Separatism in Quebec:
Off the Agenda but Not Off the Minds of Francophones

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Chapter 1: Introduction-The Future of Quebec

The Quebec separatist movement has been debated for decades and yet no one can seem to come to a conclusion regarding what the future of the province holds for the Quebecers. This thesis aims to look at the reasons for the Quebec separatist movement occurring in the past as well as its steady level of support. Ultimately, there is a split within the recent literature in Quebec, regarding those who believe that independence is off the political agenda and those who think it is back on the agenda. This thesis looks at public opinion polls, and electoral returns, to find that the independence movement is ultimately off the political agenda as of the April 2014 election, but continues to be supported in Quebec public opinion.

I will first be analyzing the history of Quebec as well as the theories other social scientists have put forward regarding separatist and nationalist movements in general. Next I will be analyzing the history of Quebec in order to understand why the Quebec separatist movement came about. I will then look at election data from 1995-2012 in order to identify the level of electoral support for separatism as indicated by the vote for the Parti Quebecois (PQ). I will demonstrate in this thesis that the level of popular support for independence is lower than it was in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and that while since 1995 there has been a steady decline, current polling indicates a considerable amount of continued popular support for independence. However, electoral returns suggest declining support for the strongest proponent for succession, the PQ. By the most recent election in April 2014, the level of electoral support for the PQ is lower than it has been since 1973.
Chapter 2: Theories of Nationalism and Separatism

The Separatist movement in Quebec is an example of protest and demands for independence by communal groups that are motivated by deep-seated grievances about the status of their group, and by the determined pursuit of political interests as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs. These motivations are overlapping and often reinforcing concepts.

The Quebec Separatist movement can be understood through the lens of conflict analysis. The separatist movements are widely considered to be an expression of, or rooted in, “nationalism”. Thus, to understand the motivations for separatism, I will focus on explanations for the sources of the rise of nationalism. The literature on nationalisms can be divided into two broad categories that are quite different in their explanations of the sources of identity-based conflict, but that overlap in their explanations of the dynamics of that conflict. These two competing theoretical perspectives regarding conflict analysis are relevant for understanding the separatist movement in Quebec: relative deprivation and group mobilization. The latter is the basis of group-ness; identity and feelings of belonging may be primordial if the group is “ethnic”. In this case, cultural characteristics and characteristics of origin constitute “markers” of membership and bases of solidarity. The former is often used to mean inequalities such as wealth, power, or status that are perceived as unjust, but is also used to denote frustrated and unfulfilled expectations.

The first perspective on separatist movements emphasizes the primordialist viewpoint. The primordialist viewpoint views communal groups as social entities based on a set of genetic, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens, in contrast to the states that govern them, which are held to be entities established and maintained by force. The most influential political philosopher in this field is Clifford Geertz who wrote “The Interpretation of Cultures”. This viewpoint focuses on conflicts between groups over the state, or between states that are dominated by a single
group. The reason this tension takes a peculiarly severe and chronic form in new states is because of the extent to which their “sense of self remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition, and because of the steadily accelerating importance in this century of the sovereign state as a positive instrument for the realization of collective aims.”¹ In the case of Quebec, it is evident that Francophone culture is being threatened by the dominance of Anglophone culture in Canada as a whole, and in the province of Quebec in particular. Geertz quotes Emerson, an early student of empire and nations, who defines a nation as a “terminal community” which “effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society”. A state has the loyalty of its citizens. However, considered as societies, the new states are susceptible to disaffection based on primordial attachments. In this thesis I will always use the term “nation” to refer to the culturally defined population, and “state” to refer to the political entity.

Geertz continues by stating that there are two aims of new states. The first is to become noticed: “It is a search for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly acknowledged.”² The other aim is practical: “it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice, and…exercising influence among the nations.”³ Furthermore, it becomes evident that a unilingual state is stable and a multilingual state is unstable. A state is built on “fellow feeling” and this feeling makes those who are charged with it feel that they are family. This feeling has two edges: “it binds together those who have it so strongly that it overrides all differences arising out of economic conflicts…on the

¹ Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States”, 258
² Ibid., 257
³ Ibid., 258
other hand it severs them from those who are not of their kind." The existence of this “fellow feeling” is the foundation of a stable democratic state. Ultimately, Quebec does not feel kin with Canada and this “fellow feeling” is non-existent in Quebec. Thus, there is a potential conflict between primordial and civil sentiments.

However, it is important to note that while the communal groups threaten governments, or forms of government, “when they have become infused with primordial sentiments” they rarely “threaten to undermine the nation itself.” Geertz, as a cultural anthropologist who focuses on culture and its meanings, insists that primordial attachment is crucial to the state. But other social scientists see attachment to groups and states as derived from many factors. Primordial characteristics, primary among them language, may be most obvious and easily mobilized. However economic performance (and the establishment of security against external threats) can result in increased material well-being, and can generate attachment and loyalty. It is also called “instrumental attachment” to distinguish it from ethno-cultural or “affective” attachment. When these movements are based on primordial attachments that do not match up with the definition of the civic state, they create alternative definitions of state and nation and therefore undermine the legitimacy of the civic state. In fact, in many cases, the so-called civic state is actually the construction of a dominant ethnic group or nation, whose identity is not the same as, or even conflicts with, those of smaller, peripheral or regional groups. While communal groups threaten governments or forms of governments, they rarely threaten to undermine the nation itself, “because they do not involve alternative definitions of what the nation is.” Thus, economic or class or intellectual disaffection threatens revolution, but “disaffection based on race, language,

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4 Ibid., 260
5 Ibid., 260
6 Ibid., 261
or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new definition of its domain.” The primordial qualities in citizens are so strong that they threaten the structure of a nation, whereas other qualities such as economic class do not. The role of identity is imperative.

There are two different types of identities that citizens of a state undertake. These identities are discussed in the article “Accounting for the Effects of Political Identity on Political Behavior” by Lachen Chernyha and Steven Burg. The article discusses a study by Chandra and Wilkinson that treats factors of identity. The study differentiates between what they call “nominal” and “activated” identities. Nominal identities are defined as “any category for which a person possesses the attributes necessary for membership.” In contrast, an “activated identity is an identity in which one professes membership or is assigned membership by others.” If an identity is expected to influence an individual’s actions, that individual must actively identify as such. If an individual might not self-consciously identify with the culture of the group that he was brought up in, but the identity is likely to influence that person’s behavior, then it is not the identity, but rather it is the fact of sharing the criteria of descent, that defines being part of the group. Most scholars of ethnicity believe that attributes of descent play an important role. According to Chernyha and Burg, two other categorical factors also should be conceived as attributes of descent due to their effects on self-identification: They are gender and membership.

Literature describing the secondary category of conflict analysis focuses on national identities and movements as "constructions" arising out of processes of modernization and

7 Ibid., 261
8 Chernyha, Burg, “Accounting for the Effects of Identity on Political Behavior: Descent, Strength of Attachment, and Preferences in the Regions of Spain”, 780
9 Ibid., 780
10 Ibid., 782
development. Whereas the relative deprivation model of mobilization is based on group characteristics, the “political opportunity” model of mobilization is based on structural features of the social and political order that create opportunities for entrepreneurs to mobilize. Elections for example create opportunities to mobilize aggrieved identity groups to seek redress by electing their political entrepreneurs to office. In authoritarian regimes, liberalizing reforms often create opportunities for action. This literature focuses on the role of states and state building in the construction of the nation. The philosopher who writes on this secondary category is Ernest Gellner. The Philosopher, Brendan O’Leary, explains Gellner’s work in his article, “On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism.” O’Leary states that, once social structure was created and put into place, “shared linguistic and cultural communication was not essential to the preservation of social order” since citizens are stratified by their nationality. According to Gellner, “Nationalism is an essential [product] of modernization, of the transition from agrarian to industrial society – the latter requiring a state that can produce and be maintained by one common, literate and accessible culture.” Gellner argues that religion is an “inesential principle of a stable and legitimate political order and thus challenges traditionalist conservatism.” More controversially, he argues that religion is not the most crucial factor when it comes to creating a stable nation, and that “law, reason, utility, material prosperity and social justice are secondary principles in establishing a stable and legitimate political order.” This analysis has provoked persistent criticism from rationalist liberals and socialists. Relative deprivation theorists, for example, identify these very factors as

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12 Ibid., 198
13 Ibid., 192
14 Ibid., 192
sources of nationalist’s mobilization with states. The question of what causes nationalism to occur is equally as important to them as the question of what results from nationalism.

Gellner discusses the preconditions of nationalism, in particular, “widespread or universal literacy, and a society committed to economic growth through its formal commitment to social mobility.” Industrial society requires effective communication through a common medium. Communicative media are crucial in maintaining nationalism, but his argument stresses the functionality of a shared culture for the effective operation of modern work-organizations and bureaucracies. Ultimately, there needs to be a type of shared culture in order for a nationalist movement to even begin to coalesce. The centrality of language and literacy to nationalism is widespread. According to Gellner nationalism can be defined as the general imposition of a “high culture” on society, where previously “low cultures” had taken up the lives of the majority population. Furthermore, nationalism means the general “diffusion of a school-mediated, academy…codified for the requirements of…bureaucratic and technological communication…the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society.” Thus, nationalism is still seen as distinctive from modernity, but it is now part of a philosophy that distinguishes three phases in human progress: the pre-agrarian; the agrarian; and the industrial. Furthermore, he adds, “whereas tribal societies worship themselves indirectly (as spirits), agrarian societies worship their rulers directly or indirectly (in monotheistic religions), while in industrial societies the participants directly worship themselves (nationalism).” Gellner views the sense of belonging as coming from the modernization of a state rather than from a primordial cultural perspective.

While nationalism is related to modernization, Gellner stated that, “nationalism is a phenomenon

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15 Ibid., 199
16 Ibid., 198
17 Ibid., 199
connected not so much with industrialization or modernization as such, but with its uneven
diffusion.”¹⁸ Thus, Gellner seems to anticipate the later argument of the relative deprivation and
political opportunity model of mobilization. The impact of industrialization and modernization
generates divides between people, and these divides are only “remediable through ‘national’
secession.”¹⁹ Gellner believes that nationalism is an important principle of political legitimacy.
Nationalism goes hand in hand with communication and expression. This view is different from
that of Geertz. While the primordial analysis implies that the group wants to be united and
separate as a means to express its culture, and would want this expression regardless of how well
its members are treated by the nation, Gellner’s view is more economic and stems from the
response of a group that is feeling deprived, whether culturally or economically, by the
developing state.

