ends—is far more in the hands of the former than in those of the latter.⁷⁹ To help bring the Palestinians closer to this reconciliation, Dr. Harkabi recommends that Israel, “...explore and initiate steps...to facilitate a change in the Arab position,” rather than cede any territory as a

⁷⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 3

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 12

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 15

precondition for negotiations.⁸⁰ The Hebrew U. professor understands that this task is no simple matter, admitting that changing the Arab position entails a “national transformation” of the world of Arab politics, as a whole. Though drastic, Dr. Harkabi laments that he sees no other means of ending the conflict.⁸¹

Professor Harkabi continues this focus on, and sympathy for-, the ordinary Palestinian people in describing the unique position they have been placed in, in the aftermath of the 1973 War. Indeed, he sees common ground with those among the Palestinian masses—they and the Israelis are, in Harkabi’s mind, both victims of the Arab leaders, Palestinian and otherwise. These leaders, Harkabi contends, have purposefully kept the fire of anti-Semitism and uprising alive among the Palestinian people, further prolonging the conflict and manipulating the Palestinian peoples’ suffering purely for political gains. As Harkabi condemns, the Palestinian leadership have become, “callous to the suffering of their people and exerted pressure on them...to remain in their camps.”⁸² The Palestinian refugee crisis and its resolution, in this sense, serve together as a convenient political façade for the Arab leadership. These states, Harkabi notes, “took a strong, unequivocal stand against a Palestinian state in any agreement with Israel,” in 1964.⁸³ That these states now call for a two-state solution is naught but a cover for their politicidal intentions.⁸⁴

What is needed is for the Palestinians in the West Bank to assume a more principle role in the diplomatic and political processes affecting them. This demographic is, after all, that

⁸⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 22

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 23

⁸² *Ibid*, 31

⁸³ *Ibid*, 38

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 37

which suffers the most from the continuation of the conflict and thus have a clear incentive to see it resolved. Those in the PLO and other popular Palestinian resistance organizations, Harkabi explains, do so from their homes and strongholds elsewhere in the Arab world, and thus the conflict is a more abstract concept with fewer and less imminent consequences for them. They are able to call for violent rebellion, as the PLO does in the Palestinian National Covenant, and not suffer the hardships that result from it. Indeed, Harkabi argues that the Palestinian leadership has become even more intransigent following the Six-Day War. Whereas before the War, the PNC, “allowed Jews present [in Palestine] in 1947 to stay,” in the event that Israel is overthrown and replaced with an Arab state, after the 1967 clash, the Covenant was revised to permit only those Jews whose ancestors had arrived in Palestine before 1917 to remain in this new state.⁸⁵ This step back in reconciliation between the Palestinians and Jews is particularly unfortunate in light of the imbalance between these two sides: the Arabs still refuse to recognize the Jews’ right to self-determination, despite the Zionists’ acceptance of a Palestinian Arab state in 1947. Harkabi insists that the West Bank Palestinians understand this aspect of the conflict, at least better than their brethren outside the Territories do, and thus peace is contingent on this group’s ability to take ownership of their cause.⁸⁶

Harkabi turns his attention to the supposed aspirations of the Palestinians and their supporters: the PNC on the one hand, and the call for a bi-national state, on the other. The former, drafted in May 1964, only attributes the right of self-determination to the Palestinians; the Jews, being a religious community and not a nation, fail to qualify for this right. Moreover, to erase the shame of 1948 and realize their dreams of independence, the Palestinian people

⁸⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 42

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 46

are enjoined to take up arms in a violent revolt against the Zionist entity.⁸⁷ Harkabi's despair at the contents of the PNC are tempered, somewhat, by his observations on the new bi-nationalist camp among the Arabs and their supporters. The professor concedes that this call for a democratic, egalitarian state shared by Jews and Arabs alike is a kind of progress. This position is far more conciliatory than the vitriol initially pedaled by Fatah, as the Jewish citizens of this imagined entity would, in theory, enjoy the same rights as their Arab compatriots. However, Dr. Harkabi reiterates, the Arab leaders chiefly responsible for reviving this policy proposal do so disingenuously. This camp creates the impression that the Arab world has embraced this policy far more than it actually has. In turn, both the international community and the Israeli electorate become less supportive of the Israeli government's position and more receptive to further proposals from the Arab camp. As, according to Harkabi, the latter group remains committed to perpetrating politicide against the State of Israel, Israelis' amenability to bi-nationalism is a policy for disaster.⁸⁸

The former general frames the Arabs' post-1973 use of the bi-national state slogan as the diplomatic reimagining of the Fedayeen attacks Israel sustained throughout much of her early history. Though these attacks may have been successful at the tactical level, Gen. Harkabi asserts that because of measures taken by the IDF, these raids never posed as much of a threat to the Jewish State as the Arab armies do.⁸⁹ Moreover, the efforts undertaken by Israel to uproot the Palestinian militants were complemented by the events in Jordan in September 1970. In Harkabi's view, this dark period in Jordanian and Palestinian history, later to be known

⁸⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 50

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 81

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 107

as “Black September,” saw the Palestinians residing in Jordan largely disavow their ties to the PLO and other resistance organizations and support King Hussein, instead.⁹⁰ For Harkabi, there are two major conclusions to be made from this bloody saga. Firstly, the East Bank Palestinians’ change in loyalty provides the Hebrew U. professor with the hope that Jordan, home to a relatively loyal Palestinian population and led by an Arab ruler now sympathetic of Israel’s security concerns, could play a major role in resolving the Palestinian question.⁹¹ Secondly, the major setbacks the PLO has suffered as a result of attempting to liberate Palestine through violence have forced the organization to seek more diplomatic means of destroying the Zionist entity.⁹²

Dr. Harkabi returns to the dichotomy between the Palestinians in the Territories and their brethren in Jordan, and also adds to this dynamic the factor of the overall diaspora—Palestinians and their descendants abroad, though largely, for his study’s sake, focusing on those in the Arab states—in assessing the future of the Palestinian people, as a whole. From Harkabi’s perspective, the third group is the least involved, politically or personally, in the conflict. Realizing this, the PLO, Harkabi asserts, have falsely declared themselves the sole representative of this diaspora community, and artificially skew Palestinian politics toward extremist positions.⁹³ Meanwhile, for the first group, Dr. Harkabi reiterates his sympathy and expresses his hope that they will be able to, “assume responsibility for a political settlement” to the conflict.⁹⁴ This “political settlement,” it must be noted, is explicitly not to take the form of a

⁹⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 142

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 143

⁹² *Ibid*, 113

⁹³ *Ibid*, 151

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 152

Palestinian state in the West Bank, as far as the former general is concerned. By the professor's estimates, such a political entity would not be viable, "because of political realities."

Specifically, Harkabi foresees Amman purposefully and severely obstructing the development of such a state, so as to avert the creation of a potentially hostile state along its border.⁹⁵ This obstructionism, however, would pale in comparison to the political consequences the Palestinians would face from the other Arab states in retaliation for the former's perceived capitulation.⁹⁶ Politically unable to form their own state in the West Bank, and militarily incapable of usurping either Israel or Jordan, the Palestinians, Harkabi recommends, should opt for a sort of autonomy agreement between themselves, Jordan and Israel; a "Palestinian region."⁹⁷ Such an arrangement will, according to the professor, come about organically, beginning with agreements between the three peoples' leaders on issues of everyday life and, ultimately, growing into a comprehensive system for coexistence. Though not ideal, Harkabi admits, this solution is the only one that provides all parties involved with, "practical justice."⁹⁸ Insofar as the West Bank, itself, is concerned, while Harkabi concedes that while, "...military occupation cannot last indefinitely," the former general also insists that, "so far, there are no indications that the patience of the [Palestinian] population is becoming exhausted," by Israel's military presence there.⁹⁹

For the first time in his writings, Dr. Harkabi then switches his focus from the Palestinian side of the conflict to the Israeli one. Still mostly a hawk, the former intelligence chief

⁹⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 153

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 153

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 160

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 161

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 156

categorically dismisses the notion of territorial concessions as a precondition to peace negotiations. As Dr. Harkabi explains, “at this stage of the conflict, no concession on our part will make the Arabs acquiesce in Israel as a sovereign state.”¹⁰⁰ Also a pragmatist, Dr. Harkabi recommends that Israel, “declare its readiness to withdraw as part of a peace settlement.”¹⁰¹ At the time of the book’s writing, Harkabi diagnoses, the two main schools of thought in Israel on the peace process each suffer from serious flaws. The hawks, ardently opposed to territorial concessions, do so at the cost of appearing obstinate to the rest of the world. The Doves, meanwhile, greatly hyperbolize the extent to which the Arab world is currently ready to negotiate with Israel, regardless of the generosity of her concessions. Gen. Harkabi, meanwhile, adopts somewhat of a hybrid approach. Such withdrawal, Harkabi reassures the hawks, need not be either total or immediate, but rather, “should be based on the degree to which Arab hostility is modified.”¹⁰² Should the Arabs prove capable of decreasing the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in their media and politics and otherwise permit Israel to exist in peace, the IDF’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines will be more extensive; if not, then less so. For Harkabi, these territories provide actual “safeguards” for Israel, and should only be released when a comprehensive peace agreement is made.¹⁰³

Besides these external safeguards, Gen. Harkabi is also concerned about his country’s morale. In order to strip away dangerous illusions about prospects for peace with the Arabs in the near future, the scholar calls for all his fellow Israeli Jews to, “study the Arab position,” in

