Ethics in Planning in the Jewish Communal Service Professions

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The language and, therefore, the actions of Jewish community workers must be formulated and based in Jewish customs, traditions, and laws. The adoption of a Judaic framework for the moral language of planners in the Jewish communal services ought to be simple. But it is far from simple for a variety of reasons.

Planning in the Jewish service professions seems to be more concerned than ever with management techniques, political roles, and career advancement. All of these are fundamentally part of professional life for the planner, and should be so. All have languages of their own, and the language of politics is substantially different from the language of management. Each has its purpose, and each has its limits. As these facets of the planning system are expanded, the ethical framework in which all decisions are made seems to be discussed less, understood less, and the awareness that ethics are a concern at all seems not to touch some decisions, individuals, or institutions.

This paper discusses the necessity for a keen awareness of the ethical framework for planning in Jewish communal service professions. It cannot prescribe such a framework, nor should it, but rather the issues involved in discussing ethics in this field are outlined. Indeed, one of the major points of this paper is that ethical discussions at all are rare, much less a definition of the codes, principles, and traditions that should guide planning decisions. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that these ethical guides are implicitly understood, or universally known and accepted. Such assumptions weaken the ability to reaffirm and explore ethical decisions because serious discussions and debates concerning the moral character of planning problems and dilemmas are precluded.

This paper proceeds by stating a number of propositions and discussing them in some detail. These propositions are the following:

1) All planning is an ethical activity.
2) Planning and politics are not the same.
3) A good planner uses skills of the trade to operate within the political system. The planner must be in the political system, but not of it.
4) Professionals have a moral calling, but the guides for behavior are not likely to be found in the profession.
5) The language and, therefore, the actions of Jewish community workers must be formulated and based in Jewish customs, traditions, and laws.

Each of these propositions is discussed in some detail in the following sections.

All Planning Is an Ethical Activity

All planning is, by definition, goal oriented, a set of activities designed to achieve desired outcomes. Goals are usually an expression of a set of values, which distinguish and calibrate relative worth. It is through systems of ethics, the disciplines that deal with good and bad, and moral duties and obligations that values are determined. Either an absolute standard of "goodness" or hierarchy of goods are the means by
which morality is determined, a moral order to the universe, a spiritual or mystic confirmation of that which is good or bad.

Goals and values are usually part of the language that is associated with planning, rather than moral duties or definitions of goodness. Yet the “good,” the public good, the religious good, the social good, are the guiding forces of all planning.

The deliberate aspect of planning, along with a sense of the “good,” is a key component in this activity. All planning, in addition to being “good-seeking,” is purposeful. That is to say that the achievement of good outcomes is the consequence of deliberate action. While a moral order is assumed to be attainable, it is not to be so without purposeful effort.

Planning must be purposeful; otherwise, it has no direction and no logical conclusion. If good outcomes are achieved by random wandering, this cannot be described as planning, even if we get somewhere by doing “something long enough.”

Being both purposeful and future oriented, planning may be characterized as utopian seeking, and planners as utopian builders. Since we do not live in a utopian world, nor is it very likely to be achieved in the near future, planners are of necessity in the position of advocating unrealistic goals. That is not to say that the goals are unattainable, but rather that they are not likely to be achieved within existing frameworks or structures, either theoretical or structural:

There ... are ideological currents within planning, those linked to its utopian aspects, which tend to challenge the limits of the system by posing basic alternatives and unrealistic goals, unrealistic because they cannot be achieved within the limits of prevailing structures. (Author’s emphasis)

All planning has utopian aspects, and all planning takes place in a political world. We must have some sense of the unreal or impossible, as well as the feasible. Clearly, planning must be system challenging or there is little, if any, need to plan. Planners can be system maintaining if utopia is ultimately achieved.