These two theories of conflict analysis find a middle point in Ted Robert Gurr’s work,
In this article Gurr presents a statistical analysis that shows how cultural identity, inequalities,
and historical loss of autonomy all contribute substantially to grievances. Furthermore, “political
mobilization, grievances, and the internal diffusion and contagion of communal conflict jointly
explain the extent of political action.”²⁰ According to Gurr, democracy, state power, and
institutional change help determine whether conflict takes the form of protest or rebellion. This
third perspective, which encompasses both of these main viewpoints in order to find middle
ground, states that grievances that are coupled with a strong sense of identity will result in
mobilization of a separatist movement. Nationalist and separatist movements such as those in

¹⁸ Ibid., 195
¹⁹ Ibid., 195
Since 1945, 161
Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders all combine primordialist and instrumentalist appeals in mobilizing the identity group. The primordial characteristics, the culture, plus modernization and institutional structures, all contribute to the rise of national identity. These identities become the basis for political demands for recognition such as autonomy and independence. The role of the modern state in developing and implementing social and economic policies, including employment and cultural policies in the public sphere makes control of state institutions and policies crucial to these movements. Where the identity is territorially concentrated in regions with their own state institutions (decentralization or devolution or federalization is in place), these movements combine efforts to seize control over these institutions with demands for greater autonomy. Since World War II, such demands have been legitimated by reference to principles of national self-determination that appear to equate nationhood with a right to statehood. Thus, the sequence of development of these movements can be described as:

A. primordial characteristics + B. unjust inequalities + C. group political entrepreneurs (elites) => D. grievances + E. opportunity in the structural framework of politics => F. mobilization of national movement for self-ID => G. agenda of demands for autonomy or independence.

Gurr identifies a formula that creates an equation for mobilizing a separatist movement. This is: identity plus grievances lead to rebellion, which then causes mobilization. Thus, a separatist movement will not begin until a group has a strong identity coupled with a list of grievances and an ability to rebel. Gurr’s theory for separatist movements combines both schools of thought: primordialist and modernization. Gurr’s theory explains the concept of mobilization for a separatist movement. Gurr defines communal groups as “groups whose core members share a distinctive and persistent collective identity based on cultural and ascriptive traits that are
important to them and to others with whom they interact.”

He states that if the primordial identities are politically salient, and if the group meets one or both of these criteria, then “the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis a vis other groups in a state and/or… the group is the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.”

Protest and rebellion by these communal groups are motivated by “deep-seated grievances about group status and by the determined pursuit of political interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs.” Grievances about perceived unfair treatment and the sense of group cultural identity provide important bases for mobilization, and they shape the claims made by the group’s leaders. Articulation of the grievances is essential and a group spokesman articulates the demands or grievances. The grievances may include both objective conditions, such as inequalities and coercive control, and political action. Gurr’s hypothesis is that the greater a group’s disadvantage with respect to the variables listed above, “the greater the sense of grievances, and the greater its potential for political mobilization.…[G]roup identity is a primordial condition but one that varies considerably in salience.”

In this thesis I will utilize Gurr’s formula to explain how the Quebec separatist movement rose to prominence.

Thus far I have discussed theories of nationalism. There is a large literature on separatism as well. Two questions must be asked when analyzing separatist movements. The first is, what factors are responsible for the separatist movement coming into existence? The second, is to ask what is the reason that ethnic groups decide to leave a territory that is their home? According to the article by Donald Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism”, secessionists invoke the
doctrine of self-determination. From this perspective, separatism is viewed as “political self-expression” and a necessary element of group distinctiveness. Self-determination is ultimately an ideology for ethnic separatism, “perhaps a necessary condition for its emergence.” The article discovers that some groups with low levels of literacy have invoked the doctrine of self-determination in support of their attempts at secessionism. The ideology of self-determination helps explain the emergence of a “political environment hospitable to territorially divisive claims, but it cannot explain which groups will take up the cause.” There is another theory that states that “if the balance of advantages, reckoned in terms of economic prosperity or security from external attack, has recently shifted to the disadvantage of the sizable state, such a shift may constitute an implicit inducement to separatism.” Ultimately whether a secessionist movement emerges is determined by domestic politics. However, whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aim is determined by international politics. Horowitz’s article divides social groups into two categories: “Advanced Groups” and “Backward Groups”. An Advanced Group is one that has benefited from opportunities in education. Its members are considered highly motivated and intelligent. Backward Groups are much less educated; they have lesser jobs and are looked down upon in society. The article concludes that a secessionist movement is more likely to occur when a Backward Group is located in a region that is less advanced and is less likely to emerge when a Backward Group is located in a more-advanced region. In short, members of Advanced Groups are more reluctant to entertain ideas of secessionism, as ultimately, the groups that choose to secede are less economically stable. This relates to the theory of relative deprivation.

25 Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism”, 166
26 Ibid., 166
27 Ibid., 166
28 Ibid., 167
Gurr’s work has been analyzed further, in light of the increasing number of articles downplaying the role that ethnic grievances play in the formation of secessionist movements. One article, entitled “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison”, by Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ultimately confirms Gurr’s work and concludes that grievances are in fact a very important factor for separatist movements occurring. Cederman et al. argue, after controlling for political power access, “that both advanced and backward ethnic groups are more likely to experience such conflict than groups whose wealth lies closer to the national average. … [W]e find that both political and economic inequalities contribute to civil war.”  

They conclude that relative deprivation theory remains the most persuasive explanation of the connection between grievances and conflict, but they maintain that this theory has a very mixed record in regard to empirical evidence. As a result, they argue that simply looking at statistical measures of inequality is not enough, and that one must look to the factors that contribute to mobilization of populations, such as perceptions that inequalities are unfair, and the activities of political entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs exploit the opportunity created by the perceptions of unfair inequalities in order to mobilize populations in support of economic and political demands and to redress these perceived inequalities. They conclude that “other things being equal, excluded groups … are much more likely to experience conflict than included ones… [H]owever, the increases in risk from greater relative deviations in economic wealth are also substantial,

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29 Cederman, Weidmann, and Skrede Gleditsch “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison”, 478
especially for an excluded group.”

This is consistent with their argument that both political and economic grievances increase the risk of conflict.

Other political scientists support this argument. The article entitled “The Political Economy of Secessionism: Inequality, Identity, and the State” by Graham K. Brown, for example, also discusses factors contributing to secessionism. Brown states that there is a strong “predictive role for… ethnic diversity in accounting for the incidence of secession…[R]egions that suffer from high ‘horizontal inequalities’—whether relatively poor or relatively rich—in relation to the rest of the country are more prone to secessionism.” He argues that inequalities that arise between horizontally defined ethnic, religious, or regional groups, create the possibility that relatively rich and relatively poor groups are more likely to secede than are others. He concludes by arguing that fiscal decentralization increases the risk of secession in regions of relatively low ethnic distinctiveness, but decreases it in regions of high ethnic distinctiveness. In contrast, the impact of political decentralization appears to heighten the risk of secessionism in regions that are highly distinctive ethnically, but mitigates the risk in less distinctive regions. This leads to the conclusion that debates over the relative merits or demerits of federalism as a conflict mitigation strategy are too simplistic and that greater attention should be placed on the nature of the decentralized institutions themselves.

The question of which nations are likely to separate is further discussed in the article by Nicholas Sambanis and Branko Milanovic entitled, “Explaining the Demand for Sovereignty.” This article states that there is an economic explanation for why groups secede that can be

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30 Ibid., 488
31 Ibid., 488
32 Brown, “The Political Economy of Secessionism: Inequality, Identity, and the State”, 7
described as a “tradeoff between income and sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{33} This theory “implies that, other things being equal, richer regions are more likely to want more autonomy and conflict arises due to a disparity between desired and actual levels of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{34}

My thesis uses Gurr’s argument to analyze the rise and fall of support for the separatist movement in Quebec. My hypothesis is that the strong sense of identity exhibited by the Quebecois people, coupled with increasing levels of federalism, has redressed their grievances and, therefore, decreased political support for the separatist agenda. One of the reasons why the Quebec separatist movement has waned is simply that Quebec separatists’ recent demands have been met.\textsuperscript{35} As Quebecois grievances have been met, the group identity of Quebecois people has evolved to the point at which it is no longer strictly aligned with Quebec, but now also is aligned with Canada as a whole. This thesis presents an analytical narrative of the development of Quebecois identity and nationalism, using the framework stated above. It presents an analysis of Quebec survey data to explore the importance of identity and the effect of a failure to redress grievances. It thus addresses both structural/institutional and primordialist/instrumentalist explanations of nationalism/separatism in Quebec.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 7
\textsuperscript{34} Sambanis, Milanovic, “Explaining the Demand for Sovereignty”, 2
\textsuperscript{35} Changfoot, Cullen, “Why is Quebec Separatism Off the Agenda? Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era”, 771
Chapter 3: The rise of nationalism in Quebec

The country of Canada has had many different identities due to changes of control between France and England. France was the first European country to take control over the area that became Canada, and Canada became known among the French colonists as “New France”. French Canadians accepted French domination and did not view France as the enemy, as they did England. This directly relates to the strength of the Francophone identity in Canada. In this thesis, I will use the term “Quebec” to refer to the political/administrative territory, and “Canada” to refer to the larger, British-ruled territories of varying statuses, including “Quebec”, that eventually are integrated into a single entity known as “Canada”. This thesis will refer to the central or federal government of Canada when discussing relations between the province of Quebec and the state of Canada.

Quebec was incorporated into the British realm in 1759 as the result of the military victory of the British over the French in the North American theatre of war that was part of the global war between them (“The Seven Years’ War”, known in the American colonies as “The French and Indian War”). At that time, the British chose to rule the newly-acquired territory in a manner that made no significant concessions to the distinctive French cultural identity of the population, although Quebec was almost exclusively Francophone and most of its residents were born in the colony, not immigrants from the motherland. Significantly, there was also no ongoing immigration into Quebec populating the colony with “Frenchmen”, akin to the process that populated the American colonies with “Englishmen”. In Quebec/New France, the language itself developed into a distinctive linguistic variation of French, so that the language spoken in the colony was not the same as the language spoken in France. Quebec was no longer under the French regime politically, but culturally was not under the English.
In February 1763, during the later days of the British military occupation, London and Paris agreed upon the colony’s destiny in the Treaty of Paris. This Treaty put an end to The Seven Years’ War, and Canada’s relinquishment by France was now confirmed. In October 1763, by royal proclamation England gave the colony its first English civil government, and immediately promulgated a law stating that only English, and not French, law would be recognized. The moment of incorporation of Quebec into the English empire involved a political refusal to “recognize” French culture in Canada, even at a time when there was as yet no distinct national Canadian identity. Failure to accommodate culture often serves as an impetus to development of a national identity, setting off a spiral of non-recognition and increased nationalism until separatism is reached.