¹⁰⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 173

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 176

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 177

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 177

the conflict.¹⁰⁴ Though this academic undertaking may depress many Israelis at times, it will also, Harkabi hopes, show them that their circumstances were, “not as bad as [they] were sometimes described.”¹⁰⁵ The return of so many Israelis to the academic environment would also do much to challenge the works of Dr. Harkabi’s colleagues therein, of whom he is highly critical. Perturbed by their criticisms of their government, Harkabi condemns Israeli “intellectuals and academics” for dividing the public with their “critical assessments.” For Dr. Harkabi, the intellectuals’ talents are far better spent articulating the full extent of the Arabs’ extremism to the international community, whom past Israeli officials have failed to adequately educate on the conflict. The criticism Israel receives from abroad, as such, is largely the result of a lack of investment into public relations efforts, rather than any flaw in her policies vis-à-vis the Arabs.¹⁰⁶

The professor goes on to elaborate on the positions the Arab elites have taken since the 1967 War. In Harkabi’s eyes, a significant percentage of the Egyptian and Lebanese citizenry, the Jordanian leadership and the Palestinians in the Territories desire peace with Israel.¹⁰⁷ This group, which Harkabi dubs the “Peace School,” would recognize the Jewish State’s right to exist, in exchange for its withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. While pleased that such a camp finally exists in the Arab world, Harkabi is also disappointed by this school’s inability to empathize with Israel’s security concerns and reluctance to consider territorial exchanges to address said concerns. Moreover, the retired general contends, Israel cannot be expected to return all the territory she took from her neighbors in the War, when only some of

¹⁰⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 182

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 186

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 187

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 199

them are willing to agree to peace with her.¹⁰⁸ The “Tactical School,” meanwhile, seemingly follow Harkabi’s advice for Israel, voicing their acceptance of UN Resolution 242 but primarily as a tactical move—a, “public relations gesture,” as the professor states. Certain that Israel will reject the Resolution, this school use international diplomacy to politically undermine the Jewish State, making her an easier target for military operations.¹⁰⁹ The “Strategic School,” to which Egypt’s leaders adhere, according to Harkabi, holds that, “it is in the Arab interest that Resolution 242 be implemented,” but believe that the conflict will continue, regardless of whatever agreements are signed. So long as Israel exists, there will always be violence, and all the Arab leaders can do is preserve their image through honoring Resolution 242.¹¹⁰ Lastly, the Rejectionists among the Arabs opt not to conceal their views on the conflict, at all, categorically refusing to recognize Israel under any circumstances.¹¹¹

Faced with this multitude of Arab positions, Harkabi recommends that Israel reach out to members of the Strategic School, as doing so provides the best opportunity for achieving a peace agreement with Egypt, without necessarily having to surrender all the territories conquered. Her security considerations being the foremost priority, the Jewish State is obligated to at least attempt to hold on to areas considered important for national defense. In addition, Dr. Harkabi recognizes the precariousness of even attempting to negotiate a deal on Jerusalem. As the professor laments, “...a settlement [on Jerusalem] tolerable to moderate Arabs is not acceptable to most Israeli moderates,” and comments that, “Israel’s self-styled

¹⁰⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 200

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 201

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 201

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 204

doves are only hawks who are unconscious of their hawkishness.”¹¹² In addition, one must consider the morale boost the Arabs would enjoy as the result of Israel’s withdrawal from the territories. Seeing this diplomatic victory as a sign of Israeli weakness, Harkabi warns that the Arab militants are liable to revitalize their efforts to take Palestine back by force, rather than agree to peace.¹¹³ For his part, Harkabi, again, attempts to level with his foes among the Arabs, acknowledging that, “the Arabs may be justified...in considering Israel as bearing the original sin for this conflict.” At the same time, though, “Israel may be justified in seeing...Arab sins...as graver than [her] own.”¹¹⁴ As such, no one is blameless in the conflict, but Israel must ensure that her citizens are safe from Arab attacks.

Part of ensuring Israel’s security, Gen. Harkabi adds, involves educating the Israeli people on how best to move forward in the conflict. Elated by the massive victories of 1967, the Yom Kippur War brought Israelis back down to earth. No longer starry-eyed, Israel is obligated to educate her public on the conflict, so that they may be directly involved in the formulation of her policies moving forward.¹¹⁵ He reemphasizes the importance of offering the Arabs territorial concessions in return for peace, even if only to draw the world’s attention to the Arabs’ hostility.¹¹⁶ He also calls for flexibility in policy-making, complaining that Israel had, “abandoned flexibility because every tactical step...takes on ideological significance.” In doing so, he also criticizes the settlement enterprise and its supporters in Israel proper. This is not so say, however, that he is entirely critical of the settler movement at this point. As he adds, “We

¹¹² Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 207

¹¹³ *Ibid*, 207

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 209

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 253

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 256

certainly have historical links to Judea and Samaria.” The problem, ultimately, is that Israel, “cannot maintain the present borders and refuse to withdraw or...to abandon settlements.”¹¹⁷ As such, Israel must choose to protect herself, rather than hold on to territory that did not, initially, belong to her.

Dr. Don Peretz, then head of the Southwest Asia/North Africa academic program at SUNY Binghamton, weighs in on Dr. Harkabi’s aforementioned assessment, ultimately finding it “very important” but nonetheless seriously flawed. Peretz explains that while Harkabi did undertake an, “extensive survey of Arab official statements...the Arab press and contemporary literature,” the former general still only, in Peretz’ view, skimmed the surface of larger Arab culture. The statements from many Arab leaders, writers, entertainers, etc., may often be vitriolic and provide little hope for a future peace agreement, but, as Peretz counters, “rhetoric alone is not a sufficient basis for making national security estimates.” The Hebrew U. professor, Peretz notes, is by no means alone in making this mistake, as many other Israelis are equally likely to base their assessments of the status of the Arab world on the statements of Arab radicals, rather than on the policies of actual Arab state leaders. Were these errant analysts to look to Arab leaders, in particular King Hussein and President Sadat, the Israelis would find that the latter have, “emphasized that Israel can no longer be expunged from the Middle East and that peace is essential for the good of the Arabs.” This said, Peretz concedes that the Arab world, overall, and in particular the Palestinian leadership, still suffers from inconsistency and incoherence in its views on a peace agreement with Israel. Until these issues are dealt with,

¹¹⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 256

Peretz concludes, Dr. Harkabi's assessments will continue to boast a level of validity that the his critics cannot legitimately reject outright.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Don Peretz, "Review: Palestinians and Israel," *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 4 (1975)

Chapter Three: Arab Strategies and Israel's Response

Dr. Harkabi's third book was released in 1977: a truly watershed year for global politics, but in particular for the State of Israel. Within the Jewish State, Labor Zionism's hegemony over Israeli politics came to an end and, in its place, the rise of the Israeli political right to the highest levels of the national government. At the head of this major realignment in Israeli body politic was Menachem Begin, the territorially maximalist leader of the Likud party. The Labor movement—with the notable exceptions of Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon and Yigal Yadin—largely supported the notion of including the West Bank and Gaza Strip among the territories Israel could exit as part of a land-for-peace agreement with its Arab neighbors. Whilst Begin agreed that the Sinai Peninsula could be returned to Egypt in exchange for peace, such a deal would have to be explicitly separate from any discussions on territories comprising the ancient Jewish homeland, primarily "Judea and Samaria."¹¹⁹ The West Bank of the Jordan River, in Begin's eyes, was sacred land to the Jewish people and, moreover, ought to belong to them, as it did their Biblical forebears. The ramifications of this ideology on Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians would prove to be one of several points of philosophical contention between the first Revisionist Prime Minister and Dr. Yehoshafat Harkabi, who, briefly, served as Begin's Intelligence Advisor. As Harkabi stated in a later interview, while he liked Begin as a person, calling him, "awfully generous," the two men failed to see eye-to-eye on Israel's policies in the

¹¹⁹ Colin Schindler, *A History of Modern Israel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 149

West Bank. Specifically, Harkabi would criticize Begin for seeking “the impossible,” in the latter’s dreams of annexing the Palestinian Territory.¹²⁰

Menachem Begin’s hawkishness would prove even more frustrating for Harkabi, in light of the monumental geopolitical consequences of 20 November 1977. Making good on past pledges to journey to the Israeli Knesset and extend his hand in peace, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat arrived in Israel to signal the end of hostilities between the two neighbors.¹²¹ As will be discussed more thoroughly later, this unprecedented move by an Arab head-of-state took Dr. Harkabi very much by surprise. A moderate Arab politician was not only leading the largest of the Arab states, but was also surrounding himself with Jews, setting foot in the State of Israel and recognizing it as such, rather than as Palestine. Most important, of course, was this moderate Arab leader was offering the Jewish State peace with his own, in public rather than as any sort of unwritten understanding. A head of a prominent member-state of the Arab League was blatantly defying the infamous 1967 Khartoum Resolution, in which the Arab national leaders swore never to negotiate with-, recognize-, or make peace with Israel. This major turn of events would instill the hope in Dr. Harkabi that future peace negotiations were possible with the other Arab states, as well as with the Palestinians, despite the latter’s exceptionally malicious, publicly stated aspirations vis-à-vis the Zionist state. As such, it is not hyperbolic to state that President Sadat’s visit to Israel fundamentally altered Dr. Harkabi’s

¹²⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom, “The Last Reminiscence: January 14, 1994,” *Israel Studies* 1, no. 1 (1996): 178