Yet often planners believe that in order to be an effective planner, they must pose only realistic goals, or there is no hope of success. Such a posture confuses a number of issues. First, it fails to distinguish between planning and politics, which is the subject of the next section. Second, it assumes that realistic planning looks only at the more barren aspects of either a situation or system, an equation of rationality and harshness, or a real world view that considers only matters of efficiency. Benveniste, in his treatise on the Politics of Expertise and the role of the planner notes:

When experts undertake analysis, they often adopt the posture of “realists.” Reality, in this context, is “hardnosed” reality; it usually involves a simplified image of humanity, say “economic” man and woman or “exchange and power” man and woman. Since experts still think they are agents of efficiency instead of inventors of the future, their calculus of rationality reflects theories of behavior that are necessarily simplified.

In planning, evaluation, or policy analysis, this results in downgrading certain concepts such as aesthetic norms, love, or even ideologies.

Disregard for love, poetry, art, ideology, or other cultural attachments results in images of the future in which love, poetry, and art play a minimal part. (They may be an item of consumption in the economy but not a principle central to explaining preferences.) Since images of the future serve to orient action and thus become self-fulfilling prophecies, the architects of the future assume less than is wanted or possible. The social edifice is gradually built on limited assumptions, and, increasingly, a limited and possibly quite unattractive social world is created. The institutionalization of many planning practices can be limiting and often devoid of moral or aesthetic content, self-fulfilling stilted visions.
Indeed, a planner must avoid the limiting, and ultimately stifling practice of beginning the planning process by looking first at the "real" constraints, and what cannot be done. Such efforts are dangerously restrictive in terms of intellectual growth or social change. Planning, if it is directed toward definitions of good, must be characterized first by notions of what ought to be.

Furthermore, it is easy to make the transition from limited vision to visions devoid of any moral content, an equation between it cannot be done, or it is politically impossible, and it does not matter if it is done. Conversation and action, if pre-limited to what is possible or what is real, may eliminate discussions, or actions directed toward what should be done, or what should be attempted to achieve "good outcomes." Fear of the unknown outcome, or maintenance of the system as it is, may choke dealing with issues as an ethical matter. But this does not imply that an activity may be ethically neutral. The maintenance of a system or the rejection of change is in itself a statement of a set of moral decisions. Bokan states that, "action is in no sense neutral—it is grounded in intentions, goals, or aims."3

The choice to limit decisions of planning to "hardnose realities," is in itself an extremely powerful statement of beliefs that limits individuals, institutions, and programs.

As choices are made, the planner must help direct the systems in which decisions are made. Planning is summarized by Benveniste as policy analysis, programming, and evaluation. Each of these activities must have standards that guide them, and moral frameworks in which to judge them. Evaluation, for example, uses established and standard criteria to assess. But the criteria themselves are determined by desired outcomes; what is it that we wish to achieve? What we wish to achieve is set in the planning framework. How is it to be achieved is a political issue, and the difference between the two modes of conceptualizing and behaving are analyzed in the next section.

Planning and Politics Are Not the Same

Politics is where agendas are chosen, planning is where agendas are formulated. In this sense, as expressed in several works by Jack Dyckman, "planning and politics are not the same—planning is in politics." While the political system is designed as an arena for coordinating diverse and antagonistic interests "... and sublimating the private interests by furthering principles with the general interest..."4, planning a priori defines what that general interest, or public good must be. Some analysts of the political system would argue that the public good is the sum of the outcomes of the political process. Planning for a utopian vision of the public good supports the notion that some political outcomes are counterproductive to the public good, and some political processes ensure the absence of true planning.