Despite the fact that Quebec had been conquered, the Quebecois people were stronger than they appeared and could not be assimilated in Anglophone Canada this country after they had put down such sturdy French roots. One of the reasons for this was the importance of Catholicism to the people of Quebec. The population was strongly Catholic, while the British were strongly anti-Catholic (“anti-Papist”). At a time when the religious domain occupied a considerable portion of the political field, religious identification may have been the core of the Canadian, and Quebecois, identity. At the time of the Treaty of Paris, the geographic territory of Quebec was also changed. Eastern North America became British territory with a few exceptions, including certain French possessions. The freedom of religion granted to Canadians under the Treaty of Paris in 1763 was qualified to permit them to practice their religion only “insofar as

36 Ibid., 30
British laws allow.\textsuperscript{38} As it turned out, English laws allowed them to practice almost nothing\textsuperscript{39}. It is not surprising, therefore, that the initial pattern of British rule was not considered to be accommodating, and that it set in place a pattern of antagonism, if not outright hostility, between the Francophone, Catholic, population and its Anglophone, Protestant, leaders.

The Canadian people were not amenable to this tight regulation on religious practice and they wanted to revolt. However, what this society did not have, and what may have been necessary in order to enable them to truly manage their conquest politically, was a bourgeoisie class. The bourgeoisie was the dynamic class of the period, politically and economically. It was the conscience of different national identities. This class developed throughout the rest of the Western world in the 17th and 18th centuries\textsuperscript{40}. Besides political and economic control, the bourgeois class also controlled the newborn power of information. For instance, no newspaper was ever published in New France prior to the founding of the bilingual Gazette de Quebec in 1764, possibly because the level of socio-economic development was so low that there was no Francophone bourgeoisie, and therefore literacy was probably not very widespread. The absence of an established bourgeois class in 1760 may provide a partial explanation of why the Canadians’ Francophone nationalism remained weak until the French revolution\textsuperscript{41}. The idea of print media as a form of shared national community is expressed in the book entitled “Imagined Community”, written by Benedict Anderson. Anderson states that popular consciousness of a shared national identity is built on the spread of the printed word. He states that, “the coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism, exploiting cheap popular editions, quickly created

\textsuperscript{38} Dufour, \textit{A Canadian Challenge}, 35
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 35
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 35
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 39
large new reading publics…and simultaneously mobilized them for politico-religious purposes.\textsuperscript{42}

Incorporation of Quebec into Canada also involved re-defining the administrative border of Quebec. The Quebec Act in 1774 was adopted in England and took into account the fact that the Quebecois were not English and never would become English. The Quebec Act also took into account broader geopolitical considerations. For instance, Canada’s territory, which had been reduced in 1776 to the banks of the Saint Lawrence River, was enlarged to include the frontiers of the former New France\textsuperscript{43}. The new province of Quebec also reclaimed territory that it had lost between the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers. During the American war of Independence, Canada was neutral. The Canadians’ neutrality kept the northern part of the continent in the hands of England.

In 1784, England granted to Canada a House of Assembly, one of the first in the world. The Canadians asked that The House of Assembly have control over government spending. The governor refused, and he dissolved the assembly\textsuperscript{44}. The Canadian people voiced their objections in terms of national pride and their desire for independence. In 1840, Upper Canada and Lower Canada were reunited\textsuperscript{45}. In 1867 the British North American Act (BNA), united New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Canada in a federal state called the Dominion of Canada and it created federal institutions that gave Quebec disproportionate power to defend its special interests: equal representation in the Senate; a fixed number of seats in the House of Commons; control over its own French civil law; and official equality of the English and French languages.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[42] Anderson, “Imagined Communities”, 40
\item[43] Ibid., 46
\item[44] Ibid., 46
\item[45] “Library and Archives Canada”
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Development of Canada

The transfer of the colony of New France to control of the British in 1763 had large economic consequences for French Canadians. One example of this is the fact that the economic activity of Quebec became integrated with that of the rest of North America creating an underdeveloped economic structure in Quebec. The result of this structure of underdevelopment “has had the effect in the twentieth century of keeping French Canadians under-represented in the ranks of the industrial proletariat and the traditional professions.”46 Thus Quebec was forced to struggle in its attempt to create a vibrant economy as well as a growing educational system and culture.

The Catholic Church also played a tremendous part in the development of Quebec. The Church “controlled large areas of the educational system and ran most of the social service institutions that operated in the Francophone community.”47 The Catholic religion in Quebec ultimately had developed institutions for a society in which religion could be fully integrated into economic and social life48. The importance of Catholicism for Quebec resulted in a controversy regarding the roles of the federal government and the church in education, which raised fundamental questions regarding the level of autonomy necessary in order to protect the interests of the Francophone population. Toward the end of the Great Depression and during the Second World War, the federal government moved to centralize fiscal and monetary powers49. Canada’s ties with Britain were loosening as differences arose between them, and the Canadian economy began to be dominated by American culture. Anglophone Canadians spoke the same language as

47 Ibid., 52
48 Ibid., 62
49 Ibid., 66
Americans, and a kinship and cultural understanding was established between them. The Francophone Canadians, on the other hand, were more easily able to resist the temptations emanating from America. Thus, Anglophone Canadians began turning to the national government in order to build a “genuine Canadian culture” because the provincial government was unable to afford the means to do this. The idea of individuals seeking assistance from the federal government became popular during the time of the Great Depression and World War II, which demonstrated that the provincial governments were not as strong as the federal government. This escalated into a debate regarding the centralization of the federal government in all cultural matters.

During this time the Francophones had extensive influence in labor unions. This resulted in a “clear-cut call for expansion of the Quebec state” in contrast to the Anglophone call to empower the federal government, as Francophone union leaders argued for a variety of new provincial governmental programs to “correct for the ‘abuses’ and ‘inadequacies’ of capitalism”. Over the time period of 1945-1955, union membership in Quebec rose dramatically and so did separatist sentiment.

As a result of the increase in separatist sentiment, two different commissions were formed to discuss the division of powers between Quebec and the federal government. The Massey Commission was formed first, by the federal government in 1949, at a time when various political leaders and other elites in Canada had a sense of optimism. The Massey Commission was publicly outspoken about its positive attitude toward French Canada, and its respect for bilingualism and openness to French-Canadian intellectual values. Ultimately, the

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50 Cairns, “Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State”, 515
51 McRoberts, Quebec Social Change and Political Crisis, 102
52 Ibid., 102
53 Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980, 68
commission was formed to preserve Canadian arts and culture in the face of the influence of America, as the post-war period saw increased military and economic association between America and Canada. This led to calls for state support for the arts and education. The Massey Commission focused on the role of federal funding for universities, the conservation of Canada’s historic places, and other similar goals. This effort reflects the increasing political assertiveness of parties based in Quebec. The Massey Commission strongly desired federal involvement in funding higher education, noting that “education was primarily a personal responsibility. Further, any group could presumably help the individual to assume that responsibility.” The Commission put forth recommendations for ways to preserve the Canadian culture, believing that survival of a national culture depended upon the existence of a homogeneous ethnic environment, which included homogeneous institutions, customs and beliefs, linguistic unity, and consistency in organizational practice. Ensuring a type of homogeneous environment was a task that fell upon the state. The state guarantees specific liberties to the nation that the nation can express freely.

Reaction to the increase in federal powers was very negative in Quebec. Specifically, Quebecers were outraged by the increase of federal power into previously provincial areas of jurisdiction. Quebec argued that all aspects of education were to be covered by the BNA Act and controlled by the provinces, and that although the federal government now may see itself having responsibility for university education, it already had a prior responsibility to respect the legal order. Quebec believed that the “legal order, of course, gave the provinces responsibility for education.” Ultimately, Quebec asked that the Commission consider how the financial system

54 Ibid., 71
55 Ibid., 72
of the province would best fit into that of the county. As a result of these concerns, the Tremblay Commission was created in 1953.

The Tremblay Commission’s main purpose was to give Quebec answers to the views articulated in the report of the Massey Commission. While the Massey Commission was a federal Commission, the Quebec government created the Tremblay Commission to examine the encroachment of federal powers on provincial authority. It was given the mission of examining the tax-sharing debate between various levels of government. After examining the current structure of this relationship, the Tremblay Commission made many recommendations. The province of Quebec defined itself as a community that was unique in regard to its origins, history, religion, and culture. The Quebec people stated that they could not be assimilated into or made compatible with any community existing in a different Canadian province, and that as a result the government of Quebec had a duty to preserve the French-Canadian nation. The BNA Act gave the provinces a large amount of responsibility. Social and cultural activity formed the essence of the autonomy that was guaranteed to the provinces by the BNA Act. The Tremblay Commission felt that the Act gave the government of Quebec authority over all matters arising from its historical, cultural, and religious character, and granted powers over civil rights and aspects of language to the provinces\textsuperscript{56}. The government of Quebec had a mission. The political program that the Tremblay Commission developed was based on the assumption that French-Canadian culture would only survive and develop if the provincial government of Quebec had the primary responsibility for the organization of life in Quebec\textsuperscript{57}. The Tremblay Commission recognized the crisis in French-Canadian society and proposed a solution that would restructure provincial

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] Ibid., 78
\item[57] Ibid., 78
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institutions so that they would reflect the traditional values of French-Canadian culture. These changes were to focus on economic activity, rather than social issues.

The Bilingualism and Bicultural Commission was a second commission created by the federal government in 1963. This Commission is an example of accommodation made by the federal government to try to figure out how to balance the Francophone and Anglophone cultures of Canada. The Commission was created to question and report on the state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend steps to develop an equal partnership between those who were culturally Francophone and those who were culturally Anglophone. The Commission was comprised of ten commissioners, collectively representing the interests of the ten Canadian provinces. The Commission ultimately reported that the Francophone population was underrepresented in each of the provinces, and it compiled a list of recommendations that included requiring that bilingual districts be created in regions of Canada where members of the minority community made up ten percent or more of the population. Second, the Commission recommended that parents be able to send their children to schools that taught in the language of their choice. Last, the Commission recommended that Ottawa, the federal capital of Canada, become a bilingual city and that English and French both should be official languages of Canada.