¹²¹ Colin Schindler, *A History of Modern Israel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 157

overall perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—namely, ultimately, on who wielded the power to bring the conflict to an end.¹²²

Alas, these two major developments in Dr. Harkabi's life and Israeli history both took place in the year that Arab Strategies and Israel's Response was published. That is to say, they occurred long after the former intelligence chief had finished putting thought to paper. As such, the Arab and Israeli political landscapes the former intelligence chief discusses in this third book are those of the pre-1977 world. For Harkabi, this world had gone largely unchanged since before the State of Israel even came to be. Indeed, as will be discussed, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response is, in many respects, a concise reiteration of his earlier works and, in turn, a reaffirmation of his earlier stated ideas. For this reason, there is a significant contrast in tone between this piece, and his pre-1977 corpus of work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as a whole, on the one hand, and the articles, books and interviews Dr. Harkabi would complete throughout the rest of his life, on the other. As the Hebrew University alumnus stated in an interview just a few years before his death: "It's not that I changed my mind, but that the situation changed."¹²³

Harkabi begins by rehashing the development of the Arab attitude and the means by which the Arab world pursue the goal of committing politicide against the Jewish presence in what is today Israel, from the pre-state era to the period between the end of the Yom Kippur War and the beginning of Sadat's efforts for peace. Having failed to prevent the Jewish State from coming to fruition, the Arabs now seek to destroy the Zionists' creation so thoroughly that

¹²² Yehoshafat Harkabi and Edward Grossman, "Israel Should Negotiate with the PLO," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 1 (1986): 180

¹²³ *Ibid*, 180

there will be scant evidence remaining to attest to the massive humiliation of 1948. Though, socially, they boasted an intense resolve to see Israel undone, militarily speaking, accomplishing this goal proved increasingly impracticable with the continued failures the Arab world suffered all the way up until the 1973 War. Unable to achieve their goal by military means, the immediate Arab world now uses diplomatic means to realize political goals. Among the most popular messages to subliminally convey the message of this objective were for the, “liberation of Palestine,” or the “establishment of a ‘democratic Palestinian state.’”¹²⁴ As Harkabi points out, these campaigns all necessitate the dissolution of Israel, as a state entity, and leave ambiguous, at times, the fate of the Jews therein.¹²⁵ This is not to say that Israel’s opponents have abandoned the use of physical force to achieve their objectives. Indeed, as the regular armies of the Arab states were eventually phased-out of the conflict with Israel, the emphasis were correspondingly increased on irregular forces—individual Fedayeen and, in time, large-scale Palestinian resistance movements.¹²⁶

In the aftermath of Israel’s stunning victory in 1967, three main ideological camps came about to answer the question of how best to eliminate Israel in lieu of open warfare: the “Erosion and Withering Away” camp, the “Reducing Israel to its Natural Dimensions,” constituency and the “Continuous Strife” group.¹²⁷ The views of the third camp are best expressed by the Fedayeen and Palestinian militant organizations, which view the Palestinians’ right to their land as absolute and eternal. If an agreement of some sort must be made with the Zionist entity, it must be purely for tactical reasons, and ultimately aimed at resuming and

¹²⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 5

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 6

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 13

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 18

winning the struggle against the Jewish State.¹²⁸ The first school is more optimistic, in a sense, in its assertion that as an inherently wicked and corrupt entity, Israel is, in turn, inherently unsustainable as a political entity. As such, there is no need to invest a great deal of resources to confronting the IDF, as the State of Israel will come to an end on account of its internal defects.¹²⁹ The second school foregoes the optimism of the first, on the one hand, and the use of force characterized by the third school, on the other. The source of the, “lay, democratic Palestinian state” mantra Harkabi excoriated earlier, the “Reducing Israel to its Natural Dimensions” school is merely, according to Dr. Harkabi, politicide with a diplomatic veneer.

At first glance, this school appears to only ask that justice be served. The State of Israel, this school holds, as a member of the international community, ought to abide by the laws of the international community. Specifically, Israel is obligated to act in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 242. Moreover, as an internationally recognized people, the Palestinians ought to enjoy the same right to self-determination as the other sovereign peoples of the world. The greatest attribute of this school, as such, is its masterful utilization of Western ideals of universal human rights and international norms. By adopting this lexicon, the Arab leadership and their supporters are able to win over additional support among the peoples of Europe and the United States, thus problematizing Israel’s relationships with these states. This victory is of special concern for Dr. Harkabi, due to his certainty that the Arab world will not be satisfied with recovering the lands from 1967 alone—that they will ultimately, through either diplomacy or force, attempt to retake the rest of Palestine.¹³⁰ Harkabi refers to

¹²⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 63

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 41

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 27

several statements released on behalf of the PLO that seemingly validate his accusations against them of political double-speak. Namely, he points to an interview *Newsweek* magazine conducted on Farouk Kaddoumi, then head of the Political Department of the PLO. According to Mr. Kaddoumi, the Jewish majority of Israel has two options: they can either concede to the Palestinians' demand for a right of return and assist their new Arab neighbors in creating the "lay, democratic Palestinian state," that the PLO now claimed to seek; or the Israeli Jews can continue to keep the Palestinians out and otherwise maintain the status quo. Kaddoumi is unafraid to discuss the consequences Israel would face, should her people opt for the second course of action. As the PLO officer states, "If [Israeli Jews] choose the latter, they will surely die and we will surely win."¹³¹ Though, Harkabi admits, there has emerged a sub-group within this branch of Arab political thought that is genuinely willing to forego their right to all of Palestine, and instead settle for a much smaller state comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On this count, Dr. Harkabi allows for a small measure of celebration, as this group, though small and not highly significant in Palestinian or Arab politics at the time, nonetheless represents a moderation of past Arab stances.¹³²

A sliver of the Arab world now seemingly open to negotiations with Israel, it is now incumbent on Israel's leaders to capitalize on this potential opportunity for peace before it is lost. Up until this point, according to Dr. Harkabi, Israel has largely concerned herself with proving to the Arabs that the latter's political intentions were "unfeasible," at least by military means.¹³³ While Israel's leaders effectively pursued this objective, particularly in 1948 and

¹³¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 29

¹³² *Ibid*, 52

¹³³ *Ibid*, 86

1967, they nonetheless failed to seriously address the problem of, “persuading the Arabs that [politicide] was unjustifiable...”¹³⁴ This failure in engaging the Arab world diplomatically is hardly surprising to Harkabi, however, given the extent of the negligence he believes Israeli governmental, social and intellectual leaders have displayed by failing to properly educate the Israeli citizenry on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Harkabi’s mind, successive Israeli administrations have blundered in one major respect or another in addressing the Arabs’ hostility since the birth of the state. At first, in the early years of statehood up until 1967, Israeli ministers were, according to Harkabi, “slack and squeamish, as though wishing not to embarrass the Arabs” in front of the international community for their aggression and politicidal ambitions. Rather than expose their foe to the world for the hostile, anti-Semitic threat that it was, the Israeli leadership, “supported the view that the Arabs were carried away by their own exuberance.”¹³⁵ The Israeli populace, meanwhile, was content with political “ambivalence” and the de facto national borders created by the 1948 armistice lines, and not sufficiently concerned about the threat still posed by the Arab world.¹³⁶ Now dealing with a post-1973 world, Israel’s leaders are failing on two opposite fronts, domestically: on the one side, not doing enough to dash the Israeli Left’s fantasy of a moderate Arab partner in peace¹³⁷; on the other, allowing the rest of Israel to become too attached to the West Bank, which should still be seen as a tool for realizing peace, rather than as an addition to the state, according to the former general.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 86

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 92

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 96

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 98

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 100

It is at this point that Dr. Harkabi reiterates his position that Israel should declare her readiness to retreat to the pre-1967 borders and otherwise act in compliance with UN Resolution 242, “including the disbandment of the settlements.”¹³⁹ Once again, though, there is a great difference between announcing one’s willingness to do something, and actually going through with it. Israel would be willing to recall the IDF out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and, moreover, “recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to negotiate with the PLO.”¹⁴⁰ However, the Jewish State should only take these actions if the Palestinians and their Arab brethren take the appropriate reciprocal measures.¹⁴¹ This, in turn, means that Israel will finally be able to turn the conversation on the conflict from Israel’s alleged transgressions to her security concerns. Doing so, Harkabi contends, would, “expose the extremism that is inherent in the PLO position,” and force the historically militant organization to substantively change this position.¹⁴² While Israel would, ultimately, lose territory, she would do so in a manner that did not significantly impact its national security considerations and, moreover, the Palestinians, according to Harkabi, would not even come out with their grievances actually remedied. As the former intelligence chief explains, due to the West Bank’s isolation from the Gaza Strip and, more importantly, from any major body of water, the political and economic futures of this state would be severely restricted. In addition, this state would be almost certain to clash with neighboring Jordan, due to both demographic issues and past bad blood. Lastly, a state so physically small would not be enough to satisfy the ambitions of the PLO leadership, to say nothing of the millions of Palestinians in exile who may wish to move