On the other hand, true planning must include carefully orchestrated and conceptualized excursions into the political process. Planning cannot simply be exercises in visionary, imaginary worlds, but the combination of vision and action. Action, of course, takes place in the political arena and requires political force, technique, and constraints. This point is made by Peattie when she notes that, "Planning without a political force behind it becomes a paper exercise and politics without planning becomes a politics of symbols or personalities...."5

Forester confirms this point, noting that, "If planners ignore those in power, they assure their own powerlessness."6
The planner must operate and create within the political system; but what role should be played? How can the planner be most effective? What tools should be used? What differentiates the planner from the politician? When, as in the final scenes of Orwell's Animal Farm, do the clients look from the pigs to the humans and from the humans to the pigs, and not be able to distinguish the difference between the two? And, most importantly, what roles do ethical concerns play in the planner's intervention and participation into the political process? Ultimately, in a system of moral conflicts and ethical diversity, where interest groups, institutions, and groups of constituents compete for different goals and moral orders, some form of social coercion is necessary. Horowitz stresses this point when he notes that planning requires power, or "... there would be no need to plan if people were going to do spontaneously what the plan insisted they do authoritatively."7

Even where interests converge, the definition of the "good" society is by no means monolithic. A hierarchy of goods comprise the greater good, and a host of political, religious, and philosophic systems combine to define this good society. The pursuit of the utopian vision can be fraught with danger. Planners can make mistakes, their judgements may be poor, they may have to pursue ends that are "... antithetical to other people's purposes. The specter of Eichmann is the constant companion of the wary planner."8 Thus, the planning system continually pushes against the political constraints that may restrict progress toward utopian vision, but also serves as brakes upon excursions into negative utopias, those visions that violate the ultimate moral order. This sense supercedes decisions in the political system, and allows us to say that a political outcome is not a good one. At some point, it may even force us to challenge those outcomes and argue that Eichmann should not have executed bad law because they violated a higher moral authority. This remains the chief differentiating factor between planning and politics. Where this definition of higher authority comes from is discussed in the final section of this paper.

A good planner uses skills of the trade to operate within the political system. The planner must be in the political system, but not of it.

A good planner possesses both planning skill and political savoir faire. It is difficult to say how one learns the latter set of skills. Some people seem to learn it through experience. In some people it seems to be innate. Some people imitate it. It seems that others can never learn effective political skills. They usually are not very successful planners, since they are easily unmasked and not very effective in persuasion or organization.

Planners' sources of power, which are discussed below, can lead to considerable influence. Three points, however, should be emphasized. First, planners who do acquire power should not be surprised when they are "resented." People who acquire power through non-elective processes tend to be looked upon as usurpers by individuals who are making decisions. Planners who actually make decisions are often believed to have no right to do so. Second, the planners' power base is never secure. They are appointed, and can be dismissed. They must walk a fine line when political roles are played. Third, planners should keep their political roles as discreet as possible.

It is interesting to attend professional conferences and hear comments such as, "he's very political." Sometimes it is said with admiration, noting that this is somebody to watch out for because he is on his way. What do we mean by that;
that he is very political? If it is so obvious, how effective can he be? There is a wonderful story about three Jewish mothers who were bragging about their children and one says, "My son is a very famous doctor in New York;" the other says, "My son is the most famous lawyer in Los Angeles!" Then the third woman says, "That's nothing. My son is the most famous spy in Europe. Everywhere he goes people say, 'There goes Shlomo the spy!" " Such obviousness usually severely limits a planner's ability to maneuver effectively.

The best discussion of the political roles of planners is Guy Benveniste's *The Power of Expertise*. He outlines a number of ways that planners can acquire power in the political system. I will use planners and experts interchangeably. Benveniste identifies knowledge as the first source of an expert's power. In discussing knowledge, he says that:

Experts deal in a scarce commodity: knowledge, which includes not only the knowledge to which they have access, i.e., their expertise, but, more importantly, the information they obtain and generate.

Data collection is a method by which knowledge is accumulated, presented, and debated. Data collection, itself, becomes an independent source of the planner's power base. It can be assumed that, "control of facts can often be translated into social power."

Furthermore, as Dekema points out, "The act of formulating a technical problem predetermines the direction an answer will take."

Even the way the data are collected and processed has political value and worth.

The third way that planners can generate power on their own is by gaining access to those who are powerful. In this sense knowledge becomes a bartering chip. It's something we trade, something we use, something that we accumulate. Benveniste says that "access to the powerful and the political value of informa-

tion combine to provide another dimension of expert power."