The recommendations of the Commission laid the groundwork that set the Official Languages Act into motion. However the recommendations put forth by the Commission were very controversial and the public was greatly divided between support and opposition. The emphasis placed on bilingualism really gained momentum due to the agenda of the political parties.

**Quiet Revolution**

The Quiet Revolution was a period of drastic cultural and political change in Quebec. The word “Quiet” is used because it was a socio-economic change over 20 years, not a sudden
change or disjunction. The word “Revolution” is used because it resulted in the transfer of power from traditional pro-Canadians to, eventually, Parti Quebecois nationalist/separatists. To understand the Quiet Revolution it is important to examine the economic policies that came into effect during that time. The economic policies that were adopted as part of the Quiet Revolution were the product of the political activity of three groups: the organized working class, the Francophone business class, and the traditional middle class intelligentsia. While these three groups never joined formally, their political demands in the economic arena were sufficiently complementary that they were grouped together as the Quiet Revolution coalition. These groups were unified through the actions of the PLQ, which adopted their proposals, put them into one platform, and called on each of the groups to support the party and its program. The Quiet Revolution represents the emergence of a new nationalist elite out of the extreme wing of the Liberal Party, articulation of a nationalist agenda in various publications, and the impact of socio-economic modernization on Quebec in terms of the emergence of a skilled middle class of Francophones demanding employment for French speakers.

The construction of Quebecois identity by the new Francophone elite involved the development of a modern, secular, state administration for Quebec, emphasizing the territorial and political dimensions of the identity of the people of Quebec. Socio-economic modernization and state building in Quebec, began under the Union Nationale party, but was transformed into a “revolution” under the leadership of the Parti Liberal du Quebec.

The Union Nationale party originated as a revolt, which took place within the ranks of the Liberal party in the early 1930’s. This revolt ultimately began when a group of young left-wing liberals, who called themselves L’Action Liberale Nationale (ALN), became dissatisfied with the

58 Ibid., 92
59 McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 105
Liberal Party’s conservative economic policies and the strict control that party exercised over its organization. The original plan of the ALN was to reform the Liberal Party from within, by persuading its leaders to adopt a more nationalist philosophy. When the ALN was “launched it was met with a favorable response from many sections of the population since its ideas conformed with the nationalist ideology then sweeping the province.”\(^6^0\) The reason for the ALN choosing to make an alliance with the Conservative Party is that the Conservative Party was equally opposed to the Liberal Party’s administration of Quebec, and had the additional advantage of having had more political experience and a better electoral organization than the ALN did. Eventually, the Conservative Party and the ALN joined forces against the Liberals to form the Union Nationale (UN). The UN represented “provincial autonomy, conservatism, economic liberalism, and rural life.”\(^6^1\) This party focused on affirmation of the province’s French and Catholic identity within Quebec; however, the UN’s political platform changed drastically throughout its existence. The social and economic positions of the party also shifted over time. The Union Nationale was “autonomist” and pro-Francophone, but not nationalist, and eventually lost its power to the PLQ in 1960. It was actually the PLQ that set the Quiet Revolution in motion.

The UN lost support due to several developments that “further strengthened the position of the Liberal Party and weakened that of the Union Nationale”\(^6^2\), including the victories of the Conservative Party in the federal elections of 1957 and 1958. With the Conservatives in control of the federal administration, the UN lost one of its strongest arguments against the provincial Liberal Party. Undoubtedly, the most important change in the Quebec political situation between

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 106
\(^{61}\) Ibid., 106
\(^{62}\) Ibid., 80
1956 and 1960 resulted from the sudden death of Maurice Duplessis. This unexpected event was a serious loss to the UN.

The death of Duplessis brought great change. His death encouraged new leadership that was dramatically different than before. The major change in this new leadership was the implementation of a program of educational reform based upon the recommendations of the Massey Commission. This change represented new emphasis given to education of the Francophone population in subjects that were believed to enable them to more actively participate in the modern economy. In 1964, the Liberal government of Canada created a federal Ministry of Education, and in 1968, the UN-led government presented Bill 85, which provided for what is commonly called "freedom of choice"—the right of parents to choose the language of education for their children. In 1974, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was adopted to address language and education rights, among other matters.

Canada is comprised of two distinct societies: Francophones and Anglophones. For Francophones their national identity is based on their use of the French language, and the Quebec identity “is constructed on the basis of belonging to a territory…within the borders of Quebec.” Language is an instrument for integrating people of various origins into a single entity, and therefore the use of French signifies that a person belongs in a Francophone civil society. Thus, “language is not only an indicator of membership in a particular ethnic group but also the means of participating in a whole society.” The lack of French language representation fueled the Quebecois grievances.

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63 Ibid., 81
64 Tetley, “Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada”, 177
65 Cairns, “Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State”, 520
66 Ibid., 520
The topic of language reform in schools was very heated, and led to the secularization of educational and broad social welfare institutions that used to be under the control of the Catholic Church. Until the 1960’s, the secular and religious sectors operated independently of each other. Then, there were rapid changes in “Quebec’s social, political, and economic milieu, that created pressure for educational reform.” The provincial Commission on Education was organized in 1961, and it recommended that a more unified educational system be established in Quebec. There was great concern about the quality of education in the private sector and possible abuses, and in response the Commission recommended that the Quebec government should supervise and inspect private schools in order to ensure uniform standards for curricula and teaching qualifications. Quebec was required to assume such duties, according to the Commission, as “a consequence of the responsibility it bears with regard to everything which affects the public interest and the welfare of the people.” The Commission also proposed that government grants to private schools should be made in proportion with the school’s ability to serve the public and to contribute to educational progress in Quebec. Many of the recommendations of the Commission were incorporated into the provincial Bill 56, the Private Education Act that was introduced by the UN government in 1968. At this time there was a transfer of control from the “Catholic and Protestant committees of the Conseil de l’Instruction Publique to the state and a common curriculum and common path of development were gradually put in place.” These trends were legitimized in 1969 when the provincial Bill 63 gave parents the right to choose the language in which their children were to be instructed. Bill 63 caused great distress among Francophones, and their organizations moved toward demanding a unilingual education system.

67 Tetley, “Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada”, 213
68 Ibid., 213
69 Ibid., 467
in French, with “instruction in the English language… a ‘privilege’ granted on a temporary basis only to Anglophones born and raised in Quebec.”\textsuperscript{70} In promoting this position, the Francophones came into direct conflict with representatives of the Anglophones, who wanted freedom of choice to be granted to all parents, as well as representatives from employer associations, who wanted the option of English-language instruction to be available at least to all those whose mother tongue was English. Because of these objections Bill 63 was repealed and Bill 22 was presented as an alternative.

Two different language laws passed in Quebec are essential to understanding of the province’s linguistic history: Bill 101, also known as the Charte de la Langue Francaise, and Bill 22, also known as the Official Language Act of 1974. The Parti Quebecois (PQ) and the Parti Liberal du Quebec (PLQ) both put forth their versions of language policy. The UN was the first important separatist political party in Quebec. It is important to compare the political agendas of the ruling parties--the UN until 1960, then the PLQ, and the emergence of the PQ out of the Quiet Revolution. These political parties mobilized the Quebecois people by listening to Francophone grievances regarding their identity, and taking action to address their concerns. These historical language policies put forth by the political parties may anticipate the kinds of political debates that will occur in Quebec in the future.

The PLQ was a federalist provincial party in Quebec that supported Quebec remaining a part of Canada. They dominated the government of Quebec from 1960 until the PQ won its first victory in 1976. Although the PLQ supported Quebec remaining part of the federation of Canada, it also supported reforms that would result in greater autonomy for Quebec. The PLQ also

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 467
believed that the government should play a strong role in the economy, and it supported many various socially liberal policies.

The PQ was formed when a former PLQ minister left his home party and joined the Ralliement National (RN), a different separatist political party. The PQ is a separatist Quebecois political party. This party advocates for national sovereignty for Quebec, involving complete secession from Canada and the creation of a separate sovereign state. The PQ ends up being the party representing Quebecois nationalism later on.

The main differences between the PLQ and the PQ lie in their views of the optimal relationship between Quebec and Canada. While the PQ advocated for an independent nation of Quebec, “The PLQ, while at times nationalistic, still saw Quebec as part of Canada and, accordingly, Quebec’s English speaking community as part of the majority group in Canada.”\(^71\)

The PQ and the PLQ differed in their views regarding the best language use policy for Quebec and the PLQ drew a line at the enforcement of the French language at local municipal school and social service institution levels. In contrast, the PQ viewed Quebec as a nation-state, and it downplayed ties between Quebec’s Anglophone community and the rest of Canada, preferring to treat the Anglophones as a “national minority”. The PQ was also less reluctant to push pluralism\(^72\).

The Quiet Revolution, and the adoption of new language laws that put French on a par with English, signified efforts by the Francophone community to secure equal status for the French language in business, culture, and public life, and these efforts opened the doors to upward mobility for a new Francophone middle class. The National Assembly of Quebec with

\(^{71}\) Coleman, “From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of Language Under the Parti-Quebecois”, 462

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 462
the support of the PLQ created Bill 22, and it made French the official language of Quebec in 1974. While Bill 22 gave free choice to all children who had “sufficient knowledge” of either English or French, it imposed an upper limit on the number of students who could be instructed in English. The employer class was satisfied, but Anglophone educators, representatives of the smaller cultural communities, and the nationalist coalitions were all intensely dissatisfied with this solution.\textsuperscript{73}

Bill 101 eventually replaced Bill 22 in 1977. Bill 101 began as Bill 1, and was the first influential piece of legislation introduced by the PQ after its election to power in November 1976.\textsuperscript{74} It was withdrawn and reintroduced as Bill 101. Bill 101’s goal was to make French the primary language used in the provincial communities. It attempted to do this by ensuring that workers perform their jobs and interact with their employers in their native language. Bill 101 required local institutions, including municipalities, school boards, and local health and social service institutions, to conform to unilingual practices of the province-wide bureaucracies, by publishing all official texts and documents in French.\textsuperscript{75} Bill 101 was very comprehensive and it applied to all private schools receiving subsidies from the province.