¹³⁹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 111

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 113

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, 113

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 114

there.¹⁴³ For Harkabi, therefore, peace is, in a way, a tactic in itself, providing Israel the time she needs to prepare for the instability that will follow the establishment of a Palestinian state. This is not to say that Dr. Harkabi is apathetic toward the Palestinians' plight; indeed, he recognizes that their "grievances are real."¹⁴⁴ Rather, he views the current Palestinian condition as largely self-inflicted. According to the former general, the Arabs of then-Mandatory Palestine, "refused a compromise solution," then, "started the civil war in 1948." More pointedly, Dr. Harkabi attempts to exonerate Israel for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, stating that many those Arabs who went into exile following the events of 1947-48, "were not banished, but left the country because of the disturbances of the war."¹⁴⁵ Since that time, these Arabs and their descendants have largely sought to erase the developments of 1948: an objective that Israelis are legitimately inclined to oppose.¹⁴⁶

Harkabi concludes *Arab Strategies* by delving into the Israeli political response to the Arabs' demands for territorial withdrawal. Beginning with the "Dovish-Dovish," school, the Hebrew U. professor discusses where, he believes, the Israeli political left errs in its approach to peace with the Arab world. For Harkabi, this school is largely divorced from reality in its assessment that the Arab leadership has become more amenable to peace with Israel and that it is, in fact, Israel that perpetuates the bloodshed. That Israel considers parts of the West Bank to be important for the former's national security is absurd to this school of political thought; Israel is safe, and will continue to be safe, because of her military capabilities, rather than

¹⁴³ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977) 115

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 117

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 117

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 118

territorial acquisitions.¹⁴⁷ This school, Harkabi charges, “undermines the moral basis,” of the State of Israel and her elected leaders, and bolsters by Arab argument by providing the latter a facade of moderation and civility. The only aspect of the conflict on which Harkabi and this school agree is on the matter of offering territorial concessions to the Arabs, and even in this respect there are clear differences. Whereas, for the Israeli doves, Israel’s offer is to be genuine and, in theory, will be met by peaceful cooperation on the Palestinian side, for Harkabi, the offer of withdrawing to the pre-1967 lines is meant, initially, as a tactical measure aimed primarily at exposing the vileness of the PLO and overall Arab leadership to the rest of the international community. While he hopes that peace will ensue, he by no means expects it.¹⁴⁸

Predictably, the “Hawkish-Hawkish” school is diametrically opposed to the “Dovish-Dovish” one. Whereas the first school sees in the Arab world former adversaries who are now willing to work for peace, this second school argues that, “the Arab position is...unalterably hawkish,” and, in turn, “Israel too has to adopt a hawkish position,” largely in the form of retaining control of the areas conquered in 1967.¹⁴⁹ This school is not wholly convinced that the Palestinians are, in fact, a legitimate people deserving of self-determination, nor is it greatly concerned by the potential demographic implications of annexing the West Bank and its millions of Arab residents.¹⁵⁰ The leaders of this ideological camp—who, Harkabi observes, “command larger Israeli public support than the [Dovish-Dovish] school”-- seek the reunification of the lands of ancient Israel under modern Israeli rule. The Arabs of the West Bank have two options, according to this school: they may either live in Judea and Samaria

¹⁴⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 129

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 130

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 133

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 135

alongside their Jewish neighbors and under Israeli law; or, if necessary, the lands currently belonging to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan may be “allotted” to them, so that the question of Palestinian statehood may be definitively solved.¹⁵¹ Though Gen. Harkabi agrees with this school’s view that the Arab world is still overwhelmingly hostile toward Israel, he considers the school’s policy recommendations—the annexation of the West Bank and the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy—utterly unrealistic.¹⁵² In addition, this school’s emphasis on Israeli militarism provides, according to the former intelligence chief, little in the way of, “offering an incentive to the Arabs to desire mutual accommodation.”¹⁵³

Lastly, there is the “Hawkish-Dovish” school of Israeli thought, to which Harkabi openly subscribes and, he laments, no Israeli political party speaks. This school is “Hawkish,” in that it recognizes the hostility of the Arab world, yet “Dovish” in its recommendation that Israel offer territorial concessions anyway. This apparent contradiction between policy and worldview, Harkabi explains, is due to, “the complexity of the Israeli existential predicament.”¹⁵⁴ That is, whilst Israel may be in the right in its view that the Arab world is still deeply hostile to the former’s very existence, the rest of the world still has yet to awaken, in Harkabi’s mind, to the threat posed to the Jewish State by her neighbors. This school emphasizes the need for flexibility in policy-making, based on political circumstances, rather than on militarism or pacifism. The former Intelligence Advisor admits that this line of thinking is far more nuanced than that of either the Dovish-Dovish or Hawkish-Hawkish brands. Nonetheless, Harkabi calls on the Israeli political leadership to adopt this school’s views as its own, arguing that doing so,

¹⁵¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 136

¹⁵² *Ibid*, 134

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, 139

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 140

“would improve Israel’s international stance,” and, in turn, would, “impress the Arabs with the need to finalize the conflict.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 147

Chapter Four: The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome

The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome is Dr. Harkabi's first book related to the Arab-Israeli conflict following President Sadat's trip to Israel, as well as the first piece the former general published after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Though the consequences of this latter development were yet to be experienced by the Israeli public, it is nonetheless apparent that Dr. Harkabi is deeply troubled by the trajectory of the Israeli body politic, in particular the latter's esteem for ill-advised acts of aggression and callousness toward international criticism. This attitude, nurtured by the Likud, represents, in Harkabi's mind, a threat not only to international peace, but also to the very moral center of the Israeli and Jewish people, both secular and religious alike. Indeed, Harkabi argues, post-1977 Israel is not so different from the pre-1977 Arab world, in terms of mindset toward peace with the adversary and ownership of the lands between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River. In this way, The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome may be seen as Gen. Harkabi's first attempt at rebutting the political, religious and social trends of late 1970s/early 1980s Israeli society that, he believed, were bound to spell disaster for the Jewish State, both internally and internationally. Interestingly, Dr. Harkabi fails to acknowledge the several national myths propagated during the Labor years, and the role the mindset cultivated by these myths played in the development of the conflict. This is not to say that the Hebrew University alumnus moved past his differences with the Arab world; indeed, in many respects, his views on the Palestinians, in particular the PLO, remained unchanged. In addition,

it is clear that Harkabi sees no parallels between the Bar-Kokhba myth propagated by the Likud movement, Rather, he accepts that peace with the Arabs will come only as a result of diplomacy and reconciliation, rather than through blind faith in the use of military force.

Following the Likud's historic victory in the 1977 general elections, Israeli political culture, in Harkabi's eyes, underwent a noticeable transformation. From the birth of the State up until the invasion of Lebanon, the dominant Israeli philosophy toward the use of military force was primarily one of necessity; Israel was defending herself against the Arab world's onslaughts. Under Prime Minister Begin's leadership, Harkabi accuses, Israeli society became more amenable to militarism and less receptive to diplomacy; more willing to entertain unrealistic dreams than they had any right to. It is in this respect that Bar-Kokhba and Menachem Begin are, in a sense, cut from the same cloth, in Harkabi's eyes: both men, "...admire rebelliousness and heroism detached of responsibility for the consequences." It is this misguided admiration that constitutes the "Bar-Kokhba syndrome."¹⁵⁶ For the Likud, this admiration is meant to inspire "audacity" in the Israeli people, particularly in their support for aggressive state policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the Arab world, as a whole. For Harkabi, on the other hand, this audacity is tantamount to, "rejoicing at an act of national suicide." It is, of course, worth celebrating that the Jewish people have endured millennia of persecution and achieved statehood. However, this history of survival, according to the professor, is due in spite of the Bar-Kokhba rebellion, rather than because of it.¹⁵⁷

Though Gen. Harkabi's criticism of the Likud message is legitimate, it is nonetheless undermined by his overall silence on the nationalist myths propagated by the Labor camp

¹⁵⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 105

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 108

during its long reign. As Don-Yehiya and Liebman discuss, leftist Zionism employed several such religiously tinged nationalist elements from the pre-state period until its downfall. Despite the movement's overall secular leanings, the researchers note, "a central place in the Zionist-Socialist educational system was accorded to the Bible and symbols of biblical origin."¹⁵⁸ The biblical period was, after all, that in which the Jewish people were free in their own homeland: a reality the Zionists wished to replicate in the twentieth century. This period also provides several historical episodes that can be interpreted to foster myriad political stances, as already evidenced by the Likud employment of the Bar-Kokhba rebellion. For the Labor movement, however, the favorite myth to invoke was that of Masada. According to the historian Josephus Flavius, the hilltop fort fell to the Romans in the year 70 C.E., after its Jewish inhabitants opted to commit mass-suicide rather than be taken prisoner by Rome. Though the Jewish sages failed to see any great religious significance to this bloody ordeal, the early Zionist settlers of the Palestine Mandate viewed the siege and its tragic conclusion as lessons for their own endeavors. Just as Begin and the Likud saw in the Bar-Kokhba rebellion an example of "audacity," the Labor Zionists believed the fall of Masada conveyed the importance of, "heroism, self-sacrifice, uncompromising struggle...and ardent desire for freedom of the Jewish people."¹⁵⁹ This myth was later replaced by that of Tel Hai, based on the deaths of eight Zionist pioneers, including the famous Yosef Trumpeldor. This latter myth built on the sanctification of the land and of self-sacrifice from the Masada myth, and also, as Don-Yehiya and Liebman discuss, sought to overrule the Arabs' claim to Palestine and recruit new personnel to the ranks

¹⁵⁸ Eliezer Don-Yehiya and Charles S. Liebman, "The Symbol System of Zionist-Socialism: An Aspect of Israeli Civil Religion," *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 2 (1981): 127

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 131

of the pre-state Jewish paramilitary forces.¹⁶⁰ In this way, the Labor movement sought to combine the sanctity of the land—itsself a religiously-based concept—with that of contemporary sacrifice on behalf of the community—a more Socialist ideal.