Fourth, planners can control the flow of information. Since knowledge and access are sources of power, information flows and bottlenecks can create and obstruct. Benveniste indicates that planners become communication filters by limiting participation and permitting "information and influence to flow only within a restricted portion of the body politic."

Fifth, planners can acquire power by changing and directing language. "Planning actions are not only technical, they are also communicative. They shape attention expectations." The management of language is a vital tool for the planner to use. Words can be used to convey different meanings and to achieve diverse purposes.

The control of language is a vital tool. How we think about things, what nuances and impressions, subliminal and overt suggestions, all can be influenced by the choice of words and phrases, and the context in which they are used. The way that issues are discussed, the terms, the catchwords, and clichés can be as informative and important as the content.

The control and manipulation of language to exercise power raises concern of what are legitimate means of exercise of power and what are not. Zaltman and Duncan outline "onerous" techniques of language control as: (1) Lying, (2) Innuendo, (3) Presenting opinion as fact, (4) Deliberate omission, and (5) Implied obviousness. All of them can be used to persuade, twist, and influence. Yet, the same authors say that manipulation as a strategy of persuasion is less onerous when appeals to emotions, or getting attention focused, for example, are
used. Clearly, these authors have prescribed for themselves a set of behaviors that are right and wrong. Each of the techniques that the planner can use to acquire power is laced with similar conflicts. This adds another dimension to the issue of ethics in planning. While planners must formulate a vision of the moral outcomes that are to be achieved, they must also grapple with ethical dilemmas on how those visions are to be achieved. What are the trade-offs? What are legitimate means to achieve these desirable ends? The guiding norms for these questions are thought to rest in the role of the planner as a professional. It is through the profession that these answers are often sought, and this is the topic of the next section.

**Professionals have a moral calling, but the guides for behavior are not likely to be found in the profession.**

The origin of the word profession is instructive. It means to receive formally into a religious community following an acceptance of required vows. It also means to declare openly what those vows will be, as a religious commitment is made to a field. Currently, "... the word ‘profession’ has a dual meaning. It is, in the first place, a species of a generic concept, namely, ‘occupation,’ and in the second an avowal or promise ... the second meaning of ‘profession’, however, is of concern to everyone ... we can always ask whether the avowal or promise has been fulfilled. Does the profession do what it promises to do? Does it accomplish what it professes?”

It is difficult to assess when the profession does what it is supposed to do, because the “oughts” are usually stated in very general codes of ethics that are more concerned with management of certain career behaviors than with religious commitments. The issues of means and ends are sometimes addressed, but the purposes and visions of the profession are generally left to a few, and often vague, statements. Marcuse notes that professional ethics do not provide answers to ethical dilemmas, even for day-to-day problems:

> Professional ethics are likely to be system maintaining rather than system challenging. The movement to reshape them in a different direction is likely to be a long and an uphill one.¹⁷

He further says that:

> And in some cases, as in guild obligations or prescriptions of allegiance, professional ethics may run counter to higher obligations.¹⁸

It is these higher obligations that create the conflict within the individual and between the individual and the institutions that are to be served.

Clearly, the planning profession does not currently provide adequate ethical guidance. As Otis Pike, a former Congressman, states: "If a Congressman arrives in Washington without morals, he won't learn any there."

The instruction of ethics, the instillation of moral character, cannot be derived from the profession alone, and the models for proper behavior will not be found from simplified codes of ethics that are profession protecting. The individual must make serious attempts to view the role as a professional as one of a calling, a religious obligation as opposed to merely an occupation. Such a view will enable the planner to evaluate decisions, to understand when the demands of the occupation run counter to his professional obligations and when the profession itself has moved away from its religious or moral obligations. As Bolan states, the professional must be an agent both of change and of moral purpose:

> In the final analysis, the professional can be seen as a moral agent—not a purely instrumental problem-solver. If professionalism is to be rehabilitated, it must lessen its overdependence on technique and science and reassert both its humanistic ideals and its own wholly human character.¹⁹ (Author’s emphasis)
This is, of course, a difficult command. How is it to be achieved?