Bill 101 is a stronger and more restrictive and demanding bill than Bill 22 and it asserts the status of French more strongly. These two language laws set the tone for the separatist movement in Quebec. The focus on strengthening Quebec culture and the French language was an idea paralleled by the economic development and modernization of the province, with a direct role taken by the provincial government, especially in securing capital for investment and directing it into the hands of the Francophone business sector.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 467  
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 464  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 465
The overall aim of the economic policies that emerged after the PLQ victory in 1960 was to create “competitive capitalist enterprises controlled by members of the Francophone business class.”\textsuperscript{76} There was a trend toward urbanization as a means to integrate the population into modern networks of communication, socialization, and mobilization. The first priority of the business class was to devise a means to bring together the capital needed to promote creation of larger firms, and they attempted to “consolidate large pools of capital for investment in Francophone enterprises, efforts to promote adoption of a more modern firm structure, and moves to increase the indigenous processing of natural resources”\textsuperscript{77}. This resulted in a clash between competing economic theories, one of which was to promote a Francophone capitalist business class, and the other of which is a socialist system that replaces the capitalist one, in which a system of public corporations replaces private ones and the Francophone community receives support from the government. However, there was a process that needed to be undertaken in order for these goals to be met. First, Francophone participation in the economy of Quebec had to be strengthened. Second, in moving to increase French-Canadian participation in the economy, special emphasis had to be placed on increasing the processing of Quebec’s wealth in natural resources. Third, movement toward these objectives would require centralized planning and thus an increased role for the provincial government\textsuperscript{78}. Over this period there was a series of confrontations between the government of Quebec and the federal government. Quebec sought the political power and fiscal ability to define its own social policies, to control the flow of migration to its territory, to control and administer radio and television broadcasting, to

\textsuperscript{76} Coleman, \textit{The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980}, 92
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 100
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 116
conduct many of its own affairs in the sphere of international relations, and to set up its own department of cultural affairs and define its own policy on culture.

Ultimately, none of these initiatives was as successful as had been hoped. The strategy created during the Quiet Revolution had been to create institutions parallel to foreign corporations, and to use the help of the Quebec government to strengthen these institutions to the point at which they could be competitive. Ultimately Quebec wanted to cut off Canadian dependence on America, by encouraging the strengthening of its own businesses. In the early 1970’s, Quebec’s economic policies were changed in order to place less importance on competition between the Francophone capitalist class and other capitalists in North America. The new policy stressed cooperation in economic development and gave a further boost to the growth of the capitalist class in the Francophone community. This new policy “sealed the fate of the Quiet Revolution coalition, and its final break-up coincided with a rise in support for political independence.”

The separatist movement reached a high point at the time of the 1980 Quebec referendum, called by the PQ-led government. This referendum was the first referendum in which Quebecois could vote on whether Quebec should separate from Canada. The proposal to favor secessionism was defeated. The PQ launched a second Quebec Referendum when it was returned to power in 1995, and that referendum also was defeated. Both referenda attempted to achieve consensus for Quebec to become its own autonomous state and to enter into a political and economic agreement with Canada. The 1995 referendum came after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, which was a package of proposed amendments to the Constitution of Canada attempting to keep Quebec within Canada. When the PQ government began planning for the 1995 referenda, “the

79 Ibid., 93
public support for sovereignty was around 45 per cent\textsuperscript{80}, and in the final vote support for sovereignty increased to roughly 49 per cent\textsuperscript{81}. Support for this referendum increased to make the final results so close because of the alienation, frustration, and anger felt by nationalists over the failure of accommodation and the refusal of the rest of Canada to accede to their demand for distinct and advantaged status in the federation\textsuperscript{82}.

In the next chapter, I will discuss how the rise of Quebecois nationalism and the separatist movement can be explained and predicted through the lens of conflict analysis.

\textsuperscript{80}Young, “The Struggle for Quebec”, 13
\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., 13
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., 13
Chapter 4: Applying Political Theory to the Quebec Separatist Movement

This thesis aims to utilize the theories of separatist movements and nationalist movements in order to explain the rise in separatist and nationalist sentiment in Quebec. The separatist movement in Quebec is an example of protest and demands for independence by the Francophones motivated by deep-seated grievances about the status of their group, and by the determined pursuit of their political interests as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs. The Quebec separatist movement can be understood through this conflict analysis lens. The separatist movement in Quebec is rooted in “nationalism”. To understand the motivations for separatism, I will apply the theories that explain the sources for the rise of nationalism. I will focus on the three primary views of separatist sentiment that arise from nationalism: those espoused by Geertz, Gellner, and Gurr.

The literature on nationalisms can be divided into two broad categories that are very different in their explanations of the sources of identity-based conflict. These two competing perspectives of conflict analysis are essential for understanding the separatist movement in Quebec: relative deprivation and group mobilization.

Relative deprivation is often used to mean inequalities such as wealth, status, and power that are perceived as unjust, but also used to denote frustrated and unfulfilled expectations of achievements. When one has not achieved the wealth, status, and power that one expected to have, the difference between what is expected and the reality, is considered unjust.

Group Mobilization is the basis of group-ness; identity and feelings of belonging are primordial, meaning that cultural characteristics and characteristics of origin constitute “markers” of membership and bases of solidarity. The primordialist viewpoint views communal groups as social entities based on a set of genetic, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens. The most influential political philosopher in this field is Clifford Geertz. Geertz would believe that the
separatist movement in Quebec escalated because of the extent to which the Francophone identity was “bound up in the gross actualities of…language.” For Quebecers, the Francophone culture is being threatened by the dominance of Anglophone culture in Canada, and in the province. As stated earlier in Chapter 2, Geertz believes that two aims of states--the search for an identity to be publically acknowledged and a demand for progress and a rising standard of living, can be seen to be taking place by the formation of the Quiet Revolution. Ultimately, all of the changes that took place during the Quiet Revolution occurred because the Francophones of Quebec remained dissatisfied with their level of status, power, and wealth. The Francophones had been subjected to discrimination of culture outside of Quebec for many years. The construction of Quebecois identity by the rising Francophone elite in Quebec focused on efforts to secure the status, and the dominance, of French as the language of public life – political, economic, and cultural – in the province. The two aims of Quebec that Geertz indicates are the desire for the Francophone identity to be publically acknowledged, as well as a rising standard of living for their identity to flourish, which were not fulfilled. Geertz would believe that Quebec is built on “fellow feeling”, which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are united. Quebec does not feel kin with Canada and therefore this “fellow feeling” is non-existent in Quebec. Thus, there is a conflict between primordial and civil sentiments.

While Geertz would explain the Quiet Revolution’s occurrence as a result of the continued dissatisfaction with the level of attention being paid to the Francophones primordial identity, the secondary category of conflict analysis literature focuses on national movements as "constructions" arising out of processes of modernization and development. Ernest Gellner is the main political philosopher who explains this category of conflict analysis. He believes that the

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83 Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution”, 258
“political opportunity” model of mobilization is based on structural features of the social and political order that create opportunities for entrepreneurs to mobilize. Elections create opportunities to mobilize aggrieved identity groups to seek redress by electing their political entrepreneurs to office. The Quiet Revolution began after the death of Duplessis, which enabled a new leadership to come in and demand the Francophone identity to be acknowledged in the political arena.

Ultimately, according to Gellner there also needs to be a type of shared culture in order for a nationalist movement to even begin. Gellner states, “Nationalism is an essential [product] of modernization.” Gellner believes that the precondition for nationalism is the “widespread or universal literacy, and a society committed to economic growth through its formal commitment to social mobility.” The rise of a competitive, business-oriented Francophone class during the Quiet Revolution demonstrates this commitment to economic growth through social mobility. Industrial society requires effective communication through a common medium, a “high culture”. According to Gellner, communicative media are crucial in maintaining nationalism, but his argument stresses the functionality of a shared culture for the effective operation of modern work-organizations and bureaucracies. The Quiet Revolution is an example of state building accompanied by nation building, as conceptualized by Gellner. This process, as Gellner argued, required the establishment of a common language. In Quebec, the political entrepreneurs were part of a Francophone elite, so they chose French as that language, and used material and status disadvantages of the Francophone population to frame grievances and mobilize support for change. The various language bills, such as Bill 22 and Bill 101, were attempts at creating a common culture. Furthermore, this also explains the tenacity shown by the Francophones during

84 Ibid., 198
85 Ibid., 199
the Quiet Revolution for implementing French in all levels of education as well as in the workplace. Gellner views the sense of belonging as coming from the modernization of a state, rather than a primordial cultural perspective. Gellner believes that nationalism goes hand in hand with communication and expression. This view is different from that of Geertz. While the primordial analysis implies that the Francophones want to be united and separate as a means to express their culture, and that they would want this expression regardless of how well they are treated by Canada and the Anglophones, Gellner’s view is economic and would include that the separatist movement stems from the Francophones feeling deprived, whether culturally or economically, by Canada.

Gellner’s theory aligns perfectly with the aim of the economic policy that emerged after the PLQ victory in 1960. The economic policy that was put into place to create competitive capitalist enterprises controlled by members of the Francophone business class, were created as a result of the Francophones consistently feeling underrepresented in the business sector. This trend was toward urbanization. Urbanization is a term used for integrating the population into modern networks of communication, socialization, and mobilization, as Gellner predicted.

While Geertz’s and Gellner’s theories of conflict analysis stress different aspects in the explanations for the rise of nationalism, they find a middle point in Ted Robert Gurr’s work. Gurr’s explanation stresses that the cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy all contributed to Francophones grievances. Grievances that are coupled with a strong sense of identity result in mobilization of a separatist movement. The Francophones grievances result from the fact that they believe their identity is not sufficiently acknowledged. These identities become the basis for political demands for recognition and independence. The Quiet Revolution provides a strong foundation for using Gurr’s formula as a theoretical framework to explain the
rise of Quebecois nationalism and separatism.

Gurr states that primordial characteristics such as the French culture and language; plus unjust inequalities that take the form of the British conquest as well as the underrepresentation of Francophones and French in day to day life; plus a group of political entrepreneurs or elites which take the from of the separatist PQ, collectively result in the emergence of grievances. These grievances, formed at a time in which the structural framework of politics has created an opportunity for new leadership after the death of Duplessis, results in mobilization of a national movement. This creates an agenda of demands for autonomy or independence, as seen by the language laws that were put in place as well as the demand for the creation of a new Francophone business class.

Ultimately, Gurr’s equation for predicting the rise of any nationalist movement can be used to explain why the Quebec separatist movement came to be. In the next chapter, I will examine the Canadian response to the growing level of Quebecois nationalism. Ultimately, there is a large challenge to Canadian unity and status quo inherent in the rise of Quebec nationalism. The stronger the nationalist sentiment the harder it will be to maintain Canadian unity.
Chapter 5: Canadian response to Quebecois nationalism

Discontent in Quebec over the status of the province and treatment of Francophone culture in Canada required the federal government to undertake efforts at accommodation of Quebec and the Francophones. Such accommodation took the form of the adoption of bilingualism and biculturalism policies. Attempts at accommodation also included the proposed Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. However, efforts to accommodate Quebec came in the context of a simultaneous effort at Canadian state building, on the basis of liberal democratic principles and a bilingual national cultural identity. These state-building efforts ultimately contributed to nationalism in Quebec. Nationalist ideology spread among the Francophone population during 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, as individuals began identifying with and becoming attached to their nation, Quebec. At this time Francophone elites had become nationalist and adopted policies intended to secure greater autonomy for Quebec in the context of Canada as well as the dominance of French language in the province. Strategies for accommodating nationalism were adapted by the federal Canadian leadership in response.