Harkabi attempts to appeal to both the religious and secular Jewish camps supporting the Likud movement. The former constituency is primarily comprised of the national-religious stream of Judaism famously championed by Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Kook. As Ravitzky writes, Rabbi Kook and his disciples viewed Zionism as a political means to achieve, what they viewed as, a sacred goal: the end of the diaspora, the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel and the restoration of Jewish law over this holy land.¹⁶¹ Human agency, specifically that of the Jewish people, is of immense importance in bringing about the coming of the Messiah. As such, the cession of any portion of ancient Israel—the land promised by God, in perpetuity, to the Jewish people—was counteractive to the salvation of the world, itself. Moreover, this ideology frames the Palestinians and all those who work to prevent the Jews' goals as, "enemies of the God of Israel."¹⁶² It is this kind of absolutist thinking that concerns Dr. Harkabi, and which he attempts to rebut with his own views on religious observance.

According to the secular Jewish academic, Jewish orthodoxy recognized from early on that the Bar-Kokhba Rebellion represented a dangerous precedent for Jewish political thought and action. Though passionate participation in the political process was, in abstract, praiseworthy, the kind of "reckless political activism," that the Rebellion represents is

¹⁶⁰ Eliezer Don-Yehiya and Charles S. Liebman, "The Symbol System of Zionist-Socialism: An Aspect of Israeli Civil Religion," *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 2 (1981): 133

¹⁶¹ Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, trans. Michael Swirsky and Jonathan Chipman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 80

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 84

“harmful,” both to the individual and, ultimately, to the larger community.¹⁶³ Rather than indulge in lofty dreams that pose actual hazards to the integrity of the State of Israel and, indeed, to Judaism itself, Harkabi urges religious Likud members to remember the Torah’s calls for humility and moderation. For the lifelong soldier, a “religious consciousness” cannot be achieved through intransigence and conquest, but rather through, “...the recognition of our [human] limitations.”¹⁶⁴ The Jewish people boast great wisdom, generosity and initiative, but they are nonetheless only human. Harkabi reminds this ideological camp that, “only the Messiah...will make the proclamation of the Redemption of Israel,” and that, “no Jew can...assume the role of the Messiah.”¹⁶⁵ This ideology, Harkabi warns, is not only dangerous to the Arabs, for whom Israeli sympathy is not in great supply, but for the integrity of Israel as a legitimate state. As the former general elaborates, “those who claim to be representatives of the Redemption...are prone to imagine that they are above the...law,” which, “undermines the foundations of justice.”¹⁶⁶

The secular Jewish members of Likud, Harkabi critiques, espouse an ethnocentric view of the conflict that poses great danger to the State of Israel. As the former intelligence chief warns, this jaundiced worldview was, “destined to lead to error in understanding world events,” which ultimately, “leads to strategic mistakes.”¹⁶⁷ This mindset is bound to cause overconfidence in one’s capability to achieve one’s goal, thus leading to the externalization of

¹⁶³ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 112

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 121

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 151

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 152

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 134

blame in the event of failure.¹⁶⁸ In this way, the Likud emphasis on the greatness of the Israel Defense Forces actually serves to harm this institution, in that it prevents honest self-reflection and the ability to learn from past mistakes. In addition, the chauvinism of this mindset will inevitably alienate the rest of the international community, leaving Israel in the strategically impossible position of standing alone against the rest of the world. Such a mindset, therefore, runs contrary to the very methods by which the State of Israel was created and, moreover, the interdependent nature of modern international relations.¹⁶⁹ Harkabi, himself a secular Israeli, extolls the virtues of secular politics, asserting that, “it is...the secularization of Jewish identity that enables Zionism.” If Zionism is to continue to be a relevant and defensible ideology, therefore, it must do away with these supremacist strands of thought and promote a more comprehensive and level headed view of the world, such as that demonstrated by Ben-Gurion.¹⁷⁰

International support is, as such, of vital importance for Dr. Harkabi. From the time of Israel’s creation until President Sadat’s visit, the Jewish State’s initial strategic error was not doing more to reveal the vitriol and bigotry of the Arab position to the rest of the world. Since the events of 1967, however, Israel’s graver mistake has been her lack of clear and rational policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories. The grievances on the two sides of the conflict now, seemingly, more “symmetrical,” the international community has become even less receptive to Israel’s claims of victimhood than before.¹⁷¹ So long as the Likud’s policies on the Territories persist, Harkabi cautions, Israelis will unwittingly serve as, “propaganda agents for the Arabs,

¹⁶⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 134

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 137

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 138

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 139

particularly for the PLO,” as images and accounts of the occupation spread throughout the world. As the wellbeing of the Jewish State is greatly reliant on the charitable and commercial support of international Jewry and on Jewish immigration to their ancestral homeland, it is incumbent on Israel to maintain a good reputation with at least the majority of the international community.¹⁷² It is, therefore, within Israel’s best interests to take the necessary steps to responsibly withdraw from the West Bank, including negotiate with the PLO.¹⁷³

This is not to say that Dr. Harkabi considers the PLO an ideal partner for peace. As he comments: “I have described the Arab position as harsh. I see no need to retract my previous analysis.”¹⁷⁴ Rather, he considers the threat posed by the Palestinian militant group to be of less concern than that posed by the continuation of current Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Territories. While Harkabi concedes that Israel’s military presence in the West Bank does address some of Israel’s security needs, including, “the strategic advantage of removing violent threats,” to the country, as well as increasing her strategic depth, this policy is bound to ultimately end the Zionist dream and replace it with that of the PLO.¹⁷⁵ Specifically, the former general is concerned with demographics, believing that the annexation of the West Bank would bring about parity between the Jewish and Arab populations in Israel. Such an eventuality would inevitably lead to the cessation of Israel as either a Jewish or democratic state. Harkabi warns that, “Staying in the territories...would lead to the creation of a shared Arab-Jewish entity,” thus effectively creating the, “secular, democratic Palestinian state,” that the PLO

¹⁷² Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 141

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, 167

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 165

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 168

championed.¹⁷⁶ In the meantime, the status quo is unsustainable. Internationally, foreign-born Jews are cautious to leave the security of their homes in many parts of the world for a country portrayed as under siege by much of the media.¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, domestically, the Israeli Jews may increasingly consider emigration in order to escape the tension and uncertainty characteristic of life in the Jewish State. As such, though the professor concedes that, “leaving the West Bank and Gaza...will create dangers,” as these territories could potentially be used as, “[bases] for terrorist forays against Israel,” this possibility is still preferable to continuing the occupation or, worse, annexing these areas.¹⁷⁸ This is to say that while it is not ideal to have one’s foe standing at one’s doorstep, this is still preferable to having the latter in one’s home.

Harkabi thus stresses the need for Israelis to act immediately to right the trajectory of their country’s ideology and policies. Doing so will be both difficult and painful, as Jewish communities in the Palestinian Territories will have to be uprooted and the status of Jerusalem as the united capital of the State of Israel may have to be compromised.¹⁷⁹ However, time is not on the Jews’ side, and they must work quickly to make these changes, and these changes are the only means of ensuring a workable peace. As Harkabi observes, the PLO and the Hashemite monarchy, once bitter enemies, moved toward reconciliation, largely because of their mutual concerns vis-à-vis Israel.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, in Cairo, political parties opposed to the Camp David agreement were becoming more vocal as the political realities within the Palestinian Territories fell short of the assurances made by Prime Minister Begin. As Harkabi

¹⁷⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983),, 168

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 169

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 167

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 171

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 171

warns, “Egyptian disappointment with the peace [with Israel] will deter any other Arab countries...from following Egypt’s example.”¹⁸¹ The peace agreement with Jordan was, of course, still several years away. Moreover, the attitude of the international community, as embodied in the legislation of the United Nations General Assembly, was increasingly embracing the Palestinians and turning against Israel. That Israel refuses to allow the Palestinians a state of their own is seen as selfish, paranoid and egotistical by many of the world’s states.¹⁸² Indeed, as Harkabi observes, Palestine is recognized by more countries worldwide than is Israel.¹⁸³ Though, Harkabi admits, “The UN does not represent international morality,” being comprised of numerous states with dubious histories of their own, the organization’s “resolutions do carry weight,” in terms of how its member-states treat those berated by the General Assembly.¹⁸⁴ The young, tiny State of Israel, as such, was compelled by both domestic and international concerns, according to Dr. Gen. Harkabi, to negotiate with the PLO and withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and allow for the creation of a Palestinian State therein, despite the potential future consequences.

¹⁸¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Bar-Kokhba Syndrome* (Chappaqua: Rossel Books, 1983), 177

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 172

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 172

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 172

Chapter Five: The Machiavellian Dove

Dr. Harkabi began as a stalwart of the Israeli right wing but gradually transitioned more to the left of the political spectrum, ultimately becoming, in his words, a “Machiavellian dove.” His earliest academic papers, particularly his doctoral thesis, Arab Attitudes Toward Israel, illustrate the violent nature of the Palestine Liberation Organization in its early days. However, as Harkabi’s later works explain, political realities, notably Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, led to the softening of Arab rhetoric and policies vis-à-vis the struggle with Israel. By the end of his life, Harkabi concluded that it was Israel’s leaders and their policies, largely those of the Likud party, who were most responsible for the continuation of the conflict with the Palestinians. Specifically, Harkabi viewed Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank and the growth of the settlement enterprise as the greatest obstacle to the realization of a meaningful peace agreement. As such, rather than enhance Israel’s security, the settlements and the ideology behind them were actually, for Harkabi, detrimental to the state. Between his final major work on the conflict, Israel’s Fateful Hour, and the interviews he conducted throughout the late 1980s, Harkabi emphasizes and reemphasizes these points, in the hope that his beloved country would heed his warning.