Ethical issues must be discussed as such. Moral discussion should take a number of directions. First, an ethically mature individual must be continually grappling with his or her own value systems, defining, redefining, and weighing personal beliefs. As Gouldner points out:

...it is no easy thing to know what our own value commitments are. In an effort to seem frank and open, we all too easily pawn off a merely glib statement about our values without making any effort to be sure that these are the values to which we are actually committed.29

Glib statements, platitudes, or flat statements of absolutism cannot illuminate the complex set of issues with which planners must deal. Constant re-appraisal and, in some sense, soul searching are required.

In addition, since a planner’s tasks are moral in character and purpose, issues, whenever possible, should be discussed as moral or ethical problems. But, as one analyst points out, such discussions are difficult to maintain or initiate:

The sad truth is that we are uncustomed to serious moral discussion. We prefer to take our morals in small doses of slogans, epithets, and invectives. When Machiavelli told us to look at the way things are and not as they ought to be, he made us modern men; but in so doing he bequeathed us a sorry legacy of trained incapacity for sound moral debate.21

The rhetoric of moral absolutism, particularly in the context of single issue interest groups, should not be mistaken for sound moral discussion. As Boulding points out:

A person who is ethically mature will constantly be weighing subordinate goals against each other and making decisions about how far to pursue each one. ... Obsession by single subordinate goals, whether this is money or sex or eating or even stamp-collecting, is a sign of mental or at least ethical ill health.22

Ethical ill health characterizes most of the moral debate in the political arena.

This is most easily understood by examining the narrow purpose and activities of single issue interest groups. It is filled with invective, and there is no sense of weighing alternatives, or balancing ethical dilemmas. Indeed, debate about moral issues in the political arena is as likely to lead to anti-ethical ends as no debate at all, since this arena is not conducive to compromise, evaluation, and reason.

There is also some risk of ethical grandstanding, which can lead to two unwanted results. The first is the grand display of moral outrage, which can result in quitting a position, or some other act that removes the individual from a conflict arena. Often, we are forced to stay in unpleasant situations because leaving the scene is a moral abdication. George Bernard Shaw admonished one of his colleagues who resigned a Parliament seat, rather than compromise: “Oh, these moral dandies, these spiritual toffs, these superior persons. Who is Joe, anyhow, that he should not risk his soul occasionally like the rest of us?”23 Rohr follows with this analysis:

... all forms of organizational life demand compromises of values one holds dear.... The significant ethical question is not whether one should compromise but when one should do so—that is, how important are the values at stake? (Author’s emphasis)

Obviously, the role of the moral agent sometimes requires extraordinary action and ability, the willingness to profess and lead, and at times compromise, the bane of the ethically immature.

Second, moral discussions, if they are pursued in an antagonistic or absolutist language, may achieve the opposite results. As with “Shlomo the Spy,” it is difficult to be “Martin the Moralist” and achieve much in the political arena. Most people find it difficult to be preached at, especially by someone who assumes a sanctimonious position about right and wrong. Discussion of moral
issues and debates of ethical concerns may often have to take place without being identified as such. It is possible to have moral discussions without making pronouncements, as such, and to speak in “moral language” without declaring so. But sound moral discussion must be based in some system of ideas and beliefs that allow for both challenge and order. A hierarchy of goals must be conceptualized, the ability to rank as well as declare. Individual planners are limited by time, resources, and knowledge. While a utopian vision must guide action, the whole of what is good, if action is to be taken, must be broken into some smaller components. Sound moral debate, then, must first focus upon the whole, and then upon the actions, strategies, and rightness of pursuing its component parts. If the planner is forced to identify the “good life” in more specific terms, perhaps some progress can be made toward that end.