Political scientists have identified three strategies for dealing with the nationalist behavior that became prevalent during the time of the separatist movement. Andre Lecours writes about these three strategies in his article regarding multi-nationalism and accommodation in Canada.

The first strategy involves promotion of the national identity of the common state, which involves, “gaining (or regaining) the loyalty of the citizens of the distinct community by developing a positive image of the State and the national community it projects.” The State’s national identity can incorporate different historical communities to various degrees: some state

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86 Lecours, Andre. “Multi-nationalism and Accommodation: Analysis of a Canadian Success,” 4
nationalism is in fact cultural, while others are more multifaceted. It is important to note that state identity can be national, multi-national, which means constituting multiple nationalities; or multi-cultural, meaning a state that constitutes multiple cultural or ethnic social groups. In this case the state derives legitimacy from the citizens being active. Also, there is a difference between promoting distinct national culture, nationalism (identity based on a single cultural political demographic group) and separatism--it is the latter that represents a real challenge to the common state, and this is the focus of this thesis.

A second strategy is to accommodate inclusion and to increase the representation and political power of the minority community within the central institutions. This is based on the idea that separatist sentiment “can sometimes emerge due to alienation in the face of a state perceived as being remote and not representative.” This strategy is based on the belief that a way to decrease nationalist action is to ensure that the minority community is represented proportionately to its demographic weight, or granted disproportionally even greater representation. In either case, its representatives must have significant consultative political power. This is achieved through such power-sharing mechanisms as consolidative arrangements or the adoption of more rules by which decisions are to be made based on consensus and mutual veto, since many simple majoritarian decisions are not likely to be favored by demographic minorities.

A third strategy involves decentralization. Nationalist movements attempt to create a distinct political destiny for the community that they represent. This takes the form of decentralizing political power in certain fields of public policy, whether for a specific community or through a process that restructures the division of powers. Thus, “Implementing this

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87 Ibid., 4
[federalization] strategy typically requires the beginning of intergovernmental relations where the exact division of responsibilities will be negotiated continually. “During the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada, “Canadian nationalism restructured itself on the bases of bilingualism and biculturalism.” The Official Languages Act of 1968 made Canada a bilingual State and enabled its citizens to have linguistic rights. The act stated that Canadians have the right to receive services from federal department in both languages. Also, it stated that Canadians would be able to be heard before federal courts in the official language of their choice. It allowed parliament to adopt laws and to publish regulations in both official languages, and stated that both versions would be equal in weight. Lastly, it stated that both English and French will ultimately have equal status in the workplace and within the federal public service, within geographically defined parts of the country that are designated as bilingual and in parts of the country where there is a concentrated Francophone population.

Separatists see the absence of recognition of Quebec as a nation or a distinct society as the main weakness of the Canadian accommodation of Quebec. While the federal government transferred powers in domains of public policy—pensions, immigration, workforce training, etc.—to Quebec since the Quiet Revolution, “the political goal of these exercises of decentralization has been to meet specific demands from the Quebec government and by this fact to recognize the distinct character of the province”.

The Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord

Two attempts at constitutional reform were made in an effort to mitigate Quebec’s grievances and to decrease support for separatism. However, even before these reforms came

\[88\] Ibid., 4

\[89\] Ibid., 6

\[90\] Ibid., 12
about, the Constitution Act of 1982 was adopted in Canada and became an essential part of the story. The Trudeau government created the Constitution Act in order to transfer control of the Canadian Constitution from the United Kingdom. Trudeau was the 15th Prime Minister of Canada (and was himself a French-Canadian). The Act contains seven parts, the first part of which is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This Charter states certain rights that Canadians have, including freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association. Under the charter, English and French are languages of equal stature, and everyone in Canada is considered equal under the law. Ultimately the Constitution Act reinforces “the independentist current within the national movement.”

However, the national unity strategy the Trudeau government had created a large amount of opposition of sovereigntists as well as federalists. Ultimately, the Constitution Act was not in line with the opinion of Quebecers, because “it was based on an idea of Canada that most Quebec Francophones did not share.” Thus, a crisis began within the federalist nationalist camp, which led to the beginning of the embodiment of autonomist nationalism.

The Meech Lake Accord was created several years later. It was a package of amendments to the Canadian constitution that was negotiated in 1987 by the Prime Minister. This package was intended to persuade the Quebec government to endorse the 1982 amendment as a means to increase support in Quebec for remaining in Canada. The accord was negotiated at a 1987 meeting, and it was comprised of five main modifications to the Canadian constitution: a recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; a constitutional veto for all provinces; increased provincial powers with respect to immigration; extension and regulation of the right for a

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91 Luch, “How nationalism evolves: explaining the establishment of new varieties of nationalism within the national movements of Quebec and Catalonia (1976–2005)”, 347

92 Ibid., 347
reasonable financial compensation to any province that chooses to opt out of any future federal programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction; and provincial input in the appointment of senators and supreme justices. The Accord ultimately would have changed the constitution greatly, and so needed the consent of all provincial legislatures, as well as the federal legislature in order to become effective. All of these consents had to be obtained within three years.

A very important political process led to Meech Lake – Quebec leadership had to make a clear willingness to compromise. The Meech Lake Accord it needed the consent of all provincial and federal legislatures in three years. The Meech Lake Accord had the support of the separatists and the Liberal Party, as well as the New Democratic Party. However, the Reform Party opposed it on the grounds that it gave Quebec unequal status among the provinces. The PQ also opposed the Meech Lake Accord. The opposition did not like the fact that the Meech Lake accord was in favor of the devolution of federal powers and control to the provincial governments. Finally, Pierre Trudeau also was against the accord, and he stated that while Quebec is distinct, it was not more distinct than other provinces.

Ultimately, when the Meech Lake Accord was debated in the Quebec National Assembly, the PQ opposed it. National public opinion polls initially showed that a majority of Canadians supported the proposed agreement. The arguments against the accord focused on the devolution of federal powers and control to the provincial governments. There was also no public confirmation through a popular referendum for the accord. Despite efforts to reform the Meech Lake Accord, it did not gain enough support. The rejection of The Meech Lake Accord resulted in the increase in Quebec of support for secession.

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94 “The Meech Lake Accord”
95 Ibid.
Once the Meech Lake Accord was rejected, The Charlottetown Accord was created. The government of Quebec created various committees to enable a conversation regarding Quebec’s future. A referendum was planned to occur in 1992 regarding Quebec’s options for sovereignty. Various commissions were created to find ways to decrease Anglophone Canada’s concerns, and on Quebec’s initiative the Charlottetown Accord was prepared. This Accord was comprised of a package of proposed amendments to the constitution of Canada, proposed by the Canadian federal and provincial governments in 1992⁹⁶. It was submitted to a public referendum on October 26 of that year, and was defeated. The Charlottetown Accord attempted to resolve long-standing disputes around the division of powers between federal and provincial jurisdiction. Federal funding would also have been guaranteed for programs such as Medicare, severely limiting the federal government's authority to negotiate national standards in return for funding increases. The accord also would have required the federal and provincial governments to work together to develop and implement policies regarding telecommunications, labor development and training, regional development, and immigration. The Accord also proposed a number of major reforms to Federal institutions, including the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of Commons. A very controversial change would have required that Quebec hold at least one-quarter of the seats in the House. This is an example of accommodation, or at least an attempt at accommodation.

The accord received some support from the Progressive Conservatives, the Liberals, and the New Democratic Party as well as all ten provincial premiers. However, there was also a vast amount of opposition for the Accord as well. However, there was also a vast amount of

opposition for the Accord as well. The former Prime Minster, Pierre Trudeau, catalyzed the largest opposition. He believed that the Accord would signal the end of Canada and would disintegrate the federal government. The Reform Party was also strongly against it just as they were against the Meech Lake Agreement. Also the two Quebec sovereigntist parties, the Bloc Quebecois and the PQ, opposed this Accord because they thought that it did not give Quebec enough power. Ultimately, both Quebec and Anglophone Canada rejected it. Probably the biggest result of the referendum was the effect of most of Canada's population voting against an agreement endorsed by every first minister and most other political groups. This stinging rebuke against the "political class" in Canada was a preview of things to come. Both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords raised a large amount of opposition in Canadian political life during the 1980s and 1990s. This absence of constitutional recognition is interpreted as highlighting non-accommodation by Quebec, since Canada does not explicitly recognize its multinational character. 

Despite the loss of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and the resulting increase in support for succession among the people of Quebec, in 1995, the citizens of Quebec voted against the sovereignty option by a small amount narrow margin.

Stephan Dion was named Minster of Public Affairs in 1996, and his first task was to challenge the arguments of the Quebec sovereignty movement. In 1996, he submitted three questions to the Supreme Court in Canada discussing secession in Quebec. The first question asked by Dion, was this: “Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?”

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97 Ibid., 12
The second question asked was: “Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?” The last questions asked was: “In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada? In 1998 the Supreme Court answered Dion’s questions stating that Quebec does not have the right to secede under Canadian or international law. The decision of the Supreme Court stated that Quebec could not legally separate unilaterally from Canada, but that the Canadian Parliament would have a political obligation to enter into separation negotiations with Quebec in the event that a clear majority of its populace was to vote for independence.

The Supreme Court reference launched a public debate between Dion and members of the Parti Québécois government in open letters published in the press and it resulted in the drafting of the Clarity Act, which Dion presented to the House of Commons in 1999. The Clarity Act established the conditions under which the Government of Canada would enter into negotiations that might lead to secession, and it stated that before separation negotiations could begin, a referendum on independence in a given province would have to have clearly framed its question to voters in terms of independence, and that the result would have to be a clear majority in favor. Dion’s strategy resulted in the decline in support for independence, since independence

99 “Stephane Dion”
100 Ibid.
and secession were declared to be possible, but could not be forced unilaterally, but only following good faith negotiations that would inevitably pit Quebec against all of Canada, not just the federal government or the federal state alone\textsuperscript{101}. In other words, the decision seems to make the possible impossible. The Clarity Act conclusion is an example of an accommodation put forth for the Francophone population by the federal government.