In the 1986 interview of Harkabi by Edward Grossman, entitled “Israel Should Negotiate with the PLO,” the Hebrew University professor identifies the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only viable partner in peacemaking available to Israel.¹⁸⁵ Initially officially bent on violently overthrowing the Jewish State, the PLO, according to Harkabi, had become more moderate and thus, while still deeply imperfect, represented the best opportunity for realizing the

¹⁸⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Edward Grossman, “Israel Should Negotiate with the PLO,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 1 (1986) 178

two-state solution and the aversion of a demographic catastrophe.¹⁸⁶ Harkabi also stresses the need for Israel to take urgent diplomatic action, so as to take advantage of the strong negotiating position Israel enjoyed at the time, as time did not seem to be on Israel's side. Regarding the PLO's attitude toward its Covenant, which explicitly calls for violent resistance against Israel, Harkabi states that, "[the PLO] will never change their Covenant...but they can consign it to oblivion"; a step, Harkabi adds, "...some [within the PLO] have started to do...as part of a change which has come over many Arabs..."¹⁸⁷ This is not to say that Yasser Arafat and his compatriots had given-up on the dream of a Palestinian state from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, but rather that the Palestinian leadership had learned to be more realistic about their goals and the consequences of continuing the resistance.¹⁸⁸ Israel was obliged, in turn, to capitalize on this new Palestinian pragmatism, in the form of making the necessary negotiations to end Israel's presence in the West Bank in exchange for peace. Failure to act on this momentous opportunity would have serious repercussions for Israel, Harkabi warned, as "in the past, [Israel] gained from postponing a solution. Now, the longer we wait, the worse off we'll be."¹⁸⁹ Already in 1986, Harkabi felt that while leaving the West Bank would be "unpleasant," staying there—i.e., continuing to put faith in the failed ideas of the Revisionist Zionist camp—would result in nothing short of national "suicide" for Israel.¹⁹⁰

Harkabi continues this campaign against Revisionists in an interview by Salim Tamari, entitled "Choosing Between Bad and Worse." For the professor, such ideologues suffered collectively from a seriously skewed worldview in which, "the internal reality of will" was given

¹⁸⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Edward Grossman, "Israel Should Negotiate with the PLO," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 1 (1986), 178

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 178

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 179

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 178

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 180

greater consideration in policy decisions than “the external reality of effects.”¹⁹¹ In other words, disciples of Jabotinsky gave greater weight to their dogmatic ambitions than to concrete political calculations in pursuing their agenda. In the meantime, the ongoing developments in the West Bank were giving birth to a new generation of Palestinians who, Harkabi feared, would not be as passive toward the occupation as they viewed their parents’ generation to be.¹⁹² In the long-term, this would mean the rise of a new PLO leadership far more militantly anti-Israel in nature than the Arafat crowd.

In lieu of any apparent calculations by the Likud, Harkabi lays-out two scenarios for the future of Israel: one wherein the Jewish State makes the smart, realistic move of negotiating with the PLO; the other, where Israel continues its policies in the West Bank and suffers the resulting consequences. In the former scenario, the Israeli leadership sits down with moderate Palestinian leaders who realize that their own self-interests are served through diplomacy, rather than armed struggle. The final outcome of this scenario is the creation of a Palestinian state and, ostensibly, the peaceful resolution of the conflict.¹⁹³ In the second scenario, the settlement enterprise continues its campaign of expansion and Israel is forced to devote increasingly greater resources and otherwise embroil itself further in the Palestinian Territory. The inevitable outcome of this scenario, Harkabi asserts, is a demographic catastrophe for Israel, with the number of Arabs under its jurisdiction dwarfing the Jewish one.¹⁹⁴ This, of course, would effectively mean the end of Israel as a Jewish State—i.e., the end of the Zionist enterprise.

¹⁹¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Salim Tamari, “Choosing Between Bad and Worse,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 3 (1987) 43

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 47

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 46

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 47

Dr. Harkabi's 1988 article, "A Policy for the Moment of Truth," further excoriates the Likud, not just for their unrealistic policies but also for the means by which they rally the support of the Israeli public, in the first place. Rather than appeal to the voters' sensibilities and willingness to make serious sacrifices for the greater good, the Likud communications workers exploited their countrymen's fear and anger for political gain. Prime Minister Begin, for instance, would often assert that abandoning the West Bank would pose a "mortal danger" to all of Israel,¹⁹⁵ while his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, condemned diplomacy as an act of "suicide."¹⁹⁶ To complement this fear-inducing rhetoric, the Likud also provided assurance that their policies would not only bring peace, but also increase the physical size of the state¹⁹⁷—i.e., a virtual win-win for Israel. Harkabi, on the other hand, foresees Likud's policy as actually likely to bring about a loss of Israeli territorial sovereignty. Classifying Likud's goals as "unattainable" and "delusional," Harkabi calculates that the massive investment of funds and personnel into the West Bank will translate to fewer resources available to maintain effective control over areas within Israel proper with large Arab populations, namely the Galilee region.¹⁹⁸

Dr. Harkabi expands on this hypothetical doomsday scenario for Israel, which includes both internal and external conflict. Domestically, the Arab demographic will come to be at least half of the total Israeli population, if not the majority therein.¹⁹⁹ This possibility is of great concern to Harkabi, who states that, "...[Israel] cannot take for granted the long-term existence of a Jewish state in which half of population is Arab."²⁰⁰ Such an event could potentially lead to

¹⁹⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, "A Policy for the Moment of Truth," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 3 (1988) 86

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 86

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 83

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 84

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 81

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 81

civil war between the Jewish and Arab Israeli communities, similar to the intra-communal bloodshed that took place during the Mandate period. Such an event, moreover, would not go unnoticed by Israel's neighbors. As Harkabi warns, "the hell that develops here will boil over into the further hell of war with the Arab states...the peace with Egypt will collapse and we will have to divide our army between two fronts."²⁰¹ The civil conflict within Israel, as such, would potentially bring about a scenario similar to the military nightmare of the Yom Kippur War of 1973—a conflict that profoundly shook the country's confidence in its government, intelligence services and armed forces.

In addition to once again calling for moderation and urgent action by the Likud, Harkabi draws on his knowledge set from years in the military to further justify negotiations with the PLO. On the one hand, the solution of the conflict through diplomatic, rather than military-, means will ultimately serve to marginalize, and thus largely neutralize, the extremist elements among the Palestinian population. As Harkabi puts it, "a political settlement eventually uproots vicious dreams and cancels them out, while lack of a political accommodation establishes and reinforces them."²⁰² On the other hand, Harkabi dismisses the security merits of the Allon Plan and its claims of defensible borders and places his faith in the competence and effectiveness of the IDF. On the physical dimensions of the state and their security ramifications in the event of a two-state solution, Harkabi writes, "with difficulty, a state can defend poor borders, of the kind we will have after withdrawing from the West Bank...but it cannot defend itself if half its population is loyal to the enemy."²⁰³ The idea, moreover, that the Palestinian leadership could be persuaded to create borders more favorable for Israel is, for Harkabi, utterly foolish, as the

²⁰¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, "A Policy for the Moment of Truth," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 3 (1988) 81

²⁰² *Ibid*, 80

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 82

international community supports the PLO's call for 1967 borders and, with time, may even support borders more favorable for the Palestinians. The conflict, Harkabi notes, has become blatantly asymmetrical, with the Israelis boasting greater arms and expanding their territorial claims on the one side, and the Palestinians seeming to only possess hand weapons and a message of coexistence. The longer this asymmetry continues, Harkabi fears, the greater the inclination of the international community will be to support the Palestinian cause.²⁰⁴

The evolution of the Palestinian cause and the means by which it is championed are further discussed in Robert Friedman's 1989 interview of Dr. Harkabi, "Israel's Fateful Hour." Harkabi does not deny that the PLO used terrorism for the purpose of bringing global attention to the issue of Palestine. Indeed, the international relations scholar concedes that, "...the Palestinians have succeeded in attracting attention through terrorism..."²⁰⁵ However, Dr. Harkabi argues that such acts of terror have largely been the result of gross offenses by the Likud-led governments vis-à-vis the Territories. At past junctures, when the Palestinian leadership tried diplomatic means, Israel blocked such measures from bearing fruit. The unfortunate consequence has been that, "the Palestinians have learned...[that] political means don't always deliver," and as such, "they have had to resort to [terrorism] because otherwise no one would pay attention to them."²⁰⁶ On the other side, Harkabi charges, the Likud have purposefully overblown the Palestinians' drive to commit terrorism, as a means of discrediting the latter as a partner in peacemaking.