But such progress is impossible if the language of planning is restricted to matters of efficiency, or if the language of business invades the planning profession and the institutions responsible for human service delivery. Some precepts and processes can be borrowed from the private sector, but others, especially if they are mimicked and lose their contextual underpinnings, can be dangerous. One example, at the extreme, is the concept of efficiency as a singular goal. Boulding refers to the

... production manager who said that all he wanted to do was to minimize costs, until it was pointed out that the easiest way to do this would be to shut down operations altogether, in which case the costs would be reduced to zero.15

The goal of efficiency is advocated more and more as resources become scarce. Scarce resources is, of course, another manipulation of language that can hide real purpose and intent. Often “scarce” resources means that these resources are allocated elsewhere, or not at all, or that the commitment to certain goals has shifted.

Two other phrases worthy of our attention are “quick and dirty,” and “the bottom line.” Quick and dirty implies the need for rapid resolution, and that the means and quality are not necessarily important. “Bottom line” is the most dangerous phrase of all in the service professions, particularly the planning professions. The bottom line is void of moral content. Why do we come to the conclusions that we have reached? How does cost measure against our ethical commitments and moral duty? What was considered in reaching the bottom line? How does one conclusion compare to another? As scarce resources become more scarce; that is, as the national commitment to certain social goods becomes less important, the necessity to avoid looking first at the bottom line becomes more critical. The line is at the bottom for a reason, it is the conclusion. Few of us read the last line of a novel first, or watch the last frames of a movie first, or begin medical study without basic anatomy. Prevailing logic in how we look at things necessitates that our moral framework comes first, the analysis comes next, and the bottom line, last.

The language of accounting as a planning paradigm is inappropriate. Boulding notes other values are critically important in planning, such as “morale, loyalty, legitimacy, and intimacy and complexity of personal relations.” Each of these is important as we analyze and plan for human service delivery. Why is loyalty less important than efficiency? How do we measure it? Or weigh it? The language of the bottom line cannot account for these aspects of a decision matrix.

If the language of business is inappropriate, so is the language of social work, sociology, or other social sciences.
If planners must speak in moral language, but must not preach ethics, what language can be used? For the voluntary sector, neither the language of the private sector nor the public sector is appropriate. One analyst said, "public administration and business administration are alike in all the unimportant ways." That is especially pertinent in the voluntary sector.

The ethical issues that planners face in the voluntary sector are quite different from those that are faced in the public sector and, indeed, radically different from the ones in the private sector and, therefore, require a different language. There is even a greater difference for those working in organized religious institutions. Therefore, the language must be different. What should be the language for those in the Jewish community service professions?

The language and, therefore, the actions of Jewish community workers must be formulated and based in Jewish customs, traditions, and laws.

The adoption of a Judaic framework for the moral language of planners in the Jewish communal services ought to be simple. But it is far from simple for a variety of reasons. First, many individuals have little or no training in Judaic law and customs. Many religious schools provide only cursory attention to ethics in Judaism, and this is usually the only vehicle for such training.

Second, individuals in the field are torn between their occupational goals and their professional calling as Jewish workers. This is further complicated by dual or multiple allegiances to trade associations, political parties, unions, school organizations, or other groups and institutions that do not operate in the Jewish sphere. Often there are conflicts between aspirations and goals of the individual as a Jewish service worker, as opposed to being a member of the Republican Party, for example.

Third, other individuals have rejected Jewish law or ethics as suitable for their tasks. The language of business or social work, or no particular language framework at all, may guide some planners in the field as a deliberate attempt to move away from what they consider to be inadequate, irrelevant, or out-dated Jewish ethics or norms.

Fourth, by no means are Judaic ethics and laws monolithic in their history, construction, or interpretation. Much disagreement exists within the Jewish community as to how certain laws are to be implemented, what their purposes might be, who are to be the judges, and so on.