In the next chapter I will be looking at the results of public opinion polls as well as electoral returns to understand the current level of support for the separatist movement and the reason for why it is currently off of the political agenda.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
Chapter 6: Level of Support for Independence/Secession Over Time

As I discussed in the previous chapters, the roots of the Quebec separatist movement date back for centuries and yet despite these deep rooted feelings, Quebec still has not officially separated from Canada. The question remains whether Quebec is dissatisfied enough with Canada and whether they have a significantly stronger Quebecois identity than a Canadian identity. There is a large amount of sources regarding the separatist movement and speculations regarding what the future for Canada will look like. I will uncover, the fact that the Quebecois identity is still significantly strong however; the dual identity of being a Quebecker and a Canadian is stronger. I will look at public opinion data as well as electoral voting results to demonstrate this phenomenon.

The increase of federal funds to the provinces is one cause for the slight decline in support for a separatist movement. Some believe that having Quebec remain part of Canada is imperative to the country due to the financial support that Quebec is given. Thus, the general revenue assistance provided to the States by the Commonwealth is distributed on the basis of the horizontal fiscal equalization principles. The politics of fiscal redistribution and the programs of horizontal fiscal equalization ultimately contribute to the increasing separatism in Quebec.

Due to accommodating sub-state nationalism, an important reason for creating Canada’s fiscal equalization program in 1957 was to stop the institutional and political isolation of Quebec\textsuperscript{102}. Federal equalization programs are about horizontal fiscal redistribution; they structure the dynamics of the relationships between federal and constituent unit governments, as well as between constituent unit governments themselves. Horizontal Fiscal Equalization programs are considered necessary because various national governments have different costs.

\textsuperscript{102} Beland, Lecours, “Accommodation and the politics of fiscal equalization in multinational states: The case of Canada.”, 337
and capacities to raise revenue for reasons that are beyond their control. The process to address these differences in revenue is known as horizontal fiscal equalization. However equalization programs can also produce resentment in other parts of the country that do not benefit from them but provide the resources that get redistributed, which may work to undermine the feelings that national solidarity and unity equalization is meant to generate. A big factor in resentment of equalization is that social welfare benefits in Quebec are higher than in the provinces providing the resources.

In the longer term, equalization programs redistribute, which causes feelings of togetherness and solidarity. Created in 1957, equalization is a program managed and funded by the federal government through general tax revenues. The program worked to designate money to specific provinces when their fiscal capacity is below a certain amount. Provinces that are above this national average do not receive any equalization payments. While there have been some modifications in this program since 1957, the basic logic of the program has not changed. The combination of the federal equalization program and Québec’s generous social programs creates resentment towards the province from other Canadians, who think that their money is paying for services Quebecers receive but that they do not enjoy themselves.

The social scientist Matthew Mendelsohn wrote an article regarding the other sources of the decline in the separatist movement. Mendelsohn analyzed election survey data to show that Quebec identity has been decreasing. Mendelsohn asserts that Quebecers have a weaker different type of Canadian identity than other Canadians do: “while most English speaking Canadians see themselves as individual, unmediated members of a Canadian community, most Quebecers see

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103 Ibid., 340
themselves as individual unmediated members of a Quebec community."\textsuperscript{104} These enduring differences in identity association are the reasons for the enduring conflicts between these two groups in Quebec. These two identities are very complicated because the Quebecers are the original Canadians as Mendelsohn explains. The word Canadian is actually a French word and over time Canadians of British decent came to think of themselves as Canadian rather then British. Ultimately, the Quebec nationalist movement is quite strong and the identification with the larger national community is very deep, which leaves a slight dilemma. Mendelsohn states that the resolution to this issue is found by the federal nature of Canada “which creates institutional incentives for provincial elites to make nationalist demands…contributing to the strength of the nationalist movement-through the continued presence of deep nested identities which prevents nationalist elites from achieving secession.”\textsuperscript{105} Mendelsohn concludes that the reason for the lack of a separatist movement is that identity is shared between Canada and Quebec. Similar to Gurr’s argument, Mendelsohn focuses on identity. However, Gurr also focuses on grievances and the actions of entrepreneurs as stated earlier in this thesis.

In contrast to Mendelsohn’s claims, according to another source, the article by Patriquin, Martin, and Maclean, separatism is actually back on the agenda. The article states that the PQ leader, Pauline Marois in 2011, received over 93 percent in her first confident vote\textsuperscript{106}. There is some controversy regarding the legitimacy of the votes and some believe that she “bought” the votes because of the attention she places on sovereignty in her campaign\textsuperscript{107}. According to the article, the PQ uses the issue of sovereignty as “something used once in a while to keep the

\textsuperscript{104} Mendelsohn, “Measuring National Identity and Patterns of Attachment: Quebec and Nationalist Mobilization”, 74
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 86
\textsuperscript{106} Patriquin, “Separatism is Back on the Agenda”, 1
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 1
militants quiet.”\(^{108}\) Some conclude that she allowed her platform to be dedicated to the PQ’s language “thus ensuring that language politics and sovereignist fist pumping will once again be front and center in the lead-up to the next provincial election, expected in the next two years.”\(^{109}\)

Marois has listened to the demand for the separatist agenda and if a PQ government is elected, it would apply Bill 101 to Quebec's system of post-secondary schools. The Francophone grievances and demands are still alive and well. Delegates had also endorsed the use of public funds for the study and promotion of sovereignty. This is why one has to distinguish between grievances felt by the population and ideologically motivated actions by entrepreneurs. In fact one the extreme end, “they came close to adopting a motion that would forbid all English signs in the province” however this was eventually debunked\(^{110}\). Despite this debunking, the authors clearly demonstrate that as of 2011, the separatist movement is very much on the agenda due to popular demand by the voters.

The article by Francis Yale and Claire Dunard also discuss the demands of Quebecers and the level of support for sovereignty. Their article focuses on the years 1976-2008. This article examines how support for sovereignty evolved outside the referendum campaigns and since the last referendum in 1995. Yale and Dunard take into account two levels of explanation: first, the wording of the question, which includes the type of constitutional proposal polled; and the passage of time and the events that marked it. Their article confirms “sovereignty combined with an association with the rest of Canada has always stood apart from more ‘extreme’ constitutional options as having the highest support, and it therefore automatically resurfaced at

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 1
\(^{109}\) Ibid., 1
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 1
the start of any referendum campaign.”111 It also confirms that the different events that marked the period only had a temporary effect on support for sovereignty. The article concludes by stating that while support for Quebec sovereignty has varied over the years, since the founding of the Parti Québécois, whatever the discussions taking place within the party or outside of it, sovereignty combined with an association with the rest of Canada has continuously stood apart from the constitutional options that have the highest support in the population. Thus the sovereignty question always automatically gets resurfaced at the start of every referendum and it is not an indicator of whether a separatist movement will occur in the near future.

Data Analysis

For my data, I looked at certain key questions where Quebec citizens were asked how they would vote in a referendum on sovereignty as well as the constitutional options that they are most interested in. I also cross-tabbed multiple questions from different surveys in order to understand trends in thinking. This data was obtained from the CROP surveys available on the CORA112 website, which holds all of the election survey data on Canada.

The first question I looked at was asking if a referendum were held today, like the one in 1995, asking “Do you want Quebec to become a country completely independent from Canada? Would you be tempted to vote yes or no?”. I found answers to this question in the election poll data for the years 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2005. The chart I compiled is below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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The chart above demonstrates that the preferences of the citizens for voting “Yes” in a referendum has remained roughly consistent but there was a dramatic drop in 1998 and it has slowly risen since then. The number of people who would vote “No” in a referendum has slowly risen as well over time however, in 1998 there was a dramatic increase in the number of people who do not want Quebec to become completely independent. In 1996 there was a larger amount of citizens who voted “Yes”. In 1998, the trend completely reversed dramatically and there was a significantly larger amount of people who voted “No”. In 2001 and 2005, the trend changed again and there was a larger amount of people who voted “Yes”. The “Yes” answer is actually increasing in this period, but so is “No”. The chart depicts that the population is divided.

The second question I looked at was asking about the constitutional options citizens desired and think would be best for the country, “Here are some constitutional options that have been proposed for Quebec. Which one do you think would be best?” An alternate indicator of support for independence is provided by a question that asked respondents about their preferred solution. I have compiled a chart with the different options listed and the percent of Quebecers who voted for it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present status in Canada</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Status</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>18.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty Association</td>
<td>19.60%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>16.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>25.20%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The chart demonstrates that the level of support for the status quo increases dramatically over the time period of these surveys. A larger proportion of Quebec respondents support this option more than any of the others. The option for special status has fluctuated quite a bit. It rose
in 1997 drastically and slowly has been declining but it is still a higher popularity level than it was initially in 1981. The option for sovereignty association had risen quite a bit in 1997 and has slowly been declining since that point. The option for independence has overall slowly risen but it declined in 1997. Despite the fact that it has been rising it is still not the most popular option.

In fact in 2012, the vote for maintaining the status quo was more than 10 percentage points larger than the vote for independence. Lastly, the option for not answering the question has been decreasing as well. There was a dramatic decrease in the number of people who wanted to abstain from the question, but since 1997 that number has been slowly rising. In all years there was no clear definitive support for the separatist movement. Although there are variations in past results, the results for 2012 make it clear that no simple option dominates the Quebec electorate. Although support for the status quo enjoys far more support than any other option.

Despite the fact that it seems that the separatist movement has waned, there is still a strong identity divide between Francophones and Anglophones. For example in 1997 the following question was asked: “would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: I am proud to be both Quebecer and a Canadian, and it makes me angry when politicians ask me to choose between these two identities”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>55.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>11.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKN/Refusal</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This chart demonstrates that those who strongly agree with the statement that it makes Quebec citizens angry to choose between their two identities, is more than half of those
answering this option with a 55.9% voting choice. This chart demonstrates that even in 1997, there was a strong dual identity between being a Canadian and being a Quebecer and it is hard for them to choose between the two identities.

When doing my data analysis I came across two important questions. The first was “What is your mother tongue, that is the first language that you learned and can still speak?” The second question was “if a referendum were held today asking you if you wish Quebec to accede to the status of a partnership, but with free trade agreement to be sub sequentially proposed to the rest of Canada, would you vote Yes or would you vote No?” Below are the answers to these questions that were asked in 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the cross-tabbed information, those who stated that they would vote “No” on the referendum of granting Quebec special status was largest for the Anglophones. This demonstrates the same trend as the data from 1995. The result here is significant because there is a huge difference between preferences of Francophones and Anglophones. Also there is a split between the Francophones.