In reality, according to the Hebrew University professor, "...[Israelis] suffer little terrorism," and moreover, "the issue of terrorism...has been deliberately exaggerated by Israel's

²⁰⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi, "A Policy for the Moment of Truth," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 3 (1988) 83

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 362

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 362

leaders...to distort [the Israeli view of Palestinians], presenting them as perpetrators of despicable acts.” While there are still, Harkabi admits, elements among the Palestinian population who genuinely seek to perpetrate acts of terror against Israel, the Likud-created generalization that all Palestinians are terrorists, which Harkabi refers to as the “Terrorization of the Palestinians,” ultimately prevents any possibility of negotiations and, as such, the continuation of the conflict.²⁰⁷ Worst of all, Israeli leaders, according to Harkabi, are fully aware of the Palestinians’ desire for a political solution to the conflict. It is precisely because of this awareness and the ramifications for their Greater Israel ideology, in fact, that the right wing labels the PLO a terrorist organization.²⁰⁸ By doing so, the Revisionists prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and keep their delusional goals alive.

These actions by the Likud are not benign in their consequences for the Palestinians or Israel. A political solution to the conflict depends on the viability of the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This legitimacy is only ensured so long as the PLO, particularly Yassir Arafat, is considered an entity that can yield the results desired by the Palestinians. Therefore, moves by Begin and others to ignore or otherwise discredit Arafat and the PLO serve to benefit the extremists among the Palestinians, who claim that diplomacy will solve nothing.²⁰⁹ The PLO, itself, is not a monolithic entity, but rather a conglomerate of several organizations, including militant ones that do not always follow his authority.²¹⁰ As such, the marginalization of the Palestinian leader and de facto validation of the extremist ideology can have dire consequences for Israelis. Arafat, Harkabi argues, proved that he could be a reliable partner for peace, even before the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993. Specifically, the

²⁰⁷ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Robert I. Friedman, “Israel’s Fateful Hour,” *World Policy Journal* 6, no. 2 (1989), 363

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 362

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 362

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, 366

Palestinian Declaration of Independence of 1988 recognizes and accepts UN Resolution 181, the Resolution that partitioned the Palestine Mandate into two states—one Arab, the other Jewish. This concession on the part of the signatories to the Declaration all but declares, in turn, their recognition of the State of Israel.²¹¹

The significance of this document is not, as Harkabi notes, lost on Israel's greatest ally, the United States. Whereas Israel continued to label the PLO a terrorist organization and officially refuse any direct communication with the latter, the U.S. expressed a willingness to dialogue with Arafat. Moreover, Washington, Harkabi believed, was, "prepared to distinguish between terrorist actions carried out by the PLO under Arafat," which would seriously compromise American connections with the PLO, and "actions carried-out by extremists...like Abu Nidal and Abu Musa," which were tragic but not sanctioned by the Palestinian leadership.²¹² Should these communications bear fruit and lead to more open relations between the U.S. and the Palestinians, Harkabi feared that the future of the Israeli-American relationship could become compromised. Such a development would be truly devastating for Israeli national security, as opposed to the cession of the West Bank, which would be a comparatively trivial complication for the country's security apparatus.

Harkabi justifies this claim by discussing the importance of territory as a consideration in security thinking. As the professor states, "I won't say that geography isn't an important factor, as far as Israel's security is concerned. But it's not the only consideration...it is not [even] the most important consideration."²¹³ Harkabi also asserts that he is not the only member of the security community who fails to see any significance in the occupation of the West Bank.

²¹¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Robert I. Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," *World Policy Journal* 6, no. 2 (1989) 361

²¹² *Ibid*, 366

²¹³ *Ibid*, 367

According to the former IDF intelligence chief, “many reservists in the High Command...will tell you that we can withdraw,” from the West Bank and not, in any way, compromise national security.²¹⁴ Indeed, referring back to the issue of demography and the threat potentially posed by an Arab majority in Israel, Harkabi concludes that, “...if you take a comprehensive view of security...you will come to the conclusion that we have to relinquish the West Bank.”²¹⁵

The final interview of Harkabi before his death in 1994, appropriately titled “The Last Reminiscence,” provides insight on the relationship between security and the settlements from the birth of the State of Israel to the 1990’s. Reflecting on the Ben-Gurion years, Harkabi admits that, “the issue of the settlements was very important,” as “the [major] security problem [for Israel] was that of infiltration by individuals.”²¹⁶ Even after the 1967 War, Harkabi did not, he believed, outright dismiss the security benefits supposedly provided by the settlements. Instead, in his time in the Ministry of Defense, he wrote that Israel simply had to be, “very careful with the settlements, and only agree to those settlements we were absolutely certain would remain.”²¹⁷ What the young Harkabi did refute, however, was the underlying logic of the Allon Plan. According to the professor, “[the notion of] ‘defensible borders’ is meaningless,” because “...some borders are easier to defend than others, and that changes with the development of technology.”²¹⁸ As such, “the Allon Plan was a non-starter from Day One.”²¹⁹

The ailing academic also makes clear that his issues with former Prime Minister Begin started out as purely ideological, but later became personal. Describing his one-time boss as

²¹⁴ Yehoshafat Harkabi and Robert I. Friedman, “Israel’s Fateful Hour,” *World Policy Journal* 6, no. 2 (1989) 367

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 367

²¹⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom, “The Last Reminiscence: January 14, 1994,” *Israel Studies* 1, no. 1 (1996) 173

²¹⁷ *Ibid*, 186

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, 192

²¹⁹ *Ibid*, 192

“awfully generous,” the interviewee discusses how he nonetheless had to resign his post over ideological differences.²²⁰ Whereas Begin was clear in his intention to hold onto Judea and Samaria, Harkabi already considered such a scenario to be nothing short of impossible.²²¹ Moreover, the costs of even attempting to realize such a scenario led Israel to take on huge resource costs—costs that will only continue to grow, regardless of which direction the settlement enterprise takes. Should the construction and expansion of the settlements continue and the settler populations grow, billions of shekels and countless personnel will be devoted to maintaining the accompanying infrastructure and security measures. Even in the supposedly best-case scenario, wherein the settlements are dismantled and the settlers brought back to Israel proper, the costs of the repatriation project will be astronomical. By Harkabi’s math, which only factored the roughly 25 thousand families in the West Bank at the time, offering each household between “one hundred- and two hundred thousand dollars,” would total a sum of seven to eight billion dollars.²²² There is also the matter of the social consequences the return of the settlers to Israel would mean for the State. As Harkabi frames it, this mass return would mean, “130 thousand mystics and dreamers...wandering around [Israel], either blaming those who authorized the settlements in the first place...or else blaming those who [had] them removed.”²²³ Harkabi concludes his thoughts on the Likud by stating that, “if you are a politician and you do something that is unrealistic, you’re guilty of immorality of immorality, because you cause...suffering.”²²⁴

²²⁰ Yehoshafat Harkabi, Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom, “The Last Reminiscence: January 14, 1994,” *Israel Studies* 1, no. 1 (1996), 177

²²¹ *Ibid*, 177

²²² *Ibid*, 186

²²³ *Ibid*, 187

²²⁴ *Ibid*, 187

Perhaps the most surprising aspect to this last interview of Harkabi is the opinions he expresses about Yitzhak Rabin. While the late Prime Minister is famous for signing the Oslo accords and seemingly taking the first real steps toward a two-state solution, Harkabi asserts that Rabin was actually not significantly different, ideologically/politically, from Begin or Shamir.²²⁵ In fact, according to the now late Harkabi, not even Rabin believed that there would ever be a Palestinian state.²²⁶ For this reason, Harkabi argued that Rabin's mindset was ultimately no different from that of the settlers. Policy-wise, this meant, "every detail [Rabin insisted] on [in his plan] will be good for no more than two years."²²⁷

Looking at the Arab side of the equation, Harkabi is content with his thoughts on the Palestinians in the early days, regretful for the state in which the Palestinians are locked, and nervous of their future and its implications for Israel. On the calculations made in the Ben-Gurion days, Harkabi states that, "I don't think we made any fundamental errors in our assessment of Arab hostility [at the time], nor did we exaggerate it."²²⁸ Rather, Harkabi claims that it was only after his time at the Defense Ministry ended that the moderation of the Arab leaderships took place and new assessments by the intelligence community were needed.²²⁹ Harkabi admits that David Ben-Gurion was, "against the Arabs," but only in a strictly political sense, as compared to the "self-righteous" mentality espoused by the Likud, which views "Arab opposition as a crime."²³⁰ The status quo at the time of this last interview was, to Harkabi, dangerous, creating, "...a Palestinian state...under the worst possible conditions, with a lot of

²²⁵ Yehoshafat Harkabi, Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom, "The Last Reminiscence: January 14, 1994," *Israel Studies* 1, no. 1 (1996), 189

²²⁶ *Ibid*, 189

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 190

²²⁸ *Ibid*, 180

²²⁹ *Ibid*, 180

²³⁰ *Ibid*, 188

bad blood.”²³¹ Rather than take concrete steps toward reconciliation, or at least de-escalation, the Palestinians in the West Bank have yet to see any fundamental changes, except perhaps the increase in the militancy of the settlers.²³² This aggression on the part of Israelis in the West Bank will ultimately only lead to the empowerment of extremist groups among the Palestinians and the continuation of the conflict. It is up to the Israeli leadership to correct this trajectory, as “...foresight is the moral obligation of a leader.”²³³

As an individual of great repute in both the military and academic realms, Dr. Yehoshafat Harkabi became a vital voice of criticism against the Likud/Revisionist ideology and the settlement enterprise it supported. In the last few years of his life, Dr. Harkabi spoke the most openly and harshly against the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict away from any potential realization of the two-state solution. Though he was no great lover of the PLO and Yasser Arafat, he nonetheless identified them as the only viable partner for achieving a political solution to the bloodshed. Not overly enthusiastic about the physical boundaries of the State of Israel in the event of the creation of an independent Palestinian state, he considered this the far lesser evil to the catastrophe of continuing the occupation. Not greatly impressed with the Labor party, he called for them and the Israeli intelligentsia to appeal to the rationality of the Israeli Jewish populace, rather than exploit its fears. One can only imagine how he might feel about the state of the Israeli political, military, diplomatic and academic fields in the twenty-first century.