Fifth, as with planners throughout most fields, many individuals simply are unable to discuss moral issues in the ethical terms that relate to Judaism because they either do not know how to do so, or they are embarrassed to do so. The serious moral debates are the most difficult ones, and require the greatest depth of knowledge and intellectual challenge. Two examples are illustrative.

1) A Federation committee is discussing whether or not to provide a Kosher meals on wheels program to elderly who are either transportation or economically poor, or both. A "bottom liner" might unilaterally attempt to move the discussion to issues of cost per meal, trade-offs between other programs, and the utility of such a program. The discussion ought to revolve around the ethical obligations of Jews to honor the religious needs (Kashrut) of some members of the community, and the most efficient means to achieve this necessary goal. Often, however, no one in the room knows why it's supposed to be so. In such cases,
the “bottom liner” may be persuasive because no one can challenge
the premises of his discussion as being irrelevant to the moral
necessity.

2) A Jewish community center has
reached non-Jewish membership
of sixty percent. A committee is
discussing the issue, and the con-
versation is concerned with the
possible loss of United Way fund-
ing. The conversation ought to re-
semble around the ideal proportion
of Jewish versus non-Jewish
population based on goals of de-
sired inter-faith interaction, op-
timum Jewish membership for de-
sired Jewish social contacts, Jewish
obligations to serve all populations
versus the kinds of programs that
are necessary for sustained Jewish
cohesiveness and so on.

Even as this is written, I can imagine
some of the readers’ response that
dealing with issues in this way does not
deal with political reality. Such a re-
response reinforces my contention that
many of us simply cannot deal with
moral issues in the face of what is viewed
as political reality. We cannot, of course,
stop with what should we do. Soon, a
discussion of how to best do it must also
occur, since planning is action oriented.
The planner, however, has a serious ob-
ligation first to revive the language of
morality in Jewish work. This requires a
number of activities:

1) Ethical discussions and forums
must be part of all conferences
and professional meetings.

2) As indicated, many Jewish service
planners must be educated or re-
educated in Jewish ethics and law.

3) Whenever possible, issues should
be brought back to their Jewish
ethical roots.

4) Jewish institutions that are no
longer responsive to Jewish ethical
conduct should be challenged
from within and without their
structure. There is nothing sac-
rosant about existing Jewish in-
itutions if they have no relation-
ship to Jewish ethics.

I will end this essay with an illustra-
tion from The Gates of the Forest by Elie
Weisel. He tells a fable about a Rabbi
whose efforts to avert misfortune
threatening the Jews took him to a spe-
cial place in the forest where he would
light a fire, say a special prayer, and the
misfortune would be averted. The fable
was passed on through the generations,
until the place, prayer, and ability to
light the fire were all lost. All that was
left was the ability to tell the story. The
fable ends with the line: “God made
man because he loves stories.”

Let us take the fable one step further.
What if the story itself is lost? The les-
dons cannot be retold or remembered if
no one has the story to tell. Planners, who
ought to be visionaries, must be the
storytellers. The “planner” may hold a
professional title that so designates him
or her, or they may be a volunteer on a
committee or a lay leader in an organi-
ization. In whatever way that the role is
assumed, each individual must redis-
cover or assert their knowledge of their
ethical roots, or the story may indeed be
lost, and with it the hope for progress
through planning.

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From this Journal
Twenty-five Years Ago

Community service is the one area which has been able to unite the widest 
segment of the Jewish community, and this is true whether the service was to be 
rendered locally or overseas. It has been a dynamic which transcended ideology, 
religious preference and organizational affiliation. While many elements in Jewish 
life offered an opportunity for identification, only community service offered the 
opportunity for an identification with total community. It is our community agen-
cies and campaigns which created common interests and objectives and which 
enabled us to work together as Jews, with Jews, and for Jews.

The concept and objective of survival has meaning only if we are concerned 
about Jews as people. To be concerned about Jewish needs in broad terms without 
including the needs of Jewish people is to separate ourselves from the living 
experience of our people, and is to make the concept of community meaningless 
and sterile.

Charles Miller 
Fall, 1959

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