In 2010 another two other very important questions were asked. The first question asked, “Here are some constitutional options that have been proposed for Quebec. Which one do you think would be best?” and I cross-tabbed this question with, “Do you feel that you are more a citizen of Canada or more a citizen of your province?” Below is the chart of the information.
The chart above indicates that those citizens who want the government to maintain the status quo in 2010 are those who consider themselves to be more a citizen of Canada. The largest percent that voted for special status does not associate with being a member of their province or Canada. Those who want sovereignty association tended to be those who are more a citizen of their province. Lastly, those who voted for independence tended to be more a citizen of their province. This chart demonstrates that those who are citizens who identify themselves as being more associated with their province are more inclined to vote for sovereignty versus the status quo.

In 2012, Angus Reid Public Opinion produced an opinion poll that demonstrates that support for sovereignty is lukewarm. The poll asked the question: “If a referendum on Quebec sovereignty were held today, would you vote Yes or No on the following question?” The question is: “Do you agree that Quebec should become a country separate from Canada?” The results of this question are shown in the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Present Status</th>
<th>Special Status</th>
<th>Sovereignty Association</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Citizen of Canada</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of your province</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both equally</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data here indicates that the majority of Francophones in Quebec stated that they would vote “No” if asked the question if they should separate from Canada. An even larger percent of Anglophones stated that they would vote “No” as well. However the support for sovereignty among Francophones is roughly 30%, which still shows some level of support within Quebec.

In 2012, another question was asked by the Angus Reid Public Opinion Survey, regarding which statement one agrees with more: “Quebec has enough sovereignty and should remain part of Canada” or “Quebec needs greater sovereignty, but should still remain part of Canada” or “Quebec should be a separate independent country”. The results are shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Francophones</th>
<th>Anglophones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec has enough sovereignty and should remain part of Canada</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Needs greater sovereignty, but should still remain part of Canada</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec should be a separate, independent Country</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these/not sure</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This chart demonstrates that the majority of Francophones believe that Quebec needs greater sovereignty but should remain part of Canada, or, that Quebec should be a separate independent country. In Contrast, the majority of Anglophones believe that Quebec has enough sovereignty as it is and should remain part of Canada. Thus the Anglophones believe that the Francophones do not need any “special” treatment and this resentment is perhaps fueled by the monetary funds given to Quebec specifically as well as the accommodations at decreasing the level of nationalism in the past.

The survey data indicates that the Quebec separatist movement is not on the political agenda. The data demonstrates that the feelings toward the Quebec separatist movement are stronger for the Francophones specifically and for those whose native language is French. Also the data demonstrates that those who are in favor of the Quebec separatist movement are those citizens who are dissatisfied with the Quebec government as it is. However there are many different options that the government can undergo and an option for special status is one that is gaining more and more attention. Also the data indicates that the separatist sentiment is not especially stronger than it was in the past few years and the trends have been somewhat consistent. The electoral voting chart below further confirms this information:

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>seats</td>
<td>% vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti libéral du Québec/Quebec Liberal Party (P.L.Q./Q.L.P.)</td>
<td>54.65</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46.08</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55.99</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>45.35</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti québécois (P.Q.)</td>
<td>30.22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41.37</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>38.69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39.58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42.87</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33.24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition avenir Quebec (C.A.Q.)</td>
<td>27.05</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.84</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec solidaire (Q.S.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action démocratique du Québec(A.D.Q.)</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.84</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality Party (E.P./P.E.)</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart indicates that right after Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accords, the percent that voted for the Parti Québécois peaked. The Parti Québécois is a separatist party, which demonstrates that the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accords in the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s increased separatist sentiment. Below is a table that demonstrates the political affiliations of the major political parties listed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parti Libéral du Québec/Quebec Liberal Party (P.L.Q./Q.L.P.)</th>
<th>Federalist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois (P.Q.)</td>
<td>Separatist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Avenir Québec (C.A.Q.)</td>
<td>Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec Solidaire (Q.S.)</td>
<td>Separatist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Démocratique du Québec/(A.D.Q.)</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality Party (E.P./P.E.)</td>
<td>Promoted equality of French and English language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallinement Créditiste (R.C.)/Parti Créditiste (P.C.)</td>
<td>Social credit party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Nationale Populaire (P.N.P.)</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an article by Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen that agrees with the conclusion of this data that the Quebec separatist movement is no longer on the political agenda. The article asks the question as to why the Quebec separatist movement is off the agenda. Ultimately the fact is that Quebec sovereignty aspirations have decreased since 1995. Part of the reason for the decline in separatist sentiment is that the main separatist party, the PQ, has not held a significant amount of power for a long time and the PLQ has held this power. The electoral voting chart listed above also demonstrates this. The article states that even the PQ leader Pauline Marois has acknowledged this, “support for the PQ has been eroding since 1994.”113 This decline in support culminated in Quebec’s 2007 election when the PQ had its worst defeat in 34 years. Changfoot and Cullen give three explanations for the reason for the decline in the separatist movement. The

113 Changfoot, Cullen, “Why is Quebec Separatism Off the Agenda”, 769
first explanation states that the new social movements are not putting their energies into sovereignist activism and instead are focusing on other hot topic issues. Thus, “Quebec social movements have shifted their emphasis from a Quebec national project to social justice, addressing poverty, redistribution of wealth and radical democratic politics.”\textsuperscript{114} Thus there is no more room left in the agenda to focus on the separatist issue. The PQ in the late 1990s no longer was a vehicle of social change for the Quebec left and there was a rightward shift. This shift of the PQ “has been that unions and social movements have been focusing their energies within civil society and less on a specific nationalist agenda.”\textsuperscript{115} Another reason that has been said for the decline in separatist support is that the Quebec youth are not very politicized and they do not identify with the separatist movement from the 1980’s and 1990’s. Lastly, another reason for this change in the political agenda is that the demands of Quebecers have been met. The federal Liberal and Conservative parties pay a lot of attention to Quebec, particularly at election time. Canada has acknowledged the fiscal imbalance between federal and provincial governments. A significant amount of money has also been designated to Quebec. Changfoot and Cullen ultimately are making a structural and political economy argument, which essentially makes the case that support for independence, would be irrational and economically counterproductive. The political agenda, which is defined in terms of public opinion support, electoral behavior, and voting patterns, demonstrates that a focus on the separatist movement does not poll well.

Ultimately the primary reason for the decrease in the separatist movement is that the neoliberal state has created cooperation between the federal and Quebec states so enough of Quebec’s demands have been met to demonstrate that federalism still works for Quebec. This transformation of the Canadian state into a neoliberal state began in the mid 1980s. This process

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 770
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 770
is said to have begun with “the signing of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement in 1988. The North American Free Trade Agreement –NAFTA was signed in 1993 and the World Trade Organization -WTO established in 1995.”\(^{116}\) These economic documents created a pattern of global integration, which has promoted free markets while constraining government intervention. The Canadian economic agenda especially since the 1990s has given provinces much more liberty to develop their own social policy and economic development. There is another important factor driving the province building in the 2000s. This has been the reorientation of provincial trade directions in the Canadian economy. Historically, Canada was built on an east–west trading axis. However, with the implementation of the CUFTA in 1988 and later NAFTA in 1993, east–west provincial trade underwent a rearrangement. With the removal of foreign tariffs and the opening of the US–Canada border, provinces were trading increasingly with their southern neighbors. In fact, by 2001, exported more to the US than to their provincial counterparts. The provinces began to have a common agenda, a trade focus outside Canada that gives all provinces a common cause in seeking more policy autonomy from the federal government in order to adopt, adjust, and tailor their policies to enhance their economic prospects in NAFTA economic space. For Quebec, this new federal–provincial context is enough for now to stall the separatist movement. This new partnership between Quebec and Canada is crucial as many Quebecers have “dual allegiances,” to both Quebec separatism and federalism and do not want to have to choose between the two.\(^{117}\) These dual allegiances is also seen in the election survey data from above and demonstrates that Quebecers do not want to have to choose between being a citizen of Canada or Quebec. Thus if Canadian federalism continues its present

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 774
\(^{117}\) Ibid., 782
course under neoliberalism with no major mishaps, this may continue to be an alternative to a separatist agenda.

As Changfoot and Cullen illustrate, the separatist movement is decreasing and part of the reason is that the PQ is losing support gradually. Ultimately, Separatism is off the agenda and Changfoot and Cullen are correct.
Chapter 7: Conclusions-The Future of Separatist Sentiment in Quebec

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the data in order to demonstrate that the passion for the Quebec separatist movement suggests no significant increase or decrease in popular support. The data demonstrates that there are dual identities at work and many Quebecers do not consider themselves simply a member of the province of Quebec but also of the county Canada. Also, for the time being, the separatist movement is off the political agenda.

More surveys and questionnaires are being done recently which demonstrates that today a majority of Quebecers would like to remain in Canada. The article written by Angus Reid Public Opinion in 2012 discovered that the victory of the Parti Quebecois in 2012 had not resulted in a large amount of support for sovereignty in Quebec. The public opinion research found that in the online survey of a representative sample “of 805 adults in Quebec, only a third of respondents would vote Yes in a referendum on whether Quebec should become a country separate from Canada.”\textsuperscript{118} Thus more than half of respondents believe that Quebec should not separate from Canada. Also, when asked about why they believe this, more than one third of respondents stated that Quebec has enough sovereignty and should remain part of Canada, while “28 per cent believe Quebec needs greater sovereignty, but should still remain part of Canada.”\textsuperscript{119} While the PQ took power in 2012 election, they barely secured more votes than the PLQ and did not have a majority on their own. In April 2014 the PQ lost almost half their seats and the PLQ secured more support in the provincial election. Ultimately, the PQ spent their time in office trying to focus on nationalist and language policy, however this did not work. The extremist language

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
policies earned them opposition, not support. Thus the electoral returns data in the previous chapter suggest the separatist movement is off the political agenda.

Furthermore, the reasons for the lack of support for the separatist movement is seen by the dual identity that most Francophones have which is so strong now that they are more content with the status quo regarding the current political set up of the county instead of becoming completely independent of Canada. However, it is also important to note that the temptation of separation to the Quebecers will always be there and as long as Canada provides some type of federalism that grants the Quebec province a large amount of liberty as well as to always acknowledge the Quebec demands in some way, the separatist movement will not become a threatening issue by any means or an issue at all for that matter.
Bibliography


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