²³¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom, “The Last Reminiscence: January 14, 1994,” *Israel Studies* 1, no. 1 (1996), 188

²³² *Ibid*, 189

²³³ *Ibid*, 188

Conclusion: A Different World?

As this paper has discussed, the political realignment of Dr. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi was, in some respects, sudden and drastic while, in other aspects, very slight. So far as Harkabi surmised over the course of his life, the attitude of the Arab world—the complex of ideas and emotions that fueled their drive toward politicide—remained largely unchanged, overall, from the creation of the State of Israel until the 1980s. The PLO may have ultimately been Israel's best chance for a partner in peace at the end of the twentieth century but, so far as the Hebrew U. professor could tell, they still harbored a deep hatred for Jews and the State of Israel. Moreover, Harkabi still saw parts of the West Bank as beneficial for Israel's national security and thus, in a better situation, worthy of holding onto. However, when presented with the options of leaving the Palestinian Territories and keeping the State of Israel alive, or annexing the West Bank and bringing the Jewish State into a demographic crisis, Harkabi considers the former option the best one. What changed, however, was the character of the politicians leading the Jewish State and her neighbors. The Arab world had become more moderate in its official diplomatic and political stances, whilst the Israeli government had become more intransigent and strategically inflexible.

Alas, Dr. Harkabi's works largely failed to make serious impressions upon the Israeli public or government spheres during his lifetime. A descendant of leftist Zionist political elites, a proud member of the Labor old guard, secular and university-educated, Dr. Harkabi, in many

ways, embodied all that the Likud and its supporters bemoaned of the Labor government. That this non-Orthodox Jew was, moreover, calling for Israel to once again show restraint, rather than capitalize on her strength and realize God's plan for the Chosen People, no doubt added to the Likud constituency's ire for him. In addition, the combination of theoretical, intellectual and military lexicon in his works often creates the impression that the late general is talking down to his readers, as opposed to speaking with them on equal terms. This may be attributed to Harkabi's aversion to participation in the political process. Though he held numerous positions in the government and military, the former general never sought elected office like numerous other IDF officers did. In this way, the 'Machiavellian Dove' became an inhabitant of the proverbial "ivory tower" of academia, commenting on the events and trends of his society without committing to action in the public sphere. Meanwhile, his ideological opponent, Menachem Begin, remained a frequent fixture of the early Israeli political scene, making himself as noticed and recognizable as possible to the Israeli electorate. Rather than speak down to his followers about the need for responsibility and restraint, Begin encouraged them to show boldness against the Arab world and pursue their dreams of a reunified Greater Israel. Faced with the choice of following the ideas put forth by an obscure academic or the exhilarating calls to action by their Prime Minister, Israelis opted to show loyalty to their elected leader. More pointedly, when presented with the choice of either offering territorial concessions to the Arab world or bolstering the IDF, the Israeli electorate chose the latter.

In light of the historical context of the 1977 election, in particular the elation of the 1967 War and the shock of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli public's reluctance to offer concessions to their sworn enemies is understandable. Though Israel did eventually agree to

the Oslo accords, seemingly in line with Dr. Harkabi's recommendations, the bloody aftermath of this treaty has since returned the Jewish State to the embrace of the Likud party. Moreover, the settlement enterprise has only grown since Dr. Harkabi's death and the entrance of such parties as Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Palestinian political realm has greatly complicated efforts for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership. That the Gaza Strip and West Bank are governed by two separate Palestinian organizations would likely come as a great shock to the late professor, who only ever considers peace agreements with the PLO. These developments are but the most obvious in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since Harkabi's death in 1994, with countless other elements further complicating the overall situation there.

Nonetheless, I believe Dr. Harkabi would still, largely, continue to stress the need for negotiations and territorial withdrawal. As there are no indications that the international community is likely to become more lenient in its views on the Jewish State, the circumstances in the West Bank continue to be unsustainable and the Israeli right continues to dominate the country's political scene, in many ways, the geopolitical realities of 2016 are not so greatly different from those of Harkabi's time. Moreover, the fact that such individuals as those interviewed in "The Gatekeepers," and other members or former members of Israel's security and intelligence communities echo Dr. Harkabi's recommendations provides evidence that while the strategy is not at all new, it still has validity.

A secular former general and intelligence advisor, Dr. Harkabi largely avoided indulging in myths, either religious or nationalist, except to openly and systematically refute those who employed such myths for their own political goals. Harkabi's writings largely revolve around military and political theory and observation, rather than on any of the propaganda of the

Zionist mainstream. The late professor only devotes significant effort to the Bar-Kokhba myth, and it is unlikely he would have done so if Prime Minister Begin and the Likud not devoted equal—if not greater—resources to propagating this myth, in the first place. In this way, the disagreement between PM Begin and Dr. Harkabi may be seen as a next step in the early clashes between Begin and Ben-Gurion. Under Ben-Gurion's leadership, the Likud and Revisionist Zionism boasted relatively limited influence in the pre-state Jewish community and the early years of statehood. As such, Ben-Gurion and his ilk needed only to maintain the status quo of the time and refute what was then a more marginal and extreme form of Jewish nationalism. In the aftermath of the Six-Day- and Yom Kippur Wars, on the other hand, the Likud became a far more appealing camp to much of the Israeli electorate, thus complicating matters for more Labor-inclined Zionists, such as Harkabi. Put another way, Ben-Gurion needed only to keep Begin in-check; Harkabi, meanwhile, sought to turn back the pro-Likud tide of his day, to roughly the pre-1967 circumstances, with some alterations. Specifically, in Harkabi's mind, Ben-Gurion failed to adequately expose the heinousness of the Arab attitude to the world, whereas Begin often, for Harkabi, overstated it.

For Dr. Harkabi, the only significant difference in the national divisions within the Arab world was that of proximity to Israel and, in turn, the Arab-Israeli conflict. In intra-state matters, this often determined the prominence of the conflict on the domestic politics of each Arab state, with geographically closer states often more passionately, outspokenly anti-Zionist than more distant ones. Otherwise, overall, Harkabi saw little significant difference between the various Arab states: their populaces all shared roughly the same ethnic, religious and cultural Arab identity—an identity, Harkabi notes, also shared by the Palestinians. For this

reason, as well as demography, Harkabi places relatively little value on borders, with the exception of those to encompass a future, post-peace Agreement State of Israel. So long as the State's security needs are met, the borders, for Harkabi, are details fully open to negotiation. Likewise, so long as the Palestinians are able to realize a more agreeable modus vivendi, such as a Palestinian region—as opposed to a full state—the exact borders of a future Levant are fully negotiable. Ultimately, the fact that Dr. Harkabi consistently avoided participating in the political process and, moreover, appeared to embody all that the dominant Likud culture opposed, all but ensured that his following remained relatively small. Representative democracy is not for the shy or the reclusive.

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- Harkabi, Yehoshafat, and Misha Louvish. *Arab Attitudes to Israel*. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972. This is Dr. Harkabi's first major published work, comprised primarily of his doctoral dissertation by the same name, with some additions. In this piece, it is clear that, from the general's perspective, the primary threat to the State of Israel is posed by the Arab world. This geopolitical camp harbors a deep and complex hostility toward the Jewish State, and intends to wipe-out the state in an act Harkabi refers to as, "politicide."
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- Harkabi, Yehoshafat. *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*. New York: Free Press, 1977. Dr. Harkabi's third book on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This also marks the last time Harkabi's primary concern for Israel's national security would originate outside the

borders of Israel. In many ways, this book is a reiteration of the first two pieces, making very similar policy recommendations and seeing little significant change in the Arab attitude toward Israel. Israeli politics are covered slightly in this piece, though not nearly as passionately or extensively as in his later writings.

Harkabi, Yehoshafat. *Israel's Fateful Hour*. Translated by Lenn Schramm. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Dr. Harkabi's final book on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In light of the disasters to befall Israel under Likud leadership, the former general calls for the return of pragmatism and cooperation in Israeli political thinking. Though the Arab world is still, overall, hostile to the Jewish State, the threat posed by this camp pales in comparison to the harm right-wing politics has done, and will continue to do, to Israel. In particular, Israel's policies toward the West Bank are especially dangerous to the former's wellbeing. To avert a major crisis, Harkabi recommends that Israel negotiate with the PLO and leave the Territories.

Harkabi, Yehoshafat. *Palestinians and Israel*. Jerusalem: Keter Pub. House, 1974.

Dr. Harkabi's second piece specifically on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this piece, Harkabi transitions from an assessment of the Arab world, as a whole--as he did in *Arab Attitudes*--to one specifically on the Palestinians. Overall, his conclusions remain the same: the Arabs are still poised to destroy Israel, the only question is how they portray this conviction. Whereas before they were more blunt, Arab leaders now use euphemisms to conceal their true desires. To combat this threat, Harkabi calls for Israel to announce its readiness to leave the West Bank, if only for tactical reasons.

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